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Faal clan meeting house
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and their children
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words in conversation. Also known as ‘kapasan’ 
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on the context of the conversation
Lofor traditional body lotion or perfume
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Pwera brave
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Shon ainang members of a clan
Shon fanuash people of our island
Shon liken outsiders
Shon Maikronesia people of the Federated States of Micronesia
Shon mataw people of the sea, in reference to the people 
of the Mortlocks
Shoon wok rewards given to the great spear after war
Shullapan allik the supreme law or the Constitution
Sofa my father’s clan in Chuuk
Sor my mother’s clan in Chuuk
Sou an expert in a given traditional profession
Sou uro expert historian
Souariras a legendary figure in the Chuuk lagoon
Taek turmeric used for body decoration, especially 
during traditional dances to enhance one’s beauty 
to attract the opposite sex
Titilap stories and legends
Tokkie traditional war stick dances
Toor traditional dress wrapped around the waist
Tukumaun magic potion
Unupwel first harvest of the taro season to honour the 
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Waa canoe
Waa serek sailing canoe
Waitawa communication between the ancestors and the 
living through channelling




The history of the people of the Federated States of Micronesia’s engagement 
with the outside world has been a neglected area of academic scholarship. 
Historians have often treated the topic as a footnote, with Micronesians 
perceived as unseen participants of colonial processes. Consequently, 
Micronesians’ perspectives of their own history have been absent from 
the main corpus of historical literature. Despite the distorted nature of 
imperial history, which portrayed Micronesians as primitive savages and 
unsophisticated people, there is an emerging trend of historical discourse 
contradicting these images.
In this book, I argue that Micronesians have been dealing successfully 
with the outside world since the colonisation period. This argument is 
sustained by examination of oral histories, secondary sources, personal 
experience, interviews and field research to reconstruct how Micronesian 
internal processes continued, rather than succumbed to the different waves 
of colonisation. For example, colonisation did not destroy Micronesian 
cultures and identities. Instead, Micronesians recontextualised the 
changing conditions to suit their own circumstances. Their success 
rested on the indigenous doctrines of adaptation, assimilation and 
accommodation deeply rooted in the kinship doctrine of eaea fengen 
(sharing) and alilis fengen (assisting each other).
Micronesians inhabit an oceanic environment of small islands and 
big seas. This oceanic world necessitated inter-island contact that 
crisscrossed the seas following the web of the expansive ainang 
(clanship) system. An  oceanic  civilisation flourished, rich in maritime 
activities and infrastructure, knowledge and skills of seafaring, warfare, 
canoe technology, fishing techniques and conservation practices that 
perpetuated Micronesian continuity. This oceanic outlook also contained 
effective mechanisms for dealing with a host of unheralded external 
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influences from beyond the horizon, such as China’s emerging influence 
in the Pacific and the impact of climate change on the Federated States 
of Micronesia (FSM).
Micronesians perceived such influences as challenges and opportunities to 
shape and reshape their societies through the processes of accommodation 
and, later, assimilation for the purposes of adapting to the changing 
circumstances brought by the four colonial powers that claimed 
ownership of part or all of what is now the FSM. As colonisation 
intensified, Micronesians began to organise themselves against outsiders’ 
oppression. Reassertion of independence was the main objective. 
The opportunity arose post World War II (WWII) with the beginning of 
decolonisation. The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia was 
formally established for the purpose of defining the modern identity of 
the indigenous people, reasserting and perpetuating Micronesian values 
and future continuity.
Humble Beginning in Understanding 
My History
My journey to write this book has been arduous and challenging. 
It began on my humble island home, Lukunor (also known as Lekinioch),1 
located in the southern region of the state of Chuuk. I learned the uruo 
of my island and its connection to other islands throughout the FSM. 
The history was in oral form and learned from my extended families. 
This experience was reinforced in the classroom in elementary school. 
For example, students were required to draw the geography of our island. 
We were also required to draw details of the villages and location of each 
clan’s community faal (clan meeting house) and provide a narrative of 
inter-clan relationships. We learned traditional war dances called tokkie 
and songs called kolin fonou (indigenous songs) from our region and other 
Micronesian regions. We also learned about leset (fishing) and angangan 
fonou (local agriculture). Elders were invited to our classes during 
social studies to reinforce our knowledge of oral history through stories 
and songs.




Figure 1: Part of my island, Lekinioch, where my humble 
beginning started.
Source: Photograph taken by Bartol Mwarey in 2014.
My high school years were spent on different islands, which connected 
me to my distant relatives dispersed throughout Pohnpei and Chuuk. 
In  contrast, the history I learned in secondary school came from 
textbooks written by foreigners and largely about topics unfamiliar to the 
life experiences of young Micronesians, such as the dawn of European 
civilisation. We also learned about Japanese and American activities in 
Micronesia, which were the main topics in my history classes. Islanders’ 
history was not included. This trend continued during my college years 
in the United States (US). After leaving the US, I continued my studies 
in Australia. I enrolled in a Pacific history program taught by Australian 
academics influenced by the new historical movement, initiated by J. W. 
Davidson at The Australian National University (ANU) in the 1950s. 
In  the program, Pacific Island students were given the opportunity to 
write history from an islander’s perspective. However, Micronesia was 
largely missing from this program due to the lack of Micronesian expertise 
in Australia. I was frustrated about Micronesia being virtually absent from 
the whole curriculum.
I was also exposed to Aboriginal history, including Indigenous Australian 
interpretations of the world and engagement with colonialism. This 
opened up new insights for me. I began to ask questions about the notion 
of  discovery, decolonisation, independence, identity and continuity. 
I was also exposed to the writings of an indigenous Pacific historian, 
Sione Latukefu from Tonga, and a Samoan writer, Albert Wendt, 
who influenced my own intellectual development. There were also 
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non-islander scholars such as Edward Wolfers, Stewart Firth and Caroline 
Ralston who challenged my own indigenous perspective of history. 
Of particular interest was the book The Other Side of the Frontier by an 
Australian historian of European background, Henry Reynolds. Reynolds 
used the book to question the Eurocentric historiography of Australia. 
Reynolds later became one of the chief architects of the watershed case 
of Mabo and Others v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) (the ‘Mabo case’). This 
case overturned the colonial legal fiction of terra nullius2 in Australia for 
the first time since British settlement, and the government of the day 
reluctantly acknowledged Indigenous rights to land.
After my graduation from university, I returned home to teach at the 
College of Micronesia, Pohnpei Campus. I encouraged my students to 
engage in terms of their own local history. I remember my first session in 
Micronesian history, where I posed the simple question, ‘who discovered 
Micronesia?’3 No one said the Micronesians. After challenging them, the 
whole class burst out in laughter and guilt. Most of the students said, 
‘well we all know that Micronesians were here first before the Europeans 
arrived, but according to the textbooks they said Europeans’.4 After 
two weeks of discussions, the students decided to ditch the textbooks 
recommended for the course. They decided to undertake projects writing 
about their own family or local history using oral sources by interviewing 
their surviving elders. They were thrilled when I also took them out to 
undertake fieldwork to see the areas where the ‘Sokehs rebellion’ took 
place and the old Spanish fort in Kolonia, Pohnpei.
After many years of teaching in the classroom, both in Micronesia and 
Australia, I decided to undertake a PhD at ANU under the wing of Pacific 
historian Paul D’Arcy. Not surprisingly, Micronesia by and large was a 
neglected discipline of study at ANU. D’Arcy kept the subject alive, 
having conducted research on the islands over a long period of time. 
2  Terra nullius was a doctrine, and later a component of international law, that the colonial powers 
used to acquire new territories overseas. It entailed that if a territory did not show any signs of 
agricultural production as perceived by the Europeans, then the first European discoverer could claim 
the territory on behalf of the colonial power they represented (Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (5th edition), Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 173–174).
3  My questions to my students were intended to provoke their awareness and focus on island 
history. I posed questions such as ‘Who discovered Micronesia?’, ‘Who owns history?’ and ‘Is history 
written or oral?’ These questions led to the students’ decision to forgo the textbooks and concentrate 
on undertaking a personal project about the history of their local communities.




He exposed me to the rigorous challenges of being an indigenous historian 
in academia. I was forced to think deeply about Micronesian history and 
its placement in academia.
My global experiences have enriched me intellectually while I have 
continued to explore my identity as a Micronesian. I have learned that, 
while oral and written history are often contradictory, in many respects 
they are also complementary. Micronesians used their own devices 
through traditional networks5 to shield themselves and their knowledge 
and history, both intellectually and socially, until opportunities arose 
to reassert their voices.6 I will therefore speak of my own uruo and how 
it can contribute to the enrichment of the historical dialogue between 
Micronesians and non-Micronesians.
I have long wondered what it would be like writing history based on oral 
discourses7 versus the academic traditions of the West. Could I somehow 
marry the two? And what sort of historical theories could I work from to 
lay the groundwork for my personal thesis about Micronesian perspectives 
of history?8 How would I integrate archival work into my thesis since 
Micronesians’ main forms of communication and engagement with each 
other are oral? Would my personal experience as a Micronesian, data 
collected from my fieldwork and secondary sources satisfy academic 
requirements to write a Micronesian perspective of history? After spending 
some time pondering these issues, I decided to write this book following 
5  The clanship network system continued to connect Micronesians during the colonisation period 
and remained so during the decolonisation period to create a nation for Micronesians called ‘the 
Federated States of Micronesia’. See The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble; 
Glenn Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies: Adaptation, Integration and Political Organisation, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, Hawai‘i, 2009, p. 23.
6  Glenn Petersen, ‘Strategic Location and Sovereignty: Modern Micronesia in the Historical 
Context of American Expansionism’, Space and Polity, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1998, pp. 200–201.
7  Micronesian history predominately takes an oral form. It has its own internal logic and can 
be used to determine what the ‘truth is’. There are processes by which evidence can be produced to 
substantiate the truth. For example, language format and concepts used by orators called itang are 
used to test one’s knowledge of historical events. Misstating traditional views of itang could bring 
shame to the narrators of history; that is, inventing one’s position in history could cause conflict 
between opposing clans as historical truths determine one’s standing and prestige in the community.
8  Micronesian historical theories are often left to highly knowledgeable clan historians to prove 
or disprove (Lin Poyer, ‘The Ngatik Massacre: Documentary and Oral Traditional Accounts’, Journal 
of Pacific History, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2003, pp. 4–22). For commentaries and detailed analysis of Pacific 
history, see Paul D’Arcy, ‘Introduction’, in The Pacific World: Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific, 
1500-1900. Vol. 3, Peoples of the Pacific: The History of Oceania to 1870, edited by Paul D’Arcy, 
Ashgate Variorum, Burlington, VT, USA, 2008, pp. ix–xiv.
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the Western traditions but to frame it within a Micronesian perspective.9 
I decided to use a combination of thematic, linear and chronological 
approaches to document Micronesian perspectives of history. That is, to 
investigate the written history of Micronesia and, where necessary, insert 
Micronesian perspectives into the growing corpus of knowledge in the 
field. Many scholars I met along the way warned me about the huge pitfalls 
I would encounter and the likelihood of distorting the FSM’s history in 
the process. Some advised me to take an easier approach by narrowing 
my topic to a more manageable one or fewer islands. However, as already 
noted in discussing my own history, regional visions and connections are 
fundamental to being Micronesian and understanding our history.
Naturally, I understood their reticence about my approach and 
appreciated their concern. However, many also encouraged me not to be 
distracted as my work could set the stage and encourage future indigenous 
scholars to write more about the Micronesian perspective of history at the 
regional level—something long overdue. I decided to use the Micronesian 
Constitution as my guiding star. The Constitution is my reference point 
to start my own personal journey as a Micronesian into the sea of the 
indigenous past in order to understand the present for the purpose of 
engaging the future. I chose the Constitution because it is a collection 
of narratives by the contemporary Micronesian leadership who framed 
the nation in the images of the islands’ past to ensure a prosperous future 
outlook for shon Maikronesia (Micronesians).
My decision to use the Constitution as a guiding star rests much with my 
background in law. My decision to become a lawyer while growing up 
in the Mortlocks was deliberate. I realised that the law could be used as 
a protective shield for islanders to preserve and control their future. During 
the campaign for Micronesian independence, for example, it became very 
clear that the proposed Constitution would empower Micronesians to 
govern themselves and forge relations internationally based on their own 
understanding of who they were historically. The birth of the Constitution 
9  What is ‘perspective’? It is debated among scholars whether the term ‘perspective’ debases 
Micronesian history in academia as it is seen by some academics as tokenism. It is claimed that 
perspective allows indigenous scholars to express their point of views, yet it is not considered part 
of mainstream history as practiced at the academic level (Vincent Diaz, pers. comm., at Weaving 
the Threads of Indigenous Knowledges: Te Whare Kura Symposium, The University of Auckland: 
Faculty of Arts, 21 June 2013). See problems of indigenous research in academia in Linda T. Smith, 
Decolonising Methodologies, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2001, pp. 1–3.
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of the Federated States of Micronesia emancipated Micronesians from 
colonisation and allowed their entry into the United Nations (UN) as 
a sovereign state.
As this book is the reflection of the past on Micronesia today, each chapter 
discusses the interaction between these themes as being fundamental to 
the Micronesian perspective of history, and as influential factors in the 
type of engagement possible with the outside world. Micronesians are 
armed with their own local strategies to facilitate the changing historical 
circumstances brought about by colonisation and globalisation. Local 
adaptation involves the process of cultural refinement through successive 
generations to ensure the maintenance of Micronesian identity and 
continuity.
This book is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with pre-
colonial Micronesian society and how Micronesians organised themselves 
by utilising the traditional infrastructure for the purposes of maintaining 
their indigenous interactions, giving rise to their identity and thus 
continuity.
Chapter 2 deals with the various Micronesian identities and how they 
played a crucial role in their engagement during the contact period 
in defining who they were historically. It demonstrates the extent of 
Micronesians’ desire to be in control of their own destiny in the modern 
world in order to perpetuate their continuity. The principle of ‘diversity 
in unity’ reveals the depth and success of multiculturalism between the 
constituent groups that predated the external powers and continues into 
modern times.
Chapter 3 compares and contrasts Micronesian engagement with 
the outside world from 1521 to 1979. This is the era of Micronesian 
interaction with colonial powers—Spain, Germany, Japan and the US. 
Micronesian terms of engagement with these colonisers depended on the 
application of their intellectual history to manage outside influences to suit 
Micronesian contexts. Micronesians’ historical knowledge of adaptation 
were used to safeguard indigenous interests despite the unequal power 
relations between the colonisers and the colonised. The main emphasis of 
this chapter is on the effective management of the four colonising powers 
by Micronesians to suit their own purposes.
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Chapter 4 focuses on Micronesia’s move towards constitutional 
independence in 1979 and the aftermath. Issues such as the rejection of 
the US’s offer for Micronesians to integrate into the US political system 
are highlighted. The reasons for the creation of a constitution to advance 
Micronesian interests against those of the US will also be addressed. This 
chapter also deals with the Compact of Free Association as a forerunner 
to full independence. The Compact allowed Micronesia time to organise 
itself politically and economically. After 2023, financial assistance under 
the Compact will diminish substantially.
Chapter 5 discusses the Micronesian Constitution as the organising 
framework for the reproduction of Micronesian continuity as islanders 
adapt to the changing world. The Micronesian identity is embedded in 
the Constitution, which perpetuates the idea of Micronesians as a distinct 
group of people who share a common history. This identity is analysed 
in relation to the past, present and future. Micronesians are conscious 
of their past and strive to preserve that heritage for future generations. 
That heritage must therefore be protected at all costs. The Constitution 
is central to the preservation and maintenance of multiple identities 
while simultaneously superimposing a single Micronesian identity. The 
Constitution is a living document that speaks to the past and organises 
the present for the betterment of the future. Principally, it established and 
strengthened Micronesian institutions to deny further external usurpation 
of Micronesian independence as enshrined under international legal 
instruments.
Chapter 6 analyses Micronesian engagement with both China and the 
US in Micronesia’s jurisdictional space and the international arena. 
The interaction between the two superpowers is part of the long history 
of colonial rivalry in the northwest Pacific. Although China is not seen 
as a colonial power, the implication is that the US is treating China as 
such because China is seen by the US as a rival. The competition is about 
winning influence in Micronesia and thereby gaining a strategic and 
economic foothold in the region.
Chapter 7 deals with climate change and its consequences in the FSM. 
Like colonisation, climate change is a new phenomenon emanating 
from external forces, in this case, industrial pollution by the world’s 
major economic powers. The consequences of this industrial negligence 
are now confronting the security of the FSM in terms of its customs, 
identity, health, food production, emigration and sovereignty. The FSM 
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is constantly exploring ways to maintain itself despite this new threat. 
Climate change is a top priority for the national agenda and will affect the 
FSM’s future engagement with the outside world.
Chapter 8 investigates and speculates on future challenges facing the 
FSM. They include the Compact, climate change, the Constitution, 
leadership and foreign affairs. These issues are discussed in light of the 
political conversation between the three levels of government and how 
this conversation will assist the country’s move towards the future. 
The above challenges will shape the FSM’s future policies and diplomatic 
engagement with the external world as well as its present integrity. It will 
be argued that Micronesians should solve their internal problems as best 
they can by way of learning from the lessons of history; that is, the best 
method to resolve arising issues is by returning to their knowledge of 
history as it is at the heart of preserving Micronesian culture and identity. 





Writing Micronesian  
History
Setting the Context
This book examines how shon Maikronesia (Micronesians)1 have 
dealt with  and controlled varied past and present external influences, 
from colonial powers to modern economic forces, and environmental 
influences from typhoons to climate change. It is one of the first written 
post-colonial Micronesian beliefs and perspectives of uruo (history). 
These perspectives are enshrined in the Preamble2 to the Constitution 
of the Federated States of  Micronesia. The Constitution represents a 
Micronesian-centred outlook  and reassertion of Micronesian heritage 
and independence.3 This book reflects the author’s upbringing, cultural 
roots and national and global identity. It traverses the space between 
local history and identity—as epitomised by the writer’s Lekiniochian–
Namoi4 identity, national, post-colonial consciousness and international 
1  Shon Maikronesia refers to the indigenous people of the modern state of the FSM. All indigenous 
terms in this thesis are in Mortlockese–Chuukese, with terms in other Micronesian languages 
indicated as such.
2  The Preamble of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia underscores a brief historical 
statement of the Micronesian people in terms of their past, present and future. See the Constitution of 
the Federated States of Micronesia, fsmlaw.org/fsm/constitution/index.htm.
3  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia is framed in accordance with Micronesian 
values and perspective of the world.
4  Lekiniochian–Namoi is a combined local and regional identity in reference to the island of 
Lekinioch, situated in the region of Namoi (now the Mortlocks) in the state of Chuuk, the FSM.
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engagement as a  scholar enmeshed in wider global historiography—to 
record in print a Micronesian perspective of history, which is absent from 
much of the literature.5
The history of Micronesians’ engagement with the outside world remains 
an understudied area of academic scholarship. Most historians who have 
studied the Pacific Islands, and thus Micronesia’s past, emphasise the 
history of outsiders’ activities in the islands. As historian Paul D’Arcy 
observed:
historians have been more focused on instances of rapid change 
… emphasising Western influences. Not surprisingly they often 
reproduced the same historical views as the main reasons behind 
the transformation of islander communities … indigenous 
relations with Europeans receive the lion’s share of attention, while 
ongoing and new interactions between local communities tend to 
be neglected.6
Like D’Arcy, anthropologist Mac Marshall highlights the continuous 
inter-island connections throughout history in reference to the indigenous 
people of the Mortlocks region, which also resonates throughout 
Micronesia. As Marshall observed, ‘long before … external control was 
imposed, people of (the Mortlocks) maintained contact with communities 
on numerous other islands via sailing canoe voyages using sophisticated 
celestial navigation techniques’.7 Marshall’s comments counter the corpus 
of literature that ignored Micronesians’ perspective of history; that 
is, Micronesians were active participants in the production of colonial 
history. Indeed, Micronesians continue to interact with each other today 
just like in the past. However, they are expanding their diaspora to far 
distant lands like the US, Japan and Australia to internationalise their 
identity in a globalised world.
5  I was born on a low-lying atoll, Lekinioch, and have lived in the US and Australia for many 
years. This has formed my deep and profound opinion and appreciation of indigenous history as 
contrasted with that of the colonial powers.
6  Paul D’Arcy, The People of the Sea: Environment, Identity, and History of Oceania, University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2006, p. 2.
7  Mac Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef: The Transformation of a Micronesian Community, 
Westview Press, USA, 2008, p. 3; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 2.
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Figure 2: Map of Lukunor atoll.
Note: Oneop is an inhabited island that shares the same lagoon. There is a deep historical 
relationship between the two islands through the clanship system.
Source: Map produced by ANU CartoGIS.
Historian David Hanlon strongly advocates for the incorporation of 
Micronesian perspectives that have been missing from historical accounts 
for too long. This is to ensure that Micronesian voices become an enriching 
component of historical discourses.8 He notes that Micronesians did not 
passively accept outside influence; they selected, incorporated and then 
manipulated what the outsiders had to offer to suit their circumstances.9 
This destroys the mainstream colonial accounts that Micronesians were 
on the periphery of history. To this end, the three cited scholars advocate 
for the inclusion of more Micronesian perspectives in the existing 
body of Pacific history to enhance the depth of the literature, which is 
currently limited by the amount of time scholars are able to spend in the 
8  David Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers? American Anthropology’s History in Micronesia’, in 
American Anthropology in Micronesia: An Assessment, edited by Robert C. Kiste and Mac Marshall, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999, p. 77.
9  Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, p. 77.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
14
field or archives. I seek to expand the partial truths that have emerged 
by presenting a more comprehensive perspective and timeframes more 
reflective of Micronesian experiences.
Four interrelated themes are used to construct this more comprehensive 
and integrated perspective of indigenous history: the law, religion, 
social organisation and the environment. These interrelated spheres of 
Micronesian actions and conceptualisation of the world in turn raise 
four major questions central to Micronesia’s historical processes: 1) who 
do shon Maikronesia identify as the people of Micronesia, 2) how do 
Micronesians organise their socio-political affairs as a people, 3) what 
devices have Micronesians adopted to preserve their customs and identity, 
and 4) to what extent have Micronesians controlled the past and present 
for the purpose of future continuity? 
Micronesianising Historiography
Uruo is perceived by those in the Mortlocks as existing in a dynamic model 
akin to an intricate spider web, dissimilar to Western historiography, 
which follows a linear model. For instance, the sou uruo, depending on 
the question at hand, has to choose a particular event in the web to begin 
his oral narrative. He then connects the event to other series of events 
surrounding the question, bearing in mind the purpose of his narrative 
in seeking ‘the truth’ while his audience of other sou uruo are ready to 
validate the narrator’s historical account.10 It is like travelling on the sea 
where the palou is surrounded by a constellation of stars in the universe. 
The navigator picks a particular star as a reference point at the outset of 
his journey. He then relates that star to other stars during the journey 
to reach his specific destination while being mindful of the subtleties of 
the waves, currents and wind, as well as observing his relationship with 
his crew to ensure a successful voyage.11 The voyaging palou would be 
judged by other palou upon reaching the final destination—on whether 
he arrived in good order, became lost or showed up late, for instance.
10  During my fieldwork, I asked for specific dates for certain recent events. The interviewees said 
that they did not know the dates but remembered that someone died when the event occurred. This 
is the association of events, rather than the chronological ordering of events as usually practiced in 
Western historical discourses.
11  Destination is not so much where one ends the journey but the various points of the journey. 
An inter-island journey, like history, is circular and never stops completely at one particular point.
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Like the navigator, my challenge is where to start to write about 
Micronesian history, since it is a vast area consisting of many local clans 
and thus histories. Naturally, the best position to start writing the history 
of the FSM is from my own personal experience; that is, the history of my 
clan and its relationship with other clans in the FSM diaspora.12 The next 
step is consulting the corpus of literature to locate specific events to impart 
a sense of chronology to it. Most of the time-sensitive events are absent 
from the literature or only mentioned in passing. The war between Ettal 
and Lukunor, for example, which significantly influenced the history of 
the Lower Mortlocks, has not been discussed widely in the literature. 
Due to the dearth of information relating to events of significance to the 
indigenous community, I resorted to researching descriptive history in 
an attempt to follow the historical patterns that existed in the sources, 
while at the same time using my own sources gathered in the field, such 
as interviews and oral history for historical cross-analysis or references. 
I hope to provide a historical framework that invites future indigenous 
scholars to build on its foundation.
The inner core of Micronesian history is sacred. It requires painstaking 
attention to detail and is a delicate undertaking as it has its own 
maniman.13 History should only be conveyed with respect and salutation 
to adhere to its inner principles. If one failed to honour this process, 
the ancestors would curse the narrator (in one form or another) for 
not adhering to the sacredness of the past. In the deep tradition of my 
Mortlockese–Chuukese–Micronesian ancestral past, it is customary for 
sou uruo (historians) to initiate their kapasan uruo (historical narratives) 
with the customary wisdom of ‘tiro womi monson amusala ren ai lamelam 
tekia ren ia tolong lan kapasan uruo’ (‘let me pay my humble respect to 
all historians for intruding into the subject of history’). This conveys 
deep humbleness, humility and respect for other historians both past 
and present. This is followed by an introductory remark, ‘kapasan lon 
manimanen uruo’ (‘within the spirit of history’), intended to invoke the 
past and also provoke the attention of the audience. This is also for 
the purpose of inviting the past into the present. This acknowledgement 
12  Due to the volume and richness of its past, I cannot include the entire history of my clan diaspora.
13  Maniman, from a Mortlockese point of view, is a form of spiritual power. It can be used to 
either destroy or save a person, depending on the context of a given situation. This term is also used 
by Pohnpeians but with a different spelling. See Rufino Mauricio, ‘Ideological Bases for Power and 
Leadership on Pohnpei, Micronesia: Perspectives from Archaeology and Oral History’, PhD thesis, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1993, p. 126; Glenn Petersen, ‘Kanaegamah and Pohnpei’s 
Politics of Concealment’, American Anthropological Association, Vol. 95, No. 2, 1993, p. 341.
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of the omnipresence of the past in contemporary discourses conveys the 
continuity in oral history. The narrator seeks the blessings of respected 
historians to protect the narrator should he misstate a particular historical 
event. So, in following the footsteps of my Micronesian heritage, let me 
also convey my own ‘tirowomi sou uruo monson’ from both the distant past 
and the present.
Historical themes and concepts are essential elements of history production 
as they have specific meanings and application in connection to historical 
events and contexts. Their meanings need to be understood for the 
purposes of facilitating and validating historical processes across time 
and space. They are also used to identify genuine historians from non-
historians. Historical truths are measured in terms of the usage of specific 
languages and concepts known only to a selective group of historians. 
These historians can then determine the narrators’ intention when 
speaking of history, especially in community settings. For example, in the 
Mortlocks, and many islands beyond, historians used specific concepts to 
test the knowledge of those who claimed/claim to know history without 
question. The exchange usually takes place during inter-island meetings, 
where itangs (orators) are also involved in contesting their knowledge of 
history in a different form of language known only to them. History to 
the itang is about validating one’s legitimate right and control of resources 
locally or within the clan diaspora. Many of the traditional concepts 
embodied in this book have special meanings.14
It is no accident that the conservation of the environment for survival 
purposes is reinforced by the traditional religious practices and historical 
social ordering of the islands as embodied in the Constitution of the 
Federated States of Micronesia. These practices are designed to connect 
the clanship system and strengthen relationships between different clans. 
It will be argued throughout this book that historical continuities of 
cultural coherence and flexibility in the face of external challenges lie at 
the heart of modern Micronesian identity. They are apparent throughout 
Micronesia’s long history of adjusting to seemingly overwhelming external 
forces, both human and environmental. In this context, Micronesians do 
not perceive themselves as victims of imposed external forces in reference 
to, for example, colonisation, Christianisation and globalisation. Instead, 
14  Traditional concepts are often difficult to translate into English as they have specific meanings 
and application. This book translates concepts into their closest English equivalents, with additional 
explanation provided where necessary.
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they perceive themselves as challengers of these potential threats who 
draw strength from lessons from the past for continuity purposes. 
For example, during my field study, I interviewed many government 
officials and academics whose goal was to develop the economic system 
in light of its Micronesian cultures, history and geographical realities.15 
The  notion that Micronesians should emulate the economic models 
of the developed world, especially those practised in the US, is to live in 
an unrealistic world that defies Micronesian traditions and relationships. 
Many former presidents of the FSM were keen advocators of developing 
the Micronesian economy in the nation’s own image.16
History as Dynamic and Trends
Historically, Micronesians have proven to be a skilful and knowledgeable 
people who have managed their relationships with each other and their 
environment to sustain their identity.17 They are active agents in  the 
production and reproduction of their own history.18 For instance, 
the FSM’s Constitution speaks of local agencies as always being active 
throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods. Drafted by community 
representatives from across the FSM, the Constitution represents the most 
comprehensive statement of Micronesian history, identity and survival 
to date.19
Micronesian history, like its seas, is fluid, dynamically subtle and inherently 
complex, with its own undercurrents. Deep human relations and the 
oceanic environment are the essence of historical narratives; they embody 
15  Mariena Dereas, Interview, College of Micronesia, National Campus, Palikir, 20 January 2011; 
John Haglelgam, Interview, College of Micronesia, Palikir, 11 January 2011; Peter Sitan, Interview, 
Kolonia, 27 January 2011.
16  Tereas, Interview; Haglelgam, Interview; Sitan, Interview; Josh Levy, ‘Micronesian Nationalism 
Revisited: Reclaiming Nationalism for the Federated States of Micronesia’, Paper delivered at Native 
American and Indigenous Studies Association, Uncasville, Connecticut, 5 June 2012, pp. 1–9; David 
Hanlon, Making Micronesia: A Political Biography of Tosiwo Nakayama, University of Hawai‘i Press, 
2014, pp. 4–5.
17  Christopher Lobban and Maria Schefter, Tropical Pacific Island Environments, University of 
Guam Press, USA, 1997, pp. 269–271, 288–294; William Alkire, ‘Cultural Ecology and Ecological 
Anthropology in Micronesia’, in American Anthropology: An Assessment, edited by Robert C. Kiste and 
Mac Marshall, University of Hawai‘i Press, pp. 81–102.
18  David Chappell, ‘The Post-Contact Period’, in The Pacific Islands: Environment and Society 
(revised edition), edited by Moshe Rapaport, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013, pp. 144–145.
19  Paul D’Arcy, ‘Cultural Divisions and Island Environments since the Time of Dumont d’Urville’, 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 38, No. 2, October 2003, pp. 217–236; David Hanlon, ‘Micronesia: 
Writing and Rewriting the Histories of a Nonentity’, Pacific Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, March 1989, p. 15.
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the Micronesian history of continuity. This book adopts the Micronesian 
perspective of uruo to balance the misrepresentations and inaccurate 
images of Micronesians that have been manufactured, reproduced and 
transported in time and space by shon liken.
The genesis of Micronesia’s historiography began with the arrival of 
Portuguese and Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century. The treatment 
and portrayals of Micronesians in the early literature focused largely on 
the types of responses exhibited by Micronesians to outsiders. Dumont de 
D’Urville, Captain Arellano and Andrew Cheyne, for instance, referred to 
the Chuukese as a violent and treacherous lot, the Pohnpeians as unfriendly 
and the Mortlockese as hospitable and considerate.20 In Ulithi, Joao de 
Barros, a Portuguese historian, observed the indigenous people to be of 
simple rationality and still in ‘the simplicity of the first age’.21 The distorted 
images of shon Maikronesia continued to appear in subsequent literature 
by a host of scholars such as ethnographers, archaeologists, legal writers, 
economists and journalists. Literature on Micronesia is often compared 
unfavourably to Polynesia and Melanesia to conjure up the image of tiny 
islands with weak social structures. Like ‘a handful of chickpeas flung 
over the sea’,22 the images of the micro-islands connote disconnection, 
isolation and deprivation. The micro-islands were imagined as a place 
lacking in the essential resources sought by the outside world.
The proponents of this perception are many. They include anthropologists 
William Alkire,23 Ward Goodenough24 and Sherwood Lingenfelter,25 
who described Micronesia as small islands suffering from isolation and 
poor soil, and depending heavily on rain to provide a subsistence life.26 
Francis Hezel, although often displaying great empathy for contemporary 
Micronesians and portraying them favourably, expounded on this 
description by reducing earlier generations of Micronesians to the lower 
20  Mac Marshall, The Weekend Warrior: Alcohol in a Micronesian Culture, Mayfield Publishing 
Company, Palo Alto, California, 1979, p. 38; Francis X. Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization: 
A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 1521-1885, University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 1983, pp. 23, 90–91.
21  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, p. 12.
22  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, p. xi; Mauricio, ‘Ideological Bases for Power’, p. 240.
23  William Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia (2nd edition), University 
of Victoria, British Columbia, 1977, p. 44.
24  Ward Goodenough, Under Heaven’s Brow: Pre-Christian Religious Tradition in Chuuk, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 2002, p. 29.
25  Sherwood Lingenfelter, Yap: Political Leadership and Culture Change in an Island Society, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1975, p. 7.
26  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, p. 44.
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end of the scale of human civilisation. He referred to Micronesians as 
‘simply living on fish and taro or breadfruit, [wearing] their traditional 
dress … and [carrying] on long-distance canoe voyages for which their 
islands were famous’.27 The attendant question is, who is to say that 
living in an oceanic environment with its own challenges is ‘simpler’ than 
living on dry, industrialised, continental land with mammoth politico-
economic problems.28 Images of Micronesia are dictated by the eyes of the 
observer, and their cultural baggage determines both what they see and 
fail to see. In portraying Micronesians as being simple people living on the 
margins of civilisation, outsiders ignore a deep and intricate lore designed 
to enable people to live in harmony with nature and a complex system 
of social organisation that developed to provide inter-island links. For 
example, in the case of a natural disaster such as a typhoon, a sophisticated 
organisation was needed to support a seafaring culture where many men 
were away for long periods. Similarly, supporting technically complex 
enterprises like canoe building and seafaring required deep knowledge 
and group involvement. European powers are assessed as organised and 
efficient by the degree to which they could mobilise their societies to put 
fleets to sea in the service of national enterprises. However, smaller Pacific 
societies that maintained the infrastructure to put their entire population 
to sea in seaworthy sailing canoes at short notice with far less resources to 
call on are depicted as living on the margins of subsistence.
Like elsewhere in the Pacific, many contemporary scholars have 
inadvertently perpetuated negative images of Micronesia as a resource-
poor nation suffering from remoteness and isolation, political corruption, 
dependency29 and an uninvestable environment due to its anti-foreign 
Constitution.30 As political scientist Meller stated: ‘Micronesia has 
limited living space and paucity of resources contributed to a subsistence 
closely bounded by the vicissitudes of nature and the ravages of human 
enemies’. According to Meller, it was ‘goods produced elsewhere which 
freed [Micronesians] from the day to day dependence on the vagaries of 
27  Francis X. Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures: A Half Century of Social Change in 
Micronesia, University of Hawai‘i, 2001, p. 7.
28  Epeli Hau‘ofa, We Are the Ocean: Selected Works, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008, pp. 30–31.
29  Francis X. Hezel, ‘Micronesian Governments: A View From Outside’, Micronesian Counselor, 
No. 55, April 2005.
30  Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article VIII, Sections 4–5.
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nature’.31 Fuelling this image, human geographer John Connell observed 
that nowhere else in the Pacific is the gulf between image and reality as 
great as it is in Micronesia:32
Micronesia’s image has become tarnished by a unique form  of 
trustee military colonialism, an unusually dependent form 
of development, and limited prospects of achieving any degree of 
economic, and political independence, despite the signing of the 
Compact of Free Association. In a century, this strategically 
important region has gone from subsistence to subsidy.33
Connell’s comments do not represent the realities of contemporary 
Micronesia; on the islands far from the political centres, traditional 
lifestyles largely untouched by American subsidies and funds remain 
the norm.
This book counters Connell’s observation of externally imposed 
dependency by arguing that the current political arrangement between 
the FSM and US stems from Micronesian initiatives based on historical 
lessons to respond to contemporary international affairs on their own 
terms—that is, the US sought what it desired (military denial) in exchange 
for what the Micronesians demanded (to pay for that interest). Connell 
exemplifies the deep-seated, economically deterministic mentality of 
many contemporary commentators on the Pacific by interpreting this 
arrangement as being externally imposed, rather than a political stratagem. 
This is a shortcoming of contemporary evaluations of Micronesia: the 
assumption that the indigenous community holds the same worldview 
and political objectives as the commentator. This mentality ignores the 
roots of social and economic realities in Micronesia.34 As will be argued in 
later chapters, these criticisms reflect externally imposed processes rather 
than inherent problems and solutions within Micronesian society.
The Compact is widely seen as the vehicle for Micronesians to access 
the US’s employment market. The Compact should be more correctly 
seen as a lease between a landlord and tenant. The Compact monies are 
31  Norman Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, The Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham 
Young University, Hawai‘i, 1985, Part 1, The Setting.
32  Gonzaga Puas, ‘Federated States of Micronesia Still a Colony’, Pacific Daily News, 15 January 
2000, p. 19.
33  Puas, ‘Micronesia Still a Colony’, p. 19.
34  Many foreign observers continue to view the FSM as too dependent on the US. The question is, 
how does one define dependency from a Micronesian perspective? There is no literature on this topic. 
See Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, pp. 53–54.
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synonymous with rent, and so the money may be spent the way the FSM 
desires. It is not up to outside observers to dictate the type of economic 
activities Micronesians should pursue, as has been attempted by American 
officials at various times during the Compact era.
Writing at a time before the move towards independence gathered force, 
political scientist Roger Gale contradicted the negative assessments 
of Meller  and Connell. He stated that there are islands in Micronesia 
(e.g. Pohnpei and Kosrae) that are ‘lush and verdant’35 and provide sufficient 
food crops for the islanders. Moreover, to Micronesians, the soil is viewed 
as very rich, as it has sustained islanders for millennia. Surpluses are shared 
between villages and neighbouring islands. Trade is also common between 
islands. The size of the islands taught the inhabitants about conservation 
techniques and fostered an appreciation of their environment. Moreover, 
‘smallness’ is a relative term and has its own advantages. For example, the 
micro-islands may have discouraged outsiders to settle permanently, thus 
reducing the disruption to lives that often follows and denying the negative 
forces and elements of the global economy that have disrupted local 
lives elsewhere, such as around large mining sites. Today, Micronesians 
continue to carry on their traditional life with manageable interruptions 
from the outside world. The redesignation of Micronesia’s past territorial 
sea, which now forms its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), also speaks for 
itself. Micronesia’s territory now dwarfs many continental nations. As in 
the past, Micronesians continue to perceive the sea as an extension of the 
land itself. The outside world is starting to appreciate this fact; it puts the 
concept of smallness in a different context. Outsiders are now fixated with 
the potential economic wealth in the FSM’s EEZ.36 Pacific Island leaders 
are now consistently depicting themselves as big ocean nations rather than 
small island nations, as will be outlined in Chapter 6.
The Micronesian perception of the land–sea continuum has not been well 
understood by outsiders. This point is illustrated by former US Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger’s response to questions about the ethics of nuclear 
testing in inhabited zones of the western Pacific without local consent 
35  Roger Gale, Americanization of Micronesia: A Study of the Consolidation of US Rule in the Pacific, 
University Press of America, Washington, DC, 1979, p. 7.
36  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 170–171; Peter Sitan, ‘The Development of the Tuna Fisheries 
in the Federated States of Micronesia’, Unpublished paper presented at the Micronesian Symposium, 
The Australian National University, 27–28 April 2014, pp. 3–6.
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being sought: ‘who gives a damn there are only 90,000 people out there’.37 
Kissinger’s condemnation of Micronesians and their islands reaffirmed 
outsiders’ ignorance of the enormity of the size of the islands’ resource 
base when including the sea, let alone the ethical issue of deciding that 
others should suffer nuclear testing supposedly for the ‘good of humanity’ 
and to preserve world peace, regardless of whether they consented or not.
Kissinger spoke his mind from a continental perspective. It had no bearing 
on islanders’ perspective of their oceanic world and their place in history. 
Micronesia might then be more accurately described as ‘Macronesia’, as 
Hanlon once noted.38 Perhaps the context is Micronesia’s 107,000 citizens 
who share a sovereign territory of 1.3 million square miles of land and 
sea.39 While the sea served as a unifying force for Micronesians, outsiders 
considered it an obstacle for the area’s effective management. Outsiders 
perceived the sea as separating the islands rather than connecting them.40
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) are no wiser in adopting the negative line predicting economic 
doom for Micronesia. For example, the IMF predicted that:
the economy faces important risks … from a potential deterioration 
in the external environment and, over the longer term, the 
scheduled expiration of Compact grants and the continued 
outmigration of the working age population.41
37  Bethwel Henry, Interview, 28 June 2012. See also David Hanlon, ‘You Did What, Mr. President!? 
Trying to Write a Biography of Tosiwo’, in Telling Pacific Lives: Prisms of Process Nakayama edited by 
Brij V. Lal and Vicki Luker, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2008.
38  David Hanlon, ‘Tosiwo Nakayama’, paper presented in Tokyo, 2011, p. 2.
39  Sitan, ‘The Development of the Tuna Fisheries’, p. 3.
40  Epeli Hau‘ofa, The Ocean in Us, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998, p. 38; The Constitution of the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 144–146.
41  International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with 
Federated States of Micronesia Asia and Pacific Department, 17 January 2013; International Monetary 
Fund, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM): 2012 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of 
the IMF November 19, 2012, www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs111912; 
Asian Development Bank, Federated States of Micronesia: Strengthening: Infrastructure Planning and 
Implementation (Financed by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction) (ADB Technical Assistance Report, 
Project Number: 44471), November 2011, p. 4, www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/ 
60497/44471-012-fsm-tar.pdf; Sione Latukefu, ‘Oral Traditions: An Appraisal of Their Value 
in Historical Research in Tonga’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1968, pp. 41–42; Paul 
D’Arcy, ‘The Role That Myths and Oral Traditions Should Play in the Study of Micronesian History’, 
University of Hawai‘i, 1986, p. 6 (Unpublished paper).
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Many observers echoed the IMF’s concern. The president of the FSM 
sought assistance from the ADB and other international organisations 
to pre-empt the negative economic outlook. However, the irony is that 
the ADB has patchy records about the economic history of the FSM 
as its data are largely based on ‘fly in, fly out’ consultants who remain 
briefly in the FSM before returning to Manila to write their reports 
and recommendations. For example, in the 2011 ADB report regarding 
technical assistance to the FSM, ADB consultants were each allocated two 
to three months in the FSM to complete their assignments.42 The report 
did not deal with indigenous perspectives of their unique economic 
circumstances but focused on what the ADB believed was the way 
forward economically. The sea was not treated as an asset by the report 
either. It failed to note the importance of the sea and the increase in the 
FSM’s income from the fishing industry. For example, the value of tuna 
in FSM fisheries in 2008 was estimated at US$41,818,486 compared to 
US$92,496,175 in 2012.43 The industry is expected to grow further in 
the years ahead.
Many consultants do not understand Micronesians’ current 
circumstances,  let alone the depth of their history. Demonstrative of 
this point, Hezel claimed that the emergence of the cash economy has 
altered the fabric of Micronesian families ‘almost beyond recognition 
during the last few decades’.44 The reality is somewhat different. Money 
has been incorporated into the island system as another commodity 
circulating within the extended family model of alilis and eaea fengan, as 
Marshall diligently puts it.45 Micronesians have not been overwhelmed by 
global economic forces but, rather, have incorporated these into existing 
mechanisms that have proven their worth over millennia. A few days in 
any location makes it clear that the doctrine of alilis fengen and the ainang 
system continue to operate and provide stability and support for clan 
members. In a different context, the informal economy model practised 
by Micronesians has never been discussed in any literature; outsiders 
fail to understand this model as it is hard to quantify in terms they are 
used to. They prefer to concentrate only on what is familiar to them.
42  Asian Development Bank, Federated States of Micronesia, p. 4.
43  Sitan, ‘The Development of the Tuna Fisheries’, p. 21.
44  Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures, p. 8.
45  Keith Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity and Alliance on Namoluk Atoll’, PhD thesis, 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 1972, p. 62.
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Micronesian Perspective of History
My upbringing and fieldwork have alerted me to the large corpus of oral 
history absent from most external commentaries on FSM societies. Only 
a fraction has been revealed to Western researchers, and much of that 
has been assessed in variable ways.46 A holistic approach is required for 
improving our understanding of Micronesians’ perspectives of history. 
The increasing presence of Micronesian perspectives in published 
histories requires that oral history must play a greater role in academia.47 
The challenge for all historians is to be conscious of the diversities of 
Micronesian voices and to ensure their placement in mainstream academic 
discourses. As in all history, different ainang have the tendency to skew 
historical narratives to stake their own claims and interests. Academic 
historians can work together with their local counterparts to construct 
possibilities and verify the validity of competing claims.
Historians must be aware of all the available tools at their disposal to 
fill in the existing gaps in Micronesian historiography. Written history 
has been appropriated as a complementary tool for Micronesian scholars 
to reconstruct their histories; they are becoming more accessible for 
indigenous scholars to examine. This trend perpetuates Micronesians 
as active agents in the production and reconstruction of their historical 
experiences. They are redefining and reclaiming their historical past 
that has been misplaced, mystified and mistreated for centuries as 
a consequence of colonialism and its agents. A Micronesian perspective of 
history is gaining momentum through emerging scholars from both the 
islands and outside.48
Many non-Micronesian scholars have been supportive of situating 
Micronesian perspectives within mainstream academia. In their assessment, 
oral history is just as reliable as written history. The fact that many scholars 
do not have access to oral history does not necessarily mean that it is not 
46  Negative portrayal of indigenous identity is exemplified by Poyer, ‘The Ngatik Massacre’, 
pp. 4–22; Ann Nakano, Broken Canoe: Conversations and Observations in Micronesia, University of 
Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1983. Positive views are yet to be revealed by the new generations 
of indigenous scholars.
47  Micronesian historical theories are often left to clan historians to prove or disprove the validity 
and dynamic of events. See Lin Poyer, ‘The Ngatik Massacre’, pp. 20–22. For commentaries and 
detailed analysis of Pacific history, see D’Arcy, ‘Introduction’.
48  Joakim Peter, ‘Eram’s Church (Bell): Local Appropriations of Catholicism on Ettal’, ISLA Journal 
of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, Dry Season 1996, pp. 278–280.
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history per se. The debate is not which history is more credible, but how 
to reconcile both forms of history to increase our understanding of island 
discourses. Both should be treated as complementing each other for the 
purpose of enlarging scholarly engagement. As D’Arcy observed:
until quite recently archaeologists and others who study 
pre-European history of [Micronesia] tended to treat island 
communities as relatively self-contained. Modern academic 
writings portray external contacts as being of limited significance 
in the development of individual islands after initial colonisation 
by human beings. Pre-European cultural development is usually 
depicted as driven by the interaction of internal processes. These 
include; cultural emphasis on competition: adaptation of the 
founding culture to a new environment; population growth on 
a limited land area; environmental change, both natural and 
human-induced, and cultural emphasis on competition for status 
channelled into warfare, or the intensification of production 
for redistribution to forge social and political obligations. The 
possibility of new arrivals introducing cultural innovations is not 
dismissed, but it is always considered of secondary importance.49
D’Arcy,50 Peter,51 Ridgell, Ikea and Uruo,52 and Berg,53 for example, have 
disproven the idea that the islands were isolated with detailed accounts of 
inter-island interactions across time. My clan historians also contradict 
this image and suggest that even D’Arcy and other Western scholars most 
supportive of the view of the pervasiveness of inter-island interaction are 
still well short of conceiving of the true extent of inter-island interaction. 
My clan, for instance, spoke of continuing contact between members 
throughout history in far more detail and intensity than is portrayed in 
published academic sources. Contact with and knowledge of communities 
in the Marshall Islands and Kiribati figures prominently in some clan 
traditions but is portrayed as isolated and unusual in academic literature. 
49  Paul D’Arcy, ‘Connected by the Sea: Towards Regional History of the Western Caroline Islands’, 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2001, p. 163.
50  For specific details, see D’Arcy, The People of the Sea.
51  For an indigenous perspective, see Joakim Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers and the Idea of Horizon’, 
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 41, No. 3, December 2000, pp. 253–267.
52  Reilly Ridgell, Manny Ikea and Isaoshy Uruo, ‘The Persistence of Central Carolinian Navigation’, 
ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, Dry Season 1994, pp. 197–205.
53  M. L. Berg, ‘Yapese Politics, Yapese Money, and the Sawei Tribute Network Before World War I’, 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 27, No. 2, December 1992, pp. 150–164.
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Today, that contact remains undisturbed, especially when I travel in the 
FSM where relatives from different islands welcome me into their homes 
without hesitation.54
Highlighting Micronesian Perspectives
A handful of scholars from different disciplines are opening new frontiers 
for Micronesian historiography. Historians such as Mauricio Rufino, 
Joakim Peter, Paul D’Arcy, David Hanlon and Vicente Diaz, sociologist 
Ansito Walter and anthropologists Mac Marshall, Donald Rubinstein, 
Glenn Petersen and Manuel Rauchholz have made valuable contributions 
to Micronesian historiography.55 This new breed of scholars have 
advocated a style inclusive of indigenous perspectives. In doing so, they 
provide a space and validity for Micronesian perspectives to be heard 
in a broader setting. Mauricio Rufino, Joakim Peter, Myjolynn Kim, 
L.  J.  Rayphand, Margarita Cholmay and myself represent a new and 
exciting wave of indigenous scholars who are decolonising their history 
with reference to the unique insights their cultural upbringing has given 
them, combined with academic lessons from external scholars open 
to exploring and questioning European-dominated historical sources 
on cultural encounters in the Pacific.56 The only nationally prominent 
advocate for FSM-centred history in the previous generation is John 
Haglelgam.57
These indigenous scholars are critically engaging with Micronesia’s history. 
For example, Mauricio noted the value of oral history in the perpetuation 
of Micronesian identity and continuity. Oral history, he claims, is an 
organising tool that can be used in conjunction with other academic 
disciplines to resuscitate Micronesia’s past:
oral traditions provide a comprehensive and multi-vocal narrative 
of history of the evolving [Micronesian] socio-political system. 
This narrative history is much more than a compendium of stories 
54  This is my personal experience. Many of my relatives are unknown to me until they explain our 
affinity and historical links.
55  These scholars have expanded Micronesian studies by perpetrating the idea of indigenising 
history to broaden our understanding of Micronesian traditional societies in response to colonisation 
and these societies’ status in the modern world.
56  New generations of indigenous scholars are currently investigating their own island histories and 
connection to their immediate region and beyond.
57  John Haglelgam, ‘Problems of National Unity and Economic Development in the Federated 
States of Micronesia’, ISLA Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Rainy Season 1992, p. 6.
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about past events. It also represents a structured and dynamic 
body of knowledge administered and managed … and continually 
translates past events … in terms of the present-day affairs.58
Haglelgam echoes Mauricio’s view where he states that, Micronesians have:
a common and ancient heritage born from the spirit of exploration, 
from the skills of navigators, and the builders of the outrigger 
canoes. Despite the differences in languages and specific traditional 
practises from island to island, we have long been aware of each 
other, occupy similar circumstances, and have been subjected to 
similar influences, both natural and political.59
Chamorro historian from neighbouring Guam, Vince Diaz, supports 
Mauricio’s points by raising the need to reposition history to incorporate 
indigenous perspectives. Hanlon referred to such repositioning as the 
‘decentralisation’ of colonial history to treat Micronesian perspectives 
as history in its own right.60 This resonates in Walter’s call to dismantle 
the self-promoting exercise designed to perpetuate outsiders’ historical 
interest.61 Again, Diaz praised such an intellectual movement as remarkable 
and a worthy cause to eradicate colonial distortions of Micronesia’s 
past.62 That is to say that the colonisation process was managed by the 
intellectual powers of Micronesians. Micronesian intellectualism was seen 
by outsiders as inferior or non-existent. The inability of the colonists to 
recognise this drive for maintaining self-direction enabled the islanders to 
continue to live in a dual world while waiting for future opportunities to 
reassert their independence.
Hanlon reaffirms Hezel’s comments, stating, ‘there has always been far 
more to the islands’ past than colonialism’.63 There is indeed a growing 
admission by scholars that ‘Micronesians [were the] agents, actors, 
negotiators, appropriators, and manipulators … who had dealt with 
past colonial regimes, survived war, and now’64 continue to challenge 
new sets of circumstances. The new generation is laying the foundation 
58  Mauricio, ‘Ideological Bases for Power’, pp. 8–9.
59  Haglelgam, ‘Problems of National Unity’, p. 6.
60  Hanlon, ‘Micronesia: Writing and Rewriting the Histories’, pp. 4–6.
61  Ansito Walter, Desirability, Problems, and Methods of Achieving National Independence: Opinions of 
Citizens and Senators of the Federated States of Micronesia, Ann Harbour, Michigan, USA, 1985, p. 33.
62  Vincent Diaz, Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native 
Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu, 2010, pp. 21–23.
63  Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, p. 77.
64  Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, p. 119.
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of a new paradigm shift in Micronesian historical dialogue. It calls for 
a reinterpretation of history from indigenous perspectives, which has been 
marginalised from published works for too long.
Marshall, D’Arcy, Rubinstein and Petersen underscored the importance 
of the ainang as interconnecting Micronesian islands throughout history. 
Such connection continues to grow globally with the new diaspora. 
As Marshall observed:
[Micronesian] culture is not bound to [an isolated] place … it is 
carried with [the people] as they cross borders in search of new 
opportunities … or safety [with their relatives] from warfare and 
revolution [and disasters].65
Marshall’s comment is supported by prominent FSM diplomat James 
Naich,66 who asserts that Micronesians’ relationship with each other 
has been an essential element that has defined, shaped and sustained 
Micronesians as a distinct group of people who have survived centuries of 
external threats.67 D’Arcy expanded on these views in commenting that 
the history of Micronesia is about a sea of crowded islands and open sea 
markers that assisted inter-island voyages,68 allowing the ainang system 
to flourish.
The Sea as History
Development experts often neglect the importance of the sea to 
Micronesians. For example, the sea is viewed as an obstacle to the movement 
of goods and services from major world markets, while in reality, the sea is 
a major part of Micronesian identity. In his book The People of the Sea, 
D’Arcy outlined the importance of the sea to islanders, noting:
People of the sea need to feel truly at home with the sea. Most of 
the inhabitants of Oceania lived along the coastal margins of their 
island homes. The sights, sounds, and smells of the sea pervaded 
their lives while the tastes of the sea were often on their lips.69
65  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 10.
66  James Naich is the deputy chief of mission (DCM) at the FSM Embassy in Washington, DC. I 
conducted an interview with him (via Skype) on 21 December 2014.
67  Naich, Interview.
68  D’Arcy, ‘Connected by the Sea’, p. 165.
69  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 27.
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This is true in the case of Micronesia, where the sea is always part of daily 
activities. No one can escape the sea or wishes to.
Pacific scholars such as Epeli Hau‘ofa ignited a debate on external 
misrepresentations of the role of the sea in Pacific Island life in the early 
1990s. He referred to colonisation as disrupting islanders’ mobility on 
the seas.70 Colonisation superimposed imaginary boundaries in Oceania 
as a means to divide and rule local inhabitants. Islanders were contained 
within the designated boundaries under the rule of various colonial 
powers. Hau‘ofa called for a reshaping of Pacific Island history to reflect 
Pacific Islanders’ oceanic past. As he noted:
Nineteenth-century imperialism erected boundaries that led to 
the contraction of Oceania, transforming once a boundless world 
into the Pacific Island States and territories that we know today. 
People were confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each 
other. No longer could they travel freely to do what they had done 
for centuries.71
Hau‘ofa’s view was more of a general vision of how to decolonise Pacific 
history than a detailed account of Pacific Islanders’ use of the sea as 
a conduit for communication.72 While his call for the decolonisation of 
Pacific history is laudable, part of that decolonisation involves correcting 
external images not only from Westerners but also other Pacific Islanders 
with different engagements with the sea. A number of Hau‘ofa’s 
assumptions are questionable, at least from a Micronesian perspective. 
It should be remembered that sea boundaries have always been a part of 
Micronesian history as they demarcated the many Micronesian identities 
that existed before colonisation. Demarcations defined people and space 
and established the norms of interaction between islands or island groups.73 
For example, in the Mortlocks, strict protocols governed fishing activities 
and sailing between islands. When a canoe approached an island, it had to 
observe protocols or the canoe would be deemed a threat. Expectation of 
foreknowledge of protocols by senior sailors was required to save lives, as 
was knowledge of the sea and landmarks, as each has a special individual 
70  Hau‘ofa, ‘Our Sea of Islands’, p. 34.
71  Hau‘ofa, ‘Our Sea of Islands’, p. 34.
72  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 55–56.
73  This is from my personal knowledge. See also D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 136.
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meaning. As landfall approached, they signalled when to fold the sail, to 
sit, paddle and wait for further signals from the hosts to approach the 
beach. Disrespecting protocols could mean battle.
A variety of academics have noted inter-island protocols in the much-
studied sawei system, when canoes from the outer islands in Chuuk would 
sail to meet their relatives in the island chain in Yap to pay tribute and 
exchange gifts with the chiefs in the main island of Yap in the district of 
Gagil.74 In Chuuk, protocols were also established between islands when 
visiting relatives or engaging in trade with each other, especially the islands 
in the Chuuk lagoon.75 Island security was defined by the boundaries 
on the seas. The protocols endured throughout the colonial period along 
with inter-island exchanges, despite the best efforts of colonial authorities 
to assert control. Decolonisation of the FSM in my lifetime has not lifted 
the restrictions; rather, they sit alongside international maritime laws that 
recognise the post-colonial divisions.
However, just as the sea is the provider for islanders, the sea may also destroy 
islanders through a new form of threat, climate change. Like colonisation, 
climate change is foreign induced and is affecting Micronesians’ 
traditional way of life. The existential threat that climate change poses 
to Micronesians and their oceanic environment represents another 
phenomenon that islanders must adapt to. This will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 7. Meeting this new threat will require resorting to historical 
knowledge of adaptation in partnership with technical knowledge from 
the outside world. However, Micronesians will continue to engage with 
the sea. It must be remembered that Micronesians have been adapting to 
natural disasters such as typhoons, tidal waves and drought in their aquatic 
world for millennia. Adaptation strategies have in turn influenced the way 
74  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 146–150; Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of 
Micronesia, pp. 49–52; Rosalind L. Hunter-Anderson and Yigal (Go’opsan) Zan, ‘Demystifying the 
Sawei, A Traditional Interisland Exchange’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol.4, No. 1, Rainy 
Season 1996, pp. 4–6; Ridgell, Ikea and Uruo, ‘The Persistence of Central Carolinian Navigation’, 
pp. 197–205.
75  Felix Naich, oral history. Naich confirmed the trading activities between the Chuuk Lagoon 
and Mortlockese. During one of the trading seasons, a sailing fleet from Lukunor stopped by Losap 
lagoon in the Upper Mortlocks on an uninhabited island called Piafo (‘new beach’). After they rested, 
the chief applied his magical chant to drag Piafo behind his sailing canoe to Lukunor for his son. 
Piafo is now located on the northern reef of Lukunor. The people of the Mortlocks still talk about this 
powerful event.
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Micronesians engaged with each other.76 Inter-island engagement prior to 
colonisation has refined the means and methods of travel and interaction 
and allowed Micronesians to adapt to new influences emanating from the 
outside world successfully.77
Outsiders continue to impose their ideologies in Micronesia through 
economic and political pressures. Yet Micronesian identity endures. 
Rather than being overwhelmed, Micronesians rearticulated colonisation 
through the process of accommodation and assimilation to absorb its 
shockwaves. For example, academics James Duane and Joakim Peter 
referred to the resiliency of the Mortlockese people in the late eighteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in adapting to Christianity on their own 
terms. As Duane noted, ‘neither missionary activity nor the European 
ships which carried civilisation with them to the islands, have changed 
the [islanders] and their mode of living significantly’.78 This eighteenth-
century observation holds true for Micronesian engagement with 
outsiders today.
Since the 1950s, Pacific history has gained prominence as a specialised 
academic discipline advanced by James Davidson, considered the 
father of Pacific history. It has undergone fundamental changes as 
historians began to develop different approaches and methodologies 
in the discipline.79 However, certain issues remain unresolved as many 
scholars continue the old habit of reproducing the Pacific in the image 
of imperial history. For example, in a recent book reviewing the sum 
of Pacific historiography, entitled Texts and Contexts,80 edited by Pacific 
historians Doug Munro and Brij Lal, historians were asked to review 
selected books considered foundational in Pacific historiography. Each 
76  The exchange of adaptation ideas between islands was long established before colonisation. 
Exchange of ideas meant social and political interaction, influencing islanders’ thought processes. 
See the discussion on mobility in Juliana Flinn, Diplomats and Thatch Houses: Asserting Tradition in 
a Changing Micronesia, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1992, pp. 11–14.
77  Pukuan are traditional signposts that demand certain behaviours when arriving at specific 
seamarks or landmarks. The legendary palou (‘navigator/s’) Rongoshik and Rongelap reveal the 
importance of strict observation of inter-island protocols; Rongelap, who had only general knowledge 
of the protocols, died, while Rongoshik, who had specific knowledge of the protocols, survived.
78  Nason J. Duane, Clan and Copra: Modernization of Etal, Eastern Caroline Islands, University of 
Michigan, University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1971, p. 170; Peter, ‘Eram’s 
Church (Bell)’, pp. 282–285.
79  Paul D’Arcy, ‘The Teaching of Pacific History: Introduction Diverse Approaches for Diverse 
Audience’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 46, No. 2, September 2011, pp. 197–206.
80  Doug Munro and Brij Lal, ‘The Texts in Its Context’, in Texts and Contexts: Reflection in Pacific 
Islands Historiography, edited by Doug Munro and Brij Lal, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006, pp. 1–11.
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of the reviewers gave their impression of how Pacific history was written 
over time. Of particular concern was the lack of indigenous historians 
included in the review process, with critics such as historian Gavan Daws 
pointing out the shortcomings in the review. Daws81 perceived Texts and 
Contexts as a vehicle for recycling outdated outsiders’ practice of Pacific 
history. He questioned why indigenous historians were not selected for 
such a  review and the reason for such a narrow selection.82 Texts and 
Contexts should be appreciated insofar as it reflects a gazing into the past; 
a self-congratulatory exercise by a combined Euro-Indio vision of what 
constituted Pacific historiography, rather than being an example of what 
Pacific historiography could and should be.83
As part of the Texts and Contexts edition, Hanlon reviewed the book 
The First Taint of Civilization, authored by Hezel. In Hanlon’s assessment, 
the book continues the old habit of reflecting negative images of 
Micronesians in contemporary literature: ‘the overall argument of [some 
writers] … points to a fatality of impact that left island peoples ignorant 
of their past, uncomfortable with the present, and uncertain about their 
future’.84 Perhaps there should be a follow-up text on ‘Oralities and 
Contexts’ to ensure a holistic trend and development of Pacific history. 
Diaz echoes Daws’s observation, stating, ‘no group of people … holds 
a  monopoly over intellectual … access to truth … as theorised and 
practiced in rituals such as historical scholarship … and in things such 
as books’.85 The observations made by the above historians echo similar 
fundamental issues in Micronesian historiography—that is, who is writing 
Micronesian history, for whom and for what purpose?
81  Gavin Daws, ‘Comment: Texts and Contexts: A First Person Note’, Journal of Pacific History, 
Vol. 41, No. 2, September 2006, pp. 250–252.
82  Daws, ‘Comment: Text and Context’, p. 252.
83  Daws, ‘Comment: Text and Context’, pp. 256–259.
84  David Hanlon, ‘On Hezel’s The First Taint of Civilization’, in Texts and Contexts: Reflection in 
Pacific Islands Historiography, edited by Doug Munro and Brij Lal, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006, 
p. 207.






The indigenous past is in the present; it is timeless with no sense of historical 
evolution as the Micronesian perspective of history contradicts the idea of 
the linear model of history practised by Western historians. As explained 
in Chapter 1, the Micronesian perspective of history is dynamic and 
revolves around a complex web of events. To understand events of the 
historical past, a sou uruo must first isolate an event and announce it to 
their listeners. This is to alert other sou uruo to create the context of these 
events for the purpose of organising the relationship between such events 
in order to determine the validity of the historical narratives and their 
conclusion. In subsequent chapters, my narrative will become descriptive 
to allow the readers to organise their thoughts about historical parallelism 
since I will be following the linear model approach but will narrate the 
history within the context of a Micronesian perspective. No Micronesian 
has written a comprehensive account of the colonial and post-colonial 
periods in relation to how the modern Micronesian identity was formed, 
evolved and perpetuated for continuity purposes.
This chapter examines the processes that shaped the Micronesian identity 
and the reasons for its perpetuation as perceived by Micronesians.1 
It demonstrates the continuity of traditional ways of organising history, 
1  The Micronesian perception of identity was mainly gathered in the field from those who 
experienced the process of independence.
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society and nature that are still thriving in FSM today. By default, 
this subject is largely covered by academics raised and trained beyond 
Micronesia. I was struck by the disassociation of nature and humans in my 
review of the scholarly literature on Micronesian societies.2 By and large, 
most academic studies of Micronesia initiate their historical discourses 
by describing the geography and environment of the islands. They do so 
before inserting the human inhabitants into the scene, as though they are 
removed from the environment.
The nature–culture nexus has always been an intellectual battleground 
between scholars. It is also a contested area between academics advocating 
environmental circumstances or cultural ways of viewing the world as 
the prime influences on human behaviour and history,3 versus indigenous 
perspectives of societies, such as those in Micronesia, who consider 
human beings as both part of nature and influential agents in the shaping 
of the environment.4 Scholars within academia are increasingly advancing 
the interdependent nexus between nature and culture.5 This chapter 
demonstrates the large degree of continuity in social relations and human–
environment relations that exists across Micronesian societies. Subsequent 
chapters then trace how this identity and its organising principles came 
about over history and how this legacy will play out in the words and 
actions of young people.
2  See e.g. Paul Rainbird, The Archaeology of Micronesia, Cambridge University Press, 2004; Roger 
Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia: A Study of the Consolidation of U.S. Rule in the Pacific, 
Washington, DC, 1979; Ward Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk (2nd edition), 
Archon Books, Connecticut, 1978; William Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of 
Micronesia (2nd edition), University of Victoria, British Columbia, 1977; Kirk Gray, ‘Modernization 
in Micronesia: Acculturation, Colonialism and Cultural Change’, PhD thesis, Western Michigan 
University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1974, pp. 1–6.
3  Kerry R. Howe, Nature, Culture and History: The ‘Knowing’ of Oceania, University of Hawai‘i Press, 
Honolulu, Hawai‘i, 2000, pp. 55–57, 59–64; David W. Kupferman, ‘On Location at a Nonentity: 
Reading Hollywood’s “Micronesia”’, Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2011, pp. 142, 162; Jane 
Landman and Chris Ballard, ‘An Ocean of Images: Film and History in the Pacific’, Journal of Pacific 
History, Vol. 45, No. 1, June 2010, p. 4.
4  Okusi Mahina, ‘The Poetics of Tongan Traditional History, Tala-e-fanua: An Ecology Centred 
Concept of Culture and History’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 28, No. 1, June 1993, pp. 219–220; 
Kenneth E. Knudson, ‘Resource Fluctuation, Productivity, and Social Organization on Micronesian 
Coral Islands’, PhD thesis, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 1970, pp. 6–8; Howe, Nature, 
Culture and History, pp. 55–57, 59–64.
5  My personal experience has shown this to be the case. Academia has been slow to come to this 
realisation and only partially contested it.
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2. PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETY AND IDENTITY
At a number of points along the continuum between cultural determinism 
and environmental determinism lies the danger of Micronesians 
becoming exotic stereotypes, like actors in fictional Hollywood movies.6 
Some writers narrated the tropical environment with exotic images of its 
inhabitants to conjure up certain preconceived cultural abstracts.7 Many 
scholars, for instance, refer to Micronesia as a dehumanised space to 
relate external myths and fantasies.8 This exercise distorts the realities of 
Micronesia, a place with its own unique historical images and identities.
In reality, modern Micronesian history and thus identity are a consequence 
of long historical processes that have spanned centuries of indigenous 
development, followed by a shorter period of external colonial rule, 
which culminated in the indigenous desire to establish an independent 
Constitution for the Federated States of Micronesia in 1979.9 Historians 
argue that all documents and perceived identities and affiliations are 
situated within broader historical processes and are deeply embedded in 
the context in which they arise.10 Prior to colonial rule, people’s identities 
were connected to one’s village, island, lineage or the clan at the regional 
level.11 Both the ainang system and geography defined an individual’s 
connection to a geographical space or their place in the social system.12 
For example, one could claim to be from a kin-based social unit within 
a village situated on a particular island, which belonged to a particular 
region. That is, the islands consisted of multiple identities coexisting with 
each other.
The term ‘Micronesia’ is an externally imposed description of the scattered 
islands in terms of geography and as a cultural area, created to serve 
colonial purposes. In time, the islanders adopted the term ‘Micronesian’ 
to differentiate themselves from the outsiders and later used the term as 
6  Kupferman, ‘On Location at a Nonentity’, pp. 142–143.
7  Howe, Nature, Culture and History, pp. 13–14.
8  Peter Hay, ‘A Phenomenology of Islands’, Island Studies Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006, p. 21; 
Howe, Nature, Culture and History, pp. 10–14.
9  It took almost 15 years after the Congress of Micronesia was established in 1965 for Micronesians 
to finally achieve a constitutional government (Hanlon, Making Micronesia, p. 100).
10  Munro and Lal, ‘The Text in Its Context’, pp. 1–11; Penelope J. Corfield, ‘All People are Living 
Histories—Which is Why History Matters’, Making History, School of Advanced Study, University 
of London, 2008, www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/why_history_matters.html.
11  Mortlocks oral history as told by my elders (hereafter Mortlocks Oral History). See also Francis 
X. Hezel, ‘The Chuuk Problem: At the Foot of the Political Pyramid’, Micronesian Counselor, No. 50, 
April 2004, www.micsem.org/pubs/counselor/frames/ chuukprobfr.htm.
12  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 22–23; Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, 
pp. 8–11.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
36
a unifying tool to fight the tyranny of colonialism.13 The outcome of this 
historical discourse is the reconfiguration of the term ‘Micronesian’ by 
islanders as an identity in response to the globalised world.14
The decolonisation process of the 1960s and 1970s led to the emergence 
of Pacific identities framed within the context of self-governing nation 
states.15 Many Pacific Islanders constructed their identities along the 
lines of their colonial experience, built on the foundation of their unique 
historical past. Micronesians were part of this process but were only able 
to exercise significant control rather late due to the prolonged control of 
their sovereignty by the US as a strategic UN Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands (TTPI). American rule merely delayed rather than stifled this 
process, however, as Micronesians later constructed their own national 
identity as part of the political emancipation process from external control.
The name ‘Micronesia’ is an example of European nomenclature based on 
the questionable association of the physical appearance of its inhabitants 
coupled with cultural similarities within a shared geographic location in 
Oceania alongside Polynesia and Melanesia.16 Geographic Micronesia 
encompasses many island nations: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, FSM, 
Palau, the US territories of the Northern Marianas Islands and Guam. 
However, the FSM now assumes the name Micronesia by political 
design.17 Today, the FSM is recognised internationally as Micronesia, and 
the indigenous inhabitants are referred to as Micronesians, especially when 
framing themselves in political and cultural discourses. Micronesians 
consider themselves as a diverse and distinct group of people with 
a proud history and traditions. That identity derives from Micronesians’ 
close relationship to their oceanic environment. It has already been noted 
that the Constitution refers to the Micronesian identity as historically 
deriving from the sea.18 The sea is the prime source of livelihood and one 
13  Robert Kiste, ‘A Half Century in Retrospect’, in American Anthropology in Micronesia: An Assessment, 
edited by Robert Kiste and Mac Marshall, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999, pp. 442–443.
14  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 5–6.
15  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 7.
16  See the Journal of Pacific History’s special issue, ‘Dumont d’Urville’s Divisions of Oceania: 
Fundamental Precincts or Arbitrary Constructs?’, Vol. 38, No. 2, September 2003, pp. 155–288; 
Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard, eds, Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750–1940, 
ANU E Press, Canberra, 2008, pp. 9–10.
17  Micronesia is now often associated with the FSM in many international forums. The people 
of Palau or the Marshall Islands identify themselves with the name of their countries—as Palauans or 
Marshallese, respectively. The disintegration of Micronesia can be blamed on the US as counter to the 
trusteeship agreement (Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 340).
18  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
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that has shaped Micronesian history and identity. For example, the sea 
provides the space where people performed meaningful activities, where 
they fought wars, fished, sailed, found romance, worked and performed 
religious rituals.19 These activities exemplify how islanders interact with 
their environment and also with each other. The sea nurtured, reproduced 
and transported Micronesian ideologies across space and time.
Micronesians still perceive and cherish their traditional universe as 
a tripartite union between saat (sea), fanou (land) and lang (sky);20 these are 
the sacred domains where the spirits of their progenitors’ dwell.21 Inherent 
in these are the local guardians empowered with maniman22 who instruct 
successive generations of Micronesians about their historical heritage. The 
Constitution is conceived of by many Micronesians as a canoe carved out 
of the progenitors’ ideological images with a purpose—to transport and 
reinforce their history. It is the sacred vessel that beholds Micronesian 
identity and continuity while engaging with the changes of the modern 
world. Accordingly, let me then pay my deep respect to my ancestors in 
conveying my ‘tiro lang, tiro pwel, tiro saat23 and tiro nganei ash samol’.24 
This is a special acknowledgement to the Micronesian saat, fonou and 
lang. It is an invocation honouring both the natural spaces where their 
ancestors’ dwell and their aramas (people) overseas.
Former Speaker of the Congress of the FSM Jack Fritz, like many 
esteemed traditional leaders before him, always began his oratory 
speeches with a passionate delivery of the aforementioned traditional line. 
It reveals Micronesians’ deep connection to their oceanic environment, 
the land and the sky. Fritz’s sentiment reflects the FSM’s first president 
Tosiwo Nakayama’s instructive dictum to his people where he impressed 
upon them to fully embrace their customs, traditions and the god-given 
19  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 32; Hau‘ofa, We Are the Ocean, p. 32.
20  For a detailed discussion, refer to William Alkire, ‘Land, Sea, Gender and Ghosts on Woleai-
Lamotrek’, American Anthropological Association (Reprinted from Special Publication, No. 25), 1989, 
pp. 85–86; Rainbird, The Archaeology of Micronesia, pp. 37–38. See also William Lessa, Ulithi: 
A Micronesian Design for Living, University of California, Los Angeles, Holt Rhinehart and Winston, 
Inc, 1966, pp. 56–57.
21  Lingenfelter, Yap, p. 80.
22  Maniman is the Micronesian equivalent to what Polynesians refer to as Mana and broadly means 
‘spiritual’.
23  Pwwel is the same as fonou. However, it is more appropriate to use the term ‘pwwel’ when 
delivering a speech during community gatherings.
24  Samol refers to traditional chiefs. Former speaker of the FSM Congress, Jack Fritz, delivered 
his speeches using the tripartite connections as a sign of deep respect to the different spaces where 
Chuukese–Micronesians’ ancestors dwell. Elders before Jack Fritz also used these opening remarks, 
and these are still used today by people during all sorts of meetings.
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islands.25 Micronesians, he said, should cease being afraid of outsiders 
who attempted to destroy their pride, dignity and self-esteem in order to 
steal their islands. Micronesians should also be reminded of the sea;26 it is 
central to their livelihood, history and identity.27
Masao Nakayama, the brother of Tosiwo and a former FSM ambassador 
to the UN, echoed both the president’s and speaker’s comments when he 
explained what the sea means to Micronesians at the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea in 1974. He declared:
Though essential, the land is tiny and relatively barren. It provides 
people with protection from the elements and a place to eat and 
sleep in comfort. But the real focus of life is on the sea. The sea 
provides food and tools and the medium to transport an islander 
from one cluster of humanity to another. As compared to the power 
and moods of the sea, the land is insignificant, humble [and] dull. 
The rhythm of life is dictated by the sea. The turbulence of the sea 
tells people when they can travel and when they can’t. It controls 
the habits of fish and the habits of the human seeking them. 
The sea sustains life with the food it provides, but also carries the 
potential to end it in the fury of one of its periodic rages. The sea 
challenges people, tests their character, provides life with drama 
and meaning.28
D’Arcy also noted that ‘The sea dominates the lives and consciousness 
of  the inhabitants … as nowhere else on earth. In this ocean setting, 
the sea cannot be ignored’.29
The two Nakayamas and Fritz’s prophetic statements convey Micronesians’ 
deep relationship with the sea. As Captain David Marar alluded to, 
‘rematau [people of the sea] is the identity that any Micronesian can wear 
as a badge of honour. It evokes the unending song sung from the ocean 
deep to remind shon fanuash [people of our island or land] of where they 
came from’.30
25  David Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia: Discourses Over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944–
1982, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988, p. 138.
26  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 138.
27  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
28  Masao Nakayama and Fred Ram, Traditional Native Approaches to Ocean Governance, United 
Nations University, 1974.
29  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 26.
30  David Marar (Wing Commander, Maritime Surveillance), Interview, Nett, Pohnpei, 13 January 
2011; Simion Weitto (Captain, FSS Micronesia (FSM surveillance ship)), Interview, 11 January 2011. 
Simion is also the makal (traditional leader) of his island, Houk, in the northwest region of Chuuk.
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Figure 3: A traditional fishing technique called lalo, used to catch bonito.
Note: This technique, which is still used today, involves using coconut fronds to trap fish 
near the beach.
Source: Photograph taken by Amanson Ansin on Lukunor Island in early 2014.
Figure 4: Another view of lalo.
Source: Photograph taken by Amanson Ansin on Lukunor Island in early 2014.
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Joakim Peter, an academic from the FSM, summed up the pervasiveness 
of the sea and sea skills in Micronesian life when he described how:
singing [represents] the use of navigation as a way of speaking 
… about elements of contemporary [Micronesia]: politics, 
government, and Christianity … the song cautions against bad 
political or social handling to enforce social order.31
This metaphoric song, understood only by Micronesians, continues to 
guide them into the future. Micronesians are creatures of the sea.
The sea has always influenced the Micronesian perception of the world, 
which in turn has framed their cultural identity. Historically, the term 
shon metau (people of the deep sea) has been used in reference to the low-
lying islands in Chuuk and Yap, whose inhabitants’ lifestyle depends on 
the sea. Anthropologist Lieber and historian D’Arcy discussed how the 
sea shapes island cultures, a theme that also resonates across the vast array 
of Micronesian oral histories. D’Arcy, in his book The People of the Sea, 
provides a detailed study in relation to how Pacific Islanders interact with 
the sea and how this interaction has shaped islanders’ cultural identities.32 
Lieber’s book More Than a Living focuses on the atoll of Kapingamarangi, 
where daily life and social structure depends on fishing activities. With 
changes in technology, new fishing practices arose as the people adapted 
to the changing circumstances on the atoll. New ideas were also borrowed 
from neighbouring islands such as the volcanic island of Pohnpei and 
Nukuoro atoll. However, fishing remains the central activity for the male 
population on Kapingamarangi.33
The inception of the Congress of Micronesia (COM) in the mid-1960s 
underscored the emergence of the modern identity and the various 
inhabitants’ historical backgrounds. The COM was the forum for elected 
leaders to discuss decolonisation and independence. The concept of one 
Micronesian identity was a top priority for the leaders. However, this 
identity was under constant threat by political elements that remained 
favourable to Americanisation. Americanisation was unpopular among the 
conservative elements of the COM, who perceived that Americanisation 
would mean American culture and values usurping those of the 
31  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble; Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, p. 261.
32  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, ch. 7, pp. 146–155. See also Hau‘ofa, We Are the Ocean, pp. 27–40.
33  Lieber, More Than a Living: Fishing and Social Order on a Polynesian Atoll, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1994, pp. 179–180.
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indigenous population. Consequently, Micronesians would be the new 
minority group and inevitably treated as second-class citizens. Proponents 
of Americanisation included Amata Kabua34 and Nick Bossy,35 as well as 
many who suffered during WWII. They considered the threat of Cold War 
hostilities being played out in the Pacific to be a more urgent danger and 
saw the continuation of a close association—perhaps even integration—
with the US to be a safeguard of Micronesian security. The administrators 
were unimpressed with the new Micronesian identity; they thought the 
quest to de-Americanise the islands was too premature, citing Micronesian 
experience as inadequate to form and operate a government.36 Despite 
the US’s roadblocks to the issue of Micronesian independence, it did 
not fade away. The desire for independence instead gained momentum 
in the early 1970s. After a series of political negotiations between the 
Micronesian and American parties, the issue remained deadlocked. 
The Micronesian leadership would not give in to the American wish to 
control Micronesia.37 The pro-independence movement rallied the people 
with resounding support, resulting in a Constitutional Convention 
(ConCon) on Saipan in the early 1970s. It was a serious demonstration 
of the leaders’ intention to define Micronesian political identity in the 
islanders’ own image, after a long period of American rule.
Towards a New Future
The ConCon was held in Saipan in the early 1970s. Its purpose was 
manifold but its main focus was to debate the new Micronesian identity 
as premised on a proposed nationwide constitution. This was a testing 
time for the whole TTPI to determine whether to remain under 
US administration.38 The ConCon was also the forum in which the 
differences between Micronesians within the American-administered 
TTPI emerged. For example, the districts of Palau, the Marianas Islands 
and the Marshall Islands decided that it was better for them to leave the 
proposed Micronesian union and create their own separate identities. 
34  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 168–169.
35  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 174–175.
36  Glenn Petersen, ‘Lessons Learned: The Micronesian Quest for Independence in the Context of 
American Imperial History’, Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1–2, December 
2004, p. 53.
37  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 119–122.
38  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 219–223; Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 179–
182; Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 92–94.
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Palau and the Marshall Islands inter alias reasoned that they did not want 
to be controlled by an imposed central identity that identified them as 
Micronesians.39 Further, these districts also did not want to share their 
revenue—from the US test missile range in the Marshall Islands, and the 
proposed oil super port to be constructed in Palau by Japan and Iran—with 
the poorer districts. The Northern Marianas Islands’ greater exposure to 
the outside world motivated them to opt to be part of the American super 
identity. In employing the colonial principle of divide and rule, the US 
granted the wishes of Palau and the Marshalls to leave the TTPI to form 
their own political identities, later known as Paluan and Marshallese. The 
remaining districts of Ponape, Truk, Yap and Kusaie40 decided to form the 
FSM, with its people now referred to as Micronesians. The Micronesian 
identity has been recognised by the UN. However, the identity required 
the forces of social valorisation for it to be embedded in everyday people’s 
imagination. The Preamble of the FSM’s Constitution became the mantra 
in print to perpetuate the Micronesian identity in the brave new world 
of autonomy and self-representation.41
The Constitution united the indigenous people whose political desire 
was to share a nation and country. Since 1979, the Micronesian identity 
has been universally accepted worldwide. The Constitution also bestows 
the identity on those who are born in foreign lands with Micronesian 
heritage. The FSM passport validates the Micronesian identity when one 
travels to different jurisdictions internationally.42 The Constitution is also 
a shield43 against outsiders’ encroachment on this new identity.
39  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 178–179.
40  Kusaie was part of the Ponape district and later became Kosrae state, separated from Ponape to 
carry on the proposed mandate of the constitutional convention. This was to allow the Constitution 
to pass and thus enable the creation of the FSM (Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 9).
41  This is from my personal knowledge. In the 1970s, high school students were required to learn 
the preamble by heart. In my communications with many high school teachers during my fieldwork 
in January 2011, I found that students are still encouraged to have knowledge of the preamble.
42  Micronesians were issued passports reflecting their status within the international system as 
TTPI residents. However, the passport was under the control of the US Government.
43  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia. The Constitution asserts Micronesians’ 
rights to their islands as recognised in international law. See United Nations Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Part I, Article 1, www.ohchr.org/
EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx; The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Article II, Section 1.
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Local, Regional and National Identities
My personal case may be used as an example of what it is to be 
a  Micronesian with multiple identities but with the national identity 
under the Constitution. I am a Lekiniochian (a person born on the 
island of Lekinioch) from the subregion of Mortlocks (Mortlockese) 
in the state of Chuuk (Chuukese) in the FSM (a Micronesian).44 I am 
a Micronesian, an identity bestowed upon me by the Constitution of the 
Federated States of Micronesia to inform others of what the indigenous 
Chuukese, Yapese, Kosraen and Pohnpeian’s collectively refer to themselves 
in this age of globalisation.45 This identity reclaims Micronesia’s historical 
past from the colonial powers. I am part of the new generation of the 
clan sor, but I am also associated with another clan as afakiran sofa, which 
entitles me to speak about my own perspective of my island and my 
uruon ainang.46 I have lived and travelled far and wide both domestically 
and internationally and have always remained loyal to my identity. I was 
born and raised in the Mortlocks, where my perspective of the world was 
shaped. My progenitors travelled the Chuukese region and beyond on 
sophisticated sailing canoes to connect with their ainang members who 
were spread across multiple atolls and high islands. Today, I am following 
their footsteps and have added new experiences to enrich my own shon 
metau background as a result of my own voyages to new spaces.47
Travelling remains central to Micronesian history and identity. This 
is because it continues the traditional network system established by 
Micronesians prior to colonisation. Such a network transmits, sustains 
and transforms Micronesian ideologies within the globalisation process.48 
Although the modes of travelling have changed, Micronesians have 
44  My personal identity is based on my island clan and the region I came from, which are rolled 
into the broader Micronesian identity.
45  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
46  Sor is my mother’s clan; it is my ascribed status. Sofa is my father’s clan, which gave me the title 
afakiran, an honorary member of the Sofa clan. On clan associations and relationships, see Marshall, 
‘The Structure of Solidarity’, pp. 50–66; Duane, Clan and Copra, pp. 59–63.
47  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 98–99, 134.
48  As a member of the Micronesian diaspora, I carry my Micronesian ideologies with me as the basis 
of my identity in the globalised world. See also Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 98–99, 134. 
Hou’ofa discussed the concept of movement of Pacific Islanders who are now part of a wider Pacific 
community in ‘Our Sea of Islands’, pp. 34–39. See also Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, 
pp. 12–19, 62, 64; Oha Uman, Ferdun Saladier and Anter Chipen, Uruon Chuuk: A Resource of Oral 
Legends, Traditions, and History of Truk, Vol. 1, ESEA Title IV Omibus Program for Social Studies, 
Cultural Heritage Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Moen, Truk, July 1979, pp. 1–7.
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adapted to new ways of travel to different spaces, further away from their 
shores.49 They are forming new communities within a wider diaspora, 
carrying with them their history and identity. The new waves of followers 
are continuing this process. Joakim Peter, a Micronesian scholar, referred 
to this move as aipwa; that is, following the footprints of fellow islanders 
who are now residing elsewhere around the globe.50 As Mac Marshall states 
in relation to shon Namoluk, ‘movement, migration, voyaging beyond the 
horizon are nothing new to Micronesian people’.51
In this process, many Micronesians have now resided outside Micronesia 
while remaining connected to their Micronesian identity, by adapting to 
their new places of residence to match established ways of doing things 
and interacting. For example, anthropologist Lola Bautista’s study of 
Micronesians from Satowan Island living abroad provided an insight into 
the Micronesian ideology of domestic space when transplanted to foreign 
spaces. Her research revealed that configuration of spaces used in the 
layout of family compounds in Satowan has been duplicated in Guam. 
The idea is to allow the Satowanese to continue engaging with each other 
as if they were on their home island.52 She observed how the Satowanese 
allocated cultural spaces between genders such as lenien maur (sleeping 
quarters), mosoro (cooking space) and a common area to accommodate 
everyday interaction in order to facilitate cultural practices.53 A separate 
detachment like a faal, if it could be afforded, would also provide cultural 
space for young men to interact.54 My observations of my extended 
family’s compound situated on what they referred to as the ‘ranch’ in 
Guam confirms Bautista’s findings. My observations also indicated that my 
family’s cultural identity remains strong despite its relocation. However, 
some features of cultural practices are eroding as the new generation born 
in Guam and elsewhere in the US are growing up in a new environment 
far from the centres of everyday cultural interactions.55
49  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 98–99, 134. See also Hou’ofa, ‘Our Sea of Islands’, 
pp. 34–39.
50  Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, pp. 256–257.
51  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 6.
52  Lola Q. Bautista, ‘Building Sense Out of Households: Migrants from Chuuk (Re)create Local 
Settlements in Guam’, City and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, June 2011, pp. 80–83.
53  Spaces are configured to reflect the gender avoidance between sisters and brothers. See social 
protocols in Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, pp. 54–55.
54  Interactions between brothers and sisters are still seen as taboo and so both sexes have separate 
spaces for interaction. This is becoming problematic with the new generation born in the US. They seem 
not to observe this taboo (Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p. 54; Lingenfelter, Yap, pp. 44–45.
55  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 142.
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Reinforcing Identity
Ainang membership and locality affiliation, citizenship and FSM 
constitutional rights form the foundation of Micronesian identity and the 
sense of belonging in the fluid modern world. For example, Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution defines Micronesians in terms of nationality 
and citizenship: ‘a person born of parents one or both of whom are 
citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia is a citizen and national of 
the Federated States by birth’.56 Section 3 demands the total loyalty 
of Micronesian citizens by prohibiting dual citizenship after a certain age:
a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia who is recognized 
as a citizen of another nation shall, within 3 years of his 18th 
birthday … register his intent to remain a citizen of the Federated 
States and renounce his citizenship of another nation. If he fails to 
comply with this Section, he becomes a national of the Federated 
States of Micronesia.57
A ‘national’ is a Micronesian by heritage but with limited constitutional 
rights. However, that is not to say that nationals are exempt from 
identifying themselves as Micronesians by virtue of ancestral connection 
to the FSM.58
Being a Micronesian involves more than conforming to legal criteria as it 
is deeply embedded in cultural ideology and practices. Personal identity 
is an ascribed status as can be seen in the ainang system in many parts of 
Micronesia. Citizenship, however, is acquired through the legal system. 
For example, American-born Micronesians perpetuate the Micronesian 
identity in a global context, though they may have no direct experience of 
Micronesia. The island culture, however, recognises their membership in 
the ainang system.59 Although the offspring of mixed parental marriages 
who are born in other global places have less exposure to Micronesian 
cultural knowledge, their absence from the FSM does not deny their 
56  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article III, Section 2.
57  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article III, Section 3.
58  There is a clash between the rights afforded to citizens and nationals, especially regarding the 
issue of land or title inheritance. For example, inheritance is by tradition and nothing can interfere 
in that process, yet the Constitution bans traditional entitlements if one loses their FSM citizenship. 
This is a flaw in the Constitution that urgently needs addressing.
59  People who are culturally foreign but born with a blood connection to the islands are 
automatically members of their clan, either as an afaker or other designation, depending on the 
gender of the parent.
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permanent membership of their parent’s ainang.60 Membership is about 
connections deeply rooted in Micronesian culture for the purpose of 
prolonging the survivability of the ainang system into the future, despite 
one’s absence.61
To celebrate and protect the Micronesian identity, a law was created 
in 2010 that designated 31 March as a national holiday known as 
Micronesian Culture and Traditions Day. The law states:
most nations celebrate their cultures and traditions as an integral 
part of their national identity. Inherent in this practice, is the 
celebration of indigenous cultures [and] … the FSM is blessed with 
its own indigenous cultures … even in the face of globalization. 
[It has] retained much of [its] cultural identity through the process 
of assimilation, and [it] will continue to withstand continuing 
foreign influences into the future.62
For a people vulnerable to natural disasters in the oceanic environment, 
maintaining both intra- and inter-island connections is fundamental to 
the reinforcement of the social safety net.63 This tradition is alive and 
well today. Displays of connections are demonstrated during public 
holidays to commemorate the history of each island, state and the 
nation. On the aforementioned 31 March national holiday, the national 
government invites cultural groups and dignitaries around the nation 
to attend the commemorative celebrations that are hosted in honour 
of the national holiday.64 The states and municipalities also have their 
own traditional holidays celebrated every year, consisting of events that 
include traditional dances, displays of traditional foods and handicrafts, 
and speeches from dignitaries. For example, in Yap, a state holiday called 
‘Yap Day’ is celebrated on the first weekend of March every year. They 
display their island wares and stick and marching dances. A canoe festival 
is also on display, where Yapese showcase their canoes and sailing skills 
rooted in the sawei traditions. As recently as 2010, Carolinians sailed over 
756 kilometres (643 miles) from Saipan in the Northern Marianas Islands 
60  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 141–142.
61  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 142–143; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, p. 82.
62  The FSM Congress, Congressional Bill No.16-01, which later became a law, created a national 
holiday to honour the cultures and traditions of the FSM.
63  See the sawei system discussed in D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 146–150.
64  This is my personal experience. Other traditional celebrations are seen during individual state’s 
constitutional days.
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to Yap.65 It only took them a week to reach their destination. This event 
was used to demonstrate their navigational prowess and the value placed 
on this knowledge as part of their identity and historical continuity.
Pohnpei state also has a holiday to celebrate the Constitution, where the 
people come together to perform their dances, market their agricultural 
produce and display their island wares.66 Traditional leaders make speeches 
emphasising the history of their islands. The Chuukese have their own 
constitutional holiday, with the showcasing of traditional dances, local 
foods and handicrafts and competitions involving traditional activities 
such as copra husking and spear throwing.67 Moreover, its low-lying atolls 
have their own cultural and traditional day. Leaders from the national and 
state governments are invited to join these celebrations. These events are 
also repeated in Kosrae and elsewhere in the FSM.68
Some observers perceive the differences in cultures as an obstacle to 
maintaining the future integrity of the FSM. Perhaps this is so when 
viewed within the context of colonial discourse where external threats 
are always looming on the horizon, ready to rupture the nation at any 
moment. This discourse may be connected to the past partition of the 
TTPI, which saw the emergence of the various small island states out of 
that territory. Some claim the FSM will follow suit because of its cultural 
diversity. For example, Petersen claimed in 1990 that ‘the FSM will break 
up in violence. Just as colonisation strung these islands together, islanders 
will undo it to suit their own circumstances as in the historical past’.69
65  If one follows the traditional sea lanes of sailing from Yap to Saipan, it should be more than 
the 756 kilometres—the distance from Gaferut to Guam. See D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 154, 
158 for a map of sea lanes and approximate distances between the islands in Yap all the way to the 
Mortlocks in Chuuk.
66  I personally witnessed this while living in Pohnpei and teaching at the College of Micronesia, 
Pohnpei Campus. See Myjolynn Kim, Into the Deep: Launching Culture and Policy in the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and Federated States of Micronesia 
Office of National Archives, Culture and Historic Preservation, Pohnpei, FSM, 2011, pp. 9–11.
67  This is from my personal experience as a Mortlockese–Chuukese witnessing Chuuk Constitution 
Day. See also Kim, Into the Deep, pp. 9–11.
68  I have personally witnessed these, such as the Kosraen community celebration in Pohnpei. See 
also Kim, Into the Deep, pp. 9–11.
69  Glenn Petersen, ‘Regime Change and Regime Maintenance’, Discussion Papers Number 12, 
Ethnicity and Interests at the 1990 Federated States of Micronesia Constitutional Convention, The 
Australian National University, 1993, pp. 67–68. The Chuuk Commission has been established to 
manage any such disintegration in future. Lack of a coherent culture was also discussed as the basis 
that may break up the FSM. For further details, see Yoko Komai, ‘The Failure to Objectify Culture: 
A Lack of Nationalism in the FSM’, People and Culture in Oceania, Vol. 19, No. 41, 2005, p. 21.
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However, Petersen’s subsequent research led him to change his position.70 
He joined fellow anthropologists such as Marshall and Rauchholz 
to convey the local perspective that Micronesians are conscious of the 
fact that their similarities outweigh their differences, as forged by their 
common history. This historical connection has been stated in many 
scholarly studies of frequent canoe voyages between islands that led to 
the homogenisation of Micronesian cultures and traditions on many 
islands.71 Seafaring was the lifeline of Micronesian islanders; it created 
economic opportunities, enhanced knowledge of space, connected people, 
strengthened relationships and initiated new alliances.72 In Micronesia 
today, travelling between islands continues but with different means of 
transportation. Modern travelling continues to reproduce Micronesians’ 
shared values and binds Micronesians closer together.
Oral traditions spoke of movements between Kosraens, Pohnpeians, 
Chuukese and Yapese that reinforced these existing connections. As Oha 
Uman, a traditional historian from Chuuk, said:
ewe samolin Ponpei a nomw a uro pwe epwe eor kinamwe lefilen 
[aramasan Maikronesia]. A tingei aewan Souariras [wisan epwe chok 
fori an epwe chok pwepweruk] nganei chuuk. Soukachaw [sou pwera] 
epe la mas on Kusae ren epe akaula sain Likinikechaw [shon afitikoko 
seni fanuan Masel] an epe tolong. A tingei Sou Yap [sou safei] Puluwat 
[Sou fal waa].73
The samol lap [paramount chief ] from Pohnpei desired a united 
people of the Caroline Islands to live together in peace. For that 
purpose, he sent souariras [the great dancer] to Chuuk to teach 
the people about dancing, and the great warrior called sou pwera 
[the great fighter] to Kosrae to keep outsiders from entering the 
empire. He also sent sou safei [the great medicine man] to Yap to 
teach the people the art of medicine, and finally the sou fal waa 
[the great canoe builder] to Puluwat.74
However, before the samol sent his sou people to their destinations, he 
also instructed them to treat all their subjects well in accordance with 
established customs and traditions. Interaction between the people 
70  Glenn Petersen, pers. comm., Micronesian Australia Friends Association (MAFA) Workshop, 
The Australian National University, 12 July 2014.
71  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 8–12; Joakim Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, p. 258.
72  The sawei system is one example (D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 146–149).
73  Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7.
74  My own translation of Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7, from Chuukese to English.
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between the respective areas under the sou was common.75 For example, 
if people from sou safei needed to learn the art of canoe building, they 
would travel to the place where sou fal waa resided, or vice versa if people 
from sou fal waa needed to learn the art of medicine. As Joakim Peter 
commented, in the earlier days, frequent voyages between islands were 
vital to the extended sou system; it kept relationships alive and created 
opportunities for people to interact and learn from each other.76 This 
interaction between Micronesians remains in place today but with 
additional purposes as Micronesians continue to adapt. The ongoing 
adaptation process binds the indigenous people in contemporary FSM.
Waa and Identity
Waa (canoe) and the sou fal waa (master canoe builder) represent an 
essential element of the Micronesian identity. That is because waa has 
sustained and transported Micronesian ideas across time and space. 
Specialised skills in canoe building and navigation were central to 
freedom of movement on the sea, which allowed islanders to restrengthen 
their connection, identity and continuity. Every island had sou fal waa. 
However, according to the Uruon Chuuk, there was a main source from 
which sou fal waa derived their knowledge. From that source, different 
techniques then emerged on different islands as they competed to create 
the best canoe model. Waa building was not just about cutting down 
a tree and carving it into a form. The sou fal waa had to possess multiple 
skills and global knowledge in relation to traditions. For example, 
intimate knowledge of breadfruit trees, carving techniques, special tools, 
measurement and people’s personalities.77 Knowing people’s personalities 
is essential to the building of canoes as it kept the team together and 
maintained skills within the extended family circle.
75  My own translation of Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7, from Chuukese to English.
76  Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, p. 258; Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 3.
77  I have experienced this firsthand; being an islander from Lukunor, I learned this from my 
elders. As a further example, I have also directly observed master canoe builders (sou fal waa) possess 
multiple skills and talents, like chanting, traditional measurement and religious practices. See also 
William Alkire, ‘Technical Knowledge and the Evolution of Political Systems in the Central and 
Western Caroline Islands of Micronesia’, Canadian Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 
1980, pp. 230–231; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 90–91; Don Rubinstein, ‘An Ethnography of 
Micronesian Childhood: Contexts of Socialisation on Fais Island’, PhD thesis, Stanford University, 
Stanford, California, 1979, p. 54.
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Traditional rituals are integral parts of canoe building as they signal the 
different stages of construction and the order in which the team needs to 
pay tribute to the ancestral gods to ensure success. For example, during 
wiieo ceremony, held upon the completion of the waa, the clan of the 
master builder, with his invited guests, would celebrate the event.78 It is 
an opportune time to display the canoe as a showpiece to the public and 
allow the larger community to take notice of the clan’s achievement. 
The  itang (master orator) would participate in this event to bless and 
praise the clan in its future endeavours.
Each island retains their specific knowledge about waa building. There 
is also an exchange of knowledge between islands when specific canoe 
designs for specific purposes are sought. For example, D’Arcy noted that 
even well-resourced high islanders used a variety of methods to retain 
their ability to build and sail canoes after sustained Western contact.79 
The villagers of Gachpar in Yap, for example, rely heavily on Carolinian 
seafarers for their knowledge and skills of voyaging. These skills enabled 
the Yap islanders to continue to sail to Palau and the Philippines.80
There are many types of canoe design81 found in the Caroline Islands, 
encompassing the modern states of Chuuk, Pohnpei, Kosrae and Yap. 
However, ioshol and maisuuk are shared Mortlockese designs. Maisuuk are 
also found in the western part of Chuuk, including the low-lying islands 
of Yap.82 Maisuuk has the ‘V’ shape on both ends of the canoe, resembling 
the tail of the frigate bird and its speed and agility. Palou Sitan offered 
further explanation of the ‘V’ shape as representing the genitalia of the 
female body and thus life, fertility and continuity.83 The body of maisuuk 
is painted in black and red to protect it from becoming waterlogged and 
the sun’s heat, while ioshol is painted black in its entirety without the 
78  Wiieo is a community gathering involving a feast and speeches to bless the completion of a canoe 
in adherence with custom. It is a time to display the pride of the clan’s master canoe builder.
79  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 144.
80  Peter Sitan, Interview, 2 January 2011; David Marar, Interview, Nett, Pohnpei, 5 January 2011.
81  Mai suk and ioshol are different canoe styles. Mai suk are bulkier and carry more weight on the 
sea. Ioshol are used for warfare, having greater agility, speed and manoeuvrability. On Lukunor, there 
was another type of canoe imported from Kapingamarangi called sain Kirinis (lit. ‘the style imported 
from Kapingamarangi’) (Kamilo Likichimus (master canoe builder from Lukunor), Interview, Weno, 
Chuuk, 20 June 2013).
82  Peter Sitan, Interview, 2 January 2011.
83  During one of my personal communications with Peter Sitan at The Australian National 
University on 29 April 2014, he sketched the ‘V’ shape and exposed it from all angles. When viewed 
from a distance, at a 90-degrees angle, there emerged a physical imagery of the female body, a sign of 
sea fertility.
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frigate bird tail shape at both ends. In Pohnpei and Kosrae, their present 
canoes have long outriggers, almost the length of the body,84 and are used 
primarily for transportation around the island itself rather than between 
islands. They do not see the need for long-distance canoes as they are well 
resourced agriculturally.
Figure 5: Maisuuk sailing canoe often used by some Mortlockese, 
people in the outer islands of northwest Chuuk and the atoll dwellers 
in Yap.
Source: Photograph taken by Donald Rubinstein on Yap in 2015.
The title palou (master navigator) epitomises the essence of Micronesian 
oceanic identity. The title is bestowed upon those who have demonstrated 
the many qualities and abilities necessary to lead people on voyages far 
and wide. For instance, a palou must have the skills of a negotiator, an 
astronomer, a master chanter, a charmer, a priest of the high seas, a warrior, 
and, most of all, a leader with courage and patience.85 He is almost like 
an itang in terms of the skills and knowledge he possesses and needs to 
master. No one questions the skills of the palou when on the sea as to do 
so would bring negative consequences. The palou still practise their skills 
and are well regarded in island communities today. Their achievements are 
celebrated by po (admission to the exclusive club for master navigators), 
84  Segal G. Harvey, Kosrae: The Sleeping Lady Awakens, Kosrae Tourist Division, Department of 
Conservation and Development, Kosrae State Government, FSM, 1989, p. 52.
85  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 80.
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especially in the western islands of Chuuk and the low-lying islands of 
Yap, for example, Pollap and Satawal.86 In the Mortlocks, palou are still 
around, although no sailing canoes have been constructed since Typhoon 
Pamela destroyed all existing ones in the Mortlocks in 1975.87
Shaping of Identities
The FSM is a collection of many islands with different forms of landscapes, 
communities and traditions. The physical environment and climate 
influence the way space is used, conceptualised and given social identity, 
and also how resources are consumed and conserved. The Micronesian 
archipelago is made up of three types of islands:88 volcanic high islands, 
like the main islands of Pohnpei, Yap, Kosrae, Weno, Fefan and Uman; 
low-lying atolls, such as Namonenu, Namonuito, Ulithi, Lamotrek, 
Mokilia and Pingelap; and standalone raised coral islands, such as Nama 
and Satawal. Typical atolls are encircled by coral reefs with a deep lagoon 
and enough vegetation to support its dwellers and biosystem, while 
standalone raised coral islands are completely surrounded by the sea.89 
Atoll islanders are heavily dependent on the sea because of a lack of land. 
Volcanic islands are typically lush with rich fauna and flora in comparison 
to the low-lying islands because of the presence of mountains that block 
moisture-laden winds off the sea, forcing them upwards to condense as 
rain clouds.90 The different types of island environments have influenced 
varying community organisations and social identities.
Island communities are constructed and spread along the shoreline, 
allowing immediate access to the sea on both high and low islands. The sea 
provides food and sea life that can be utilised for their medicinal properties, 
as well as a place to perform religious activities to appease the anun saat 
(sea gods). It is also the place where young people develop and practise 
their skills in fishing, sailing, martial arts, swimming, weather reading, 
romance and leisure. All these activities are crucial in the construction 
of one’s ‘sense of belonging’ to the islands or being a genuine remetaw. 
86  James Naich, pers. comm. (online), 21 August 2013.
87  Jimmy Emilio, pers. comm., 5 January 2013. Jimmy is a descendant of one of the great palou 
of Ettal, Limiroch. However, palou Simen also possessed the art of palou (D’Arcy, The People of the 
Sea, p. 80).
88  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, p. 5.
89  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, p. 5.
90  Darcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 13–20.
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The sea is also where rites of passage take place, especially for young 
males. In the past, an example of a rite of passage to enter manhood was 
a young male having to join a fauko (deep sea fish trap) trip where certain 
rituals had to be performed. His elders had to decide his fate based on his 
performance of the required fauko task. As Felik, a traditional historian 
once noted, ‘the sea is where one is born and returns when one dies’.91 
Once a young male became a man, he was required to sleep in the ainang’s 
faal (men’s house) until he found a suitable wife. The chosen wife had to 
come from outside the clan to comply with eoranei fel (sacred traditions); 
that is, avoiding marrying his own female relatives. The faal was like 
the forum where young men undertook further training in traditional 
curriculum such as martial arts, dancing, mask carving, canoe building, 
fishing techniques and public oratory.92 The ainang history was taught in 
detail to orient the young men about their place in the ainang diaspora 
and within the community hierarchy.
It was also a testing time for young men to hone their interests in 
particular sets of skills to enable them to acquire the title sou (lit. ‘one who 
specialised in …’), for example, sou set (specialised fishermen), sou fal waa 
(specialised canoe builders) and sou rong (expert in traditional medicine 
and martial arts).93 Steven Maipi, a former teacher from Lukunor, 
described what constituted a real man: ‘a man must not only possess the 
skills required by eoranei, but must know when to use his internal strength 
as to when to fight, negotiate, and withdraw’.94 These principles were 
played out in relations with outsiders, especially during the Japanese and 
US occupations, to protect the integrity of Micronesian cultures.
91  Felix Naich, or Felik as locals call him, was a historian of Lukunor Island. He was born in the 
early twentieth century and experienced all the changes on Lukunor Island from the German era to 
the US Trust Administration. I grew up listening to his histories of the island from settlement, culture 
and contact with the outside world. In his estimation, knowledge of history gives one identity and 
stability in life. Explanation of the importance of traditional history is explained generally by William 
H. Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-Island Socio-Economic Ties, University of Illinois Press, 1965, 
pp. 114–119; Hanlon, ‘Micronesia: Writing and Rewriting the Histories of a Nonentity’, pp. 7–8.
92  Felix Naich, oral history. Many of the activities were still practised when I was living on Lukunor, 
my island home.
93  The term ‘sou’ is still used in the Mortlocks to refer to people with specialised skills (Felix 
Naich and Kamilo Likichimus, oral history). I learned the history from Felix and observed Kamilo 
carving many canoes in the 1960s and 1970s on Lukunor Island. I also interviewed Peter Sitan at 
The Australian National University on 29 April 2014. The term ‘sou’ is also used in Pohnpei to refer 
to persons with high standing in the community.
94  Steven Maipi was my teacher in the early 1970s. He came from the clan Sor. His sub-clan are 
known to have secret knowledge of paralysing people by placing pressure on specific parts of the 
human anatomy called tikifel. He explained what it means to be a real man in view of our customs 
and traditions.
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In many parts of Micronesia, entering manhood or womanhood is 
an important event in a person’s life as it formalises one’s status in the 
community and creates new networks in the community by virtue of 
marriage outside the clan.95 In the past, finding a suitable wife or husband 
involved one’s participation in social events such as traditional apwarik 
(special dances).96 Apwarik could be sponsored by any samol of a particular 
ainang. Apwarik often took place in the faal (clan’s community meeting 
house) owned by the ainang. Apwarik was a time when relationships 
formed. The son or daughter of the samol who sponsored the apwarik 
had to pick his or her choice of partner first during the apwarik. Apwarik 
could take many nights and only ended when the son or daughter of 
the samol found a partner to marry. Others formed relationships during 
apwarik as well. Apwarik was important in the life of the community 
as it facilitated many important activities; it created trade, enhanced 
religious practices and reinforced connections between local people and 
others from different islands. For example, people who participated in 
apwarik had to dress up to impress their opposites. The best island attires 
were worn during the event, such as urupow (elaborate feathers), taek 
(turmeric), lofor (traditional perfume), mwaremwar or akelet (leis) and toor 
(traditional lavalava).97 New dances were invented and kapasan tong (love 
poetry) composed to attract the attention of the intended partner. Many 
items used during apwarik had to be sought from elsewhere. Wa  serek 
(sailing canoes) were often sent to far-off destinations to trade for the 
desired goods and reconnect with distant clan members.98
Lamelam (religious) rituals were part of the apwarik activities. Opposing 
parties who competed to win the affection of the most desired partners 
would call on the assistance of their ancestral gods. Lofor me tukmaun 
(potions) and ngorongor (chanting) were used as part of the apwarik rituals 
95  Personal experience. It was explained to me that social behaviours distinguish man from woman, 
as well as real men from ordinary men. From early childhood, I learned how to behave accordingly.
96  Personal knowledge as taught to me by Felix Naich (oral historian).
97  Mortlocks Oral History. Apwarik was one of the big events in island life as it brought together 
young people and, in the process, they formed romantic relationships. The event was also used 
for displaying one’s wealth as imported items were used for bodily decoration. Wealth connects to 
people’s identity and social standing. Religious practices were also used as in awar (magic/love potion) 
See brief comments by Thomas Gladwin, East is a Big Bird: Navigation and Logic on Puluwat Atoll, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970, pp. 61–62. See also Goodenough, Under 
the Heaven’s Brow, pp. 26–27.
98  Mortlocks Oral History. These Mortlockese economic activities were replicated across the 
Caroline Islands, especially in and among atoll communities. See e.g. Alkire, Coral Islanders, ch. 3, 
‘Daily Activities’, pp. 41–68.
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to increase the chances for one to capture the heart of a desired partner. 
The traditional historian Felik spoke of a popular legend called pon mosor 
(sweet smell of the mosor flowers) where a shy young man always hid 
outside the apwarik venue. The sweet smell of his mosor mwaremwar 
(lei) captured the imagination of the queen of the apwarik. The queen 
followed the smell and immediately fell in love with the shy young man. 
It was claimed that the mwaremwar was a love potion provided by the 
young man’s father, assisted by the hands of an ancestral god.99
Continuity Under Threat
Continuity of the human–environmental relations at the heart of 
Micronesian identity is under threat because of climate change and 
illegal fishing activities by distant countries. Currently, the national 
government is undergoing a series of changes to implement strategies 
to slow down such threats, especially the impact of climate change.100 
The  key question directing government strategy is, what is the best 
method to maintain the health of the environment to sustain Micronesian 
continuity? Micronesians must fight these threats to safeguard their home 
islands. Deep historical knowledge and reinforcement of environmental 
laws, both at the domestic and international level, are essential in the 
maintenance of the ecological system.101 Islanders’ acute awareness of their 
aquatic environment has enabled them to plan better for the future. This 
essentially optimistic local outlook is at odds with the general prognosis 
for Micronesia’s environmental future and community sustainability as 
the international consensus emphasises only the vulnerability of these 
Pacific communities. This book seeks to overturn the marginalisation 
of Micronesians’ knowledge of their own environment and ability to 
self-sustain. Continued misrepresentation has practical and far-reaching 
contemporary consequences.
Fanou works in sync with saat; they provide sustenance, stability, 
identity and continuity for Micronesians. The land is the provider of the 
daily intake of carbohydrates, which the sea complements with protein.102 
99  Alkire, Coral Islanders, ch. 3.
100  FSM Climate Change Policy, Palikir, 2011, pp. 2–3.
101  Lieber, More Than a Living, pp. 51–59.
102  Islanders from the Mortlocks always need salei (protein, being meat or fish) to eat with taros and 
breadfruit, for example. A meal consisting only of carbohydrates is considered an impoverished meal.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
56
Applying that concept to a Mortlockese perspective, it means the land 
provides mongo (the daily meal) and the sea provides salei (protein) to 
compliment mongo. One’s identity is also tied to the land as it is where the 
ainang established its roots, meaning the traditional faal system.103 Any 
person who is not connected to a faal would be considered a stranger from 
afar. However, strangers are often adopted by mwalo, and, as a consequence, 
new connections are established with the stranger’s distant ainang.104 New 
connections expand familial networks. This is important in contemporary 
Micronesian political discourse, especially during elections when kinsfolk 
are called upon to contribute to the campaign process. This in turn 
reinforces clan identity and networks in the island diaspora. The extended 
family continue to be the safety net for Micronesians. It is the foundation 
of the traditional economy to prevent destitution. The extended family 
system has increased its global connections by virtue of the new diaspora 
facilitated by the Compact between the FSM and US. This has expanded 
Micronesian identity and continuity on a global scale.
Figure 6: A clan’s faal on Lukunor Island.
Note: This style of faal is common throughout the Mortlocks region. It is used by men 
to perform their traditional activities and serves as the meeting place for the clan.
Source: Photograph taken by Amanson Ansin in 2012.
103  Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll, pp. 28–29.
104  Goodenough, Under Heaven’s Brow, p. 29.
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Community and Gender Relations
Gender roles are typically differentiated by the complexities of the 
tasks and  traditions of each island environment.105 For example, in 
the  Mortlocks  region, male tasks typically involve activities requiring 
strength such as climbing trees, carrying heavy loads, diving, canoe 
building and long-distance sailing.106 Females are assigned tasks that are 
considered light, such as cooking, caring for children, gathering firewood 
and weaving. However, there are tasks shared by both the sexes such as 
scraping coconuts, gathering firewood and tending the gardens. In  the 
western part of Chuuk, cooking, seashell gathering and collecting taros 
are female tasks. It is also noted that, in many of the outer islands, 
fishing tasks are specifically assigned to males while women perform land-
based tasks.107
However, the gendered division of labour does not mean males always have 
the dominant power because of physical strength. In some communities, 
females wield power because they control the land and maintain the 
clanship system where one’s identity is rooted. It is also noted that gender 
relations are also changing because of certain features of the modern 
economic system, which is affecting power relations because of differences 
in performance in the modern education system and employment market.
Community Structure
The basic unit of an island community in the Mortlock Islands is 
inepwinou (father, mother and their children) followed by mwalo (sister 
of the same great grandmother and all their offspring). The size of each 
mwalo depends on the number of children of the sisters. Different mwalo 
are part of an oushamw (belonging to the mwalo) who share the same faal, 
which is made up a branch of an ainang. Members of mwalo share their 
105  Francis X. Hezel, Edwin Q. P. Petteys and Deborah L. Chang, ‘Sustainable Human Development 
in the FSM. Chapter 2: The People and Their Cultures’, micsem.org/pubs/articles/economic/ shd/
frames/chapter02fr.htm.
106  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 45–46; Lingenfelter, Yap, 
pp. 19–29; Goodenough, Under Heaven’s Brow, p. 26.
107  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 45–46; D’Arcy, The People 
of the Sea, p. 177; Lingenfelter, Yap, pp. 19–29; Descantes Christophe, ‘Integrating Archaeology and 
Ethnohistory: The Development of Exchange Between Yap and Ulithi, Western Caroline Islands 
(Micronesia)’, PhD thesis, UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1998, pp. 71–72.
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pei lap (estate). Each island has different ainang, ranked in order of their 
arrival.108 Membership of an ainang is automatically inherited, with all 
the ascribed rights and privileges. The extent of an ainang diaspora is 
dependent on the ainang’s own history. For example, in many parts of the 
FSM, each of these ainang link to a greater network dispersed throughout 
a designated geographical space and beyond.109 When one arrives on an 
island for the first time, the question always asked of the visitor is, ‘ia omw 
ainang or an semomw ainang?’ (‘What is your clan or father’s clan?’). This is 
to enable the receiving islanders to connect the visitor to their kinsfolk.110
Aterenges is the next level up, which constitutes relatives from both 
sides of the parents. Membership in the father’s clan is afaker (honorary 
member), though with lesser rights to the father’s clan properties. Members 
of the father’s ainang have duties and obligations to defend their afaker 
when under threat. Afaker are treated with marked respect by their father’s 
clan. For example, afaker can go unpunished if consuming food on the 
father clan’s land while in different parts of an island.111
The uruo of each ainang is used to establish the history of each island 
in the FSM.112 Ainang connects identity to locality and other places 
in a region. For example, the ainang Sor is widespread throughout the 
region of Chuuk and the low-lying islands of Yap, as Alkire suggested 
in his study of Lamotrek.113 This is one of the biggest ainang in a wider 
region. The origins of other clans began in the Chuuk lagoon and extend 
to Pohnpei and Kosrae as suggested by oral narratives. Rauchholz noted 
that in pre-colonial times, there was contact between the different Trukic 
communities through ‘family connection and commerce’.114
108  Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll, p. 29; Oral history of Lukunor Island.
109  Clan connection is now more widespread within the FSM as people are allowed (or able?) to 
migrate between the four states.
110  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 46–47; Rubinstein, 
‘An Ethnography of Micronesian Childhood’, p. 90. I personally experienced this when I travelled in 
the Mortlocks, the Chuuk lagoon and Pohnpei.
111  Afaker are special to the father’s clan as it is the duty of the father to protect his children (Duane, 
Clan and Copra, p. 91).
112  David Damas, Bountiful Island: A Study of Land Tenure on a Micronesian Island, Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, Canada, 1994, pp. 18–19; David Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar: A History of the Island 
of Pohnpei to 1890, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu, 1988, pp. 7–9.
113  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, p. 42 (the clans called Saur 
in Yap and Sor in Chuuk); Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 35; Manuel Rauchholz, ‘Notes on 
Clan Histories and Migration in Micronesia’, Pacific Asia Inquiry, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 2011, pp. 57–59.
114  Rauchholz, ‘Notes on Clan Histories and Migration in Micronesia’, p. 53.
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Political power on each island resides with the makal of ainang who 
represent the first settlers; the ainang control land and the reef by virtue of 
being the first residents. The makal allocated ownership of land and the reef 
to subsequent clans who, in turn, passed on their properties through the 
generations. The makal are still recognised as the traditional spokesperson for 
each island, especially in the Mortlocks region. Today, the clanship network 
system is still in full swing and central to the Micronesian sense of social 
identity. The ainang system is a security network that constantly dislodged 
foreign elements that purported to rupture the longstanding Micronesian 
traditional societies. Ainang is the basis of economic production, which 
sustains the various social identities, which in turn collectively feeds into 
the larger pool of the present Micronesian sense of identity.
The inhabitants of the volcanic island of Pohnpei have developed 
a different social system in comparison to those found on the low-lying 
islands in Chuuk and Yap. Pohnpei’s social structure is highly stratified, 
with five districts headed by a paramount chief called the Nanmwarkhi.115 
His ‘spokesperson’, the Nahniken,116 is chosen from the second-ranking 
clan in each district. Nahnmwarki and Nahniken sit at the apex of the social 
pyramid, with their subordinates and the untitled people below them.117 
Their subordinates are assigned specific community tasks and maintain 
the specific structure of the social order. During kamadhipw (community 
feast), social ranks are displayed by the order of where individuals are 
seated and served in the nahs (traditional meeting place). The public 
members observe everyday rituals, especially during kamadhipw (feasts) 
where they pay their dues to the Nahnmwarkhi by contributing sakau, 
pigs, yams, fish and other items appropriate for the kamadhipw.
In the low-lying islands in Yap and Chuuk, the social structure is less 
stratified, with the samol or tamol responsible for each clan or sub-
clan.118 Their ranks are noted during mweishen fanou (island meeting). 
In  Kosrae, the highest chiefs are called Tokosra (the sacred chief ) and 
Kanka (secular chief ).119
115  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, p. 144; Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and 
Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 60–63; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 354.
116  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, p. 144; Alkire; An Introduction to the Peoples and 
Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 60–63; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 354.
117  Hezel, Petteys and Chang, ‘Sustainable Human Development in the FSM’, micsem.org/pubs/
articles/economic/shd/frames/chapter03fr.htm.
118  Samol is used in many parts of Chuuk, while Tamol is used in the outer islands of Yap.
119  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, p. 132.
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Survival mechanisms in the FSM, both intra- and inter-island, are 
premised on the principle of reciprocity. At both levels, individuals assist 
each other when the need arises, for example, in the erection of faal, 
building of canoes and agricultural activities that require a large number 
of people. An individual may volunteer to trade his labour in exchange 
for a particular item from the other person or may be obliged to assist due 
to familial ties. The volunteer will, in return, expect the recipient of such 
labour to reciprocate when the need for future work arises, thus triggering 
the stimulus and response cycle.120 This model underscores the foundation 
of economic modes of production in traditional Micronesian societies and 
further protects members of the community from exploitation.121 This 
practice has continued through successive colonial periods to the present 
day. However, it must be remembered that the strength of traditional 
practices varies between the port towns and the distant islands because 
of the former’s exposure to external influences, particularly the market 
economy.122
Colonisation has also influenced labour relations and property 
transactions  between people. This was particularly true after WWII, 
when Micronesia was slowly integrated into the capitalist economy under 
the US.123 Money was increasingly used as mode of exchange. Its power 
interfered with the existing reciprocal system, especially in the port 
towns where labourers were paid in cash rather than returning favours. 
Land, labour and Western commodities can also be bought with money, 
especially by the new, small business class. Money found its way into 
the local system during the colonisation period, but many people are 
mindful about its effect on communities.124 For example, many people 
at the village level continue to work by the ainang system as it has proven 
many times over to be a safety net. Money does have its own value but is 
120  David Labby, The Demystification of Yap: Dialectics of Culture on a Micronesian Island, University 
of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 20.
121  My personal experience, which includes reciprocating in village activities such as apwipwi 
(working together in a team and taking turns working each team members’ land) on the taro farms.
122  Gonzaga Puas, Labour Standards in the FSM, FSM Department of Justice, Palikir, 12 April 2005, 
pp. 3–4.
123  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 73–83.
124  When I was growing up on the islands, dried copra were sold to field trip ships in return for cash. 
Goods were then bought and distributed within the extended family as the copra were collected from 
the family land. See also Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 31–32; Labby, The Demystification of 
Yap, p. 8.
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controlled by the external world. The Micronesian identity thus reflects 
the social dynamics of the FSM. It constantly negotiates itself in response 
to changes in the global system.
However, this is not to say that the social disruption brought about by the 
influence of the outside world has completely obliterated the Micronesian 
social safety net mechanism. For example, emigration, education and 
the legal system are playing their parts to suppress the tide of societal 
disruption, as alluded to in Hezel’s studies. Emigration, both internally 
and internationally, has created more opportunities for many islanders to 
relocate to different places, creating a new outlet by which to understand 
the globalised world.125 The educational system, especially the College of 
Micronesia, is equipping the new generation with the means to understand 
and live successfully in the new world.126
The style of governance at the three levels of government has allowed the 
new generation to engage in the democratic process. Varieties of youth 
and community groups have expanded in large numbers throughout the 
nation, thus giving rise to more opportunities for the younger generation 
to assist each other to be better citizens, both at the community level 
and through collaborating with other international youth groups. The 
expanding numbers of indigenous people with college degrees from many 
parts of the world and the perpetual rearticulation of the extended family 
system in the FSM is testimony to how the people have reversed the image 
of the FSM as the suicide capital of the world.
The Environment
Fanou and saat provide the basis for identity and continuity. In the pre-
colonial period, the management of resources was community-based, 
owned and jointly managed by members of the extended ainang127 (clan) 
or mwalo (sub-clan). This form of alilis fengen (caring for each other) 
and eaea fengen (sharing resources) bind the ainang members together as 
125  Micronesia Forum, www.micronesiaforum.org/.
126  Micronesia Forum, www.micronesiaforum.org/.
127  Ainang is the clanship network system that has effectively been the foundation of Micronesian 
identity. It is one of the most important concepts to understand as we cannot comprehend the full 
extent of FSM history without it. Leaders continue to use this network to maintain socio-political 
connections (Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, p. 23).
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a social unit.128 Ainang is a large extended family identified by the physical 
space they share with relatives in a local area or within the diaspora. 
Food production has always been a collective enterprise that connects the 
mwalo or ainang.129 Micronesians have lived in close harmony with their 
fanou and saat for centuries, managing the resources to ensure continuity 
for future generations. Disharmony arose when the production and use 
of natural resources was out of kilter, for example, when recalcitrant 
clans sought to reorder the control of resources in territory they were not 
historically entitled to.
The economy and society are interconnected by the aforementioned 
principles, which in turn contribute to the conservation of resources. 
Traditional methods of environmental management are still in practice 
today. They include pwau, otoul, mwanmei and unupwel (restriction and 
offerings of coconuts, breadfruit and taro). Many of these practices are also 
common (but with different terms) in the Micronesian region, such as in 
Yap, Pohnpei and Kosrae.130 Moreover, conservation techniques varied as 
these are dependent on the topography and seascape of each island.131 For 
example, in the low-lying islands, pwau is the most effective method of 
conservation, restricting human activities from degrading fragile parts 
of the coral reef and the land along the seashores.
During lerak, the summer season (usually from May to September), 
restrictions on taro consumption may have been imposed on members 
of a clan by its samol (traditional leader). Such restrictions allowed taro 
to grow fully as they take three years to mature. Also, during lerak, when 
breadfruits are in abundance, members of each mwalo would band 
together to harvest them and store them underground where they ferment, 
preserving the breadfruit—called mar—for later use.132 Restriction of 
movement between villages was another way to ensure maintenance of a 
128  Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p. 55.
129  Eaea/alilis fengen is the principle of sharing to promote continuity (Marshall, ‘The Structure of 
Solidarity’, p. 62). For land sharing, see Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 77–78.
130  Rubinstein, ‘An Ethnography of Micronesian Childhood’, p. 52; Knudson, ‘Resource Fluctuation’, 
pp. 194–195.
131  Lingenfelter, Yap, pp. 5–17; Margie V. Cushing Falanruw, ‘Food Production and Ecosystem 
Management in Yap’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, Rainy Season 1994, 
pp. 11–18; Bill Raynor, ‘Resource Management of Upland Forests of Pohnpei: Past Practices and 
Future Possibilities’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, Rainy Season 1994, 
pp. 49–64.
132  Mar is an important food item specially eaten during the lefang months. Relatives from the 
mother’s side usually share the mar.
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clan’s resources. For example, members of village A may not enter village 
B without prior permission. This is to prevent wanderers from damaging 
the land or helping themselves to the resources on someone else’s land.
According to oral history, coral rocks were arranged in such a way so as to 
facilitate the natural flow of currents and patterns of waves to minimise 
shore erosion. Planting of native plants such as rakish (seaoaks), fash 
(pandanus), mosor (guettarda speciosa) and shia (mangrove) a few feet 
from the shorelines was another method used, with rocks and heavy 
debris used to fill the gap between the shore and the native plants. This 
was a form of local adaptation and a mitigation strategy developed to 
strengthen the shorelines where they were susceptible to erosion and 
damage from currents and waves.133 Since colonisation, the landscape has 
been altered to accommodate the needs of outsiders in the forms of docks 
and seawalls. This has created more problems in managing the seascape 
and shore erosion. Outsiders’ lack of knowledge of the environment and 
their ignorance of local knowledge to facilitate the proper installation of 
the seawalls and docks are the main problems that have persisted into the 
post-colonial period.
These problems have been re-evaluated along with the new compound 
threat of climate change. Climate change is a new phenomenon caused 
by industrialised countries in distant lands, yet its impact is felt in the 
island environment. It is altering the integrity of the fragile environment, 
especially in the low-lying atolls. To this end, new seawall design is being 
used as a defence mechanism to prevent breach erosion due to climate 
change.134 Moreover, traditional methods have been combined with 
outside engineering methods. The complementary nature of historical 
understanding of the environment and the use of compatible modern 
technology is an ongoing process, as discussed in Chapter 6.
The Constitution safeguards traditional methods of conservation of the 
FSM’s territorial sea as recognised by international law. It also incorporates 
modern practices compatible with traditions. An example of this can be 
133  Marion Henry (FSM Secretary of Resources and Development), Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 
5 July 2013.
134  Between 22 and 26 June 2013, I travelled to Kosrae and observed a new seawall design. It 
promoted local adaptation to climate change using appropriate forms of technology borrowed from 
the outside world. The FSM’s climate change policy promotes integration of modern technology to 
be used in the nation. See Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009: The Federated States of Micronesia, 
14 December 2009, p. 2.
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seen in the allocation of the nation’s resources between the municipality, 
state and national governments. For instance, marine space between these 
respective jurisdictions is clearly defined; ownership of reefs by different 
clans is acknowledged in the constitutions of the states of Yap and 
Chuuk. Municipalities control the areas around the reefs, often using the 
traditional methods of pwau to conserve the sea and land environment, 
while the states are responsible for conservation outside the municipal 
border to the 12-mile zone. The national government has conservational 
jurisdiction from the 12-mile zone to the 200-mile EEZ.135
Religious Practices
Lamelamen eoranei (traditional religious practices) are an integral part of 
Micronesian self-assurance, control and continuity. Religious practices 
formalised people’s relationship with the environment and each other 
throughout history. For example, environmental conservation practices 
command people to treat and respect nature since it provides sustenance 
for life. Sacred places, such as designated special spaces, rocks, trees 
and places on the reef, have meaningful historical value,136 as may be 
explained by the narratives of the different clans. For example, each 
designated space may honour the sacredness of the ancestors to that clan. 
Sacredness connotes restriction of access to the land and the reef, which is 
reserved for the members of that clan only, referred to as aan shon ainang 
(designated area for a particular clan or sub-clan).137 People respect these 
reserved areas, as to dishonour such would mean violence between the 
extended families of the perpetrators and the guardians of the sacred areas. 
Respect helps maintain equilibrium between people of different clans and 
the environment. As in the popular traditional saying, ‘liwini ngeni pwal 
neningeni’ (lit. ‘one good turn deserves another’).
135  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article I; Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 
8 FSM Intrm. 353 (Pon. 1998).
136  Each clan sets the value and the significance of its designated spaces. It also demands that the 
public observe such significance. Conflict could arise from disrespecting a space’s sacredness.
137  Reinforcement of sacred spaces is not confined to the clan members only, but also includes 
obligated afaker and non-clan relatives.
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To seek assistance from the leeo (ancestral gods), waitawa138 
(communication between the ancestors and the living that involved the 
spokesperson entering into a trance of spiritual possession) is used as a 
medium of communication between the people and their leoo. The leoo’s 
wisdom protects the environment by establishing the norms of conduct 
for the people as custodians of fanou (land) and saat (sea). Traditional 
concepts such as roong (life science), maniman (spiritual power), sou safei 
(medicine person), eoranei (traditions), anulap (the big god) and anukis 
(the lesser gods) are integral parts of Micronesian religious doctrines as 
embedded139 in each clan’s history.
Offerings are part of religious practices to ensure the ongoing special 
relationship between the ancestors and the people. For example, oneiset 
(first offering of fish), mwanmei (first offering of breadfruit), otoul (first 
offering of coconuts) and wenipwel (first offering of taros) are deep 
gestures to thank the ancestors for keeping the land and sea productive. 
These offerings are taken to the clan’s chief, the living mediator between 
the clan and its samol. It also signifies the clan’s appreciation of the public’s 
respect in relation to the doctrine of pwau, which effectively allows the 
land or reef to recover.140 The above connection between religious and 
conservation methods are still practised today. Reflecting the importance 
of religious practices, the Constitution recognises them as inherent 
fundamental rights141 of the Micronesian people.
The extent of ‘Micronesianising’142 foreign religion can be well 
understood in connection to Christianity. Christianity is an alien 
religion, yet Micronesians have integrated it into their religious 
practices.143 Micronesians inserted their own religious ideology into the 
138  Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, p. 55. Note that Goodenough used 
different spellings of the word ‘waitawa’ (his version is ‘waitawa’) but it is the same religious concept. 
Similarly, he used different spellings for many Chuukese words, some of which are unfamiliar to me. 
See also Francis X. Hezel, ‘Possession and Trance in Chuuk’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995, www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/socprobs/frames/posstranfr.htm.
139  Religion in traditional societies was patterned along ainang’s own anulap and anukis. This continues 
to be the case in many local communities in the modern FSM. See Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples 
and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 17–18; Francis X. Hezel, ‘Spirit Possession in Chuuk: A Socio-Cultural 
Interpretation’, Micronesian Seminar, Pohnpei, 1991, www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/socprobs/frames/
spiritposschkfr.htm.
140  Personal knowledge. See also D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 98–99.
141  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Articles IV and V.
142  ‘Mironesianising’ refers to the process of incorporating outside influences into a Micronesian 
context.
143  Joakim Peter, ‘Eram’s Church (Bell)’, pp. 282–285.
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womb of Christianity and, over time, this gave birth to what I coin as 
‘Micronesianity’. Micronesianity is the appropriation of Christianity 
by Micronesians. Micronesianity perpetuates social cohesion through 
religious and community relations. For example, the use of awosiwos144 
is practised to receive favourable outcomes from both the traditional and 
Christian god in times of conflict or self-doubt. The gods share the same 
religious space.
Figure 7: An example of ‘Micronesianity’.
Note: Here, a statue of Jesus Christ stands at the edge of Lukunor’s channel, where the 
spirits of the ancestors continue to live in the environment—they are sharing the same space.
Source: Photograph taken by Jocelyn Rayphand in June 2014.
Freedom to practise one’s belief system has long been a part of Micronesian 
history, as may be seen in each clan’s practices. This is recognised by the 
Constitution and the FSM’s legal codes. As declared in Article IV, Section 
2 of the Constitution, ‘no law may be passed respecting an establishment 
of religion or impairing the free exercise of religion’.145 Section 207 of the 
FSM Code Title 42 states that:
Nothing in this (title) shall be interpreted to preclude the practice 
of, or require medical health care licenses for, the traditional 
healing arts as customarily employed by citizens of the Federated 
States of Micronesia.146
144  Awosuwos is a form of traditional psychological warfare through subtle performance or songs 
with hidden meanings to call for spiritual support from both the ancestors and the Christian god.
145  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
146  FSM Code Title 42, fsmlaw.org/fsm/code/index.htm.
67
2. PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETY AND IDENTITY
Healing is part of Micronesian religious practices. It involves calling upon 
the leoo to assist in curing social and physical ailments,147 for example. 
In  this respect, traditional religious practices also serve to reinforce for 
social relationships.
Social Organisation
Social organisation reflects the different units of community present on 
each island or group of islands as patterned along the different ainang 
system. The ainang is a kin-based unit usually translated as a clan 
designed to perpetuate both local and regional continuity; it centres on 
social relations. Shon ainang148 (members of the clan) naturally inherited 
their identity first from the mother’s149 ainang and second by the father’s 
ainang. In Chuuk, and in some parts of Yap and Pohnpei, matrilineality 
is more dominant, but one is also connected to the father’s clan as an 
afaker.150 This dual membership passes on rights and obligations to the 
next generation. This in turn maintains connection with one’s relatives 
and allocates one’s rank in the islands’ ainang system.
The degree of obligation upon individual members depends on their 
social position in the clan. At a minimum, one is expected to be loyal in 
order to have access to the ainang’s economic resources and social status. 
Each member is required to defend the integrity of the clan. The people of 
each island created their own customary laws to safeguard their resources. 
The differences in social organisations are most notable between volcanic 
and low-lying islands. This also affected the way islanders responded to 
each other within the Micronesian archipelagos. For example, islanders 
on the small coral islands do not share many of the customs practised by 
islanders on the mountainous islands such as Yap, Pohnpei and Kosrae, 
which are more socially hierarchical because of their comparatively large 
land mass and greater population.151
147  According to oral history, ruup (yaws skin disease) was common throughout the islands in the 
Mortlocks and beyond. It is not known what the remedy for this skin disease was. Oral history spoke 
of magic men who tested the power of their magic or potion to lure beautiful women to clean the 
men’s diseased skin.
148  Shon ainang means one’s membership in a clan (Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p. 62).
149  As most Micronesians societies are matrilineal, the mother’s clan identity is one’s prime identity.
150  Afaker means one’s associate membership in the father’s clan. For more details, see Marshall, 
‘The Structure of Solidarity’, pp. 94–95.
151  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 130–132.
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The ainang system is not confined to one locale but is spread across 
different islands depending on their historical connection—common 
ancestry, marriage and trading partners. In the high volcanic islands like 
Pohnpei and Yap, social and political relationships are more stratified, 
with a greater degree of recognised hierarchy between clans (close knit 
and interrelated families) and lineage (a common ancestor), as in the 
Nahnmwarki152 and sawei systems of Pohnpei and Yap, respectively.
In contrast, the smaller social units in the outer islands of modern-day 
Yap, Chuuk and Pohnpei rely on their own internal hierarchy of clans 
within their particular island and their inter-island relatives based largely 
on who arrived first, reflecting the pattern of settlement of each island 
or group of islands.153 Disputes between opposing parties are referred to 
the social units within the local system or the larger social units between 
islands, depending on the complexity of the issues. For instance, stealing 
of coconuts would be dealt with by the heads of the village families, 
while killing would be dealt with between opposing clans in the islands’ 
diaspora. However, in the modern-day FSM, a blend of the old and new is 
used to resolve disputes. One can choose whether to use the court system 
or traditional options of settlement.154 Often, ainang leaders have roles 
in the arbitration of disputes between opposing parties. Traditionally, 
compensation for damages depended on the nature of the injury and 
the cultural geography where the injuries occurred.155 For example, for 
offences such as personal injuries and property damage, the recompense 
was measured in material dues proportionate to the pain and suffering 
experienced by the victim, or the extent of injury or damage. The goal of 
dispute resolution was to maintain cohesion between the social entities 
of Micronesia.
In some instances, public shaming of the perpetrator was also warranted. 
However, the occurrence of a death was a complex and sensitive issue 
between the families of both the victim and the perpetrator. Sometimes, 
retribution was the only way to resolve the breach, but that had the effect of 
152  Nahnmwarki is the paramount chief of the chiefdoms in Pohnpei. See Hanlon, Upon a Stone 
Altar, p. 366.
153  Personal knowledge. This is enshrined in The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Article XI.
154  Michael Lieber, Using Custom in a Court of Law, Association of Social Anthropologists in 
Oceania (ASAO) Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 5–7 February 2012, pp. 1–12.
155  FSM v Mudong, 1 FSM Intrm. 135 (Pon. 1982), fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
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escalating into a vicious cycle of violence.156 The modern legal system may 
interfere to prevent further violence. Violence may be confined to a local 
area, or could spread to a wider geographical space by dint of families’ 
extended relations on other islands by virtue of marriage or clan connection.
In the past, revenge could restore peace when one side acknowledged 
defeat;157 it was seen as a form of honouring the so-called victor. Land 
giving, gifting and surrendering of fishing rights to the victors were 
also practices used to restore peace in the community.158 Many of these 
practices are still used in Micronesia but with their own subtleties. 
Shon liken (outsiders) may find it hard to comprehend customary laws 
in contemporary Micronesia as such understanding requires a deep 
connection with the local community. It is my contention that the 
same deep-seated continuity in traditional Micronesian societies has 
served as both a stabilising influence in times of external disruption and 
a confounder for external commentators and administrators attempting 
to understand the driving forces within Micronesian society.
The Law
As history is about continuity of identity, ownership of resources and 
relations between clans, allik (laws) were also needed to maintain order 
in the island communities. Allik were expressed in religious activities and 
environmental conservation practices and reinforced by the different 
social organisations as in the clan system.159 History demonstrates the 
overall modes of conduct embedded in traditions as being upheld by 
the leaders of the different clans and their people. For example, contests 
over ownership of resources are often scrutinised by clan leaders. Their 
knowledge of history is treated as evidence. Evidence is put forth by 
retelling one’s own history and how a clan fits into the overall socio-political 
structure of an island or group of islands. Final decisions are rendered by 
156  Duane, Clan and Copra, pp. 141–142; Stephen M. Younger, ‘Violence and Warfare in the Pre-
contact Caroline Islands’, The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 118, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 144–146. 
I also have personal knowledge of this, being a member of my clan Sor and connected to other relatives 
on different islands in the FSM, for example, the Mortlocks, Chuuk and Pohnpei states.
157  Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, pp. 51–52.
158  Surrendering of land and/or reef to victims of violent death, called shap or liwinen sha (blood 
payment), is common in many Micronesian societies, and there are many oral histories that can attest 
to this. See also Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, pp. 52–54.
159  Mortlocks Oral History; Francis X. Hezel, ‘Congries of Spirit: The Meaning of Religion’, Micronesian 
Seminar, Pohnpei, 1995, www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/religion/frames/congspiritsfr.htm.
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the clans’ historians, who are usually in a leadership role, and this system 
is often accepted as being the best mechanism of settling a dispute.160 
In my youth, I witnessed this form of dispute resolution. A particular clan 
claimed part of a reef as its property based on the traditional concept of 
shoon wok (reward for spears after a fight). When this claim was put under 
historical scrutiny, most of the historians from other clans disagreed with 
it. The claimant did not pursue the matter further as to do so would bring 
shame to the claimant. Even if it went through the court system, it was 
guaranteed that it would be a hopeless case as the court would also rely on 
the evidence from the historians of other clans.
Historically, food security reinforced clanship solidarity and has always 
been a major part of Micronesian conservation laws, particularly in the 
low-lying islands where the need to protect limited resources is foremost. 
Pwau (traditional law banning human activities) is an effective traditional 
conservation practice that restricts the harvesting of fish in certain areas of 
the reef.161 Pwau serves two purposes: to honour the death of an important 
person in the clan and conserve the reef ’s resources by way of public 
announcement.162 For example, when an important member of the clan 
who owns the reef dies, pwau is automatically imposed. Publicly announced 
pwau is also imposed when the clan decides to close the reef during the 
windy season. A big tree branch called shell is planted in the designated area 
to warn the public to stay away from the reef. The restriction is ended when 
the branch is removed. The community respects this form of conservation 
method as it benefits the island population as a whole.
Any violation of the pwau may lead to severe consequences including 
violence or even death. Oral history speaks of violent fights between 
the members of clans who imposed pwau and the violators and their 
relatives.163 The violators suffered serious injuries. The dispute ended 
when the heads of the two opposing clans came together for settlement. 
Pwau is also practised on the land by sou fanou (land owners). In this 
160  Lukunor Oral History; Personal knowledge from direct observation; Lieber, More Than a Living, 
pp. 4–12.
161  Lukunor Oral History; Personal knowledge.
162  I have personal experience of this, having routinely accompanied my father when imposing such 
a restriction by planting a big branch of a tree on the reef belonging to his clan, Sofa. See also D’Arcy, 
The People of the Sea, pp. 98–100.
163  Lukunor Oral History. An example would be Anaun Lengashu (a sub-clan chief of Lukunor), who 
gave away a big reef as a shap (payment of blood) to his wife’s clan as he was so upset about the treatment 
of his young son who was killed by Anaun Lengashu’s sister for breaching pwau. It is claimed that the 
reef was approximately the size of the area where the currents had carried the blood of the victim.
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practice, coconut fronds are tied around a tree or the entrance to the land 
area to indicate that pwau is currently imposed. Uninhabited islands, or 
parts thereof, are subject to the same restrictive measures by the clan who 
has the traditional rights and duties as the guardians of the land. Land 
pwau fulfils the same purposes as discussed above in relation to owners 
of a reef. These traditional methods are examples of the laws of the land 
recognised by the Constitution.
The FSM is a nation with many unique forms of custom and traditions164 
that differ between its geographical spaces.165 The variety of traditions 
should not be seen as an impediment to its internal coherence but, rather, 
a pool of shared ideas from a socio-political basket with a common goal 
that is resilient enough to accommodate diversity.166 Indeed, the Shulapan 
allik (Constitution) embodies the concept of unity in diversity.167 It is the 
hallmark of the modern state of the FSM and provides the framework in 
which the country’s institutions are linked to Micronesian values, identity 
and continuity.
As stated in the Preamble:
We affirm our common wish to live together in peace and 
harmony, to preserve the heritage of the past, and to protect the 
promise of the future. To make one nation of many islands, we 
respect the diversity of our cultures. Our differences enrich us.168
The preservation of heritage is protected by Article V: ‘nothing in this 
Constitution takes away the role or function of traditional leaders as 
recognised by customs and traditions’.169 Article XI, Section 11 reinforces 
Article V by declaring:
Court decisions shall be consistent with this Constitution, 
Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social configuration 
of Micronesia. In rendering a decision, the Court must consult 
and apply sources of the [FSM].170
164  ‘Custom and traditions’ are called facsin in Kosrae, tiahk in Pohnpei, eoranei in Chuuk, and yalen 
or kafal fuluy in Yap. See Petersen, ‘Regime Change and Regime Maintenance’, p. 40.
165  D’Arcy, ‘Cultural Divisions and Island Environments’, pp. 217–218.
166  Mac Marshall, ‘“Partial Connections”: Kinship and Social Organisations in Micronesia’, in 
American Anthropology in Micronesia: An Assessment, edited by Robert C. Kiste and Mac Marshall, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999, pp. 107–108.
167  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
168  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
169  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
170  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
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The Shulapan allik is connected to the globalised world as referred to in 
‘the Declaration of Rights’ enumerated under Article IV, Sections 1–13. 
Articles VII–XII are structured to approximate traditional political values 
based on geography. For example, Article VII establishes a three-layered 
government and their respective branches, and allocates their roles and 
functions within a Micronesian context. These layers correspond to the 
configuration of Micronesia while integrating relevant elements of the 
outside world.171 Articles VIII and IX limit the government’s arbitrary 
power; inherent in this are the parallel powers of traditional leaders 
and those of present-day political leaders. The construction, scope and 
content of the Constitution focuses on the unique interaction between 
law and custom in the modern world to ensure continuity. It says, ‘With 
this Constitution we, who have been the wards of other nations, become 
the proud guardian of our islands, now and forever’.172 Nevertheless, the 
Constitution, by definition, is the supreme law of the land.173
Characterising FSM the Economy
Three theories have been proposed to describe the economic situation in 
the Pacific, including the FSM. It is often hoped that such theories will 
provide answers to improve small island economies. The three models 
are MIRAB (migration, remittance, aid and bureaucracy), SITEs (small 
islands tourist economies) and PROFIT (people considerations, resource 
management, overseas engagement, finance, insurance and taxation, and 
transportation). MIRAB emphasises foreign aid, transnational migration 
and remittances (where money and goods are remitted from metropolitan 
countries), often from the former colonial powers, to sustain small island 
economies like the FSM.174 The SITEs model refers to tourism as having a 
dominant role in the building of island economies. SITEs aims to ‘increase 
foreign exchange earnings to finance imports’.175 The PROFIT model is 
geared towards shrewd immigration and cyclical migration policy. It aims 
171  Dennis Yamase, The Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia: The First Twenty-
five Years, FSM Supreme Court, Palikir, Pohnpei, 12 July 2006, fsmsupremecourt.org/fsm/rules/
FSMSupCt25YrsforPDF.pdf; The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
172  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
173  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article II.
174  Paul D’Arcy, ‘The Nourishing Sea: Partner Guardianship of Fishery and Seabed Mineral 
Resources for the Economic Viability of Small Pacific Island Nations’, Sustainability, Vol. 5, No. 8, 
pp. 33–48.
175  Riaz Shareef, Small Islands Tourism Economies: A Snapshot of Country Risk Ratings, Department of 
Economics, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia, p. 2, www.mssanz.org.au/MODSIM03/
Volume_03/B05/04_Shareef_Snapshot.pdf.
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for domestic control of local resources through political processes to 
secure and control viable means of transportation, and through luring 
foreign direct investment by offering low or no taxes.176 It thrives on the 
use of intensive diplomacy to achieve purposeful outcomes. It has low 
reliance on aid and remittances to sustain local incomes and focuses on 
strong financial management.177
The FSM economy has been characterised as mirroring the MIRAB model. 
This is because the FSM lacks sustained tourism, has no mineral resources, 
has weak financial control and its diplomacy (especially as practised in the 
PROFIT model) is constrained by the terms of the Compact. In alignment 
with the MIRAB model, the Compact allows Micronesians to migrate to 
and work in the US. They subsequently remit money and goods to their 
families on the islands. The Compact also finances the FSM government 
bureaucracy, the main employer in the FSM.178 In my field interviews 
with government officials, many had not heard of and did not understand 
the MIRAB model. However, those familiar with MIRAB rejected the 
model because it projects a negative image of Micronesians as incapable of 
providing for themselves. This is at the heart of the dependency assumptions 
concocted by foreign economists with no expertise on Micronesia. For 
example, there has been no reliable data collection about the sending and 
receiving of remittances, and the Compact should not be seen as a form of 
foreign aid since it is a treaty, components of which stipulate Micronesia’s 
right to receive money from the US.
Perhaps, one can argue that one of the best economic practices suitable 
to islanders is one that enmeshes the daily cultural life of the FSM, rarely 
acknowledged by outside commentators, and relevant elements of the 
modern world. Such practices revolve around the complex web of the 
diasporic ainang system (DAS) driven by its own inherent social forces 
reinforced by reciprocity, sharing and sustainable conservation practices.179 
DAS has its own channels of circulation and distribution of goods and 
monies to ensure that no one is excluded from the extended family 
benefits. The wealth of DAS cannot be measured in terms of statistical 
176  Geoff Bertram, ‘Introduction: The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century’, Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint, Vol. 47, No. 1, April 2006, p. 5.
177  Bertram, ‘Introduction: The MIRAB Model’, p. 5.
178  The Compact provides the main funds for the operation of the FSM Government.
179  I coined the ‘DAS’ term to explain the complex foundation of Micronesian societies that could 
be included in economic analysis to better our understanding of the islanders’ economic system. Such 
an understanding could assist foreign consultants in working closely with Micronesians to design 
an economic model appropriate for the islanders. See also Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, 
pp. 62–64; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 19–23.
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analysis as practised by economists. That is because Micronesians’ wealth 
is measured in terms of how many relatives one has. It is not wholly 
measured in terms of how the value of the dollar is distributed on a per 
capita basis based on a gross domestic product (GDP) abstraction, which 
then translates into the ranking of a country’s wealth on the international 
economic scale. DAS is a homegrown ideology that has its own internal, 
self-supporting mechanism in the shaping, sustaining and positioning 
of the FSM in the contemporary world.
All three of the economic models discussed above are, at best, only marginally 
relevant in a Micronesian context. Perhaps Micronesia’s future should start 
with its reclassification as a dual economy with the ainang system at its very 
core.180 It has its own measures of success not yet well understood or valued 
by many economists of the day. MIRAB has also been challenged by Pacific 
scholars as nothing more than reinforcing neo-colonialism with a new 
image.181 It continues to underestimate the astute judgement of islanders 
in pacing and framing their own economic circumstances. MIRAB reflects 
nothing more than the continuing belittling of Pacific Islands, as described 
by Epeli Hau‘ofa.182 Micronesia is refining the DAS lifestyle as it suits its 
social, political and economic lifestyle.
The Geography of Contemporary 
Micronesia
Despite the increasing globalisation of the world economy, Micronesia’s 
current realities remain, as always, deeply embedded in the geographical 
realities of the local oceanic environment:
Millions of years ago undersea volcanic activity created the 
islands that now comprise the Federated States of Micronesia. 
The vast distance from one another (one days’ sail for most) and 
from continental land masses allowed the evolution of unique 
ecosystems and a large number of endemic species.183
180  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 19–23.
181  Laurence E. Rothenberg, Globalization 101: The Three Tensions of Globalization, Occasional 
papers from the American Forum for Global Education, No. 176, 2002–2003, webspace.ship.edu/
hliu/347/14global/3-tensions.pdf.
182  Hau‘ofa, ‘Our Sea of Islands’, pp. 29–30.
183  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010: The Federated States 
of Micronesia, Palikir, Pohnpei, 15 December 2010, p. 71.
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Of course, these species have been a part of Micronesians’ food supply for 
many centuries. Today, they are threatened because of the changes in their 
natural habitat due to climate change and overfishing by fleets from other 
nations, as will be detailed in later chapters. The distance between islands 
also influenced the common language shared by groups of islands and the 
dialectical variants that evolved.184
The inhabitants of low-lying islands depend heavily on fishing and 
small-scale farming to meet their daily needs. This is supplemented by 
purchases of Western foods from the port towns,185 from visiting relatives, 
or remittance of food or funds.186 Small, local stores provide sources for 
purchasing Western foods when necessary. However, on the volcanic 
islands where the central port towns are located, the inhabitants, despite 
the abundant land to farm, prefer imported food products from Australia, 
Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the US for their daily diet.
Non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, high blood pressure, obesity, 
stroke and heart problems are now common in the population because of 
the changes from traditional dietary habits to that of a modern diet high 
in refined ingredients and chemical additives.187 The FSM Department of 
Health and Social Affairs is advocating a return to a more traditional 
diet to improve community health, which is also crucial in terms of 
maintaining the health of the nation. As a consequence, many islanders 
are replanting indigenous crops for the purpose of adhering to a healthy 
diet to slow down the consequences of non-communicable diseases, which 
have slowly spread beyond the major port towns.188
The FSM forms the northwest part of the region of Oceania. It lies 
immediately above the equator between Papua New Guinea to the south, 
Guam to the north, Palau to the west and the Marshall Islands to the east. 
184  Jeffery C. Marck, ‘Micronesian Dialects and the Overnight Voyage’, Journal of the Polynesian 
Society, Vol. 95, No. 2, June 1986, pp. 253–258.
185  Port towns are the hubs of politico-economic activities in each of the states within the FSM. 
They emerged during the colonial period and remain today.
186  Hezel, The New Shape of Old Cultures, pp. 152–154.
187  Marcus Samo (Deputy Secretary of the FSM Department of Health and Social Affairs and 
Chuukese Historian), Interview, Nett, Pohnpei, 21 January 2011, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 9 July 2013; 
Gibson Susumu and Mark Kostka, Federated States of Micronesia Food Security Assessment Report 
(Final Draft), Palikir, Pohnpei, March 2011, pp. 18–19; World Health Organization, ‘Micronesia, 
Federated States of ’, in Western Pacific Country Health Information Profiles, 2011, p. 219. iris.wpro.
who.int/handle/10665.1/10522.
188  Kippier Lippwe, pers, comm., Department of Health and Social Affairs, 2 July 2013.
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It consists of more than 607 islands189 dispersed across a vast oceanic space. 
Only 65190 of the islands are inhabited, varying in population from less 
than 100 in the low-lying islands to over 35,000 in the volcanic islands.191 
The islands range from small atolls that barely exceed 4 metres above 
sea level to many volcanic islands.192 The total land area of the FSM is 
approximately 271 square miles.193
Figure 8: Federated States of Micronesia in relation to the world.
Source: Map produced by ANU CartoGIS.
189  Susumu and Kostka, Federated States of Micronesia Food Security Assessment Report, p. 1.
190  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, pp. 1–2.
191  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, pp. 1–2.
192  Rosita Henry, William Jeffery and Christine Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia: 
A Report on a Pilot Study Conducted on Moch Island, Mortlock Islands, Chuuk, Federated States of 
Micronesia, January 2008, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia, 2008, p. 7.
193  Kim, Into the Deep, p. 271.
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The FSM has 2,978,000 square kilometres of EEZ.194 According to the 
latest census published by the Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic 
Management, Overseas Development and Compact Management 
(SBOC), the FSM’s population is estimated to be just over 107,000.195 
It is estimated that 49,840 of the 107,000196 are living in the US as of 
11 October 2012. Of these 49,840 living in the US, around 16,790 were 
born in the US197 and are referred to as the ‘Compact generation’.
There are four main native languages spoken in Micronesia: Pohnpeian, 
Chuukese, Kosraean and Yapese. Many linguists claim that these 
languages belong to the modern Trukic language, a derivative of the 
Malayo-Polynesian or Austronesian language family group.198 Each 
of these languages has their own dialectical variants. However, English is 
the lingua franca of the FSM. Most Micronesians today are multilingual 
speakers, especially on the island of Pohnpei, where the capital Palikir 
is located. People from across Micronesia gravitate towards Pohnpei for 
tertiary education, employment and to visit relatives.
The climate is tropical and humid, with heavy year-round rainfall, 
especially in the eastern part of the country. The temperature is usually 
around 26°C, with two seasons (the dry months or lerak,199 generally from 
May to September, and the windy months or lefang,200 from October 
to April).201 The FSM is located on the southern edge of the typhoon 
belt. Typhoons vary in intensity but usually cause severe environmental 
damage.202 Climate change is also affecting the nation’s environment. 
For example, local fishermen have observed that tropical depressions and 
194  Paul D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean? Voluntary Compliance Regimes and Offshore Resource 
Exploitation in the Pacific’, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2014, p. 3.
195  SBOC, www.sboc.fm/ (site discontinued).
196  Francis X. Hezel, ‘Micronesians on the Move: Eastward and Upward Bound’, Pacific Islands 
Policy, No. 9, East-West Center, Hawai‘i, 2013, pp. 33–34.
197  Hezel, ‘Micronesians on the Move’, p. 34.
198  Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, p. 26; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian 
Societies, pp. 37–38; Rufino, ‘Ideological Bases for Power’, pp. 36–39; Alkire, An Introduction to 
the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 10–11; Rubinstein, ‘An Ethnography of Micronesian 
Childhood’, p. 23.
199  For an in-depth discussion, see D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 14–16, 152–153; Gladwin, 
East is a Big Bird, pp. 24–25; Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-Island Socio-Economic Ties, pp. 44–45.
200  Lefang (the windy season from October to April); D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 152–153.
201  Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, pp. 22–23. Lerak is referred to as the 
breadfruit season where an abundance of food is available. It coincides with the summer months of 
May to September. Lefang is referred to as the lean months or the windy months (October to April). 
Navigators called the windy months meramen atilei fatel (the months to rest the paddles).
202  Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-Island Socio-Economic Ties, pp. 17–20.
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sea surges are occurring more frequently and with increased intensity.203 
Studies on climate change conducted by Fletcher and Richard,204 Henry, 
Jeffery and Pam,205 Gibson, Wichep and Silbanuz,206 and Keim207 have 
confirmed the locals’ observations. The studies indicated that rising sea 
levels are slowly eroding beaches and increasing saltwater incursion into 
wells and agricultural lands. The protection of the environment from 
external threats is central to the maintenance and continuity of the 
FSM. For example, the introduction of foreign agricultural practices not 
suited to local conditions, the environmental impact of WWII and now 
climate change increase the urgency for locals to implement traditional 
conservation practices in collaboration with Western technologies.
In May 1979, the FSM became a constitutional government in a Free 
Association transitional arrangement with the administering colonial 
power, the US. This transitional arrangement has been the source of 
increasing friction over governance and independence issues despite 
the close economic, migration and cultural ties between the two 
nations.208 The FSM comprises four constituent states—Chuuk, Kosrae, 
Pohnpei and Yap—with the capital on the main island of Pohnpei. 
The Constitution underscored a long history of political processes 
stemming from Micronesians’ determination to control the future of 
their islands. Self-preservation, control and continuity were at the heart 
of Micronesians’ collective desire to become independent during the post-
WWII decolonisation process.209
203  Interviews with locals from the Mortlocks, Sokehs, Pohnpei, 14 July 2013; Asian Development 
Bank, Federated States of Micronesia Development Framework 2012. Looking to the Future: A Foundation 
for Discussion at the FSM Development Partners Forum, 2012, p. 27.
204  Charles H. Fletcher and Bruce M. Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, 
University of Hawai‘i Sea Grant College Program, 2010, pp. 4–5.
205  Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, pp. 38–39.
206  Gibson Susumu, John Wichep and Marlyter Silbanuz, Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) 
Report Federated States of Micronesia: Agricultural Damage Report, December 2009, pp. 4–9.
207  Mark E. Keim, Sea Level Rise Disaster in Micronesia: Sentinel Event for Climate Change, National 
Center for Environmental Health, Agency for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
208  Edward C. King, ‘Custom and Constitutionalism in the Federated States of Micronesia’, Asian-
Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2002, p. 3; Clement Mulalap, ‘Islands in the Stream; 
Addressing Climate Change From a Small Island Developing State Perspective’, in Climate Change 
and Indigenous People: The Search for Legal Remedies, edited by Randall Abate and Elizabeth Warner, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2013, p. 386.
209  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 7.
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The different island identities are based on given groups’ perceptions of 
themselves in relation to the sea or land. For example, the term shon metaw 
is in reference to the Mortlockese people as being from the deep seas. 
In some islands in the state of Yap and the northwest part of Chuuk, the 
term is re-mataw. Today, identities are based on the sub-geographical areas 
of the FSM, such as mehn Pohnpei (people of Pohnpei) or shon Chuuk 
(people of Chuuk). These identities connote people’s historical past, which 
are now collectively under the Micronesian identity. These  identities 
continue the historical affinity between islanders.210
Theories of Peopling the FSM
Micronesian identities and continuity are memorialised and celebrated in 
indigenous uruon fanou (history of the land), pwarik (dances),211 pisakin 
eoranei (material cultures), kolin fonu (local songs), ngorongor (chants), 
titilap (stories and legends) and palou (navigational knowledge).212 Oral 
history has enabled islanders to trace their places of origin and their 
connection to these by looking at historical continuity. This body of 
knowledge is largely ignored and uncited by most academic investigators 
of the origins of the peoples of Micronesia. Most academic theories 
assert that Micronesians most likely originated from Southeast Asia 
and Melanesia. For example, William Alkire,213 Glenn Petersen214 and 
Paul Rainbird215 are proponents of this theoretical assumption based on 
archaeological, botanical, linguistic and migration interpretation.216
Thomas Gladwin noted that the pattern of settlement of Chuuk and Yap 
originated from the Marshall Islands via Kosrae, Pohnpei then Chuuk.217 
However, anthropologist Ward Goodenough referred to kachaw as the 
world with layers of heavens in his quest to represent how some Chuukese 
210  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 7.
211  Glenn Petersen, ‘Dancing Defiance: The Politics of Pohnpeian Dance Performances’, Pacific 
Studies, Vol. 15. No. 4, December 1992, pp. 13–27.
212  Peter, ‘Eram’s Church (Bell)’, pp. 275, 279, 283.
213  Alkire, Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 5–13.
214  Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 39–40.
215  Rainbird, The Archaeology of Micronesia, pp. 97–100.
216  Alkire, An Introduction to the People and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 5–13.
217  Gladwin, East is a Big Bird, p. 4.
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perceived their origins.218 Pohnpeian archaeologist and historian Rufino 
Mauricio referred to Pohnpeians as migrating from unknown islands from 
the east, west and south.219 Ironically, these valuable traditions add weight 
to archaeological theories of migrations from Melanesia to the south as 
one of the sources of Micronesian settlement. Don Rubinstein noted that, 
according to local traditions and based on oral history of Moyitigitig, the 
island of Fais in Yap was fished up from the depth of the sea.220 This 
tradition is in keeping with the Oceania-wide traditions of early founding 
discoverers and navigators, such as the Polynesian ancestor, Maui, fishing 
islands out of the sea and fixing them in place from the hitherto unknown 
through navigational plotting.
However, Oha Uman, Ferdun Saladier and Ante Chipen, in a detailed 
and valuable collection of local traditions titled Uruon Chuuk,221 spoke 
of oral narratives of inter-island migration within Micronesia. This uruo 
was written in the Chuukese language and was based on oral narratives 
recorded in the 1970s. Apart from a few English translations commissioned 
in the late 1990s by Paul D’Arcy, it remains largely untranslated and 
uncited within academia. My reading of these oral narratives confirmed 
what I learned from my elders. For example, the peopling of the islands 
in the Mortlocks originated from the Chuuk lagoon.  It also confirmed 
the pattern of contact between the Yapese, Pohnpeians and Kosraeans. 
Uruon Chuuk also contains details of the sea lanes between islands for 
migration purposes facilitated by the leoo, whose dwellings are situated 
at particular points in the sea. It pointed to Pohnpei and Kosrae as the 
point of origin of the Chuukese people.222 Marshall confirmed the oral 
histories of contact between Mortlockese, Pohnpeians and the islands 
in the northwest of Chuuk lagoon before colonisation.223 Despite this 
uruo, each island always resorted to its own uruo to trace its origin and, 
218  Ward Goodenough, ‘Skyworld and This World: The Place of Kachaw in Micronesian 
Cosmology’, American Anthropology, Vol. 88, No. 3, 1986, pp. 551–568. This idea of a heaven 
with layers was noted as originating from Nama Island in the Mortlocks. This confirmed how some 
Lukunorians perceived heaven during the 1980s. For example, when I tried to explain to one of my 
uncles, Taichy, about the earth existing in the universe, he countered my explanation by stating that 
human beings live inside the earth, which has different layers where the wind comes from—efong, eor, 
lotow and efang (north, south, east and west)—and lang (heaven).
219  Mauricio, ‘Ideological Bases for Power’, pp. 2–7.
220  Rubinstein, ‘An Ethnography of Micronesian Childhood’, pp. 18, 21–22. See also Rawari 
Taonui, ‘Polynesian Oral Traditions’, in Vaka Moana: Voyages of the Ancestors, edited by K. R. Howe, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006, p. 30.
221  Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7.
222  Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7.
223  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 19.
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more importantly, its connection to other Micronesians. For example, the 
first inhabitants of my island of Lukunor in the Mortlocks region traced 
their origin to a village in Weno called Wichap in the Chuuk lagoon.224 
Likewise other low-lying islands in Chuuk claimed their origins in the 
same lagoon.225 The islands in the Chuuk lagoon in turn spoke of Yap, 
Pohnpei and Kosrae as their points of origin.226
Moreover, Pohnpeians traced their origins to distant shores over the 
horizon.227 Peter Lohn, the traditional Wasai228 of the chiefdom of 
Sokehs, noted that some of these distant shores are Tuvalu and Kiribati.229 
Many inhabitants of the low-lying islands in Yap came from Chuuk, as 
evidenced by clan relationships and oral histories. Kosraeans point to the 
Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Yap as some of the places where they came 
from.230 All in all, we can see that Micronesians perceive their origins 
as situated at different points within the huge area that encompasses 
the Micronesian region. Micronesians have argued that their own uruo 
is a science in itself; it has its own internal logic and coherency. Their 
historical claims therefore have the same capability as Western sciences in 
the determination of historical certainty.231 For example, when looking at 
land cases in Chuuk, the court often looks at oral histories to determine 
who actually owns the land based on ainang histories.232
224  Wichap is one of the villages in Weno Island, the capital of the state of Chuuk.
225  Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, p. 258; Eve C. Pinsker, ‘Traditional Leaders Today in the Federated 
States of Micronesia’, in Chiefs Today: Traditional Leadership and the Pacific Postcolonial State, edited 
by Geoffrey M. White and Lamont Lindstorm, Stanford University Press, California, 1997, p. 163.
226  Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7. However, others such as Goodenough 
argued that people from Weno were the descendants of the anu-aramas, half human, half ghost, who 
came from the different heavens.
227  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 42.
228  Wasai is the second in line to the Nahnmwarki of Sokehs (the highest traditional chief ) from 
that district on the volcanic island of Pohnpei.
229  Oral history also connects the Mortlockese and the people from Kiribati, for example, with the 
clan called tuum.
230  Gordon, Kosrae, p. 6; Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7.
231  Oral history, according to a traditional perspective, has its own logic. It is used to validate or 
invalidate the processes of historical debate and pinpoint certainty. For example, members of the first 
clan on a particular island can shed light on the order of events by virtue of being related to the 
first occupants.
232  See e.g. Mailo v Atonesia, 7 FSM Intrm. 294 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995), CA no. 73-92.
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Conclusion
As discussed throughout this chapter, the modern Micronesian identity 
emerged as a consequence of the colonisation process. The colonial powers 
attempted to reorder indigenous societies by imposing an alien system of 
government upon them. It did not result in Micronesians abandoning 
the traditional system that has served them well for many centuries. 
The traditional system with its own inherent adaptation mechanism 
perpetuates the principles of the ainang system, now built into the FSM’s 
Constitution to ensure continuity. The Constitution represents the 
collective identities within the modern state of the FSM as deeply rooted 
in the nation’s historical past. It also conveys resiliency and continuity.
In the globalised system, where many identities are disappearing because 
of the speed of new ideologies spread through technological means 
and unsuited to the preservation of indigenous cultures, Micronesians 
continue to adapt as much as possible to ensure their progress into the 
future. This has been possible because of Micronesia’s historical strength 
in maintaining traditional values. The Micronesian identity is the 
foundation of Micronesian strength, and any questioning of its resilience 
stems from external perceptions of the FSM, not from the inhabitants 
themselves. The Constitution perpetuates Micronesians’ continuity 
in the modern world while also safeguarding the FSM’s traditions and 




Responding to  
Colonisation
The preceding chapters strongly suggested that there was greater 
continuity than change in indigenous survivability in Micronesia 
because of the strength of their traditional institutions. This suggests 
that colonial rule in Micronesia was relatively ineffective. The previous 
two chapters proposed that the reason for Micronesians’ endurance 
stemmed from their ability to rearticulate foreign influences to suit their 
own context.1 This chapter deals with Micronesian engagement with the 
colonial powers of Spain, Germany, Japan and the US. It will discuss 
how Micronesians indigenised outsiders’ influences to suit local contexts 
despite the seemingly unequal power relations. As history is a forum of 
intellectual discourses, Micronesian perspectives will be emphasised since 
they are the least covered of the colonial era. Many of the incidents and 
attitudes expressed to me about the colonial era are recollections of my 
parents and grandparents; they are absent from published accounts of this 
period. By including them here alongside conventional historiography, I 
seek to broaden the debate and range of sources to stimulate and widen 
our understanding of Micronesians’ perspective of history.
The colonisation process brought many foreign ideologies to the FSM. 
One such ideology was written history. This form of history is in and 
of itself a self-serving instrument in the framing and perpetuation of 
Micronesians as subservient to outsiders’ civilisation. This is a misleading 
1  Paul D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule on the Indigenous Population of Japan’s 
South Seas Mandate?’, University of Hawai‘i, 1986 (Unpublished paper), pp. 1–21; Duane, Clan and 
Copra, pp. 200–228.
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exaggeration since Micronesians continue to use traditional forms of 
history to educate subsequent generations about indigenous history. The 
post-WWII decolonisation period saw the re-emergence of indigenous 
history that had been suppressed by outsiders for centuries. The question 
is, how does one intellectually imagine indigenous history within the 
framework of linear history, or vice versa, since their productions and 
nuances are different? In other words, how does one reconcile the 
two different types of history? As this book is written for an academic 
audience, I am compelled to adopt the chronological order of history, 
but with relevant elements of indigenous perspectives to open up a new 
frontier of Micronesian historical discourses. Therefore, this chapter and 
subsequent chapters will follow the linear approach to hopefully bring 
together our understanding of how Micronesians perceived themselves 
during and after the colonial period.
There are many theories about the causes and effects of colonisation, 
ranging from exportation of European civilisation and Christianisation to 
economics and empire building.2 However, for the purpose of this chapter, 
colonisation will be defined as an act by a foreign power of establishing 
a colony to assert control over the indigenous people of an area.3 Hezel 
expanded on this by framing it in the context of the terra nullius principle, 
which states that:
colonisation is the utilisation of the earth, of the flora, fauna 
and the above all of the human beings to the advantage of the 
colonising nation, and the latter is therefore obligated to give in 
return for the higher culture … and its better methods.4
At least according to their own definitions of relative worth and value.
By applying these two definitions in Micronesia’s context, the process of 
colonisation has its genesis in the sixteenth century, when Spain declared 
that what is now known as the FSM was part of its colonial empire. Spain 
2  See Peter Hempenstall, ‘Imperial Manoeuvers’, in Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the 
Twentieth Century, edited by K. R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste and Brij V. Lal, University of Hawai‘i Press, 
1987, pp. 29–39.
3  ‘Colonize’, Oxford Dictionary, www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/colonize# 
colonize_16.
4  Terra nullius was a doctrine, and later a component of international law, that the colonial powers 
used to acquire new territories overseas. It entailed that if a territory did not show any signs of 
agricultural production as perceived by the Europeans, then the first European discoverer could claim 
the territory on behalf of the colonial power they represented (Francis X. Hezel, Strangers in Their 
Own Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands, University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 1995, p. 132; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 173–174).
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administered its Micronesian colonial territory from Guam and later from 
the Philippines until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Effective rule 
beyond Guam was minimal until the late nineteenth century, and most 
Micronesian islands remained unknown and unvisited by the Spanish 
until then. An attempt to extend Spanish influence beyond Guam into the 
area of the present-day FSM saw a Christian mission established on Ulithi 
in the early 1730s; it was not successful.5 Actual Spanish colonisation 
began in 1866 when Spanish authorities finally decided to establish their 
presence in Pohnpei and Yap. Micronesians’ tacit consent was not just 
desirable but essential in the absence of effective coercive ability and the 
need for economic returns to justify the extra effort needed to impose 
colonial laws by the overstretched and underfunded Spanish forces.
General Perspectives of Peshe Seset
Peshe seset 6 are always looked upon with suspicion by Micronesians. 
Suspicion is an element of survival that allowed Micronesians to keep an 
eye on intruders. Such suspicion was employed during the colonial era. 
However, the question is, how did the colonisers perceive the indigenous 
population? The historical literature speaks volumes about the treatment 
of Micronesians in terms of derogatory language and labels such as 
‘savage’, ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’ in comparison to the outsiders’ own 
standing on the civilisations continuum.
To the Micronesians, the outsiders were pale peshe seset who were arrogant 
and oblivious to the order of the indigenous world. This arrogance led 
peshe seset to underestimate the strength of the Micronesians. They treated 
the small population as too weak to mount a substantial resistance against 
colonial occupation. For example, small military detachments were usually 
deployed to guard the different colonial interests in Micronesia, only to find 
that their forces were insufficient in the face of serious local opposition.7
5  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 58–59.
6  The term ‘peshe seset’ means ‘salty feet from foreign seas’. I am using the term in reference to 
the colonists who were not indigenous to Micronesia and yet asserted control of the islands without 
permission.
7  The Spanish and Germans military detachments in Pohnpei underestimated local resistance and 
had to send for reinforcements from their headquarters outside Micronesia (Peter Hempenstall 
and Noel Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, University of the South Pacific, Fiji, 
1984, pp.  109–110; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 30–33; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, 
pp. 271–273.
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The peshe seset mistook Micronesian silence as a sign of weakness. 
Micronesians used a variety of survival strategies against the colonial 
authorities that were learned from their past historical experiences. These 
included open military resistance, patience, passive resistance in the 
form of non-compliance and political manipulation. This is part of their 
history—to adapt to new circumstances based on past experience and 
observation as to what strategies to implement for effective protection 
under any given circumstance. Invariably, indirect resistance rather 
than direct confrontation against a foe armed with modern weaponry 
proved most effective. At other times, Micronesians gave the appearance 
of patiently accepting colonial demands while covertly continuing 
the traditional system of authority and interactions with each other to 
maintain their identities and continuity.8
Having experienced frequent natural disasters and inter-island warfare 
in their oceanic environment prior to colonisation, Micronesians have 
developed a significant capacity to rapidly mobilise resources and defend 
their homes. Centuries of struggle against nature and men to preserve 
their cultures, regardless of any threats, left Micronesians better prepared 
for the new external threat of poorly resourced colonial authorities 
than the colonisers realised.9 In addition, rivalries between the colonial 
powers and the geographical nature of the islands also made colonisation 
ineffective.10 The strength of Micronesian continuity and resilience, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, derive principally from their social 
system and understanding of their oceanic environment.
Historically, the environment is susceptible to natural threats such 
as typhoons and drought. This has made Micronesians extremely 
adaptable and capable of rapidly mobilising available resources to deal 
with catastrophic circumstances. These threats have influenced the 
way Micronesians have organised their social, political and economic 
connections. Their organisational skills stood them in good stead for facing 
anthropomorphic challenges from beyond the horizon, few of which 
have matched the intensity of typhoons, with the possible exceptions of 
WWII (the typhoon of war) and some severe exotic epidemics.11 These 
survival strategies have been at the heart of Micronesian adaptation 
8  Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures, p. 1.
9  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, pp. 112–113.
10  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 22–23.
11  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 152–153; Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 26–27; 
Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 6–7.
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practices.12 Prior to colonisation, the flow of information between islands 
was already established via the clan network between islands, which was 
also the source of developing islanders’ diplomatic skills. That is to say 
that conflict avoidance was crucial to Micronesian survival.13 The same 
network was also used to circulate information about the colonial powers 
and their activities.
Local Responses to the New Arrivals
Colonisation had both negative and positive consequences for Micronesia. 
Micronesian life was affected to varying degrees when outsiders started 
to appear on their shores. Micronesian modes of engagement with the 
outsiders depended on the intensity of the colonisation process as it 
differed between the various islands and atolls. For example, on some 
islands, outsiders met intimidation and violent death at their first point of 
contact.14 On other occasions, islanders received the outsiders on friendly 
terms.15 The type of responses exhibited by the islanders during the early 
engagement period signified the nature of the social system present on 
that island.
Many historians have claimed that the islanders’ recognition of iron 
and other Western goods as being valuable items often created friendly 
conditions for encounters.16 Metal tools were highly valued as they 
shortened the time required for the backbreaking traditional manual 
tasks. Historian Scott Russell noted the value of iron to an Ulithian man 
who a Spanish priest ‘converted’ to Christianity. The Ulithian man, after 
his conversion, said to the priest, ‘as you long for heaven, so we long 
for iron’.17 This statement demonstrates the manipulative dimensions of 
exchange used by islanders and the fluidity of negotiation between the 
12  Rainbird, The Archaeology of Micronesia, p. 245; Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and 
Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 86–88; Knudson, ‘Resource Fluctuation’, pp. 4–6.
13  Gray, ‘Modernization in Micronesia’, pp. 59–61; Gonzaga Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System: Responses 
to US Influence’, Paper presented during the Association for Social Anthropologist in Oceania, Portland 
Oregon, 6 February 2011, pp. 3–4.
14  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 100–101.
15  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 96–97.
16  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 96–97.
17  Scott Russell, ‘Roots of the Falawasch’, Mangilao, Guam, MARC Library, n.d. (Unpublished 
MS paper), p. 2.
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two sides to achieve their own objectives. No one knows exactly how the 
Micronesians came to recognise iron, though some have speculated that it 
was discovered in driftwood and possibly by unrecorded earlier contacts.
Unfriendly relations in early encounters may have resulted from the 
outsiders intruding into Micronesian spaces without prior permission, 
especially sacred spaces.18 Killing was a form of eliminating threat in the 
local communities. The methods of killing exercised by islanders were 
ambush,19 open confrontation and seeking guidance from their ancestors 
in terms of magic or paut (sorcery).20 Selection of the appropriate security 
measures utilised to suppress any arising threat posed by outsiders was 
conditioned by the particular circumstances of each island during the 
contact period. For example, ambush was common in island histories as it 
was swift, and secretive. It warned enemies to refrain from intruding into 
unfamiliar spaces. Open confrontation was a display of bravery, ferocity 
and determination to defeat opponents and involved large-scale warfare 
between island alliances or extended opposing clans.21 Negotiation was 
used to dissuade warring sides from taking up arms. Physical violence 
was used to signal to the outsiders that Micronesians were capable of 
mounting attacks if they were put under pressure.22 The quick realisation 
that there was a mismatch between the two sides led islanders to utilise 
a variety of different tactics to sustain their interests. From the patchy 
record of first contacts, as best we can tell, the majority of first contacts in 
Micronesia were mainly peaceful, with sporadic violence.
18  My personal opinion. Outsiders may not be aware of the sacred spaces of the gods, which were 
and continue to be considered off limits to the public. Intrusion into such spaces could result in a 
fight or possibly death.
19  Mortlocks Oral History. Ambush is personal, however, it could develop into full-scale warfare 
between two extended families.
20  Mortlocks Oral History. Sorcery is a psychological element of warfare that involves calling 
upon the ancestors for support. See David Hanlon, ‘Sorcery, “Savage Memories” and the Edge of 
Commensurability for History in the Pacific’, in Pacific Islands History: Journeys and Transformation, 
edited by Brij V. Lal, Journal of Pacific History, 1993, pp. 118–119.
21  Mortlocks Oral History. Open warfare involved displaying one’s bravery and was used as an 
intimidation tactic against opponents.
22  Violence took many forms, from small and personal attacks to large-scale conflict like in the 
Pohnpeians’ violent resistance against the Spanish and Germans. See Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, 
pp. 287–289; Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 136–144.
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Sustained Contact
Having established the basic background of the islands, it should not be 
a surprise that outsiders were met with varying treatments during the 
colonisation period. The Pacific Ocean is the largest body of water in the 
world and promised profits for whalers. The search for more profits led 
many whalers to the islands in Micronesia, largely by accident. By  the 
mid-1800s, whalers, traders and beachcombers began to arrive in large 
numbers. Having no whaling stations in Micronesia from which to 
purchase provisions, they had to rely on whichever islands and islanders 
they came upon. It meant the outsiders had to give in to the islanders 
as they controlled the land resources that they required. Pohnpei and 
Kosrae became known for good provisions. Subsequently, Pohnpeians 
and Kosreans experienced increasing numbers of visiting vessels to their 
shores. The islands offered necessary provisions and fine harbours for 
vessels to shelter during the windy months. Most of the crew members 
were Europeans and Americans, with a number of other Pacific Islanders 
among them.23 New trade ensued between the locals and outsiders as 
a result of this increased contact. The high chiefs of Pohnpei and Kosrae 
influenced trade deals to suit local circumstances, leveraging their control 
of access to the provisions that the visitors required. As the volume of trade 
increased, there was a commensurate rise in the value of the islanders’ 
commodities.
While in port, sailors rested and indulged in pursuits of pleasure, finding 
comfort in women and alcohol. The attraction of the island lifestyle 
encouraged many sailors to abandon their ships; they became the first 
beachcombers.24 The increased traffic in whaling and trading vessels 
developed islanders’ awareness of international commerce and politics.25 
For example, in Pohnpei, the powerful Nahnmwarki(s)26 and local 
businessman Henry Nahnpei exploited this knowledge and manipulated 
the visiting vessels and foreign residents for personal interests. The 
Nahnmwarki also manipulated the beachcombers into serving them as 
negotiators in order to acquire more material wealth from the visiting 
23  Francis X. Hezel, ‘Book Review: Double Ghosts: Oceanian Voyages on Euroamerican Ships’, Journal 
of World History, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999, pp. 479–481.
24  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 92–93.
25  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 91–92; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 84–85.
26  For explanation of the tile Nahnmwarki, see indigenous historian and archaeologist from Pohnpei 
Rufino Mauricio’s Ideological Bases, p. 60. Note that there is no plural for Nahnmwarki, so  I  use 
‘Nahnmwarki(s)’ to refer to the various holders of the title.
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vessels. This contest later played out in local politics, especially between 
local leaders vying to consolidate their power base. In the less-visited, low-
lying islands like Ngatik (Sapwafik), Mokil and Pingelap, locals also honed 
their trade skills to obtain iron, clothes and tobacco.27 Trade precipitated 
a notably violent massacre in which the male population of Ngatik28 was 
decimated by a combined group of rogue Pohnpeians and outsiders. This 
reconstitution of the population demographic became the subject of an 
interesting scholarly study of ethnicity in contemporary Micronesia.
In Kosrae, the chiefs also exploited the imbalance in the trade relationship 
and did not hesitate to use violent means such as looting and burning 
visiting ships to keep the outsiders at bay.29 These acts could be explained 
in terms of the tension between the chiefs and their subjects against the 
intruding outsiders. For example, local women were exploited sexually 
by the visiting sailors. This was unacceptable to the locals and was 
compounded by a handful of sailors who abandoned their ships against 
the wishes of the locals. In response to these affronts, violence broke 
out and two ships were burned and sunk by Kosraens. To avoid further 
conflict, captains of the visiting ships sought assistance from the high 
chiefs in Kosrae and Pohnpei by offering rewards for their sailors’ return.
In the outer islands of Chuuk, such as the Mortlocks, whalers also 
occasionally sought provisions but on friendly terms. The high volcanic 
islands of Chuuk were avoided due to their fierce reputation as portrayed 
by the early explorers. In Yap, foreigners were mindful of the power of the 
local chiefs over their subjects and acknowledged this by appeasing them. 
The chiefs used their influence over their trading activities to demonstrate 
their power in local politics. This was to send a message to the outsiders 
that the chiefs were in control. Far fewer beachcombers settled in Yap than 
Pohnpei, demonstrating the way in which local politics differed and how 
that influenced the manner in which different communities addressed the 
common threat posed by the sailors.30
27  Oral history indicates that, at least in Chuuk, some of the foreigners who married locals were 
instrumental in educating Micronesian people about the outside world. For example, many outsiders 
like Jack Elhers, who married a lady from Lekinioch, mediated between outsiders and the indigenous 
people during the German period (Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 66).
28  Known as the Ngatik massacre. See Lin Poyer, The Ngatik Massacre: A History and Identity on 
a Micronesian Atoll, Smithsonian Institution Press, London, 1993, pp. 4–22; Hezel, The First Taint of 
Civilization, pp. 120–122.
29  Segal, Kosrae, pp. 73–74.
30  Amanda Morgan, ‘Mystery in the Eye of the Beholder: Cross Cultural Encounters on 
19th Century Yap’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 31, No. 1, June 1996, pp. 27–41.
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Micronesianising Missionaries
Unbeknownst to the Micronesians, reports of drunken and disorderly 
behaviour and the sex trade in Pohnpei and Kosrae reached the ears of 
religious leaders in the US. The American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (ABCFM) based in Boston took up the challenge to 
Christianise Micronesia. It was believed that the success of the ABCFM 
in Hawai‘i could be reproduced in Micronesia.31 However, this was not 
to be the case as the missionaries’ lack of knowledge of Micronesian 
societies handicapped their efforts to convert Micronesian islanders to the 
Christian faith. Did the American missionaries seek permission from the 
Micronesian islanders to bring Christianity to their islands? What sort of 
reception were the missionaries expecting since they did not understand 
the islands’ social structure?
In 1852, a group of ABCFM missionaries sailed to Pohnpei and Kosrae. 
Benjamin Snow and his wife, in addition to a Hawaiian couple, were 
permitted by the highest-ranking leader to start their mission activities 
in Kosrae. The rest of the American party—Dr Luther Gulick and his 
wife, Mr and Mrs Sturges and their Hawaiian assistant Ka’aikaula—
sailed to Pohnpei.32 Immediately upon their arrival in Pohnpei, the 
missionaries were at the mercy of local politics. The missionaries set up 
residence in the district of Kiti as encouraged by the powerful Nahnken 
who gave the missionaries land to use. The Nahnken took an interest in 
the missionaries’ activities, foreseeing future benefits from hosting them.33 
In Pohnpeian society, the Nahnken is lower than the Nahnmwarki and 
yet the missionaries followed the Nahnken’s demands. This immediately 
landed them in the middle of the internal politics of Pohnpei as there had 
also been ongoing problems caused by the unruly behaviours of many 
foreign residents. Such occurrences delayed the establishment of the 
Christian faith in Pohnpei.
31  Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, pp. 143–144.
32  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 143–144; Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, pp. 143–144. 
There is a discrepancy between these the two authors’ comments on the pattern of missionisation 
in Pohnpei and Kosrae. For example, Hezel states that the missionaries landed in Kosrae first before 
sailing to Pohnpei, while Hanlon states that the opposite occurred.
33  Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, p. 147.
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Lip service was a methodology employed by the locals to convert to 
Christianity. To manipulate the missionaries, Nahnken was converted and, 
naturally, his followers were too. This was part of the Micronesian strategy 
of indirectly controlling outsiders and at the same time Micronesianising 
the foreigners to advance internal priorities, such as chiefly rivalries.34 
Manipulation of the missionaries meant that the missionaries had to 
work harder for many years before Christianity was tolerated in Pohnpei 
and Kosrae.35
Micronesianising the Spanish Rule
To prop up the Spanish ego as being one of the remaining superpowers 
in the Pacific, in 1886, Governor Don Isidro Posadillo and his Spanish 
force set foot on Pohnpei to take control of the region for the Spanish 
Empire. Spain claimed much of Micronesia with this move, although its 
actual physical presence was largely confined to the port town of Kolonia 
in Pohnpei. By the time the Spanish arrived, the Pohnpeians were already 
aware of the side effects of foreign influence as had been brought by the 
whalers, beachcombers, traders and American missionaries who had 
preceded the Spanish by 50 years.36 The Spanish thought that controlling 
Pohnpei would be an easy affair. Again, like the missionaries, they did not 
seek permission from the locals to set up their foreign institutions and 
their knowledge of Pohnpeian societies was poor. What kind of reception 
did the Spanish think they would receive while imposing their presence in 
Pohnpei? They would soon find out.
The Spanish incursion in Pohnpei was subdued until Governor Posadillo 
tested his power over a land called mesenieng that was already in the 
possession of the ABCFM after the local ruler, the Lepen of Nett, granted 
them the right to reside on the land. The governor needed the land to 
establish his headquarters and looked for a way to acquire it. The governor 
sought the assistance of the Lepen of Nett to claim the land. To the Lepen 
of Nett, this was absurd. The land did not belong to any of the foreign 
claimants as the land system in Pohnpei did not recognise agreements 
34  See David Hanlon, ‘Another Side of Henry Nanpei’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
April 1988, pp. 36–51.
35  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 175.
36  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 240.
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on paper under the customary system called tiahk en sapw.37 Doane, 
one of the American missionaries who represented the ABCFM, resisted 
the governor’s insistence, angering him in the process. Consequently, 
Doane was arrested and deported to the Philippines for undermining 
Spanish authority. Doane’s deportation highlighted the power struggle 
between the Americans and Spanish, as well as the simmering relations 
with the Pohnpeians.
The Pohnpeians did not anticipate anything that would alter their 
perception of the new arrivals.38 The Spanish initially did not seem to learn 
from the experiences of the outsiders who preceded them. The Pohnpeians 
were not going to succumb to the new rulers after having managed 
the influence of all other arrivals before them. The indigenous people 
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach to observe what the Spanish were up to 
before responding. Patience is an element inherent in indigenous cultural 
practices to strategise during both natural disasters and man-made threats. 
These traits characterised Micronesian strength as weakness in the face of 
adversaries: outsiders only saw passivity rather than assertiveness in their 
culturally restricted reading of these actions.
The Spanish failed to understand the dynamics of Pohnpeian society in the 
late nineteenth century. Kolonia was one of the busiest port towns in the 
Pacific. For example, Hanlon estimated that more than 50 ships arrived 
during the windy months when they sought shelter from the storms.39 
During the windy season, port life centred on rum and women, much to 
the displeasure of the missionaries. As well as ships’ crews, the community 
of beachcombers, traders, castaways, whalers and adventurers also threw 
themselves into the mix.40 Islanders and outsiders mingled with each other 
seeking mutual interests. Pohnpeians understood the need of the foreigners 
and dealt with them accordingly. The missionaries were preaching to the 
locals about the bible. However, at the same time, many of the resident 
foreigners countered the message of the missionaries by their involvement 
in prostitution and heavy drinking41 to satisfy the needs of the visiting ships’ 
crews. Pohnpeians also cashed in on the prostitution business and traded 
local products for tobacco, alcohol and other Western commodities.42
37  Tiahk en sapw encapsules all the customary practices of Pohnpei, which defined the Pohnpeian 
identity (Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 5).
38  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, pp. 106–107.
39  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 112; Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, p. 122.
40  Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, pp. 94–95; Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 110–111.
41  Marshall, The Weekend Warrior, p. 32; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 155, 157–158.
42  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 93–94.
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The indigenous political system in Pohnpei was and still is structured 
into five chiefdoms. At the apex are the Nahnmwarki,43 the paramount 
chiefs and their spokesperson, the Nahnken.44 The paramount chief has 
power over the land and its people. In turn, the people worked the land 
and paid tribute to the Nahnmwarki. The Nahnmwarki also assigned titles 
to his subjects on a competitive basis, trading favours and influence for 
titles and status. The power of each Nahnmwarki is dependent on the 
size of the land he controls and the size of the population in his political 
domain. Political and economic relationships between the five chiefdoms 
were generally fluid but could become more rigid depending on local 
circumstances. Demands made by Nahnmwarki were often carried out by 
his subjects accordingly.
The relationship between Governor Posadillo and the Pohnpeians became 
strained when he moved to consolidate his power. Posadillo sought to 
increase Spanish control by developing a road infrastructure to allow 
free movement of Spanish officials around the island. He also sought to 
promote the Catholic faith and for the Spanish language to be the new 
lingua franca. Both moves were not well received by either the locals or 
the American missionaries. To make things worse, the governor called on 
the Nahnmwarki to support his ambitious plan to build the road system.45 
The governor wanted a team of men from each of the chiefdoms to be 
rotated on a weekly basis as labourers during the construction of the 
circumferential road. In addition, each Nahnmwarki would be required 
to supply food for the working teams.46
When the Nahnmwarki of Madolenihmw objected to the governor’s 
demands, he was threatened with punishment. Further breakdown 
between the opposing sides ensued when the Nahnmwarki of Nett was 
ordered to clean a latrine as a form of punishment for insubordination.47 
This insult to their leader infuriated the local population as he epitomised 
Pohnpeian sacredness, power and identity. For Pohnpeians, to receive 
orders from an alien figurehead without consulting the Nahnmwarki was 
43  Muricio, Ideological Bases, p. 60.
44  Muricio, Ideological Bases, p. 60.
45  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 264; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 29; Paul D’Arcy, 
‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule: With Reference to Spanish and German Colonial Rule in the 
Caroline Islands Identify the Various Parties Influencing the History of this Era? What Perceptions 
and Objectives Were They Motivated By?’, University of Hawai‘i, 1986 (Unpublished paper), p. 2.
46  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 29; Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, p. 264.
47  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 267–268; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 29.
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unthinkable, let alone to punish and humiliate someone of this rank. 
This gesture of arrogance brought the simmering tension between the two 
sides to a boiling point. The Pohnpeians rallied behind their traditional 
leaders by refusing to comply with the governor’s demands.48
In response, the governor ordered the closures of schools and the ceasing 
of local activities like feasting until the road system was completed.49 
This only hardened the Pohnpeians’ resolve to resist, and they were ready 
to pick up arms to retaliate against the Spanish. Things came to a head 
when a detachment of soldiers was sent to Sokehs to arrest the Lepen 
and Wasai (traditional chiefs of Pohnpei under the Nahnmwarki) for 
subverting Spanish order. The detachment arrived during a local feast 
and demanded that the two men be taken to the governor in Kolonia. 
Frustrated at the lack of immediate compliance, the detachment opened 
fire and killed seven Pohnpeians.50 The Pohnpeians responded by killing 
17 of the soldiers, including their leader. The Wasai then declared that 
‘it was better to die fighting rather than living as slaves’, signifying a new 
era of engagement between the islanders and the Spanish.51
This incident initiated a state of war between the Spanish and Pohnpeians. 
The Pohnpeians took their fight to the colony in Kolonia to demonstrate 
their determination to subvert any further Spanish demands. Governor 
Posadillo’s style of administration was criticised by his own Spanish 
priests, but this criticism fell on deaf ears. When Posadillo learned of 
more planned retaliation against the Spanish, he pre-empted this threat 
by evacuating his people to a ship anchored off the island. However, the 
governor and a few of his men remained in the colonial compound.52
To prevent the governor from escaping, the Pohnpeians posted guards 
in the vicinity of the compound. Fearing for their lives, the governor 
and his men tried to escape, but they were caught and killed. The rest 
of the Spanish party remained on the ship, waiting to be rescued. Help 
arrived when a Spanish man-of-war arrived to deliver supplies to the 
48  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, pp. 108–109.
49  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 267–268; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 29.
50  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 267–268; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 30; John Fisher 
and Ann Fisher, The Eastern Caroline Islands: Human Relations Area, Files Press, Connecticut, 1970, 
pp. 37–38; Paul Ehrlich, ‘“The Clothes of Men”: Ponape Island and German Colonial Rule, 1899–
1914, PhD thesis, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, 1973, p. 71.
51  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 267–268.
52  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 109.
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colony. Upon hearing of the governor’s death, the commander of the 
ship, de la Concha, opted to remain in Pohnpei to hold the colony until 
reinforcements arrived from Manila.
A new governor, Don Luis Casadro y Rey, arrived a few weeks later from 
Manila, accompanied by three warships, 700 soldiers and two artillery 
batteries.53 Immediately upon his arrival, the new governor bombarded 
the colony with his naval guns to intimidate the locals. It was sufficient 
to persuade the Nahnmwarki of Kiti, Madolenihmw and Uh and the 
Wasai of Sokehs to meet with the Spanish at the negotiating table.54 The 
governor demanded the unconditional surrender of Pohnpeian agitators 
and the return of all guns and property taken from the Spanish fort in 
Mesening. He further demanded that Lepen Nett and Wasai Sokehs should 
face Spanish justice and that the rest of the inhabitants should adhere to 
Spanish law and order. While the people of Nett did not like the new 
order, Lepen Nett, against the wishes of his people, decided to surrender 
to prevent further bloodshed. The execution of the two traditional leaders 
was intended as a warning to the local population. However, three locals 
volunteered to be executed instead of the Lepen and Wasai.55 The Spanish 
executed the volunteers instead of the two perceived agitators. Given that 
the Spanish were seeking to demonstrate their strength and supremacy, 
why did they agree to that deal?56
Believing that he had total control of the Pohnpeians after these executions, 
the new governor pushed for the completion of the road system.57 
He  obviously had not learned from Posadillo’s experience. At  first, he 
designed a scheme to pay local people for the road construction, but 
the Pohnpeians remained unwilling participants. He went ahead with 
the road program, using whatever labourers he could muster, but it was 
unsuccessful.58 Local politics also played a part. For example, in Kitti, 
there were two opposing factions headed respectively by the Nahnmwarki 
and the local businessman and pastor Henry Nahnpei, who the American 
missionaries supported. To shift the balance of power, the Nahnmwarki 
of Kitti associated himself with the Catholic Spanish. He urged the 
53  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 32.
54  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 110.
55  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 110; Hanlon, Upon a 
Stone Altar, p. 274.
56  I have yet to find an answer in any literature or oral history.
57  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 38–40; David Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 311–314.
58  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 111.
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Spanish governor to build a church in Kitti.59 The Spanish saw this as an 
opportunity to expand their presence around the island. The church was 
built next to the Protestant Church and a guardhouse was also erected 
for Spanish soldiers, signalling a new discourse in island politics. The 
Spanish believed that their presence in Kitti was a success and were keen 
to duplicate the experience in other parts of the island.60 The governor 
demanded that another Catholic Church be built in the settlement of 
Ohwa on the other side of the island in Madolenihmw.61 He also ordered 
that a new road be constructed to connect the two churches. The proposed 
church in Madolenihmw was to be built within a stone’s throw of the 
Protestant Church. The governor ignored the strong Protestant support 
in Madolenihmw and the advice from his own priests against such 
a move. Believing in his own superiority, he ordered the completion of 
the church to coincide with the birthday of the Queen Regent of Spain.62 
His misjudgement and overall attitude fuelled simmering tensions on 
the island.
Fighting broke out between the Spanish and the people of Ohwa. Many 
of the Spanish soldiers and workers were killed. The surviving priests 
were assisted by Nahnpei to escape. News of the event reached Kolonia, 
whereupon the governor responded by sending the warship Manila to 
bombard Ohwa. This operation failed when the gunship ran into a reef. 
The soldiers who were sent ashore did not have the capacity to engage in 
combat with the islanders,63 and knowledge of the terrain and seashores 
gave the locals the upper hand. It was mentioned in local accounts 
that magical power was also used to ward off the Spanish aggressors.64 
The soldiers were unable to bring order to Madolenihmw and returned to 
Kolonia to await further orders.
It took a few more months for reinforcements to arrive from the 
Philippines. The new commanding officer, Colonel Isidro Guiterrez, was 
keen to capture the local leaders and decisively wipe out the opposition. 
59  The ABCFM and the Spanish Catholic Church were incorporated into local politics to increase 
the dominance of certain leaders. For the power struggle between the leaders in Kiti, see Hanlon, 
Upon the Stone Altar, pp. 311–313.
60  Hanlon, Upon the Stone Altar, pp. 311–313.
61  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 114; Hanlon, Upon a 
Stone Altar, pp. 314–317.
62  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 40; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 312.
63  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 40; Hanlon, ‘Sorcery, “Savage Memories” and the Edge 
of Commensurability’, p. 114.
64  Hanlon, ‘Sorcery, “Savage Memories” and the Edge of Commensurability’, pp. 114–115.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
98
His plans were thwarted by his lack of knowledge of the terrain and 
weather conditions in Pohnpei. His humiliation at failing to quickly 
achieve his objective eventually led to his suicide the night before he was to 
launch an attack on Ohwa.65 Fighting resumed with the Pohnpeians, who 
continued to resist the assaults, using their local knowledge of the terrain. 
After many attempts to subdue the local resistance, the Spanish retreated 
to Kolonia, but only after they claimed a token victory in securing an 
abandoned local fort in Madolenihmw. The Spanish were confined to 
their little compound in Kolonia, protected by what is known today as 
the Spanish Wall.66 The Spaniards’ lack of knowledge on local politics, 
geography and the traditional system doomed their attempt to build 
a  successful colony.67 In the end, the Spanish withdrew in humiliation 
from Pohnpei. The Spanish Wall still stands in the heart of Pohnpei’s 
capital, Kolonia, and is a reminder of Spain’s short history in Micronesia.
Spain also attempted to set up a colony in Yap. While they encountered 
American missionaries in Pohnpei, they came across the already 
established German commercial interests in Yap. In an attempt to counter 
this influence, the whole Caroline Islands were awarded to Spain by the 
Vatican.68 Relations between the Yapese and the Spanish were cordial but 
cautious. Hezel portrayed the Yapese as ‘tenacious of their beliefs and 
practice … and … far more discriminative of what they would accept 
from the outside world’.69 The Spaniards were quick to establish open and 
friendly relations with the local Yapese chiefs to achieve their aims in this 
well-regulated society.
Yapese resistance to Spanish rule was expressed in many forms. These 
forms included the continued traditional practices of keeping women in 
the men’s long house for sexual purposes against Spanish wishes and the 
honouring of traditional gods. The Yapese paid lip service to the newcomers’ 
wishes while continuing to pursue their own priorities behind the backs 
of the Spanish. The Spanish were quick to learn that maintaining the 
balance of power between the village chiefs was essential to maintaining 
their presence in Yap. For example, the chief of Gachpar withdrew his 
support when he complained about the lack of Spanish benefits reaching 
his village. In response to this displeasure, Governor Bartola and the senior 
65  Hanlon, ‘Sorcery, “Savage Memories” and the Edge of Commensurability’, pp. 319–320.
66  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 329.
67  Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 108.
68  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 8–9; Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 245–246.
69  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 15.
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Spanish priests travelled to Gachpar to appease the powerful chief.70 The 
governor humbled himself before the chief at the meeting. Sensing this 
humbleness and respect, the chief welcomed the governor, which opened 
a new frontier of mutually beneficial relations. The governor indicated 
that a missionary would come and live in Gachpar;71 the chief saw this as 
a means of retaining his eroding power. The encounter prevented violence 
and was used as an educational example for the Spanish to cement peaceful 
coexistence between the Yapese and themselves.72
In the low-lying Caroline Islands, the Spanish exercised almost no power 
over the outer islands, which they rarely, if ever, visited. The islands were 
scattered over a large expanse of water, which was almost impossible to 
administer.73 The Spanish Empire was also dwindling and lacked the 
necessary resources to enforce its rule. The islanders continued their 
cultural practices as usual. The handful of German traders who occasioned 
the islands to gather copra for the European market did not make 
significant inroads into inducing change on a large scale. This history of 
resistance held the islanders in good stead, ready to face the challenges 
posed by other external powers in later years.
Engagement with Germany
Spain’s loss in the Spanish–American War resulted in Spain’s ejection 
from Micronesia. As a spoil of war, the US took over Guam as an 
unincorporated territory. The rest of Micronesia was sold by Spain to 
Germany. Micronesians had already experienced German influence since 
they had been allowed to conduct commercial trade during the Spanish 
colonial era. However, Micronesians were not consulted about these 
arrangements.74 Like the Spaniards before them, the Germans did not 
have a coherent policy in Micronesia. Their main objective was economic: 
to develop the copra industry and, later, exploit phosphate when it was 
discovered on Fais and Angaur.75 In terms of enhancing the social and 
70  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 24.
71  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 24.
72  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 24.
73  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 14.
74  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 30–31; Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and 
Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 118; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 94–95.
75  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 121–122.
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economic welfare of Micronesians, there was nothing much to show as 
the German companies adopted a laissez-faire approach. This suited the 
Micronesians as it minimised interruptions to their traditional lifestyles.
Yap and Pohnpei became hubs for German commercial and administrative 
activities headed by district officers and their entourages. German traders 
working for the Jailut Gesselshaft copra company in Chuuk and Kosrae 
were appointed as German representatives. To increase the volume 
of its copra exports to European markets, Germany encouraged copra 
production in the islands. The Micronesians understood clearly that the 
Germans were not in Micronesia to improve Micronesian’s economic 
conditions, but for their own interests. As Micronesian scholar Walter 
noted, the German ‘administration did not come to … [fulfil] the 
wishes of the Micronesian people, but according to their own desires’.76 
In Chuuk, copra was not profitable and so individual traders were left to 
pursue other business activities from which they might profit.77 Elsewhere 
in Micronesia, copra was profitable due to different growing techniques.
Christianity continued to be used as a tool for Western indoctrination. 
A  buy-back scheme to control the spread of guns was instituted to 
minimise local conflict in the hope of centring Christianity as the new 
locus of a renewed colonial era that it was hoped would bring peace and 
prosperity.78 The success of these measures is questionable, given the 
continued presence of many ‘pagan’ practices in this period. For example, 
in the Mortlocks, waitowa (communicating to the spirits), apwarik 
(traditional dances), falifel (tattooing) and apupulun fanou (non-Christian 
marriages) were revived and continued to thrive. One missionary observed 
in reference to the islands of Nama and Ettal, ‘neither the missionary 
activities nor the ship[s] [that carried European] civilisation changed their 
concepts and their mode of living’.79 In Yap, the Spanish Missionaries 
struggled to end the ‘institutional prostitution’, high rate of divorce, 
polygamy and practise of kan (offerings to ancestral spirits).80 Wilhelm 
Friedrich (a German missionary), who worked in the Mortlocks in the 
76  Walter, Desirability, Problems, and Methods of Achieving National Independence, p. 34.
77  Francis X. Hezel, ‘A Brief Economic History of Micronesia’, Past Achievements and Future 
Possibilities, Majuro: Micronesian Seminar, 1984, pp. 11–62, micsem.org/pubs/articles/economic/
frames/ ecohistfr.htm.
78  Hezel, ‘A Brief Economic History of Micronesia’.
79  Duane, Clan and Copra, p. 170.
80  Hezel, ‘The Catholic Church in Yap: A Foothold in the Carolines’, Micronesian Seminar, 2003, 
www.micsem.org/pubs/books/ catholic/yap/.
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1930s, complained about islanders who professed themselves as being 
Christians and yet ‘continued to make use of magic means whenever 
something needs to be accomplished’.81 In other outer islands such as 
Satawal and Ifalik, Christianity was virtually non-existent until the 
1950s.82
Islanders from different parts of Chuuk were recruited on minimal wages 
to work in the mines in Nauru and Angaur.83 Islanders from the low-
lying islands in Yap were recruited to work on German projects on the 
main island and were also sent to Nauru, Palau and Fais to work in the 
phosphate mines. Internal island politics also played a role in the Yapese 
recruitment system as influential chiefs used their power in the sawei 
structure to extract wages from workers. However, at the same time, 
workers began to disassociate themselves from the sawei system when they 
realised the exploitative nature of the labour system.84
In Pohnpei, the German administration attempted to establish good 
relations with the locals but the memories of the Spanish era were still 
fresh. The relationship between the two sides was cordial but changed 
with subsequent German administrators. The Germans reimposed labour 
requirements for road construction and imposed a new tax regime and an 
obligation to work for 15 days on public projects.85 A new land system 
based on individual ownership was also introduced in an attempt to 
drive a wedge between the Nahnmwarki and their subjects. The German 
administrators envisioned that a private land system would be more 
productive instead of the commoners paying tribute to the Nahnmwarki 
in return for occupying the land.
Local politics and personalities were also involved in the political discourse, 
and local action at times contradicted the German’s administration policy. 
For example, businessman Henry Nanpei, who many claimed was the 
instigator of the ‘Sokehs rebellion’, attempted to turn the southern 
Protestants and the northern Catholics against each other to consolidate 
his own personal power.86 Nanpei was a shrewd businessman who 
81  Lothar Käser, ‘Light in the South Seas. Wilhelm Friedrich & Elisabeth Kärcher: The Life and 
Work of a Liebenzell Missionary Couple’, Verlag Der Liebenzeller Mission (Unpublished), p. 134.
82  Hezel, ‘The Catholic Church in Yap’.
83  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 22–23.
84  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 109.
85  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 136.
86  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 134.
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benefitted from the trade boom and a key player in the Protestant Church 
movement. He envisioned an alternative political system in Pohnpei 
premised on the parliamentary model, with himself as the new ruler of 
Pohnpei. His naked ambition was well known to the leaders of Pohnpei 
and the colonial masters.87 His machinations were unsuccessful as the 
traditional system continued its course on the basis of the pre-existing 
social and political order.
Tension between Pohnpeians and their colonial administrators grew 
when  a new German administrator, Boeder, was appointed to oversee 
German interests on the island. Boeder was well known for his harsh 
treatment of indigenous workers; for example, he had used force to put 
down a labour revolt against German interests in Africa. He came from 
a military background and was determined to emulate the brutal policies 
he oversaw while in Africa. He ignored sound advice from his predecessors 
and executed harsh measures whenever he could to match his Protestant 
work ethic.88
In the rush to complete the road construction, he forced a labour team to 
build a bridge to join the island of Sokehs and the main island of Pohnpei. 
He miscalculated the risk the work imposed on the indigenous road 
workers. Violence broke out when an overseer beat a local worker almost 
to the point of death. The Pohnpeian response was immediate and swift, 
and culminated in the loss of many lives on the German side, including 
Boeder himself. This event was a breaking point, at which the Pohnpeians 
felt the need to restore their pride and honour as embedded in their local 
customs and traditions.89 The outsiders were oblivious to this reality and, 
as a result, contributed to their own demise. Like the Spanish governors 
before him, Boeder’s sense of superiority and misjudgement led to the loss 
of his life.90 The Micronesians, like any human group, tolerated external 
pressures to a certain extent, but they would not tolerate subjugation that 
undermined the roots of their culture and traditions. Violent resistance 
against outsiders periodically occurred in Micronesian history, but there 
87  D’Arcy, ‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule’, pp. 3–5; Hempenstall and Rutherford, Protest and 
Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 118.
88  D’Arcy, ‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule’, p. 4.
89  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 348.
90  D’Arcy, ‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule’, p. 4.
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were internal mechanisms to control and minimise violence. Micronesian 
intellectuality also played its part to restore internal coherence for the 
purpose of peaceful coexistence.91
The news of Boeder’s death at the hands of a few locals from Sokehs 
triggered a disproportionate German response. Germany dispatched 
gunships with trained troops from its headquarters in New Guinea. Upon 
their arrival, they bombarded the island of Sokehs with cannon fire in 
an attempt to flush out the perpetrators. However, those responsible 
had already escaped before the arrival of the German force. They were 
scattered around the main island of Pohnpei; many sought shelter with 
their relatives. After an intensive search for the perpetrators, the leaders of 
the resistance group gave themselves up to prevent any further bloodshed. 
The leaders were brought to Kolonia and executed in front of a crowd in 
the hope of teaching the locals a lesson of the consequence of disobeying 
their German masters.92 The rest of the perpetrators were deported to 
Palau and Papua New Guinea. After the ‘Sokehs incident’, the Pohnpeians 
went back to their normal routine, only to be interrupted a few years later 
when the Japanese arrived in Pohnpei to establish a new colonial rule.
The German experience in Yap was the opposite of that in Pohnpei. 
Yap was considered a model colony. For example, the district officers 
realised that the best way to implement colonial objectives was first to 
win the hearts and minds of the Yapese people. To do so, they needed 
to understand the cultural structure of the island. Social relationships 
were the foundation of Yapese culture, and with that understanding, the 
Germans were able to develop a cordial relationship with the Yapese, 
especially with the chiefs.93 It was a policy of inclusion, one that was 
mutually beneficial. The chiefs mobilised their people to assist in the 
development of colonial infrastructure such as roads, docks and offices, 
as well as abiding by the principles of law and order. In return, the chiefs 
received material benefits and German recognition of their chiefly status. 
The personalities of the German overseers also played a crucial role in 
bringing both sides together.94
91  The ‘Sokehs rebellion’ was caused by many factors, including both intra- and inter-clan rivalries 
(Paul Ehrlich, ‘“The Clothes of Men”’, pp. 159–167).
92  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 140–141.
93  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 264–265.
94  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 105–106.
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One can argue that there was not much difference between the Spanish 
and German colonial policies in the Pacific. Both were caught up in 
their own pursuit of being world-class powers in the Pacific, using the 
islands, as Hezel claimed, as ‘the ornament’95 of their colonial power. 
The Micronesians’ traditions continued to function as usual, with the 
incorporation of new ideas learned from the outside world. The lack of 
support from the motherland countries affected the manner in which 
colonial policies were implemented in Micronesia.96 By and large, 
the German administrators were left to finance the running of their 
administration of Micronesia primarily based on their personal view as 
to what benefits Micronesia offered to Germany. The Germans’ overly 
ambitious plan for Micronesia and their political temperament brought 
complications, particularly in Pohnpei as previously discussed.
Geography and resources dictated the way the Germans implemented their 
colonial policies. Violence was more pronounced in the high islands, as in 
the case of Pohnpei, while lowkey diplomatic tactics were the main norms 
of engagement in the low-lying islands.97 The Micronesians were not easy 
to dominate since they did not allow the colonisers to have a free hand on 
their islands, as in the case of Pohnpei. Further, they had seen the different 
demands of the outsiders who frequented their islands throughout the 
Spanish and German colonial times. The islanders’ responses were framed 
within the context of survivability and continuity.98 They understood 
that each colonial power had its own weaknesses and thus limitations. 
The change of colonial flags represented the unsettling politics of the 
external world, which also enabled Micronesians to frame their mode 
of cautious responses to the continuing colonial process. In the main, 
the Micronesians did not have to fight too hard as the external world 
was unstable and changing.99 In the end, Germany was too preoccupied 
with other affairs, culminating in World War I. The defeat of the Central 
Powers foreshadowed their territorial concessions to the victors. Great 
Britain later supported Japan in the League of Nations to take over the 
political administration of Micronesia.
95  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. xiii.
96  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 136.
97  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 81–82.
98  D’Arcy, ‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule’, pp. 5–6.
99  D’Arcy, ‘Spanish and German Colonial Rule’, p. 1.
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Tolerating Japanese Colonisation
Japanese merchants were not new in Micronesia as many were already 
working on the islands during the German administration. Many locals 
were already familiar with the Japanese work ethic and general attitude 
towards islanders. Micronesia was annexed by Japan as a Class C 
mandate under strict order of the League of Nations. Under the terms 
of the mandate, Japan’s responsibilities were framed in accordance with 
international terms to: 1) promote the material and moral wellbeing 
and social progress of the local inhabitants; 2) eliminate slavery, traffic 
in arms and ammunition and alcoholic beverages; 3) refrain from 
building fortifications and military bases or from giving military aid to 
Micronesians; 4) permit freedom and worship and missionary activity; 
and 5) submit an annual accounting report to the League of Nations 
by way of its mandates and commission.100
Yet again, Micronesia was passed to another colonial ruler without any 
Micronesian input into the process. Japan was mindful of its mandate, 
but in practice, its administrators paid only lip service to their obligations. 
For example, economic development was for the benefit of the Japanese 
rather than Micronesians.
Lacking the local knowledge to form a coherent policy for the 
implementation of the league’s instructions in the Class C mandate, 
scores of Japanese scholars and technicians descended on the islands to 
conduct economic surveys and study the cultures of the area. However, 
the hidden dimension was the old practice of incorporating the islands 
into a foreign political structure. Japan built their economic vision on 
the existing infrastructure left by the Germans. From 1917 to 1922, 
basic systems for education and health were established and Christianity 
continued its course. Japanese became the official language of the islands. 
Copra and phosphate extraction continued, while fishing and agriculture 
were identified as having future economic potential.101 However, to make 
these industries viable required a large labour pool from Japan, which also 
served as an outlet to relieve the overpopulation in their country.102
100  Gray, ‘Modernization in Micronesia’, p. 40.
101  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, pp. 10–12.
102  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, pp. 3–4.
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In 1922, Japan started large-scale implementation of its development 
plan for Micronesia. Many more Japanese were sent to Micronesia, and 
towns like Kolonia in Pohnpei were referred to as ‘little Tokyo’ due to 
the preponderance of the Japanese population.103 Japan upgraded the 
copra and phosphate businesses left by the Germans and maximised the 
output of the fishing and agricultural industries.104 It is estimated that, at 
its peak in 1937, the fishing industry produced approximately 6,000 tons 
of katsuobushi (dried tuna) annually. The tuna trade brought in around 
¥3 million profit annually, which tripled by the end of the decade.105 Most 
of the fish exports were produced in Chuuk.
Pohnpei was developed into an agricultural hub. Large tracts of land were 
cleared to plant crops such as tapioca, cotton, coffee, eggplants, cucumber 
and others. Over ¥400,000 was earned from the export of tapioca alone.106 
Phosphate production increased from 60,000 tons before 1935 to 
120,000 tons at the end of the decade. Copra production increased from 
4,733 tons in 1922 to 13,703 tons in 1935.107 The economic ‘miracle’ was 
expressed in the figures from 1935, where exports totalled ¥26 million 
and imports ¥15 million. Export revenue increased to ¥40 million by the 
end of the 1930s.108 Many Micronesians entered the workforce on their 
own accord to earn money to supplement their needs, although for some 
it was by Japanese demand.
By the 1930s, the Japanese population in the islands outnumbered 
the Micronesians. The Japanese reaped the benefits of the economic 
boom, reinforced by a racial policy that created social divisions between 
Micronesians and non-Micronesians.109 The Japanese occupied the upper 
echelon of the class structure, followed by Okinawans and others in 
the middle, and the tomin (Micronesians)110 at the bottom. This racial 
division ran deep in the education system and the employment sector. 
103  The development plan was to benefit the Japanese, whereby they would eventually outnumber 
indigenous Micronesians and build Japanese commercial centres like little towns in Japan (Hezel, 
‘A Brief Economic History of Micronesia’).
104  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 195; Duane, Clan and Copra, p. 216.
105  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 197.
106  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 197.
107  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, p. 9.
108  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 198.
109  Hezel, Strangers in their Own Land, p. 204; D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, 
p. 12.
110  ‘Toming’ is a Japanese term for Micronesians. According to Mortlockese who survived the war, it 
was a derogatory term distinguishing between the so-called ‘sophisticated’ Japanese and the low-class 
Micronesians at the bottom of the class structure during the Japanese era. ‘Kanaka’ was a similar term.
107
3. RESPONDING TO COLONISATION
For example, D’Arcy noted that in the phosphate industry, Japanese 
workers earned ¥5.7–6.5 per day, whereas Micronesians received ¥1.2–
1.5 per day.111 In the public education system, Micronesians received 
three years of basic education compared to the six years required for 
Japanese children. Physical segregation continued in the classroom, where 
Micronesian children were taught separately.112 Likewise, in the health 
sector, Micronesians occupied the lower levels in terms of employment 
and received meagre health treatment compared to their Japanese 
counterparts.
Micronesian responses to Japanese occupation continued. This was 
based on traditional social networking, where circulation of material 
goods for survival operated and benefits were shared among families. 
Micronesians entered the workforce to supplement their local lifestyle. 
Their participation in the workforce enlarged their understanding of the 
new immigrants, allowing them to strategise for the future. Such strategies 
became important when the Japanese fortified the islands in preparation 
for WWII. The Japanese sense of superiority over the Micronesians was 
soon to be shattered when they were humiliated and forcefully ejected 
from the islands at the hands of another outside power, the US.
Japan and Its Iron Fist
Survivors of WWII described the Japanese occupation in Micronesia 
as ‘harsh’, ‘brutal’ and ‘unjust’.113 Infliction of cruel punishments, 
land appropriation, slave labour (which the islanders called kinrosy), 
unwarranted execution and forced prostitution are some examples 
of the Japanese brutalities that the islanders were subjected to. Japan’s 
misconduct was in defiance of the instructions of the League of Nations, 
which was to supposedly promote the welfare of the Micronesian people. 
Anthropologist Lin Poyer discussed such cruelties and brutalities and 
noted them as deliberate aspects of Japanese intimidation, intended to 
111  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, p. 11.
112  According to family history, some of my uncles attended the school catering for Micronesian 
students, which was equivalent to elementary level. See Hezel, Strangers in Their Own land, pp. 172–
173.
113  Oral history as told by my family members about the Japanese period of administration. See also 
D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, p. 19.
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force Micronesians to obey Japanese policy.114 It was a deliberate attempt 
to break the spirit of the indigenous people to serve the war agenda of 
Japan.115 The need to survive strengthened the extended family network 
that was itself the social net for survival. Gale noted:
never before in Micronesian history had the transfer of authority 
from one regime to another been carried out by violence … the 
gradual build-up in American naval strength led to the imposition 
of blockade that brought severe food shortages in its wake and in 
some places led to starvation and Japanese atrocities.116
A German Missionary who was in Chuuk during WWII also stated:
even in plain view … Japanese soldiers commit the most gruesome 
atrocities against the islanders. During one of [many] air raids 
many women, most of whom had to serve in forced prostitution 
for the imperial army, flee into a roofed-over trench close to the 
harbor. The commander in charge fears that the invasion of the 
American marines is just about to take place and he also fears that 
the island women he abused could speak out as witnesses against 
him. He therefore gives orders to kill the women. He calls three 
corporals to the trench. These fire their machine guns through the 
entrance into the deep darkness inside until the screams of the 
women are heard no more. With the help of a flashlight they then 
count about seventy bodies lying there in their blood.117
Starvation, enslavement of islanders and cannibalism also began to emerge 
in Chuuk.118
The main Japanese naval base in Micronesia was located in the Chuuk 
lagoon. The US did not invade the lagoon, instead employing its air 
force to bomb the Japanese fleet, airports and main installations. Many 
lives were lost during these bombardments. In the outer islands, bombs 
were dropped on Japanese installations but inflicted minimal damage. 
114  Lin Poyer, ‘Yapese Experiences of the Pacific War’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, Dry Season 1995, pp. 223–224, 239–241; Suzane Falgout, Lin Poyer and Laurence Carucci, 
‘The Greatest Hardship: Micronesian Memories of WWII’, ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, 
Vol. 3, No. 2, Dry Season 1995, pp. 210–211.
115  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, p. 12.
116  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 40.
117  Käser, ‘Light in the South Seas’, p. 116.
118  Falgout, Poyer and Carucci, ‘The Greatest Hardship’, pp. 203–222. Micronesian scholar 
Myjoylynn and local person Chero Erwin stated that Japanese cannibalism was true in regard to 
a person from their village nearby (pers. comm., 20 April 2015 and 2 February 2014). Their accounts 
are based on family history and local connection.
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Most islanders in the outer islands escaped this nightmare as they had 
already been relocated elsewhere as part of Japanese security measures. 
The memories of such atrocities are still fresh in Micronesian minds today 
as the stories are told and retold by subsequent generations. Micronesians 
today ask the question, what did the innocent Micronesian civilians do 
to the Japanese that warranted their massacre? Micronesian suffering was 
neglected or treated as secondary to the sufferings of the combatants.119
Subsequent generations of Micronesians still possess the historical 
knowledge of the Japanese activities on their islands, as passed down 
from their families who survived WWII. In the low-lying atolls, islanders 
share stories of indigenous forced labour teams called kinrosi. The 
Japanese organised these teams, and every morning, islanders had to 
assemble for antere120 to ensure they were all were ready to execute the 
daily tasks. People were severely beaten even if they had an authorised 
break or simply stood up to straighten their back after being bent over for 
hours.121 Youth groups called sainentang122 were created to spread Japanese 
indoctrination. For example, the Japanese required islanders to bow in 
the direction of Japan as a show of respect to the emperor when passing 
particular Japanese symbols placed along the roadside. If they forgot to 
bow, they were beaten.
Songs were recorded and sung on special occasions, which captured the 
collective imagination of the new generation about Japanese ill-treatment 
of their forebears.123 People in the Mortlocks, the Chuuk lagoon, Kosrae, 
Pohnpei and elsewhere were removed from their homes to make room 
for the Japanese war effort.124 Today, the end of Japanese occupation 
continues to be celebrated with community holidays. For example, the 
people of Satowan celebrate their holiday as a reminder of the islanders’ 
119  Falgout, Poyer and Carucci, ‘The Greatest Hardship’, pp. 204–205.
120  ‘Antere’ was a term used by the Mortlockese to refer to morning roll call before the kinrosi teams 
started work. Oral history indicates that if someone was a no show, Japanese guards would look for 
the absent person and, once they were found, punish them with brutal force. See also Peter, ‘Eram’s 
Church (Bell)’, p. 283.
121  My grandmother told me about the Japanese treatment of islanders during clean up. She was one 
of the victims of this brutality.
122  ‘Sainentang’ is a Japanese term adopted by Mortlockese to refer to youth teams graded in terms 
of their skills and strength. See also Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 174.
123  Florian Seady, ‘Eshemeto papa mama ren ar riaffou’ is a song often sung by the Satowan people, 
reminding them of the hardship experienced during WWII and the day they finally returned to their 
island after being displaced by the Japanese military. The people of Satowan celebrate their freedom 
from the Japanese on 1 November (Satowan Oral History of Japanese occupation of Satowan).
124  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 225–226.
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resilience under the Japanese regime. Despite the displacement of islanders 
and the slave labour system imposed by the Japanese, the Mortlockese 
people continued to live traditionally by way of the ainang system. 
It restrengthened their identity and continuity as a people totally separate 
from the Japanese.125
However, it should be remembered that the islanders were not merely 
passive actors under the Japanese rule. The Micronesians exercised 
discretionary measures in an attempt to neutralise the Japanese system 
of oppression and subjugation, at least at the psychological level. For 
example, when food was in short supply due to the American blockade, 
agricultural products were reserved for Japanese soldiers. Any islanders 
found taking food crops from their own land were beaten. However, such 
brutality did not deter Micronesians’ access to their land. They organised 
food-raiding parties at night, many of which were successful.126 They 
devised an underground network based on kinship affiliation (or just 
being an islander bonded by their opposition to the Japanese) to share 
resources and enable them to patiently sit out the war. They reinforced 
each other’s self-esteem and spied on the Japanese activities to shield 
each other.127 The Micronesians knew the war was between outsiders and 
would eventually come to an end. Once the Japanese were defeated, the 
Micronesians regathered their lives and continued to live in accordance 
with their traditions while awaiting the new world order and whatever 
new colonial power that might bring.
Engagement with the US
Micronesians who survived WWII spoke of Japan’s harsh mistreatment 
of them, which came to an abrupt end when the US dropped atomic 
bombs on Japan and forced it into accepting unconditional surrender. 
Some accounts of Micronesian experiences were recorded by non-
Micronesians during the war but these are largely still missing from the 
records.128 As in the past, oral history is relied on to portray a Micronesian 
125  I heard Satowan people’s experiences during the Japanese administration from Krispin Carlos, 
an uncle, when he attended the Mortlocks Junior High School in the early 1970s.
126  Oral history and family experience recounted by Kaiko Muritok. I heard this history when 
growing up in the Mortlocks during the 1970s. On the Japanese’s cruel treatment of islanders, see also 
Käser, ‘Light in the South Seas’, pp. 159–163.
127  Mortlocks Oral History; Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 240.
128  Käser, ‘Light in the South Seas’, pp. 162–168.
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perspective of WWII. Micronesians were appreciative of the Americans 
when they expelled the Japanese from their islands. The US was not a new 
interloper in Micronesia. Its interests in the islands dated back to Captain 
Truxton of the USS Jamestown who signed a treaty in 1870 with the 
Wasai of Sokehs.129 American ideologies had also spread via the ABCFM 
missionaries who had earlier established themselves in Pohnpei, Kosrae 
and later the Mortlocks and Chuuk lagoon.
Oral accounts record that the Mortlockese composed songs to welcome 
the Americans to their islands. The American flag was displayed in many 
public spaces as a symbol to represent their newly found freedom and 
peace. I remember clearly a song composed for the Americans that says, 
‘a urute ash filaik, filaik mi kirier o parapar’ (‘let us raise our flag in stripes 
and red’), referring to the colours of the American flag.130 It was a time for 
islanders to rest, rebuild their lives and contemplate their future. While 
the islanders did so, the US was formulating a plan for how to acquire 
the islands as part of its forward strategy to defend itself in the Pacific.131
While the US had favoured self-determination for Micronesia, its position 
changed when it realised Micronesia’s growing strategic importance during 
WWII. This position led the US to negotiate with the UN to place the 
islands under a strategic trust territory, later known as the TTPI. This 
paved the way for the US to have an exclusive free hand in the islands. 
Having experienced WWII, the Micronesians understood that reliance 
and patience was the best possible survival approach to maintain their 
integrity and continuity. Colonialism was an anathema to their future 
survival. The US was in no hurry to improve the islanders’ economic 
situation, which had been devastated by the war.132 There were more 
pressing issues on the US’s Pacific agenda, like using the Marshall Islands 
for nuclear tests and Saipan as a CIA training camp to subvert communist 
activities in China. Micronesian interests were put on the political 
backburner.
129  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, pp. 202–205; Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, pp. 231–232.
130  I learned the oral history of the war from my family members who experienced the war. I grew 
up listening and singing the song. During the Vietnam War, US naval ships would stop by Lekinioch 
Island and entertain the people by playing baseball and socialising. We sang the song of the US flag, 
but in retrospect, I wonder whether the Americans understood the song.
131  Rinn-Sup Shinn, ‘Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands’, in Oceania, A Regional Study, edited 
by Frederica M. Bunge and Melinda W. Cooke, Area Handbook Series, Foreign Area Studies, 
The American University, 1984, pp. 303–304.
132  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, p. 79; Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 60–61.
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The thousands of American lives lost in WWII and the close proximity 
of Micronesia to Asia fuelled the Pentagon’s desire to retain possession of 
the islands.133 Since then, the Pentagon’s interest has been one of the main 
drivers of American policy in Micronesia, featuring in successive policies 
of the US Government. First, the US Government required the US Navy 
to administer the islands immediately after WWII. The Pentagon then 
imposed a wall of silence by sealing off the islands from the outside world 
as they were considered a sensitive military zone.134 This policy denied 
Micronesians access to the outside world without the US’s approval. 
When successive American policies were no longer effective due to 
Micronesian political pressures, the US’s final tactic was the Compact of 
Free Association—a document framed in military terms and created to 
provide the US with a foothold in the FSM in ‘perpetuity’.135
The US Navy supplied free food, education and healthcare and imposed 
a system of government based on what the US thought was appropriate. 
Inherent in this was the three levels (municipal, district and Trust Territory 
Government) and branches (executive, legislative and judiciary) of 
government that were slowly instituted. Six districts made up the TTPI: 
Palau, Yap, Ponape, Truk, the Marshall Islands and the Marianas Islands. 
Each island in the district formed a municipality and each district was 
comprised of a collection of municipalities grouped together on the basis 
of a shared perceived culture and language similarities.
At the municipal level, especially in the outlying islands, the inhabitants 
continued their traditional ways.136 That is because the field trip ships 
that delivered supplies from the district centres were infrequent and there 
was thus less reliance on them. Sailing canoes continued to be used to 
maintain connections between islands, especially in Yap and Chuuk. 
Traditional social and religious practices were in the hands of traditional 
elders despite the presence of Christianity and the new system of 
American-inspired government.137 The land system was largely unaffected 
in the villages, and law and order was left to the islanders to administer. 
Traditional agriculture and fishing remained the primary economic mode 
133  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 60–61.
134  Paul D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia: 1946–1958’, University of Hawai‘i, 
1986 (Unpublished paper), pp. 2–5.
135  Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States of 
America, Compilation of Documents as Amended, Palikir, Pohnpei, FSM, 2003, Title Three, Articles I, 
IV, V.
136  D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia’, pp. 2–5.
137  D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia’, pp. 4–5.
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of production despite the occasional USDA assistance and the free lunch 
programs distributed throughout the far-flung islands.138 In some ways, 
the islanders adopted the newly introduced government model, but 
the substance of daily life remained largely Micronesian. The  ongoing 
adaptation process to outside influences remained at the heart of 
continuity; that is, the rearticulation of relevant elements of the modern 
world was carefully crafted to suit the Micronesian context. Although 
Micronesians slowly entered the TTPI government structure at every 
level, political power remained in the hands of Americans. This reinforced 
the continuing feature of the colonial system, whereby Micronesians were 
always rated as second-class citizens.139
At the district level, administrators received their orders from the US 
high commissioner in Saipan, who in turn received his orders from 
Washington, DC. The district governments ran on a shoestring budget 
as infrastructure for development remained a problem. People who 
worked in the port towns began to derive benefits from the new post-
war activities, though these were unevenly distributed. For example, in 
the Chuuk lagoon, inhabitants of the islands close to Moen (the port 
town) began to receive benefits from working in the capital.140 This was 
not the case in the far-off islands in Yap, Pohnpei and Chuuk. Naturally, 
Micronesian cultures and identity were the foundation of continuity 
with these islands. The US concentrated on its own interests, leaving the 
Micronesians to think seriously about their own future.141 Colonisation 
after all was about the self-serving interests of the outsiders at the expense 
of the traditional inhabitants. Once again, Micronesians were aware that 
the external world had undergone yet another reconfiguration process 
after WWII.142 Perhaps most relevantly, decolonisation was underway 
across the world, prompting serious thoughts of independence among 
Micronesians. Micronesians wanted their islands to also be free from 
outside control and were not afraid to govern their islands under the new 
international order.
138  My personal experience growing up in the Trust Territory era. Free lunch programs were 
provided to elementary schools and in the aftermath of typhoons. See also Marshall, Namoluk beyond 
the Reef, pp. 65–66; Nason, Clan and Copra, pp. 266–267, 276.
139  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 40–41.
140  Goodenough, Property, Kin and Community on Truk, p. 26. I attended high school in Weno 
during the 1970s. At the village level, most villagers relied on traditional food production and the 
sharing of this produce.
141  D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia’, pp. 1–2.
142  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 60–61.
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In response to the emerging decolonisation process, the US Department 
of the Interior (DOI) took over responsibility for the islands from the 
Department of the Navy in 1957. This was to create the image that the US 
was not another colonial power but an interim administrator, responsible 
for stewardship only until the inhabitants chose their own political future. 
American policy under the DOI was slow and cautious; it was business 
as usual. The DOI was oblivious to the political undercurrents gathering 
strength and unifying the islanders’ voices in seeking an alternative to the 
status quo.143 The policy of benign neglect was exposed in the 1960s when 
the US was criticised by the UN Security Council for the dereliction of its 
duties under the trusteeship agreement.144
Nevertheless, military interests remained influential in the formulation of 
policies regarding Micronesia’s future. Micronesians, after a long period 
of waiting, took matters into their own hands. They established the COM 
in the mid-1960s as a forum for political dialogue between the districts 
in their efforts to consider different options for the future. When the 
US realised that the Micronesians were seriously considering their future, 
they pre-empted the issue by offering the Micronesians commonwealth 
status.145 This offer was rejected outright and, after a series of negotiations, 
the US realised that it could no longer stop Micronesian leaders from 
pursuing independence.
To retain its strategic interests in Micronesia, the US crafted the Compact 
of Free Association. Under the Compact, the US proposed to have 
‘veto’ power to override a future constitution in the event Micronesians 
pushed for independence, effectively continuing US administration of 
the islands. The Micronesian side disagreed and continued to push for 
full independence. Independence meant a break from its colonial past 
and a renewal of Micronesian freedom enshrined in international law, yet 
framed in terms of Micronesia’s traditional past.
The islands were the sites of many fierce battles in the Pacific, where 
the US lost many soldiers fighting the Japanese.146 It was this experience 
that prompted the US to keep the islands as part of its security zone to 
avert future aggression from Asia. The Pentagon was at the forefront of 
143  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 161–162.
144  D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia’, pp. 1–2.
145  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 220–221.
146  Bill Jeffery, War in Paradise WWII: Sites in Truk Lagoon, Chuuk, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Chuuk Historical Preservation Office, 2003, pp. 3–8.
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this push to keep Micronesia within the US’s sphere of influence. Like 
before, the traditional inhabitants were not consulted147 because they were 
considered too weak to resist the US’s wishes. While other trust territories 
were quickly decolonised, the TTPI was in political limbo since the US 
had its own plan for the territory’s future.148
Micronesians were stateless people in the sense that the US controlled 
all matters concerning the governance of the territory. For example, the 
TTPI granted America authority over passport control and thus over the 
international movement of all of Micronesia’s inhabitants. The passports 
issued to Micronesians read:
the rightful holder of this passport is a citizen or inhabitant of 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under United States 
administration and is entitled, under Article Eleven of the 
Trusteeship Agreement between the United States and the United 
Nations Security Council … to receive diplomatic and consular 
protection of the United States of America. This passport is not 
valid for travel to the following areas under control of authorities 
with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations: 
Albania, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam.149
This restriction on Micronesian travel could only be lifted if Micronesia 
achieved its independence as a nation state.
Discontent towards the US increased, and the leaders of the TTPI banded 
together to inform the US that they wanted to run their own government 
in accordance with their own political design.150 They demanded 
independence on the basis of the principle of inalienable human rights 
under international law. The question was not how Micronesians should 
achieve their independence but, rather, what was the quickest way to 
achieve this goal.151
147  Robert Kiste, ‘Termination of the US Trusteeship in Micronesia’, Journal Pacific History, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, July 1986, pp. 127–128.
148  Robert Kiste, ‘Overview of US Policy’, in The Ninth Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference 
Proceedings: History of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, edited by Karen Knudsen, University 
of Hawai‘i, 1985, pp. 1–4; Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 60–61.
149  Gonzaga Puas, TTPI Passport (issued in 1982). I am still in possession of this passport, which 
instructs the bearer not to enter the countries listed on the passport.
150  Glenn Petersen, ‘Differences, Connections, and the Colonial Carousel in Micronesian History’, 
Pacific Asia Inquiry, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 2011, pp. 14–16.
151  Petersen, ‘Lessons Learned’, p. 61.
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To the US, the wish was laughable; they thought the Micronesians 
were unsophisticated and incapable of running their own affairs either 
domestically or internationally, having been cocooned politically by 
colonialism.152 The downside of this assumption was that the Americans 
did not bother to understand the Micronesians’ desire. The US’s resistance 
only hardened the Micronesian position, and TTPI leaders rejected all 
American offers short of independence. Faced with mounting pressure, 
the US caved and started negotiations for Micronesian independence.
To achieve independence, a constitution was required to attain Micronesian 
sovereignty, as demanded by international law. In 1979, the Constitution 
was finalised and became the law of the land and the basis for formulating 
relations with the external world.153 Losing the islands again to a foreign 
power was unthinkable according to the FSM’s leaders.154 However, 
Micronesians were happy to retain some form of loose association with 
the US in exchange for assistance regarding economic development and 
support for international recognition of Micronesian independence. After 
many years of negotiations, the FSM finally gained its independence on 
3 November 1986 after the UN Security Council formally terminated 
the trusteeship agreement with the US. This date is considered the end 
of colonialism in the FSM and is celebrated as FSM Independence Day.
Since independence, the Compact of Free Association has been used by the 
US to remain in Micronesia, with the FSM Government receiving billions 
of dollars of necessary funding in return. The Compact was renegotiated 
in 2001 and extended to the year 2023, at which time certain Compact 
funding will be under review. However, after 2023, the FSM will access its 
trust fund, set up to replace the Compact funds. It has been estimated that 
there will be an annual shortfall of US$600 million in the trust fund,155 
and thus a blowout in the FSM’s budget unless other sources of income 
are found.156 As pointed out in the DOI’s report on the FSM economy 
dated 16 November 2011, ‘the most devastating conclusion of the report 
152  Petersen, ‘Lessons Learned’, pp. 17–18.
153  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, p. 3.
154  John Haglelgam, Interview, College of Micronesia, Palikir, 7 January 2012.
155  President Emmanuel Mori, State of the Nation Address, Congress of the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palikir, Pohnpei, 18 May 2012.
156  Pers. comm. with many officials in the FSM Government, especially in the Departments 
of Foreign Affairs and SBOC during field study in July 2013. President Mori’s Speech, President’s 
State of the Nation Before the 18th Congress of the FSM, 29 May 2014, Palikir, Pohnpei.
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is FSM’s 2023 estimated $265–$600 million trust fund shortfall of the 
$1.82 billion target’ to live off during the post-2023 era.157 These future 
challenges are discussed in Chapter 4.
Conclusion
Colonisation in the FSM took many forms and was dependent on the 
policy of the particular colonial power. Micronesian continuity relied on 
the strength of their customs and identity in their engagements with the 
colonial powers. For example, Micronesians survived by utilising their 
network via the ainang system. The colonists misunderstood this and the 
geography of the islands. Despite all the colonial policies implemented to 
disempower Micronesians, colonisation was not successful in Micronesia. 
Micronesians developed an understanding of the external world and the 
changing alliances within it as a result of their exposure to colonialism. 
The changing colonial masters in Micronesia were part of a bigger picture 
beyond the horizon—something quickly understood by the islanders. 
The islanders understood that they had to be patient and wait, and 
eventually political control would come full circle. Micronesian history 
is about a  people with patience, respect for reciprocity, connectivity 
and intellectual prowess. These values formed the basis of Micronesian 
identity and continuity as an independent people, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.








Prior to colonial rule, each island in Micronesia governed itself. However, 
the islands were linked via an extensive inter-island network centred on 
the ainang system. This system survived four successive colonial powers 
because of the limited influence of colonialism, which was largely confined 
to the port towns. In the 1970s, the Micronesians faced the prospect of 
independence framed in the image of a nation state. This chapter discusses 
the processes that led to the shaping of the FSM’s independence post 
WWII and issues that arose following independence.
Three factors underpinned the people’s desire for independence as 
promoted by Micronesia’s founding fathers. The first was the US’s 
adamant intention to fully incorporate the islands into its political 
sphere of influence regardless of Micronesian wishes. The second was the 
Micronesian leaders’ own political consciousness stemming from their 
understanding of the new world order, which drove them to move the 
islands towards independence. The third was the indigenous notion of 
how independence should be shaped based on historical and cultural 
imperatives, rather than in a form imposed by outside forces. Concerns over 
these factors seemed increasingly justified post independence during the 
debate about the Compact of Free Association. A number of Micronesian 
leaders were especially concerned about the terms of the ‘permanent denial 
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clause’ sought by the US as a restriction on the FSM’s independence. 
Although initially agreed to by Micronesian representatives, this clause 
remained a concern and the Compact was amended in 2001.
Images of Micronesia Post WWII
Oral accounts from the Mortlocks recall that immediately after WWII, 
US military forces rounded up the Japanese garrisons in the islands and 
deported them back to Japan. For example, on Satowan and Lukunor 
islands, Japanese soldiers were disarmed and taken to the docks, where 
American naval crafts transported them to American warships anchored 
offshore to repatriate them back to Japan. During this process, the 
islanders would call out, ‘awlela Resepan auspaw shuan no liwin’ (‘go home 
Japanese do not come back’) and sarcastically bid saionara1 forever to the 
soldiers. However, American soldiers were welcomed with open arms.
Mortlockese people often communicate in a language of distortion 
called afeliel (hidden meanings) about issues affecting them. This is an 
offshoot of a special language used between itang.2 Messages are delivered 
in a secretive mode of communication only understood by an intended 
audience. For example, people of Satowan Island are famous for using 
kapas apiliwek (reverse psychology) when talking between themselves.3 
A level of familiarity is required to decipher the meaning of the language 
during conversation. Afeliel and kapas apiliwek were used to communicate 
hidden messages between islanders during WWII. This provides an 
example of how Micronesians maintained their connection with each 
other during the extended colonial period.
1  ‘Saionara’ is an adopted Japanese term meaning to bid farewell. Bidding farewell in Mortlockese 
is ‘aulela’.
2  ‘Itang’ is a person with many talents, knowledge and skills. They can be an orator, manipulator, 
warrior, negotiator and historian, for example. People respect itang because of their wisdom and 
knowledge.
3  Okusitino Māhina, a Tongan scholar referred to the same in interpersonal dialogue called 
helihaki (to speak one thing but mean another). It demonstrates the extent to which communication 
can be manipulated in different Pacific Islands contexts. See Okusitino Māhina, ‘The Poetics of 
Tongan Traditional History, Tala-e-fanua: An Ecology Centred Concept of Culture and History’, 
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 28, No. 1, June 1993, p. 113.
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This metaphoric language is not confined to the Mortlocks but is also used 
in Yap and Pohnpei. For example, Glenn Petersen referred to a common 
practice in Pohnpei called kanengamah, where the indigenous people use 
metaphoric language to conceal real meanings in their communication 
with each other. Peterson notes that kanengamah means:
deliberately concealing the truth about oneself or what one knows, 
and it is tempting to liken it to a lie. Pohnpeians do not perceive 
it as lying, however, concealment is different than distortion or 
outright falsehood.4
Manipulation of the local languages was necessary to transmit 
information between Micronesians about Japanese activities without 
detection. Survival strategies also included using local knowledge to 
secretly harvest Micronesians’ own land at night. There were stories told 
by my elders about locals who were pursued by Japanese guards while 
tending the gardens at night. However, the islanders were not caught and 
Japanese attempts to identify the culprits floundered when they could 
not penetrate the solidarity of silence among extended family networks. 
Japanese investigations of the raids were unsuccessful due to the solidarity 
of the Micronesian people.
My grandfather likened Micronesia after WWII to a fatigued elderly man 
slow in movement but with a sharp, agile mind; retaining his intellectual 
wit to maintain his personal integrity, though retired from physical labour.5 
Having been a grandfather many times over, he was used to providing 
for his extended family with his bare hands; he did not need someone 
else’s imposed charity. He was worried about the future of his children 
and, as such, instructed them politely to rely on their own capabilities 
and be productive if they wanted to survive. He believed that receiving 
charity from someone else’s sweat should not be a part of their future. 
This personal recollection, while anecdotal, reflects beliefs common to 
my grandfather’s generation. This chapter will suggest that this attitude 
4  Petersen, ‘Kanaegamah and Pohnpei’s Politics of Concealment’, p. 34; Hempenstall and 
Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, p. 107. Hempenstall and Rutherford referred 
to kaningama (note their different spelling) as ‘a poker-faced patience in the face of life’s adversities’.
5  Ring Puas was one of the leaders of Lukunor or Lekinioch Island post WWII. He was 
a traditional chief and the magistrate of Lekinioch Municipality. He later became an associate judge 
in the Truk District judiciary system and subsequently an associate justice of the state of Chuuk 
Supreme Court (Hanlon, Making Micronesia, p. 88). See also Micronesian Reporter, Saipan, July 
1962, Micronesian Leaders Conference <001 19780700: 32 - Pacific Digital Library>; Micronesian 
Reporter <001 19570300: 19 - Pacific Digital Library>.
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of self-reliance prevailed at this time and indeed throughout Micronesian 
history, and the outsiders’ failure to realise this was a significant reason for 
the failure of colonial regimes. The Micronesians’ attitude was, however, 
often masked behind polite smiles of silence that outsiders mistook for 
compliance and consent.
My grandfather’s rhetoric condemned outsiders’ treatment of 
Micronesians.6 In his humble view, outsiders disrespected the indigenous 
population by reducing them to second-class citizens.7 Despite all the 
adaptation, assimilation and re-contextualisation of outside forces, he 
thought independence should be sought through islanders’ intellectual wit 
and built solidly on Micronesian integrity and identity.8 He believed that 
it was the only way forward to restore indigenous dignity. Coincidently, 
his views resonated with many Micronesians, especially the leaders who 
fought for independence, and similar rhetoric was used to put the wheels 
of independence into motion.9
Centuries of foreign rule had left Micronesians suspicious of outsiders. 
Their suspicions were expressed in various forms of local resistance against 
the colonisation process. Memories of subjugation among Micronesians 
laid the foundation for Micronesian unity and political independence.10 
Independence gained momentum after WWII when the circumstances 
of the external world changed and the US desired outright annexation of 
the islands.11 This was not acceptable to Micronesian leaders.
Micronesians’ first priority was to continue to survive. The land and sea 
remained the sources of sustaining their livelihood. Micronesians did not 
conceal their genuine appreciation of the Americans who had ejected the 
Japanese from their islands.12
6  David Hanlon, ‘Patterns of Colonial Rule in Micronesia’, in Tides of History: The Pacific Islands 
in the Twentieth Century, edited by K. R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste and Brij V. Lal, University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 1987, pp. 93–94.
7  D’Arcy, ‘What was the Impact of Japanese Rule’, pp. 6–7.
8  My personal knowledge. See fn. 5 for Ring Puas.
9  Mortlocks Oral History. Although Ring was a traditional chief, his thoughts coincided with the 
objectives of the FSM’s leaders for independence (Hanlon, Making Micronesia, p. 88).
10  Hanlon, ‘Patterns of Colonial Rule in Micronesia’, pp. 93–96.
11  Kiste, ‘Termination of the US Trusteeship in Micronesia’, p. 127.
12  Oral history of Lekinioch Island. See also Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures, pp. 4–5.
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Figure 9: War relics on Satowan in the Mortlock Islands.
Source: Photograph courtesy of Vince Sivas (October 2013).
Figure 10: Airplane wreckage on Satowan Island from the 
Japanese period.
Source: Photograph courtesy of Vince Sivas (October 2013).
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Responses to the TTPI
At first, Micronesians were curious as to what the US had planned for 
their islands after the war. The islands were soon classified as a strategic 
trust territory, later known as the TTPI. Unlike the other 11 trust 
territories that existed after WWII, which were under the UN Trusteeship 
Council, the TTPI was also put under the supervision of the UN Security 
Council.13 The reason for this was that the US had a veto power in the 
UN Security Council and could therefore control the future of the TTPI. 
As Roger Gale commented, the US ‘created a unique entity … different 
from the other trust territories in that its political status cannot be altered 
without the permission of the administering authority’.14
Under the UN trusteeship agreement, the US had responsibilities to develop 
the islands socially, economically and politically before the Micronesians 
could decide their future.15 Like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) in Eastern Europe, the US drew its own iron curtain over the 
territory by sealing off the islands as a strategic and militarily sensitive 
area.16 Outsiders, including American civilians, required permission to 
enter the TTPI. The ‘iron curtain’ years contributed to the slow economic 
development of Micronesia. There was not enough exposure of islanders to 
the outside world, and the outside world had no opportunity to learn what 
Micronesians were experiencing under the US. Micronesians were kept in 
the dark and isolated from the flow of international information. Like 
previous colonial practices, the inhabitants of the TTPI were not consulted 
about their future. It became apparent that the new administration was 
planning to remain in the islands, just like the previous colonial powers.
The TTPI comprised six districts: Ponape,17 Truk,18 Palau, Yap, the 
Marshall Islands and Marianas Islands. Their function was to organise 
services for the municipalities and implement the TTPI Government’s 
objectives.
13  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 61–62.
14  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 12.
15  Charter of the United Nations and Statutes of the International Court of Justice, Chapter XII, Article 
76(b), www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
16  Kiste, ‘A Half Century in Retrospect’, p. 461.
17  Which later changed its name to its indigenous name, Pohnpei.
18  Which later changed its name to its indigenous name, Chuuk.
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Figure 11: Map of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) prior 
to its break up into separate political entities in the 1970s.
Source: Map produced by ANU CartoGIS.
A high commissioner was appointed by the US president to liaise between 
Washington, DC, and the Micronesian people. The commissioner had 
the power to make decisions for the TTPI without Micronesian input. 
Before the creation of the COM in 1965, the US made little progress 
in developing the islands as required under the UN agreement.19 It only 
built and maintained a skeleton infrastructure necessary to achieve its 
own strategic goals, seemingly oblivious to the realities on the ground.20 
For example, expenditure for the TTPI was estimated at US$5.2 million 
per annum during the US Navy administration. This increased to 
US$7.5 million21 by the time the DOI took over. This was insufficient 
to meet the costs of running the territory and building effective 
infrastructure. As the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world, 
the US’s financial commitment to the TTPI was dismal.
Public buildings such as classrooms and dispensaries, as well as public 
homes in the district centres, were rudimentary structures of corrugated 
iron, plywood and whatever could be salvaged from the war.22 The road 
system was in disrepair and needed maintenance. The main docks were 
only maintained to minimum standards to allow shipments in and out 
of the port towns.23 There was also a discrepancy in salaries between 
19  Kiste, ‘Overview of US Policy’, pp. 8–9.
20  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 135–139.
21  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 15–16; Kiste, ‘Overview of US Policy’, p. 10.
22  Hezel, Strangers in Our Own Land, p. 324.
23  I attended high schools in Weno and Pohnpei during this period and witnessed the docks.
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the Americans and the local people. Americans were paid more than 
Micronesians with the same qualifications. Social interaction was almost 
non-existent as Americans had their own social spaces such as social clubs, 
houses and offices.24
In the outer islands, the inhabitants were virtually left alone and 
traditional lifestyles remained largely unaffected by the American 
presence. The  municipal governments, schools, churches and the local 
health system were predominantly run by the few elected officials who 
were also traditional leaders. Sailing canoes continued to be the main 
mode of inter-island transportation. Inter-island contacts remained vital 
as economic and social interdependency continued to be maintained.25 
Decisions made in a distant land had little impact on the daily life of 
the inhabitants of the atolls.26 Colonialism and WWII in particular had 
interrupted their lifestyle and the post-war period was an opportunity 
to reassert traditional ways of survival adapted to the modern world. 
It  was understood that the Americans had their own agenda, just like 
the previous colonial powers. The idea of political independence was not 
fostered by the US but reached a crescendo at the discussion table in 1965 
when the COM was formed.27
The ongoing importance of traditional institutions did not mean 
Micronesians were against change. Frustrated with the slow pace of 
development, Micronesians devised ways to be heard by the international 
community. The Micronesians expressed their concerns to the UN visiting 
missions as well as appearing in the UN in the early 1960s. The COM 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s took up the cry for independence.28 
Micronesians’ push for self-determination later gained sympathy in the 
UN.29 For example, the former USSR became a prominent critic of the 
US’s performance in the TTPI. The US, for its part, continued to present 
24  Lukunor Oral History told by the people of Lukunor who worked in the port town of Moen 
during the Trust Territory days. The issue was more pronounced on the island of Ebye, next to 
the military base in the Marshall Islands, where the indigenous people lived in rundown squalor. 
See Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 188.
25  Peter, ‘Chuukese Travelers and the Idea of Horizon’, p. 264; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 166.
26  Oral History. See also Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures, pp. 3–4; Kiste, ‘Overview of 
US Policy’, pp. 1–2.
27  Oral History. See also Kiste, ‘Overview of US Policy’, pp. 1–3.
28  D’Arcy, ‘American Administration of Micronesia’, pp. 1–2.
29  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, pp. 98–99.
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an image that it was working towards fulfilling its obligations under the 
UN agreement. The reality was different on the ground; it was business as 
usual, with limited development or consultation with the locals.30
Organising Micronesians
A UN visiting mission to the TTPI in 1961 reported that the US ‘must 
end its neglect and undertake greater efforts to prepare the TTPI for self-
government’.31 The visiting mission also revealed that the long presence 
of the US in the islands had not contributed to serious development. 
A number of common phrases were used to describe the US’s poor record 
in the TTPI, such as ‘benign neglect’, ‘the Rust Territory’ of the ‘pathetic’ 
islands, and that Micronesians had ‘the trust’ but Americans had the 
territory.32 The USSR was highly critical of the US following the release 
of the UN visiting mission’s report in 1961. The report’s criticism of the 
US for not fulfilling its obligations under the UN agreement was echoed 
by the USSR and the Micronesians, who were invited to the UN General 
Assembly to voice their experiences of the US’s failure to carry out its 
responsibilities in the territory.33
The Kennedy administration responded to the criticism by appointing 
Professor Anthony Solomon from Harvard University to undertake 
a study of the TTPI. The purpose was to provide information to President 
Kennedy on how the US should proceed in terms of the TTPI’s future in 
order to avoid further political embarrassment. The professor subsequently 
produced the famous Solomon Report, which strongly recommended 
rapid Americanisation of the TTPI in anticipation of full annexation of 
the islands.34
30  Kiste, ‘Overview of US Policy’, pp. 2–4.
31  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 91; Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 15.
32  During my contract work with the Congress of FSM and the Department of Justice, the terms 
were often used by many FSM government officials to blame the US’s historical record of the lack of 
development in the FSM. See Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, pp. 258, 260. Others took the opposite 
view, claiming that the FSM should grow up and accept its own faults on this issue. As Mariena 
Dereas, a senior lecturer in Micronesian Studies at the College of Micronesia said, ‘let’s get it right 
this time, and forget the old thoughts’. This seems to be the new motto for the new intellectuals who 
do not want to waste their energy on blaming others. I interviewed Mariena and her colleagues on 
11 January 2011 in Palikir, Pohnpei.
33  Epel Illon, Interview, 13 January 2011, about his appearance in the UN in the early 1980s.
34  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 93–94.
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Americanisation meant a structural reform to systematically indoctrinate 
Micronesians through education, law, politics and economics to embrace 
all things Americana.35 To reinforce the reform agenda in the TTPI, 
American agents of change such as anthropologists, economists, educators 
and lawyers were involved in targeting the new generation of Micronesians 
to embrace America. The US also increased its funding to the TTPI 
to upgrade infrastructure and further facilitate its future objectives for 
the territory. For example, the budget in 1952 was US$7.5  million; 
this increased to US$25 million in 1967 and reached its peak of 
US$85 million dollars in 1977.36 Jobs were created, new classrooms were 
built, free lunch programs were implemented, and the mass promotion 
of American culture in the public domain occurred through movies 
and music.
Such American action was ironically subverted when Micronesians began 
to attend tertiary institutions in the US and encountered the realities 
of Americana, including racism. These students started to question the 
‘American lifestyle’ compared to that of their island cultures. For example, 
many realised that should the islands become part of the US political 
family, Micronesians would suffer in an American system where indigenous 
peoples were to be found on the lower rungs of the social ladder. This arose 
from their direct observations of the status and treatment of minorities 
such as the Chamorros, Hawaiians and the American Indians.37
Racism also affected Micronesian leaders’ perceptions of the American 
system. As Bethwel Henry, former speaker of the COM, said to me during 
an interview, ‘my experience of racial discrimination occurred during my 
trip to the US. I asked a taxi driver in Kansas to drive us to a hotel, but 
they dumped us at a hotel for coloured people only’.38 Patsy Mink, then 
congresswoman for Hawai‘i, favoured incorporation of Micronesia but 
35  A. N. Solomon, Report by the US Government Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, Washington, DC, 1963, vol. 2, p. 3.
36  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 104. Sapuro Rayphand, Interview (online), 13 December 
2013. Sapuro was a qualified teacher with a master’s in education from Lekinioch, who taught in many 
schools of the Trust Territory, including Saipan. He was told that the gap in pay between Americans 
and Micronesians was because American teachers needed to pay for their own accommodation and 
food. This was a poor excuse—why did Sapuro not receive such compensation on Saipan since he was 
away from home and needed to pay for his own accommodation and food?
37  Bethwel Henry (former speaker of the Congress of Micronesia), Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 
28 June 2012.
38  Henry, Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 28 June 2012.
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declared in 1971: ‘It seems obvious that Micronesians will not be satisfied 
with anything less than independent status, and the longer a decision is 
delayed, the more insistent they will become’.39
The first generation of Western-trained intellectuals and leaders, like 
Bethwel Henry, Tosiwo Nakayama, Petrus Tun, John Mangefel, Jacob 
Nena and Leo Falcalm, were already advocating for independence for 
Micronesia based on their own experiences in American universities.40 
These leaders in the making became a political force of considerable 
influence in Micronesia. They formed a substantial lobby group to arrest 
the rising tide of Americanisation in Micronesia. This new phase, which 
arose from the new educated elite, contributed to the waning support 
for full acceptance of Americanisation or annexation in the islands. The 
waning support also stemmed from other reasons. First, Micronesians 
were directly exposed to a greater level of Americanisation, providing them 
with the opportunity to evaluate American values and culture compared 
to their own. Second, many of the American professionals exported to the 
TTPI to implement American objectives were young and full of ideals 
and empathy. Once exposed to the weaknesses and hypocrisies within the 
US’s political system, many became friends of the Micronesian movement 
for independence.41 Third, the Micronesian leadership made it clear to 
the Micronesian populace that becoming part of the US would likely see 
them lose their land and become second-class citizens.
Micronesian Dissatisfaction
In 1961, a UN report condemned the US for not developing the 
islands to a level acceptable under the trusteeship agreement. The US 
had breached its duties and obligations materially under the agreement, 
which imposed upon the US the responsibilities to develop the islands 
economically, socially and politically before the issue of self-determination 
could be decided.42 In 1965, the COM asked the US to produce serious 
plans to develop Micronesia economically and politically.43 The uneven 
39  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 230.
40  Henry, Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 28 June 2012.
41  Henry, Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 28 June 2012.
42  Solomon, Report by the US Government Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
vol. 2, pp. 3–10; Bethwel Henry (the first speaker of the Congress of Micronesia), Interview, 28 June 
2012.
43  Hanlon, Making Micronesia, pp. 119–122.
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development throughout the TTPI and the lack of Micronesian input at 
the top echelon of the decision-making process were key elements driving 
Micronesian political frustration.44 For example, Micronesians complained 
about the hiring practices in the public sector, wherein Americans still 
occupied the best-paying jobs despite there being qualified Micronesians 
who could perform at that level. In a way, it was the recycling of past 
colonial practices where Micronesians were at the bottom of the economic 
ladder. Many islanders had the requisite qualifications and wanted the top 
positions.45 For example, a former Micronesian teacher I interviewed said 
that he was receiving US$3,000 per annum in the 1960s, which increased 
to US$5,000 in the mid-1970s. By comparison, American teachers 
were paid US$12,000 annually.46 In response, the COM legislated for 
Micronesians to be paid a salary based on the philosophy of ‘equal work, 
equal pay’.47
The discrepancy in conditions between the district centres also became 
apparent. For example, Saipan, where the headquarters of the TTPI 
was located, continued to benefit from the US’s greater presence while 
underdevelopment continued to be the norm in other district centres 
such as Yap, Truk and Ponape.48 In the outer islands, life continued as 
usual. Visits to the outer islands by the field trip ships were infrequent. 
Health and education programs were left to the locals to organise as they 
had always done in the past. They continued their traditional system 
of governance while adapting to the new American-formed municipal 
governments.
In the Mortlocks, for example, history remained largely taught by the 
elders, Christianity and local religious beliefs coexisted, and economic 
activities concentrated on taro farming, fishing and breadfruit harvesting. 
Although there was meagre cash made from copra trading, it was often 
shared by the extended family.49 It was the same pattern in the other 
low-lying atolls in the TPPI such as in the districts of Yap and Ponape. 
News of local government activities and plans could be heard on the new 
44  Bethwel Henry (the first speaker of the Congress of Micronesia), Interview, 28 June 2012.
45  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 126; Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 102.
46  Sapuro Rayphand, Interview, Guam, 13 December 2013. Sapuro was a teacher during the 
Trust Territory days from the 1960s to 2010. He holds a master’s in education from the University of 
Guam, yet was paid less than his American counterparts (see fn. 36).
47  Bethwel Henry (the first speaker of the Congress of Micronesia), Interview, 28 June 2012.
48  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 336.
49  My personal experience.
131
4. NEGOTIATING INDEPENDENCE
radio stations such as WSCZ in Chuuk and WSCD in Ponape. However, 
the locals listened to radio for entertainment rather than government 
policy.50 The islanders preferred to engage in face-to-face meetings with 
their Micronesian leaders during field trips to the outer islands rather 
than listening to them on the radio.51 Such meetings were in accordance 
with traditional meeting practices that aimed to build harmony within 
communities.
The economic situation in the TTPI was seen as heavily subsidised by the 
US and perceived as promoting a dependency mentality in Micronesia. 
The Micronesian leaders in the COM began to analyse this situation 
and debated how to move away from an economic model based on 
dependency on the US.52 The debate on dependency rose to prominence 
in the 1970s as a backlash against free market development agendas 
espoused in development agencies dominated by US-trained economists.53 
Dependency connotes a state of helplessness, whereby Micronesians are 
unable to take care of themselves. This welfare theory was connected to 
the free feeding program (called aikiu by the Mortlockese) provided by 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) for schools, the elderly and 
following natural disasters.
There was also debate over the relative nutritional value of the food 
obtained from the USDA program versus local produce. For example, 
new categories of diseases such as hypertension, diabetes and other 
illnesses arose, believed to be associated with eating white rice, bleached 
flour, spam, chopped meat, powdered milk and shortening cooking oil. 
Some communities provided their schools with local agricultural products 
to supplement the rice and canned meat to increase the nutritional value 
of the meals. Many leaders such as Julio Akapito, a former congressman 
from Chuuk, challenged the intention of the free family lunch program 
as ‘racially and culturally arrogant’ and self-serving.54 He declared that 
he had lived in Chuuk ‘for the past thirty years [and had] never gone 
50  My personal experience. On Lekinioch, people would undertake work like husking coconuts 
while the radio was playing. When the news came on, they would turn the radio off and have 
a conversation. See details in Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 32.
51  In my personal experience, the prevalence of traditions is one reason for the neglect of development.
52  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 158–159.
53  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 158–159.
54  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 178.
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hungry’,55 and questioned the point of the free lunch program and the 
other welfare programs. Nevertheless, Julio had his own critics and USDA 
food continued to flow to the islands.
Dependency theory, like colonialism, was a theory developed by outsiders 
and exported to the islands without any understanding of the structure 
of Micronesian economic life that had sustained the islanders throughout 
their history. Self-reliance is fundamental to the islanders’ survival and 
continuity. It is argued that Micronesian economic conditions should not 
be measured in terms of foreign economic yardsticks such as GDP as 
these have no bearing on Micronesian social reality.56 Micronesians value 
connections with their extended families; their individual and collective 
social network, wealth and mental health depend on these connections. 
It  should be remembered that Micronesians have been governing 
themselves for centuries without outside help, and to be labelled as 
dependent on the US is at best ignorant, ethnocentric and arrogantly self-
serving misinformation.57
Independence on the Horizon
Despite the rising tension between Micronesian leaders and the US over 
the political future of the TTPI, the indigenous population continued 
to transform their communities, using their historical skills to adapt to 
the new order emanating from beyond the horizon. Traditional socio-
economic practices remained the mode of production to maintain the 
internal coherency of communities. Few were willing to wait around 
and depend on ‘handouts’. Some Micronesians set up businesses trading 
Western goods in exchange for traditional goods. For example, copra was 
traded for items like cigarettes, candies and canned food.
However, such small businesses could not earn enough profit because of 
the inherent tumunu fengen (sharing and caring) principle embedded in the 
Micronesian cultural structure.58 For example, new businesses called koap 
(the co-ops) emerged but, after a few years in operation, they collapsed 
as profits and goods were withered away by relatives of employees calling 
55  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 178.
56  My personal view. See also Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 1–2.
57  Hezel, Strangers in Our Own Land, p. 274.
58  Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p. 62; Other leaders like Hans Williander advocated 
a small-scale business model based on cultural roots. See Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 137.
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on traditional obligations to receive goods without payment.59 Interest 
in Western products also faded, as islanders preferred to fish and farm 
within their customary practices. This basic reality of doing business in 
Micronesia continues to be ignored by overseas’ consultants who regularly 
recommend beefing up the private sector as the best means for economic 
growth in the FSM. Foreign consultants need to alter their foreign 
perspective of mass consumerism to understand Micronesian modes of 
production and survival. In that way, collaboration can occur to undertake 
new forms of community production to enhance islanders’ lifestyles, with 
due consideration also towards the business principles of credit ratios, 
capital reserves and earnings sufficient to cover costs and reinvest into 
improving the enterprise.
Micronesians who embraced Americanisation argued that it was better 
to live under the US because it offered a convenient way of living where 
individuals did not have to be accountable to the clanship system.60 
Individuals could acquire wealth and live as luxuriously as they desired. 
This new wealth could ease the burden of backbreaking traditional work 
like climbing breadfruit trees and farming in muddy taro patches, as 
well as procure Western-style housing that could withstand the seasonal 
typhoons.61 However, after a few years, the Western houses collapsed due 
to lack of maintenance and USDA food programs ceased. Consequently, 
islanders had to revert to the traditional system as the best option for 
survival and continuity.62
The debate between the anti- and pro-independence movements could be 
heard during sotang (village meetings). For example, after Typhoon Pamela 
hit the Mortlocks in 1976, USDA food and other forms of American 
assistance were distributed to all the islands. On Lukunor, during sotang, 
59  I witnessed two to three co-ops virtually disappear within a year of inception. The co-ops 
ranged from financing of housing to small groceries stores. One of the stores was passed on to new 
management but again folded within a year. This was called the Lazarus phenomena (referring to the 
Biblical person brought to life again by Jesus). The question is, why did the co-ops never profit as 
intended? Was this due to culture or lack of management skills? See Francis X. Hezel, ‘Is that the Best 
You Can Do? A Tale of Two Micronesian Economies: The Plea to Grow Economy’, East-West Centre, 
Hawai‘i, 2006, www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/economic/frames/taleoftwofr.htm.
60  Ignacio Soumwei (Teacher at Mortlocks Junior High School, Satowan), comments in class, 
Semester 1, 1974. Soumwei coined the term ‘chocolate cookie Micronesian’, referring to individuals 
who looked like Micronesians but think like Americans.
61  Ignacio Soumwei (Teacher at Mortlocks Junior High School, Satowan), comments in class, 
Semester 1, 1974. I also personally observed this after Typhoon Pamela struck the Mortlocks in 1975.
62  Ignacio Soumwei (Teacher at Mortlocks Junior High School, Satowan), comments in class, 
Semester 1, 1974. I also personally observed this after Typhoon Pamela struck the Mortlocks in 1975.
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many complained about the rice and chopped meat meals, which were 
not filling and considered tasteless.63 Many preferred agricultural tools 
such as mattocks, shovels, bush knives and fishing equipment since these 
had more application in sustaining local production. To others, the USDA 
assistance promised a life that Micronesians could enjoy without exerting 
too much work on their land.64 High school teachers and their students 
also engaged in the debate regarding the pros and cons of independence 
stemming from the dependency issue.65 The ongoing debate led to the 
emergence of the fringe group labelled ‘chocolate cookie Micronesians’, 
referring to individuals who look like Micronesians but think like 
Americans.66
For those with higher salaries in the port towns, American materialism 
became very attractive. The power of money was limitless to them; it 
could buy whatever one desired, including land and human labour to 
work the land while they lived in their newly acquired luxury. They had 
acquired the taste of immediate gratification from the power of money. 
Many from the new generation also fell into this economic trap since they 
had never experienced the harsh realities of life, for example, under the 
Japanese rule.67 They wanted the US to protect the islands from slipping 
into the hands of the new ‘evil empire’, the USSR.
Security was foremost in their calculations and they wanted the best of the 
American system. This group of people were referred to as ‘the sell-out’ 
or sokon remirika.68 They dreamed of an American lifestyle but had no 
63  My personal experience during village sotang. See Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 65–66; 
William Lessa, ‘The Social Effects of Typhoon Ophelia (1960) on Ulithi’, in Peoples and Cultures of 
the Pacific: An Anthropological Reader, edited by Andrew P. Vayda, The Natural History Press, New 
York, 1968, p. 59.
64  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 172–177.
65  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 318. Secondary schools like Xavier and Truk high 
schools were engaged in the debate for a new political status for Micronesia.
66  Ignacio Soumwei (Teacher at Mortlocks Junior High School, Satowan), comments in class, 
Semester 1, 1974; Teachers and village elders during sotang (observed by me on Satowan Island). 
Ignacio Soumwei coined this term.
67  Ignacio Soumwei (Teacher at Mortlocks Junior High School, Satowan), comments in class, 
Semester 1, 1974; Teachers and village elders during sotang (observed by me on Satowan Island).
68  Ignacio Soumwei and his cohorts referred to sokon remirika as consisting of many of the 
recipients of the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG), students who studied in the US, 
those harbouring anti-Japanese sentiments and many big business owners in favour of integrating 
with the US. John Haglelgam gave the example of pet projects by congressmen and their cohorts 
who diverted funds into the erection of seawalls while pocketing substantial amounts for themselves 
(John Haglelgam, Interview, College of Micronesia, Palikir Campus, 11 January 2011). Many leaders 
benefited from the TTPI purse and advocated close relations with the US.
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means to convince others about how to achieve it. They included many 
politicians, returned college students, teachers and the few petty capitalists 
who owned small retail outlets in the port towns.69
Other supporters of the money economy who came from the outer 
islands flocked to the port towns to find work and send goods to their 
families on their home islands. This group contributed to the increased 
population in the port towns. For example, in Ponape, the capital Kolonia 
had a population of less than 2,000 in 1963, which grew to over 2,800 by 
1970.70 In Moen, Truk, the population of 5,687 in 1967 grew to 9,562 
in 1973. In Yap, the population of the Rull and Weloy municipalities 
increased from 1,741 in 1963 to 2,482 in 1973.71
The Road to Independence
After the long decades of what many called the era of benign neglect, the 
issue of independence went public, driven by the leaders of the six districts 
who came together to create the COM. The leaders petitioned the high 
commissioner to create a nationwide forum where Micronesian leaders 
could meet and discuss matters of concern regarding their islands. At first, 
the US was reluctant to recognise the Micronesians’ request. However, 
under constant pressure, the US relented and created the bicameral COM 
in September 1964, consisting of 12 senators in the House of the Senate 
and 21 members in the House of Representatives.
The COM became the voice of the people, signalling a new era in 
Micronesian political history. One of its prime purposes was to accelerate 
the process of decolonisation. This happened in 1966, when House 
Joint Resolution No. 47 was adopted, expressing that ‘this generation 
of Micronesians should have an early opportunity to determine the 
ultimate constitutional and political status of Micronesia’.72 In 1967, the 
US president sent a proposal to the US Congress to study the future of 
the TTPI and how ‘to consult with the people of Micronesia’.73 The US 
69  My personal experience regarding relatives who operated small stores to earn a few dollars.
70  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 323.
71  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. 128.
72  Summary of the Political Status Talks of the Joint Committee on Future Status, Congress of Micronesia, 
Saipan, 1973, p. 1.
73  Summary of the Political Status Talks of the Joint Committee on Future Status, p. 2; Meller, 
Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 52.
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Congress did virtually nothing. It made no recommendations and did not 
investigate the issue as requested by the COM. The US Congress did set 
up a committee, which produced no tangible result.
In response, the COM adopted Senate Joint Resolution No. 25, creating 
its own future political status without input from the US. The resolution 
demanded the following: 1) that the COM develop a process for political 
education in Micronesia; 2) that Micronesians choose their future political 
status; and 3) that Micronesians undertake ‘a comparative study of how 
Puerto Rico, Western Samoa, Cook Islands and other territories have 
achieved their self-government, independence, or other political status’.74
The US, having been pressed by the COM to come to the negotiating table, 
reluctantly participated in a series of negotiations with the Micronesians. 
Four options for Micronesians were proposed by the Micronesian 
representatives during these negotiations: independence, free association, 
integration with another sovereign power or continuation of the status 
quo. In response, the US offered commonwealth status, which meant 
becoming an unincorporated territory of the US.75 This proposal failed 
as it did not meet Micronesian expectations. The US was also criticised 
by the UN for not honouring the trusteeship agreement, which allowed 
the people of the TTPI the choice of determining their own means of 
self-determination. Micronesians were more politically astute, determined 
and angrier than the Americans realised.76 The central question thus 
became what sort of political independence would be suitable for all six 
districts. The Micronesian leaders also proposed the Compact of Free 
Association as an alternative to independence. The US found this proposal 
acceptable but operated on the assumption that the Compact should be 
negotiated on their terms.
These issues were the subject of the ConCon that brought Micronesia’s 
political and traditional leaders to Saipan in the early 1970s.77
74  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 2.
75  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 2.
76  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 136–139.




The ConCon brought together the educated elite and traditional leaders 
of the six districts of the TTPI. It was a forum designed for Micronesians 
to discuss their political future. Norman Meller, the main advisor to the 
ConCon, described it as the forum where the TTPI leaders gathered to 
demonstrate both their differences and similarities. For example, the Palau 
delegation came to the ConCon with an arrogant attitude, demanding 
certain conditions and proclaiming that if the ConCon disagreed, then 
Palau would withdraw from the ConCon.78 Palau demanded that the 
capital should be situated in Palau, and each state should be allowed 
to withdraw from the proposed federation after eight years of joining. 
Further, Palau envisaged a decentralised form of federation, where the 
central government acted only as a facilitator, and foreign aid should 
be divided equally between the states.79 Palau’s proposals were virtually 
ignored by the rest of the delegates at the ConCon.80
Meller noted that Palau’s position seemed to signal that the ConCon was 
destined to fail. Palau’s aggressive stance related to their belief that Palauans 
were more sophisticated and politically astute than other Micronesians.81 
The Palauan delegates believed that they would be better off economically 
without the proposed federation. A proposed joint venture between Japan 
and Iran to build a super oil storage port in Palau played a major role in 
Palau’s decision to steer clear of any proposed federation. The Palauans 
thought that they would pocket millions of dollars from this port and did 
not want the other states to share in this benefit.82
The Marianas and Marshallese delegations had their own reservations 
about the federation. Like Palau, they considered that their own interests 
might not necessarily benefit from federation. The Mariana Islanders had 
greater exposure to the outside world, which motivated them to continue 
the consumer culture and cash economy they had become accustomed to. 
Some viewed their position as being politically engineered by a minority 
elite.83 The Marshallese, on the other hand, had experienced the economic 
78  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 351–353.
79  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 176–177.
80  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 184–188.
81  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, pp. 351–352.
82  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 175–176.
83  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 220–221.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
138
benefits arising from the US military installation in Kwajalein. The chief 
architect of the Marshallese separation movement was Amada Kabua, one 
of the paramount chiefs of the Marshall Islands.84
Opposing factions of pro-federalists and separatists dominated the political 
landscape in Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Marianas Islands. Their 
own domestic referendums were decisively in favour of separating from 
the TTPI. The disintegration of the TTPI was blamed squarely on the US 
as it allowed the other districts to negotiate for separate political status, 
contrary to the UN-imposed requirement of deciding the political future 
of the territory as a single entity.
The delegations from the conservative states of Truk, Pohnpei and 
Yap, who favoured retaining much of their traditions while joining the 
international community of nations, would not allow the fragmentation 
to sway them from their objective of achieving an independent nation for 
the rest of the Micronesians. Their leaders were instrumental in ensuring 
they remained together as a political unit. For example, the first president, 
Tosiwo Nakayama, and his political cohorts were instrumental in uniting 
the leaders of Yap and Chuuk. Nakayama belonged to an extended clan 
network that spanned from Chuuk to the outer islands of Yap. Many of 
these islands are part of the traditional sawei system.85
The only obstacle to the adoption of the Constitution was to fulfil the 
requirement in the proposed Constitution that three-fifths of the voters in 
a majority of the remaining four states approved the Constitution. Since 
half of the districts had already left the TTPI, the district of Kosrae was 
created to satisfy this legal requirement and thus allow the majority of the 
states to adopt the Constitution by referendum—that is, three-fifths of the 
voters in the majority of the remaining four districts in the TTPI approved 
the Constitution.86 These districts, now called the states of Chuuk, 
Pohnpei, Yap and Kosrae, became constituted as the FSM in accordance 
with the majority vote of the people.87 In 1979, the FSM declared itself 
an independent constitutional government. The Constitution as carried 
84  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 220–221, 226.
85  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 25–27.
86  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 329–330.
87  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 329–330; Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, p. 174.
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by the majority requirement affirmed the historic commitment of the 
common wish of the people to live in harmony with each other. It also 
legitimised the FSM as a new, self-governing nation.88
The Debate Over Disintegration
Some questions about the legalities of the US’s conduct surrounding the 
disintegration of the TTPI remain unanswered. In particular, the question 
of whether the US violated the terms of the trusteeship agreement. 
The terms of Article 83 of the UN Charter as applied to a strategic trust 
territory stipulated that:
1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic 
areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship 
agreements and of their alteration or amendment which shall 
be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable 
to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the 
trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security 
considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship 
Council to perform those functions of the United Nations 
under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, 
social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.89
There is a strong case for arguing that the US’s conduct contradicted the 
terms of the agreement. For example, Section 1 of Article 83 indicated 
that any ‘alteration or amendment to the TTPI agreement shall be 
exercised by the Security Council’. The US did the opposite by facilitating 
the disintegration of the TTPI into four independent parts, Palau, the 
Marshal Islands, the Northern Marianas Islands and the FSM, without 
the UN Security Council’s prior approval. The US’s conduct constituted 
an alteration of the TTPI agreement because it engaged in negotiations 
with districts within the TTPI rather than engaging with the TTPI 
representatives as a whole.
88  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article I.
89  Charter of the United Nations and Statutes of the International Court of Justice, Article 83.
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The fragmentation of the TTPI, supported by America’s conduct, violated 
the UN precedent in relation to the doctrine of territorial integrity of 
a non-self-governing territory.90 One issue was whether the FSM was 
required to continue their negotiations with the US given that the 
TTPI had disintegrated. The FSM was no longer a constituted part of 
the TTPI as agreed to under the terms of the trust territory agreement.91 
In  hindsight, perhaps the FSM could have taken a different path to 
ensure the realisation of its economic goals under a different political 
arrangement, with or without the US.
Anthropologist Robert Kiste argued that there were no specific procedures 
regarding the termination of the TTPI agreement and, in the absence of 
such, both the FSM and US ended it on their own terms. An alternative 
view is that the principles within UN Resolution 1514 (XV) could have 
been applied to terminate the TTPI agreement92 rather than a simple 
agreement between the US and Micronesia. The TTPI agreement 
specifically granted the UN Security Council the final power to terminate 
the agreement. One can also question why Micronesia was subject to US 
approval to terminate the TTPI, given that the TTPI as originally formed 
no longer existed.
It can also be argued that there was a:
material breach of the trusteeship agreement on the part of the 
USA. That is because it failed repeatedly to satisfy the terms, 
which were to develop the islands economically and politically 
towards self-government or speed up the process of independence 
as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust 
Territory and its people before the Constitutional Convention.93
Further, the chief advisors to the Micronesian ConCon, Norman 
Meller and Leonard Mason (an American anthropologist with deep 
knowledge of the islands), also advised the US not to divide up the trust 
territory as it would contradict the UN agreement. They were ignored.94 
As Petersen stated:
90  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 325.
91  Personal argument based on what constituted the TTPI.
92  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 170–173. Resolution 1514 referred to the 
former South West Africa (now Namibia), which involved the Security Council being required to 
apply the provisions of the said resolution in relation to Article 83 of the UN Charter. The same 
principle could have also applied to the case of Micronesia.
93  Summary of the Political Status Talks of the Joint Committee on Future Status, p. 1.
94  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 324.
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At the time of the 1975 ConCon the US was engaging in political 
status negotiations with individual [districts] as a means of 
overcoming the Congress of Micronesia’s resistance to American 
demands for the permanent control over Micronesian lands.95
Perhaps the US should not shoulder all the blame since the Micronesian 
leaders should have been aware of the issue and responded to it legally. 
However, the above exercise demonstrated the contradictions in 
international law, whereby the most powerful countries can ignore or 
manipulate the UN to suit their own purposes.96
Independence and the Constitutional 
Convention
Various issues concerning independence continued to be raised during 
the ConCon. What sort of independence was appropriate to the new 
state of the FSM? What government structure should the leaders strive 
towards since Micronesia is a diverse collection of islands and cultures? 
While the Micronesian leaders debated the issues, the US was studying 
the Compact. It emerged that there was a conflict between the proposed 
Compact of Free Association and the newly drafted Constitution.97
The Compact, as perceived by the US, should have overriding power over 
the Constitution;98 that is, the Constitution should literally restate the 
language of the Compact, with the Constitution having a secondary role. 
This position was seen by Micronesian leaders as a deliberate attempt by 
the US to undermine the sovereignty of the FSM and its people.
To respond to the US’s tactic, the president of the ConCon, Tosiwo 
Nakayama, cleverly said:
it will be best to draft a constitution without knowing what is in 
the draft compact, because in working on the constitution, we 
are dealing with the interests of the people and we should not 
be concerned with trying to protect the interests of [an outside 
power] in Micronesia.99
95  Glenn Petersen, Federated States of Micronesia in Pacific Ways: Government and Politics in the 
Pacific Islands, edited by Stephen Levine, Victoria University Press, 2009, pp. 47–48.
96  Contradictions in international law that the super powers always exploit.
97  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 25–27.
98  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 317–318.
99  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 317–318.
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The draft Constitution was sent to Washington, DC for American 
comments. The US responded by citing the inconsistencies between the 
draft Constitution and the Compact. The US insisted on the Compact 
as having an overriding power in relation to the Constitution.100 
The Micronesian negotiators responded by saying, ‘while the Constitution 
may be inconsistent with [the US] interpretation of free association, it is 
not inconsistent with [the Micronesians]’.101
It took many more negotiations before the US finally faced the fact that 
Micronesian independence could no longer be denied. The US opened 
new rounds of negotiations, focusing on the ‘permanent denial clause’ 
of the Compact that gave the US unilateral power to refuse any third 
party from accessing FSM territories for military purposes and sole 
responsibility for the defence of the FSM.102 The FSM’s interpretation 
of the Compact is that the US’s rights derive from the Compact and end 
when the Compact ends. The concept of the permanent denial clause 
contravened the FSM’s sovereignty as upheld in its Constitution.103
Figure 12: The official flag of the Federated States of Micronesia.
Note: The stars represent the four states. The blue colour represents the ocean from 
which Micronesians derive their identity.
Source: Image courtesy of the FSM Government.
100  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 317–318.
101  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, p. 319.
102  Who are the enemies of Micronesia that the US wants to defend the FSM against?
103  The ‘permanent denial clause’ in the Compact pertains to the principle of a permanent agreement 
between Micronesia and the US. Changes within could be negotiated but the compact remains as is. 
It is based on the philosophy that US security in the northwest Pacific should be protected forever 
(Stewart Firth, ‘Sovereignty and Independence in the Contemporary Pacific’, The  Contemporary 
Pacific, Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2, Spring/Fall 1989, pp. 79–83).
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The 15-Year Life of the Compact
The FSM stood firm in refusing to recognise the permanent denial clause 
but agreed to a variation, whereby the denial clause would only last 
the 15-year duration of the Compact, after which the Compact would 
be  subject to renegotiation. This was done by the FSM’s negotiators 
on the basis of pragmatism rather than acquiescence; they saw that the 
Compact needed to be signed quickly so that the US could terminate 
the UN trust agreement.104 The FSM could then join the UN and forge 
diplomatic relationships with other nations for the purpose of enhancing 
its economic and political position.
The Compact was then framed on the basis of a bilateral treaty with the 
US, providing US$3.4 billion dollars to the FSM Government in exchange 
for the US being granted the right to exercise power to deny third party 
states access to the islands if such access was deemed contrary to the US’s 
interests.105 The Compact was renegotiated in 2001 and extended to 
2023. However, it is still debated as to whether the ‘deniability clause’ will 
have any validity after 2023.
Despite arguments by political scientists that the FSM has lost its 
sovereignty because of the security arrangements under the Compact, it 
can be argued that the denial clause does not and cannot usurp the FSM’s 
Constitution. The Constitution’s Preamble states, ‘We, the people of 
Micronesia, exercising our inherent sovereignty, do hereby establish this 
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia’.106 Section 1 of Article 
II then reaffirms Micronesian sovereignty by declaring:
This Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people 
and is the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia. 
An act of government in conflict with this Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of conflict.107
104  The Compact needed to be signed quickly to trigger the process of recognition by the 
international community (Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 317–318).
105  The First and Amended Compact of Free Association Combined, www.fsmitha.com/world/
micronesia.htm.
106  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
107  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article II.
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Therefore, any act of Congress, including the signing of a treaty, cannot 
be contradictory to the Constitution; if it is, then the act is made without 
power to the extent of its conflict with the Constitution. Congress is not 
empowered to sign away the FSM’s sovereignty.
The Compact restates the language of the FSM’s Constitution by stating 
that the US recognises that the Compact:
entered into force on November 3, 1986 … based upon the 
International Trusteeship system of the UN Charter, and in 
particular Article 76 of the Charter … the people of the Federated 
States of Micronesia…and in the exercise of their sovereign right 
… have adopted a Constitution appropriate to their particular 
circumstances … the Compact terminates the Trusteeship and 
establish a government-to-government relationships … [however] 
the people of the Federated States of Micronesia have and retain 
their sovereignty.108
Title I, Article I, Section 3 reaffirms this, stating: ‘The people of 
the Federated States of Micronesia, acting through the Government 
established under the Constitution, are self-governing’.109 The two 
documents are clear on the matter that sovereignty rests in the hands 
of the Micronesian people. Nothing can usurp such a power, except by 
constitutional means—that is, by a referendum.110
The Micronesians accelerated the process of approving the Constitution 
by sidelining the debate on the Compact. The people approved the 
Constitution in 1979 by a referendum, without delay. Tosiwo Nakayama’s 
tactic worked as the Compact was then required to be derived from the 
Constitution. The US had no choice but to acknowledge the superiority 
of the FSM’s Constitution over the Compact.111
The Compact has been perceived as creating problems for the FSM, 
affecting FSM–US bilateral relations. At the heart of the problem are 
the issues of sovereignty and dependency. Since the implementation of 
the amended Compact in 2001, Micronesian observers and leaders have 
expressed their disappointment in the way the US has been meddling 
108  Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States 
of America, p. 55.
109  Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States 
of America, Title I, Article I, Section III, p. 55.
110  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XIV.
111  Gale, The Americanization of Micronesia, p. 241.
145
4. NEGOTIATING INDEPENDENCE
with the internal affairs of the FSM. For example, the Joint Economic 
Management Committee Office (JEMCO), which consists of five members 
(three of whom are American), is now becoming the ‘fourth branch’ of 
government by controlling how Compact funds are utilised. An example 
of JEMCO’s heavy-handed tactics is the delayed implementation of the 
education sector grant to Chuuk State in 2008 when Chuuk disagreed 
with the US on priority needs in its education system. The US refused 
to budge when the Micronesians vehemently objected to JEMCO’s 
assertion that, as the Compact funds are paid for by US taxpayers, the 
US has the right to interfere in the FSM’s internal affairs to ensure the 
funds are implemented as allocated.112 The FSM Congress has questioned 
this approach, but their concerns have so far been ignored. By setting 
up an absolute 3:2 American majority in JEMCO, the Compact has 
effectively become a tool for the US to pressure the FSM Government to 
comply with US demands or suffer financial consequences.113 The issues 
surrounding the Compact are yet to be settled, with the 2023 end date 
fast approaching.
The Compact and Economic Development
It can be argued that the Compact should be viewed as a transitional 
vehicle or an experimental tool to allow the islanders to measure the 
success and failure of various economic strategies advocated by foreign 
experts.114 Others see Compact funds as ‘rent money’ paid by the US 
112  Carl Apis, pers. comm., FSM Department Foreign Affairs, Nett, Pohnpei, 2012. I also discussed 
the issue with Epel Illon, who was one of the negotiators from the FSM side. He noted that the right 
for the US to interfere in the implementation of the Compact funds in the FSM was agreed to from 
the start. The US left the FSM to do the implementation for the first 15 years. However, when the 
Compact was amended, the US saw the need to interfere to ensure the funds were appropriately 
implemented. He also said that it was agreed to that the US Department of the Interior was granted 
the right by the FSM to audit the funds in the FSM. The question of sovereignty includes the right of 
the FSM to forgo some of its rights, according to Epel Illon. See also The Constitution of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Article IX, Section 4, for approval of treaty delegating power to another sovereign 
power. This section seems to be deliberate as the Compact and the Constitution were drafted and 
negotiated concurrently in the 1970s and 1980s.
113  JEMCO has two members from the FSM and three from the US. The FSM is always outvoted 
on issues the American members do not want to implement.
114  The Compact is considered a transitional economic vehicle to test whether it would satisfy 
Micronesian development circumstances. For a brief discussion, see John Fairlamb, Office of Compact 
Negotiations, U.S. Department of State Compact of Free Association Negotiations: Fulfilling the Promise, 
A Paper Originally Presented to Island State Security Conference Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, June 2001, www.fsmgov.org/comp_per.html.
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for wanting to exclusively maintain the islands as part of the American 
security zone in the Asia-Pacific region. As such, Micronesians have the 
right to use the rent money as they desire because such a rental is an 
implicit acknowledgement of their sovereignty.115 The supporters of this 
position have questioned the mindset of the tenant (the US) in believing 
they have the right to tell their (Micronesian) landlord how to spend the 
rent money. They argue that Micronesians should stand up and move 
forward by devising their own economic plan while only paying lip 
service to the US’s economic strategies.116 Why should they be pushed by 
someone else’s demand?117
Since the termination of the TTPI in 1986, the FSM’s development 
programs have been restricted by the terms of the Compact. The Compact’s 
main premise is to stimulate economic activities such that Micronesia will 
be able to sustain itself economically in the future. For example, in the 
first 15 years of the Compact, the US provided around US$1.5 billion to 
the FSM Government.118 The funds were used for general government 
operations in health and education, economic development, capital 
improvements and other special purposes.119 Sixty per cent of this amount 
was spent on operational costs and the remaining 40 per cent on capital 
investment.120 Micronesians looked forward to an improvement in their 
living standards as measured by economic indicators. It was likened to the 
lerak season, the season of plentiful food, where money was in abundance. 
The perception was that Micronesians would be bathing in this newfound 
wealth and not worrying too much about the future, since the money 
would be coming from somewhere else. However, this ray of economic 
sunshine was grossly insufficient for its stated purpose of establishing an 
independent economic base beyond the Compact era for a nation of over 
103,000 citizens whose multi-island nature makes the provision of services 
115  James Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership: Comments on the US Report on 
the First Five Years of the Amended Compact of Free Association, Embassy of the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Washington, DC, October 2010, pp. 1–10.
116  The US has suggested various models of economic development, none of which have been 
very successful. The debate continues as to why. See The Micronesia Forum; Hanlon, Remaking 
Micronesia, pp. 146–148.
117  Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 146–148.
118  Report to Congress on the Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) for Fiscal Year 2006, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 3.
119  Report to Congress on the Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) for Fiscal Year 2006, p. 3.
120  Francis X. Hezel, ‘Rough Seas Ahead: The FSM Economy During Compact II’, Micronesian 
Counselor, No. 44, January 2003, www.micsem.org/pubs/counselor.htm.
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problematic. Corruption also greatly reduced the effectiveness of the funds. 
For example, the 60 per cent earmarked for necessary infrastructure at the 
state and municipal government levels was siphoned off by politicians and 
their cohorts. Congressional appropriations were used for pet projects121 
to appease politicians’ electorates by providing them with community 
halls, motorboats, fishing gears, cars and food. Municipal monies were 
squandered on superfluous projects that could not be sustained, like 
purchasing inter-island ferries that were not seaworthy. Many politicians 
spent money just on looking for boats outside the FSM, with the expenses 
being categorised as a holiday.
In 1987, the amount of Compact money spent per person per annum 
was approximately US$1,357. In 1993, this figure decreased to around 
US$996 per person per annum. This decline in relative per capita funding 
has continued in subsequent years. It is predicted that per capita funding 
will decrease to US$562 by 2023 under the amended Compact.122 
These figures do not mean much to many citizens, who do not benefit 
directly from the pet project appropriations. Each congressman and their 
cohorts control the funding of ‘infrastructure projects’ in their states and 
municipalities, presenting opportunities for corruption and personal 
enrichment. In the mid-2000s, investigations and subsequent criminal 
action was undertaken against three powerful congressmen who were 
later convicted of corruption. (They have since been pardoned but are 
permanently banned from running for Congress.) Corruption continues 
to be a major problem, as discussed in the Chuuk Reform Agenda 
public forum123 and a report by the Office of Public Auditing in 2014.124 
121  William Cook, ‘U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action: Executive Summary’, 
Washington, DC, June 2014, p. 8; Henry Asugar, Congress Bill No. 13-76, A Bill For an ACT, ‘To 
grant amnesty to certain classes of people who are now being accused, or yet to be accused, or who 
have been prosecuted of certain types of crimes against the sovereignty of the Federated States of 
Micronesia but not yet convicted, and for other purposes’, 20 January 2004.
122  David Gootnick, director of International Affairs and Trade, Micronesia Faces Challenges to 
Achieving Compact Goals: Testimony before the Insular Affairs Subcommittee, House Resources Committee, 
U.S. House of Representatives: Attachment III: Estimated FSM Per Capita Compact Grant Assistance, Fiscal 
Years 1987–2023, United States Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 10 June 2008.
123  Chuuk Reform Agenda, www.chuukstate.org/; Office of the National Public Auditor, FSM, 
CFSM Public Projects and Social Programs: 1.6 Million Approved without Clear Criteria. Audit Report 
Number 2015-04, 2014, www.fsmopa.fm/files/onpa/2014/Audit%20Report%202015-04.pdf.
124  Vid Raatior, ‘Audit Confirms That FSM Congress Misuse of 1.6 Million of Public Funds’, Chuuk 
Reform Coalition, 10 February 2015, www.chuukstate.org/audit-confirms-that-fsm-congress-misuse-
1-6-million-of-public-funds/; Office of the National Public Auditor, CFSM Public Projects and Social 
Programs: 1.6 Million Approved without Clear Criteria. Audit Report Number 2015-04.
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In  denying the ongoing issue of corruption, the speaker of Congress 
claimed that the Office of Public Auditing was intentionally engaging in 
politics and recklessly misleading the public.125
The issue of corruption raises the question of how Micronesians will sustain 
themselves amid the projected decline in living standards after 2023. 
The US has encouraged the FSM Government to address the shortfall by 
tapping into different revenue sources outside of the Compact. The FSM 
is engaging with China to explore opportunities to expand its revenue 
base. It is unclear as to whether China will be receptive to the FSM’s 
overtures. If so, can China match the magnitude of assistance provided by 
the US under the Compact? Otherwise, it is not known how the US$600 
million shortfall will be met.
Pessimists perceive the Compact as nothing more than a vehicle for 
facilitating the US’s recolonisation of Micronesia. Although the objectives 
of the Compact are well intended, at least at the theoretical level, its 
application can be seen as undermining the FSM’s sovereignty.126 Some 
observers have claimed that the US is using the Compact as a power 
by proxy through a backdoor approach to reassert its dominance over 
the FSM.127 For example, JEMCO, which has a majority of American 
members, dictates how Compact funds should be used despite Micronesian 
objection. In doing so, JEMCO is effectively pressuring the FSM to 
conform to an American vision of the FSM’s future, with the implicit 
threat of withholding funds. For example, President Mori objected to two 
resolutions by JEMCO that demanded:
an incremental $700,000 annual reduction of Compact funding 
to the College of Micronesia [COM] beginning in 2013 until 
the College’s funding is peaked at $1 million per year … and by 
2023 approximately $25 million will have been subtracted [by this 
reduction].128
125  ‘Speaker Halbert Responds to Audit Report’, The Fourth Branch, www.tfbmicronesia.com/
articles/2015/2/16/speaker-halbert-responds-to-audit-report.
126  The JEMCO is controlled by its American members who often make decisions based on their 
perception of what development ought to be (Fabian Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National 
Assessment Report. Support for the Formulation of National Sustainable Development Strategies in the 
Pacific Small Island Developing States, Palikir, Pohnpei, June 2006, p. 34).
127  A popular issue of public debate is whether the FSM is experiencing the same treatment by the 
US as it did in the Trust Territory days.
128  FSM Information Office, ‘President Mori Expressed Serious Concern Over JEMCO Draft 
Resolutions’, Press Release No. 0911-04, Palikir, Pohnpei, 6 September 2011, p. 1.
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The same resolution rejected US$8.4 million in funding to improve 
infrastructure for the College of Micronesia over the next four years. 
JEMCO also demanded a US$1.8 million reduction in scholarships, which 
would reduce funding by US$18 million over the remaining Compact 
period.129 In the state of Chuuk, the government asked JEMCO to spend 
money on improving the physical structure of classrooms; the US said 
that improving teacher qualifications and the purchase of new textbooks 
were more important and thus the priority for new expenditure.130 This 
has created friction between Chuuk and JEMCO, leading to a resurfacing 
of old colonial tensions regarding America’s paternalistic attitude towards 
Micronesians. In my interview with the current chairman of the Chuuk 
Education Committee, Mr Walter, he said, ‘let the USA push its own 
agenda as we know 2023 is not that far [away]’.131 JEMCO’s bellicosity 
exemplifies the extent to which the US is prepared to demonstrate its 
power over Micronesian financial affairs under the Compact, as well as 
the short sightedness of this policy in not anticipating local opposition. 
The FSM president has demanded that JEMCO conduct formal, public 
consultations about funding for all public programs before implementing 
new measures that could be seen as being against Micronesian interests. 
His request has been ignored. Micronesian leaders can protest against 
JEMCO’s actions but, legally, there is nothing much they can do 
if  JEMCO’s decision in the ‘best interests of Micronesians’ differs 
from what Micronesian leaders perceive to be in the best interests of 
Micronesians.132 It remains to be seen what the FSM’s leaders will do 
before the 2023 expiration of the Compact.
Supporters of the Compact welcome American involvement regarding 
financial oversight, viewing this as a means by which the misspending 
of funds earmarked for the private sector, social programs and public 
infrastructure can be prevented.133 The US has made good on its promise 
to audit the Compact funds, and will continue to withhold funds until the 
FSM has put its house in order. For example, per David Gutnik, director 
of International Affairs and Trade, US Government Accountability 
129  FSM Information Office, ‘President Mori Expressed Serious Concern Over JEMCO Draft 
Resolutions’, p. 1.
130  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia National Assessment Report, p. 35.
131  Inos Walter, Interview (online), 3 April 2013. His comments alluded to 2023 when the FSM 
will change the way it conducts business internationally.
132  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia National Assessment Report, pp. 34–35.
133  Francis X. Hezel, ‘How Much is Enough? US Aid and Free Association’, Marianas Variety, 
Saipan, 22 March 1985. www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/economic/frames/howmuchfr.htm.
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Office, ‘prior to the annual awarding of compact funds, the FSM 
must submit a development plan that identifies goals and performance 
objectives for each sector’,134 such as education, health, and private and 
capacity-building programs. There have been repeated failures on the part 
of the FSM Government to comply with JEMCO’s demands. Gutnik 
claims that ‘numerous factors have negatively affected the use of the 
compact grants for FSM development goals’. The FSM’s grant allocations 
have reflected Compact priorities by targeting education, health and 
infrastructure. However, as of April 2008, the FSM had completed 
only three infrastructure projects and approximately 82 per cent of the 
US$82.5 million in infrastructure funds remained unexpended. Lack of 
progress can be explained by entrenched disagreement between national 
and state governments over infrastructure priorities, problems associated 
with the project management unit and Chuuk’s inability to secure land 
leases.135 Other problems with the FSM’s development programs include 
the inflated public sector, limited tax revenues, reliance on external 
finance assistance (amounting to 65 per cent of the FSM’s GDP), lack of 
expertise and lack of development in the fishing and tourism sectors.136 
It seems as though Gutnik, the ADB and their cohorts consider the FSM’s 
future to be rather bleak, especially in light of the looming 2023 Compact 
end date. It remains to be seen whether the Compact will be renegotiated 
for a third time and, if not, what new form of engagement will develop 
between the FSM and US.
Optimists perceive the Compact as a means of maintaining a very 
important connection between the US and FSM. They align with the 
view that the FSM should not ‘cut its nose off to spite its face’ even though 
the Compact’s goals have not been met,137 arguing that the Compact is a 
safety net that has assisted in building the nation’s political and economic 
capacity (despite the slow progress). The FSM’s association with the US 
has brought stability to the nation and regional security. Further, the 
Compact allows Micronesians to live, work and seek education in the 
US. It has provided excellent opportunities for the increasing number 
of Micronesians migrating to the US. An associated benefit has been the 
134  Gootnick, Micronesia Faces Challenges to Achieving Compact Goals, p. 6.
135  Gootnick, Micronesia Faces Challenges to Achieving Compact Goals, p. 3.
136  Gootnick, Micronesia Faces Challenges to Achieving Compact Goals, p. 6; Asian Development 
Bank, Federated States of Micronesia Partnership Strategy, www.adb.org/countries/micronesia/strategy.
137  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia National Assessment Report, pp. 34–35.
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economic benefit provided to Micronesian families through remittances.138 
The reduction in FSM citizens’ living standards under the Compact has 
prompted massive emigration to greener pastures in the US. However, if 
the Compact restricts emigration in the future, what opportunities will 
there be in the FSM139 for its citizens who have come to expect and enjoy 
a more Westernised lifestyle?
Dependency and the Economy
Dependency theories are many and dominate the public debate. Many 
advocates of these theories characterise Micronesians as relying too much 
on the US’s generosity. This perpetuates the previous era of American 
influence and stifles the urgency of seeking alternative funding sources.140 
Dependency is seen as synonymous with the Compact and necessary to 
enable Micronesians to survive. There have been considerable statistical 
data generated over the past 20 years that indicate that billions of dollars 
have been poured into the islands without a significant return, as judged 
by the economic modelling favoured by economic statisticians.141 There 
have been many workshops, economic summits and discussions about 
economic strategies that could be appropriate for Micronesia; however, 
positive results have yet to be produced.142
Part of the FSM’s unsuccessful economic story has been blamed on 
Micronesians themselves. This has stemmed from reports asserting that 
the Micronesian leadership is not equipped with the requisite economic 
knowledge to competently develop Micronesia.143 For example, during my 
fieldwork and in discussions on the Micronesia Forum, many participants 
blamed their congressmen and the executive branch of government for 
misappropriating Compact funds to serve their own interests.144 Others 
138  Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, p. 5.
139  Glenn Petersen, ‘Routine Provocation and Denial from the Tonkin Gulf and Hainan to Kyoto 
and the Pacific Islands’, in Security in Oceania in the 21st Century, edited by Erie Shibuya and Jim 
Rolfe, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003, pp. 210–212. Lorin Robert also confirmed 
Petersen’s point on the FSM as the ‘hole in the donut’, referring to it strategic value (Interview, Palikir, 
Pohnpei, 7 January 2011).
140  It is known to many Micronesians that ‘dependency’ is not a real economy.
141  Pers. comm. with many citizens during field research in 2010–2013.
142  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia National Assessment Report, pp. 13–14.
143  Raatior, ‘Audit Confirms That FSM Congress Misuse of 1.6 Million of Public Funds’.
144  Bill Jaynes, ‘Cabinet Member to Stand Trial on FSM Criminal Charges’, Kaselehlie Press, 13–26 
April 2015, p. 3.
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blamed the Micronesians’ lack of expertise, which limits their ability to 
effectively scrutinise145 advice provided by foreign consultants (who have 
also benefitted from Compact funds). It is also based on the belief that 
the FSM continues to emulate economic strategies that are unviable in 
Micronesia due to the small domestic market, limited access to overseas 
markets, transport costs to market and limited output/ability to satisfy big 
market demands.146 Some observers seriously question whether the FSM 
negotiators involved in the Compact negotiations undersold the islands, 
as the funding level was only enough to build a skeleton infrastructure.147
Micronesians have seen the rise and fall of all the colonial regimes and 
various business models brought to their shores. Businesses were set up 
for the benefit of outsiders. To the local people, it is a cycle of economic 
antagonism, wherein outsiders exploited the lands, sea and islanders 
themselves. Scores of consultants have descended on the nation, proposing 
new ideas of what economic development ought to be. The ideas ranged 
from cooperative models, to the creation of both public and private 
corporations, to individual trading stores, to partnerships with outsiders. 
The main emphasis is on stimulating the private sector, a concept 
deeply entrenched in the idea of capitalism. It should be remembered 
that Micronesians continue to practise their traditional economic mode 
of production, which has served them well for millennia, and have used 
the introduced foreign economic system to enhance their lifestyle and 
continuity.
Globalisation
Globalisation is becoming the new economic mantra in the FSM, yet the 
term is elusive because it connotes many things, which islanders need to 
comprehend before acting on it. Globalisation can be defined in many 
ways; this chapter adopts the definition of:
145  Gootnick, Micronesia Faces Challenges to Achieving Compact Goals, pp. 1–4; Bill Jaynes, ‘GAO 
Official Says Compact Impact Reporting is Not Reliable or Consistent’, Kaselehlie Press, 29 July 2013.
146  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia National Assessment Report, p. 17.
147  There is a section of the public that is critical of the FSM negotiators for accepting the 
composition of the JEMCO when it was initially created (Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia 
National Assessment Report, pp. 34–35).
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a process driven by international trade and investment and 
aided by information technology. This process has effects on 
the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic 
development and prosperity, and on human physical wellbeing in 
societies around the world.148
Micronesian leaders believe that opening up the FSM to global influences 
is the economic road to prosperity. However, there are dangers in rushing 
to embrace this idea. For a start, the FSM must diligently study what 
globalisation entails and what consequences it may have on Micronesians.149 
For example, what are the costs and benefits of integrating Micronesia into 
the global structure? Will the benefits outweigh the costs? Historically, 
Micronesians have always looked beyond the horizon, as their world 
is connected within a large region with its own mini globalisation that 
predates colonisation. The region had its own communication and trade 
routes where goods and ideas were often exchanged.150 This past must 
be understood to enhance Micronesian engagement with each other and 
outsiders. For example, is globalisation a new idea or a reconceptualised 
notion of the colonial past dressed up in modernity? What historical 
lessons can islanders learn from the past in terms of colonisation before 
jumping on the globalisation bandwagon? These questions may enable 
Micronesians to better frame their future, given that globalisation has the 
propensity to erode the island lifestyle faster than one can imagine.151
It is no secret that the world is divided unevenly in terms of the distribution 
of wealth. To the West, which incorporates elements of Marxism, social 
democracy and the free market, the touted best solution for advancing the 
standard of living is through the creation of wealth measured by individual 
and corporate acquisition of materials and money.152 This is possible 
through the utilisation of the capitalist mode of production, wherein 
individuals pursue their own objectives at the expense of the masses. 
Profit is the main goal and success is measured by the size of individual 
bank accounts.
148  Rothenberge, Globalization 101.
149  The debate is ongoing and discussion can be found in the Micronesia Forum: www.micronesia 
forum.org/.
150  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 3.
151  Globalisation is an ongoing debate in the FSM, especially among the educated elite. See the 
Micronesia Forum for some of the current debates: www.micronesiaforum.org/.
152  James M. Boughton, ‘Globalisation and the Silent Revolution of the 1980s’, Finance and 
Development, Vol. 39, No. 1, March 2002, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/03/bought.htm.
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Human exploitation is part of the capitalist system.153 In order to 
maximise profit, the few owners of wealth require more workers to create 
more wealth for them. In return, workers receive wages from the owners 
for their labour. This creates a cycle of dependency between the wage 
earners and the owners of wealth.154 As owners become richer, they gain 
control of the labour market that the wage earners depend on. Since the 
owners control the labour market, they are also selective as to who and 
how many workers they will employ or make redundant.155 This is the 
heart of the idea of dependency—not the kind of relationship that the 
FSM has with the US under the Compact. The issue is that workers in 
the capitalist system will not survive without wages if the labour market 
suddenly collapses because of a downturn in the economy, as has been 
seen numerous times throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
This is not the case in the traditional Micronesian economic model as 
the ainang system is the basis of individual survival. Micronesians are 
well aware of the changing circumstances in their islands caused by the 
introduction of capitalism. The US will continue to inject more funds into 
the FSM under the Compact in order to buy Micronesian acquiescence 
for the implementation of American economic practices.156 The key 
question is, how does one measure the standard of living under the 
Compact compared to the traditional model that has been the provider 
of Micronesian continuity and predates colonialism?
Micronesians are a separate and independent category of people different 
from Americans, as based on their deep historical connection and unique 
identity. The answer lies in the Micronesian understanding of their history 
and how to exploit the lessons of their past to engage in the larger sphere 
of international relations. This is the subject of subsequent chapters.
153  Chrisoula Andreou, Philosophy of Economics: In Defense of Marx’s Account of the Nature of 
Capitalist Exploitation, www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Econ/EconAndr.htm.
154  Albert Einstein, ‘Why Socialism?’, Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, Vol. 61, 
No. 1, May 2009, monthlyreview.org/2009/05/01/why-socialism/.
155  Art Perlo, Capitalism and Unemployment, 17 October 2011, peoplesworld.org/capitalism-and-
unemployment/.
156  US$2.5 billion annually is provided to the FSM under the Compact, yet the FSM remains 




Independence from colonial rule did not come easily for Micronesians. 
Autonomy and respect for the sovereignty of local social and political 
entities have always been part of Micronesian history, prior to, during and 
after colonisation. Successive, poorly resourced colonial regimes left many 
communities beyond administrative centres relatively free to pursue their 
own priorities and objectives, which continued to revolve around ainang 
solidarity and support. Micronesians’ political astuteness and negotiation 
skills have thus far thwarted American attempts to retain political control 
over the FSM. The FSM’s leaders ensured that the Constitution was 
ratified prior to the Compact so as to ensure the relatively inferior position 
of the Compact and thereby promote Micronesian priorities ahead of 
American interests. Upon the ratification of the Constitution, the US’s 
push for the supremacy of the Compact over the FSM’s sovereignty 
was no longer viable—the Constitution was formally established as the 
supreme law of the land and the Micronesian people. Today Micronesians 
continue on their historical path to ensure the existence of their identity 
and continuity. These are essential to the management of superpower 




The Constitution and 
Post-Colonial Identity
The backdrop to the constitutional philosophy of the FSM reflects 
the dynamics of history as a circular web of social connections. This 
chapter deals with the Shulapan allik1 (Constitution) of the FSM as 
the embodiment and perpetuation of shon Maikronesia history, identity 
and continuity, while acknowledging the relevant elements of colonial 
history. The Shulapan allik reconciles internal differences and asserts 
a  distinct politico-cultural perspective and personality.2 To understand 
how this perspective developed requires an investigation of four 
interwoven processes. First, what historical precedents motivated the 
diverse Micronesian population to share a nation state? Second, what 
historical factors inspired Micronesian leaders to convince the indigenous 
population that a constitution was necessary to regain control of their 
islands? Third, why did the leaders advance the concept of constitutional 
independence while sidelining economic development as a secondary 
issue? Fourth, how do Micronesians perceive themselves after the adoption 
1  The concept of Shulapan allik is a Mortlockese–Chuukese term referring to the Constitution 
as the backbone of all laws in relation to the modern FSM state. For an in-depth discussion of 
modern forms of constitution and theories, refer to Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (2nd edition), The Federation Press, 1998, 
pp. 4–20. For a specific discussion on FSM Constitutional Federalism, see John Haglelgam, ‘Federalism 
and Multiculturalism. Federalism in the Federated States of Micronesia’, Asian Resource Centre for 
Decentralisation, 2006, pp. 125–138, localgov.up.edu.ph/federalism-and-multiculturalism-haglelgam-
federalism-in-the-federated-states-of-micronesia.html.
2  See The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble, which conveys the distinct 
Micronesian identity and perspectives in view of the many islands.
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of the Constitution in terms of the ongoing debate between economic and 
political development as well as jurisdictional issues between the federal 
and state governments?
These four interrelated questions are central to any discussion of 
Micronesian identity in a post-colonial era as they facilitate our 
understanding of Micronesian opposition to the long occupation 
of Micronesia by foreigners. As will be demonstrated, the ongoing, 
contested interaction between internal Micronesian priorities and actions 
on the one hand and external influences on the other continued well 
after the Constitution came into force. With recourse to detailed legal 
analysis supplemented by cultural observations, this chapter explores the 
Micronesian perspective from the dawn of fledgling independence to the 
FSM’s future prospects. It is generally accepted among constitutional law 
specialists that a constitution is a written document designed to provide 
the socio-political framework by which a nation is governed. It defines 
power relations between government organs and the people, as well as the 
manner in which the constitution can be amended to alter those power 
relations.3 The general objective of a constitution is to prevent government 
tyranny against its people.4 Colonial tyranny was the backdrop to 
Micronesians’ push to establish a constitution to protect their future 
interests in line with international standards and to assert the FSM’s status 
as an independent nation, with all the rights afforded to that status. It was 
reassuring for Micronesians to use the Western concept of a constitution. 
The FSM’s Constitution then became a framework to harmonise and 
project a united voice for Micronesians. It was also a concept recognised 
by external powers and presented legitimacy for Micronesian sovereignty.
The Constitution is a living document that reminds the people of 
their historical past and shields them from emerging threats to their 
sovereignty. As constitutional scholars Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams comment, ‘if a constitution is written, then, with the passing 
of time … the living constitution inevitably comes to be related much 
as the past is related to the present’.5 In reflecting the historical past 
and geographical realities of Micronesia, the Constitution established 
a government structure referred to as coordinate federalism. This entails 
that both the states and national government are sovereign within their 
3  Blackshield and William, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, pp. 5–7.
4  Peter Hanks, Deborah Cass and Jennifer Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and 
Commentary (6th edition), Buttersworth, Sydney, 1999, p. 8.
5  Blackshield and William, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, p. 5.
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respective areas of power, ‘each is to be free to perform its functions 
without hindrance by the other governments … except in the case of 
concurrent legislative powers (where the national government) prevailed 
over the states’ if state laws are inconsistent with national laws.6 Political 
scientist Peter Larmour credited the successful constitution-making in 
the Pacific Islands to the pre-existing cultural conditions that facilitated 
the transfer of colonial institutions into the hands of indigenous Pacific 
Islanders.7 The Micronesian experience fits Larmour’s observations.
Colonisation underscored the uneven power relations between shon 
Maikronesia and the colonial powers. Colonial authorities ignored the 
rights of the indigenous people as first settlers of the islands and instead 
annexed the islands into their own externally imposed political structures. 
The consequence of this alien imposition was the development of a sense 
of Micronesian unity as a separate, distinct group of people. This shared 
feeling intensified post WWII, when Micronesians realised that the US’s 
control of Micronesia was perpetuating colonial attitudes and behaviours 
similar to those experienced prior to the war. The universal awareness 
that decolonisation was a fundamental right of indigenous people fuelled 
Micronesians’ desire to emancipate themselves from further external 
control. However, to do so required a constitution for the purpose 
of gaining international acceptance.
The Essential Elements of the FSM’s 
Constitutional Model
The search for a constitutional model befitting Micronesians’ outlook 
became the task of the emerging Micronesian leaders post WWII. 
The  leaders envisioned a constitution embedded in eoranian fanou 
(cultures of Micronesia) and supported by international standards.8 
Historically, Micronesians did not have a written legal code. Codes of 
conduct were handed down orally and enforced through the generations 
via a system of culture, and post-colonially, through the adopted legal 
6  Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, p. 1.
7  Peter Lamour, Foreign Flowers: Institutional Transfer and Good Governance in the Pacific Islands, 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005, pp. 36, 41, 70.
8  Post WWII brought dramatic changes in the world order. Micronesian experiences of colonisation 
were more acute than before, and thus the desire to control their own destiny was also more acute. 
For general discussion, see David Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, pp. 53–54; Gale, Americanization 
of Micronesia, pp. 67–73.
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
160
system. Violations of socially sanctioned behaviours were dealt with 
in accordance with community standards. The FSM’s Constitution 
acknowledges the various eoranian fonou while also providing the legal 
structure for their reinforcement in the modern world.9
The success of the Shulapan allik rests on the adaptability of the 
traditional socio-legal system to deal with the import of modern legal 
doctrines. The Shulapan allik defines who Micronesians are as a people, 
designates their territorial home and provides the structure and manner 
of government.10 The Constitution’s ultimate aim is to perpetuate 
the principles of peaceful coexistence within the FSM’s territory and 
promote the new Micronesian identity internationally.11 In reflecting the 
historical past and contemporary realities, the Constitution superimposed 
a coordinated federalism as the principal form of governance. Under the 
Constitution, each island (municipality) and island group (state) are 
free to form their own constitutions without hindrance by the federal 
government, except in circumstances of concurrent powers, in which case 
the Shulapan allik can be negotiated or else prevails.12
The establishment of the Shulapan allik meant that the FSM fulfilled the 
four internationally accepted requirements to become a sovereign nation: 
1) a Constitution to protect its population’s interests, 2) a population 
whose desire is to share a common identity, 3) a territory for its residents 
to live as a free a people and 4) a nation state fully recognised by the 
international community.13 The first three elements are explicitly stated 
in the Constitution’s Preamble:
We, the people of Micronesia, exercising our inherent sovereignty, 
do hereby establish this Constitution of the Federated States of 
Micronesia. With this Constitution, we affirm our common wish 
to live together in peace and harmony, to preserve the heritage of 
the past, and to protect the promise of the future … We extend to 
all nations what we seek from each: peace, friendship, cooperation, 
and love in our common humanity.14
9  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article II, Section 1.
10  Blackshield and William, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, pp. 5–7.
11  Hanks, Cass and Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law, p. 8.
12  Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, p. 1.
13  The Trust Territory agreement ended in 1986, and the FSM was admitted into the UN in 1991. 
However, per the terms of the Compact, the FSM is free to have dialogue with the international 
community to pursue its own political interest, but this must be in line with US interests (Epel Illon, 
Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 13 January 2011).
14  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
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Figure 13: The islands of the Federated States of Micronesia.
Source: Map produced by ANU CartoGIS.
The FSM’s Constitution is sui generis15 as it puts Micronesian customary 
values at its very heart for the purpose of protecting the integrity and 
sovereignty of the traditional inhabitants. For example, the Shulapan allik 
obliges the courts to take account of customs and traditions by following 
the ‘geographical and social configuration principle’ when handing down 
decisions.16 Each municipality is encouraged to maintain their cultural 
practices as rooted in their historical past.17 It also acknowledges the 
hierarchical power structure within local communities and beyond. 
Devolution of power as traditionally practised is also emphasised with 
the demarcation of responsibilities between the municipalities, national 
government and states.18 The Shulapan allik also allocates power to each 
of the three branches of government (executive, legislative and judiciary) 
so as to maintain political and social cohesion.
The states and municipalities manage their own affairs by the power 
of their own constitutions in relation to the national government. 
The national government in turn represents the states in matters of 
international concern.19 Article XIII, Section 3 of the FSM’s Constitution 
requires the state and national governments to cooperate with each other 
in maintaining the integrity of the Federation:
15  ‘Sui generis’ is a legal term meaning ‘of its own kind’ or ‘unique’.
16  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 11.
17  Haglelgam, ‘Federalism and Multiculturalism’.
18  The demarcation principle approximated the grouping of islands. See Haglelgam, ‘Problems of 
National Unity’, pp. 5–12; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 12–13.
19  The FSM Government was modelled on the US Constitution while its features are largely 
of Micronesian construction. See King, ‘Custom and Constitutionalism in the Federated States of 
Micronesia’, p. 3.
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it is the solemn obligation of the national and state governments 
to uphold the provisions of [the] Constitution and to advance the 
principles of unity upon which [the] Constitution is founded.20
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. No laws, foreign or 
domestic, usurp its sovereign power.
The Constitution and the Environment
As previously explored, the Micronesian people live in an oceanic 
environment where they share common historical experiences. Their 
national identity comes from the sea. Their territorial seas have been 
recognised by the international community and must be protected at 
all times from unscrupulous external threats exploiting their resources. 
The Constitution is thus the legal instrument that shields Micronesian 
interests. The Constitution makes it clear that Micronesians are the 
custodians of their oceanic environment and its resources.21 Their history 
is testimony to such a claim, which fundamentally advocates the doctrine 
of interdependency between the people, sea and land.22 Micronesians 
conserved and preserved the environment, which in return provided 
sustenance for survival. This doctrine influenced Micronesians’ social, 
economic, religious and political affairs. The people derived their sense 
of identity through genealogy by tracing this identity to specific spaces 
within the oceanic environment, such as the locales where their clans 
or extended families originated.23 Genealogy in turn influenced the way 
each island conducted its affairs locally, regionally and nationally. These 
interrelationships collectively shaped how Micronesians engaged with 
each other.
The national Constitution embraces the preservation of the sea and asks 
the international community to observe this practice. It speaks of unity, 
identity and continuity: ‘the seas bring us together, they do not separate 
us. Our islands sustain us. Our island nation enlarges us and makes us 
20  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XIII, Section 3.
21  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
22  The concept of interdependency is widespread in the FSM as the clanship system acts as the 
people’s social security web (Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 22–23).
23  The term ‘shon ainang’ is used to trace one’s local identity and within the clanship system. 
See  Hanlon, Upon a Stone Altar, p. 353; Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p.  55; Duane, 
Clan and Copra, pp. 59–60.
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stronger’.24 The sea is intimately linked to Micronesian identity, and the 
Yapese and Chuukese call themselves remetaw or shon metaw (the people 
of the deep sea).25 Micronesians have lived together in harmony within 
the seas. Colonisers misunderstood the special relationship between 
Micronesians and the sea. For example, Micronesians were discouraged 
from sailing during colonial times to prevent the need for costly rescue 
efforts,26 prevent warring between islands27 and divert men’s attention 
from sailing towards land-based food production. However, Micronesians 
continued to sail the seas despite such restrictions because the sea and 
seafaring was an essential part of their identity and way of being.28
Customary rights of the seas are protected by the Constitution. 
For example, ownership of reefs and fishing rights beyond the reefs and 
within the lagoons are traditionally demarcated. These are provided for 
under Article V, Sections 1–3. Section 1 states:
nothing in this Constitution takes away a role or function of … 
custom and tradition, or prevents a traditional leader from being 
recognized, honoured, and given formal or functional roles at any 
level of government as may be prescribed by this Constitution or 
by statute.29
Section 2 states:
the traditions of the people of the Federated States of Micronesia 
may be protected by statute. If challenged as violative of 
Article IV, protection of Micronesian tradition shall be considered 
a  compelling social purpose warranting such governmental 
action.30
24  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
25  Mortlockese called themselves shon metaw, which is the same as re-mataw often used by the 
people of the northwest of Chuuk and some of the low-lying islands in Yap. These terms are in 
reference to people of the sea as emphasised by Paul D’Arcy in his The People of the Sea.
26  Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land, p. 108; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 164.
27  Flinn, Diplomats and Thatch Houses, p. 25; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 164.
28  In the 1960s and 1970s, sailing canoes were still travelling between islands in the Mortlocks. 
I have personal experience of this. See also Gladwin, East is Big Bird, pp. 134–144; Duane, Clan and 
Copra, p. 258.
29  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article V, Section 1.
30  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article V, Section 2.
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Section 3 ensures that customs and traditions are protected under the 
guidance of the indigenous leaders:
the Congress may establish, when needed, a Chamber of Chiefs 
consisting of traditional leaders from each state having such 
leaders, and of elected representatives from states having no 
traditional leaders. The Constitution of a state having traditional 
leaders may provide for an active, functional role for them.31
Framing of Identities to Constitutionality
Pre-existing regional and local identities are recognised by the FSM’s 
Constitution with the provision for three layers of government, the 
federal, state and local or municipality. At the municipal level, residents of 
each island community elect their own government officials and recognise 
their traditional leaders to ensure harmonious coexistence between 
municipal ordinances and customary laws. This duality is typified by the 
constitutions of Lekinioch Municipality (in Chuuk) and the state of Yap.
The Lekinioch Constitution empowers sou eak (traditional leaders) to 
ensure imported laws are compatible with local customs. Its Constitution 
declares:
Oolap V, Okisen 1 a apasa, ei chulap mi amafila me apechakula 
eoranei, nonnoon aramas, samolen eoranei me pechakilen soupisek. 
Tumwunen limaach, osupwangen aramas, are afefeitan tufich epwe 
ffor pwal itei pwungen alluk. Okisen 2. Soueak a auwennam on 
tumunen me apechakkulen eoranei.32
the Constitution shall reinforce the traditions of the people, 
recognise their traditional leaders, and customary ownership of 
properties. The maintenance of traditional community health 
and prevention of poverty shall be reinforced by the municipal’s 
ordinances.
Section 2 further states that ‘traditional leaders shall be the guardians and 
reinforcers of traditions’.33 The Municipality of Namoluk’s Constitution 
similarly reinforces its customs and traditions: ‘the people of Namoluk 
31  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article V, Section 3.
32  The Constitution of Lekinioch Municipality, Lekinioch Island, 17 August 1996, Section 1-2.
33  The Constitution of Lekinioch Municipality.
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… affirm our desire to respect and uphold our traditions and customs, 
protect and promote our natural heritage and social bonds we have as 
a people, now and forever’.34
Traditions and customs are also constitutionally protected in the 
neighbouring state of Yap. For example, Article III, Section 1 of that state’s 
Constitution expresses that ‘due recognition shall be given to the Dalip 
pi Nguchol35 and their traditional and customary roles’.36 Section 2 states:
there shall be a Council of Pilung37 and Council of Tamol38 which 
shall perform functions which concern tradition and custom. Due 
recognition shall be given to traditions and customs in providing a 
system of law, and nothing in this Constitution shall be construed 
to limit or invalidate any recognized tradition or custom as 
articulated by section 3.39
The state of Chuuk also ensures that traditions and customs are fully 
safeguarded in its Constitution. Article IV, Section 1 states:
existing Chuukese custom and tradition shall be respected. 
The Legislature may prescribe by statute for their protection. 
If challenged as violative of Article III, protection of Chuukese 
custom and tradition shall be considered a compelling social 
purpose warranting such governmental action.40
Section 2 states:
nothing in this Constitution takes away the role or function 
of a  traditional leader as recognized by Chuukese custom and 
tradition, or prevents a traditional leader from being recognized, 
honoured, and given formal or functional roles in government.41
34  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 6.
35  The Dalip pi Nguchol are the paramount chiefs of Yap State. See Donald Rubinstein and Clement 
Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap: Vulnerabilities, Opportunities, and Pacific Geo-
politics’, Paper presented at Micronesian Symposium ‘Micronesia in Focus’, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 28–29 April 2014, p. 9.
36  Yap State Constitution, Article III, Section 1, fsmlaw.org/yap/constitution/index.htm.
37  Pilung refers to the three pillars of traditional wisdom and power. See Pinsker, ‘Traditional 
Leaders Today in the Federated States of Micronesia’.
38  Tamol refers to the traditional chiefs of the outer islands in Yap. In Chuukese, they are called samol.
39  Yap State Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
40  Chuuk State Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, fsmlaw.org/chuuk/index.htm.
41  Chuuk State Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.
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Section 3 allows the state legislature to appropriate funds annually for 
a traditional leaders’ conference. Section 4 ensures that ‘traditional rights 
over all reefs, tidelands, and other submerged lands, including their water 
columns, and successors’ rights thereto, are recognized. The Legislature 
may regulate their reasonable use’.42
Article II, Section 1 of the Kosraen State Constitution affirms that:
except when a tradition protected by statute provides to the 
contrary:
(a) No law may deny or impair freedom of expression, peaceable 
assembly, association, or petition, and
(b) a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of 
the laws.43
The Pohnpeian Constitution, Article 5, Section 1, ‘upholds, respects, 
and protects the customs and traditions of the traditional kingdoms of 
Pohnpei’.44 Section 2 states:
the Government of Pohnpei shall respect and protect the customs 
and traditions of Pohnpei. Statutes may be enacted to uphold 
customs or traditions. If such a statute is challenged as violating 
the rights guaranteed by this Constitution, it shall be upheld 
upon proof of the existence and regular practice of the custom 
or tradition and reasonableness of the means established for its 
protection, as determined by the Pohnpei Supreme Court.45
Section 3 seeks to ‘strengthen and retain good family relations in Pohnpei, 
as needed’ by recognising and protecting ‘the responsibility and authority 
of parents over their children. This Constitution also acknowledges the 
duties and rights of children in regard to respect and good family relations 
as needed’.46
42  Chuuk State Constitution, Article IV, Section 4.
43  Kosrae State Constitution, Article II, Section 1, fsmlaw.org/kosrae/constitution/entire.htm.
44  Pohnpei State Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, fsmlaw.org/pohnpei/index.htm.
45  Pohnpei State Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.
46  Pohnpei State Constitution, Article IV, Section 3.
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Prelude to the Creation of the 
Constitution
The FSM’s Constitution was negotiated during the ConCon and adopted 
by Micronesian representatives in the early 1970s. During the negotiation 
process, each state delegation expressed what needed to be included in 
the proposed constitution. The essential features were related to the 
harmonisation of the variety of cultures in the structure of the proposed 
government. The key question was how should the constitution be framed 
to accommodate the issues? Recognising their differences, the delegations 
agreed on traditions and local environmental issues to be left to the state 
and municipal governments,47 while foreign relations were delegated to 
the national government. The Yapese and Pohnpeian delegations wanted 
their paramount chiefs to have a role at the national level. The delegation 
from Chuuk disagreed with this idea as the Chuukese have no paramount 
chief; each village or island in Chuuk has its own samol, and it would be 
hard to nominate a paramount chief from the pool of samol to represent 
Chuuk at the national level. Kosrae had lacked paramount chiefs since 
Western diseases reduced the population in the nineteenth century. 
An  agreement was reached between the delegations that a chamber of 
chiefs should be created constitutionally,48 with the decision on how to 
select chiefs to represent them at the national level left to each state 
to decide. To date, the provision relating to the creation of a chamber of 
chiefs remains dormant as there has been no move to activate it. At the 
state and municipal levels, however, chiefs continue to play essential roles 
in protecting cultures and traditions.49 It is very possible that the ongoing 
power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the 
national government may precipitate the need for the chamber of chiefs 
to intervene. This suggests that traditional chiefs can assist in shaping the 
nation’s future.50
47  For an in-depth discussion, see Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 261–281.
48  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article V.
49  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
50  Political leaders of the FSM need to understand the purpose of traditions as included in the 
Constitution as an alternative to legal dispute. The Chamber of Chiefs is meant to serve this purpose. 
See the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article V, Section 3.
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Connecting the Constitution and 
Micronesian History
The FSM’s Constitution underscores the continuity of Micronesian 
history and belief in the ongoing value of unity in the face of challenges 
presented by the modern world. It empowers Micronesians to wear the 
Micronesian identity as a personal badge of honour as they carry their 
passports, crisscrossing the globe.51 The assertion of Micronesia’s place in 
history is noted in the Preamble:
with this Constitution, we affirm our common wish to live together 
in peace and harmony, to preserve the heritage of the past, and to 
protect the promise of the future. To make one nation of many 
islands, we respect the diversity of our cultures. Our differences 
enrich us. The seas bring us together, they do not separate us. 
Our islands sustain us, our island nation enlarges us and makes us 
stronger. Our ancestors, who made their homes on these islands, 
displaced no other people. We, who remain, wish no other home 
than this. Having known war, we hope for peace. Having been 
divided, we wish unity. Having been ruled, we seek freedom. 
Micronesia began in the days when man explored seas in rafts 
and canoes. The Micronesian nation is born in an age when men 
voyage among stars; our world itself is an island. We extend to all 
nations what we seek from each: peace, friendship, cooperation, 
and love in our common humanity. With this Constitution we, 
who have been the wards of other nations, become the proud 
guardian of our own islands, now and forever.52
While it is easy to dismiss these as statements of desire rather than reality, 
the values espoused above are culturally valued and historically proven 
pillars of Micronesian identity. They were inserted into the Constitution 
to help restore Micronesian memories of values suppressed by colonial rule 
and permanently embed them into the national psyche for the purposes of 
perpetuating the Micronesian identity and continuity. While framed by 
colonial boundaries, a deeper reading of Micronesian history and nation 
51  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia was constructed based on Micronesian 
historical experience in response to the changing international circumstances. As the Preamble states, 
‘to preserve the heritage of (Micronesian) past and to protect the promise of the future … to make 
one nation of many islands, we respect the diversity of our cultures. Our differences enrich us’.
52  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
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building reveals the FSM was born from Micronesians’ own historical 
consciousness stemming from their deep affinity with each other prior to 
and after colonialism.53
Oral history and linguistic evidence suggests that the configuration of 
the FSM approximates the pattern of past boundaries.54 The sawei 
system,55 which centred on inter-island connections between the volcanic 
island of Yap and its low-lying islands in the western part of Chuuk, is 
a reminder of the extensive connection between the central and eastern 
parts of the FSM. This connection also served as a form of insurance 
to ensure the survivability of the people who depended on each other 
in an environment prone to natural disasters such as typhoons, ocean 
surges and famine. The FSM is located in what is known as typhoon alley. 
Typhoons or melimel (strong storms) frequent these islands every year. 
They can devastate islands and deprive the islanders of their food supply. 
Historically, in such instances, the high volcanic islands of Yap and Chuuk 
would provide assistance to the low-lying islands as their larger land area 
and high ground meant that they could better withstand typhoon damage. 
Assistance was distributed through the established sawei network, with an 
associated regular voyage of outer islanders to Yap to acknowledge the 
latter’s parental kin relationship. Yapese hosts benefitted from the prestige 
of this off-island recognition of their authority, which made them willing 
to give far more than they received in the material exchanges between low 
and high islands that took place during outer islanders’ stays on Yap.56
53  Historian Hanlon argued that Micronesia is a colonial construct and only exists in people’s 
imagination. However, anthropologist Glenn Petersen claims that while this may previously have been 
so, the people of Micronesia now have a sense of their historical connection as united by the name 
‘Micronesia’. Thus, this is no longer a figment of imagination and is a reality in the contemporary 
FSM. See Hanlon, ‘Magellan’s Chroniclers?’, pp. 53–54; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, 
pp. 12–13.
54  The FSM is part of the Trukic geo-linguistic group prior to the arrival of the colonists. See 
Rauchholz, ‘Notes on Clan Histories and Migration in Micronesia’, pp. 54–55.
55  William Alkire, ‘Traditional Exchange Systems and Modern Political Developments in the Yap 
District of Micronesia’, in Persistence and Exchange: Papers from a Symposium on Ecological Problems 
of the Traditional Societies of the Pacific Region, edited by Ronald W. Force and Brenda Bishop, 
August–September, 1979, pp. 16–18; William Lessa, ‘Ulithi and the Outer Native World’, American 
Anthropologists, Vol. 52, 1950, p. 32; D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 146–147; Hunter-Anderson 
and Zan, ‘Demystifying the Sawei’, pp. 4–6. The sawei system was a tribute system between the 
volcanic island of Yap and the low-lying islands to east of it and the northwest Chuuk. It was seen as 
security insurance for all involved.
56  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 146–150.
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Similar networks are found in the islands of present-day Chuuk and 
Pohnpei states. In the Mortlocks, for example, the ainang system imposes 
duties and obligations to provide food to its members in the island chain 
during famine or when a member travels between the islands.57 Pohnpei’s 
oral history also speaks of a network system between its low-lying islands 
surrounding the volcanic main island. These network systems are still in 
existence, but with evolving dimensions as they incorporate new elements of 
the modern world.58 Pohnpei and Kosrae were also linked, for example, by 
the exchange of ideas in the design of their architecture. Kosraean structures 
have similar designs to Nan Madol in Pohnpei, suggesting cultural links.
Reconnecting Islands
The sea remains central to Micronesian survival. It serves as the highway 
for inter-island communication and trade throughout the Micronesian 
archipelagos.59 Although modern modes of transportation have replaced 
sailing canoes, the sea routes remain known to Micronesians today. 
The modern economy is increasingly focused on marine resources. 
Micronesians continue to retest their knowledge by retracing their 
ancestral voyages on sailing canoes and open motorboats using traditional 
navigation techniques. For example, in June 2013, a traditional palou 
from Poluwat named Soste and his relatives sailed from his island to 
Guam using traditional methods of navigation.60 Likewise, Peter Sitan, 
a traditional palou from the Mortlocks, tested his skills on the sea as 
recently as 2008 using an outboard motor skiff to travel from his island 
of Ettal in Chuuk to the main island of Pohnpei.61 Soste’s and Sitan’s 
actions served as a reminder of the ongoing links to and value placed 
on sea navigation by Micronesians. The Constitution’s Preamble states 
57  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 39–40; Flinn, Diplomas and Thatch Houses, p. 141.
58  My personal knowledge. The descendants of Mortlockese people who migrated to Pohnpei 
after the 1907 super typhoon that devastated the Mortlock Islands hold some traditional titles 
bestowed upon them by the traditional chiefs of Pohnpei, especially the chiefdom of Sokehs. This is 
in recognition of their contribution to tiahk en sapw (Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 40–42; 
Goodenough, Property, Kin, and Community in Truk, p. 86).
59  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 144–145; Duane, Clan and Copra, pp. 120–123; Marshall, 
Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 8–10.
60  Phillip H. Blas, ‘Traditional Chuukese Sailing Canoe Reaches Guam: Crew Navigated 500 
Miles without Using Modern Technology’, Pacific Islands Report, 19 June 2013, www.pireport.org/
articles/2013/06/19/traditional-chuukese-sailing-canoe-reaches-guam.
61  Peter Sitan, Interview, Pohnpei, 20 January 2011; Blas, ‘Traditional Chuukese Sailing Canoe 
Reaches Guam’.
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that Micronesian history ‘began in the days when man explored seas in 
rafts and canoes. The Micronesian nation is born in an age when men 
voyage among stars’.62 This suggests that Micronesians still honour their 
ancestral ways to perpetuate islanders’ continuity, as demonstrated by the 
above two navigators. It is worth noting that Sitan is the president of 
the National Fisheries Corporation and applied his traditional knowledge 
of the sea to return the FSM’s fishing fleets to profit and sustainability. 
Micronesians are in touch with their deepest past while simultaneously 
mastering the modern world.
The Ainang System
The ainang system has been central to Micronesian relationships across 
the horizon. For example, the kachaw clan in Chuuk has its origin in Kosrae 
and Pohnpei.63 Likewise, some Yapese clans’ origins extend to the islands 
of Chuuk and vice versa.64 Today, the indigenous people continue their 
relationship with each other via the ainang network. Linguistic evidence 
also suggests a shared Micronesian connection through a  common 
language called Chuukic that encompasses the Mortlock Islands in the 
eastern part of the former Caroline Islands to the western end of the island 
chain in Palau.65 This is evidenced by the fact that many of the low-lying 
islanders in Yap can converse with the people in the western part of Chuuk 
and the Mortlocks region.66 Connection between Micronesians through 
this common language remains strong, and the Constitution has provided 
opportunities for more interaction.67 For example, any citizen of the FSM 
can travel and reside anywhere in the FSM, and most migrate if they have 
kin connection in a new place.
Since Micronesian people are historically mobile, they naturally continue 
to transplant themselves further afield. This is made possible by the global 
transportation system and political links with former colonial powers. 
Current estimates indicate that under the Compact, more than 20 per 
cent of the Micronesian population now resides outside the nation, 
62  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
63  Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 1–7; Kim, Into the Deep, pp. 6–7.
64  Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll and Inter-Island Socio-Economic Ties, p. 10.
65  Rauchholz, ‘Notes on Clan Histories and Migration in Micronesia’, pp. 54–55; Kim, Into the 
Deep, pp. 6–7; Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll, pp. 28–30.
66  Marck, ‘Micronesian Dialects and the Overnight Voyage’, pp. 253–258.
67  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
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particularly in the US.68 This new diaspora will continue to expand as 
a result of the globalised world and the inherent urge of the Micronesian 
people to travel to join their families now searching for opportunities 
outside Micronesia. It is argued that a consequence of this process is 
the exportation of Micronesian ideologies to the new spaces in order to 
facilitate Micronesians’ transition to their adopted environment while 
maintaining a connection to their island homes.69 The ainang system is 
the glue that links geographically dispersed clan members to each other 
and their nation state.
Forever mobile throughout their long past, Micronesians are adapting 
quickly to their new globalised lifestyle. As Captain Marar notes, 
‘Micronesians are genuinely great navigators; they continue to explore new 
stars to sail in the new globalised sea of the globalised world to reconnect 
with their history and new experiences’.70 Despite the movement of 
Micronesian people beyond the horizon, the Shulapan allik recognises 
their citizenship. For example, Micronesians living abroad continue to 
participate in national elections; their votes are sent back to the FSM 
to be counted. Further, their interests in land over non-citizens are legally 
protected by the Constitution.71
The Legal System in its Micronesian 
Context
While reflecting Micronesian history and values, the FSM’s Constitution 
is still derived from an American model. This provides an inherent 
tension between American and Micronesian jurisprudence.72 This 
tension was naturally present from the outset as US judges dominated 
the court system. Legal precedents were framed in the image of American 
judicial precedents. For example, lawyer Brian Tamanaha argued that US 
judges used their knowledge of the US legal system when interpreting 
Micronesian cases due to their unfamiliarity with Micronesian traditions, 
68  SBOC, www.sboc.fm/ (site discontinued).
69  Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 144–145.
70  David Marar, pers. comm., Nett, Pohnpei, 20 January 2011.
71  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XIII, Section 4.
72  There is often tension between FSM and US interpretations of the law, especially when the issue 
of culture is involved. Although some cases have been settled, it is debated whether the decisions were 
conclusive. See FSM v Mudong, 1 FSM Intrm. 135 (Pon. 1982); FSM v Tammed, 5 FSM Intrm. 426 
(Yap 1990).
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despite being constitutionally mandated to consider these traditions.73 
However, former Associate Judge Dennis Yamase asserted that this is no 
longer the case as more Micronesian judges have entered the court system 
and are shaping it in accordance with Micronesian jurisprudence.74 
The court system has matured legally and is promoting constitutional 
principles immersed in traditional practices, such as alternative dispute 
resolutions among communities.75 However, one still wonders about the 
validity of Yamase’s claim, particularly when most Micronesian judges are 
educated at institutions that teach American jurisprudence.
It is understood that at the time of the FSM’s independence there were no 
qualified indigenous lawyers certified by competent law schools to organise 
and develop the legal system and a Micronesian-based jurisprudence. 
Consequently, US judges were appointed to undertake the task. The 
judges’ landmark decisions essentially reinforced non-Micronesian legal 
principles, which promoted the interests of the state and the universal 
rights of a person as an individual. This line of thought and priority 
contradicted traditional values despite the Constitution’s recognition 
of the importance of cultures and traditions in the courts’ decisions.76 
This is still a matter of controversy and the subject of ongoing debate 
between the black letter approach and the radicals who seek a wider and 
fuller interpretation of the Constitution, including the application of 
customary laws. The key legal question is, what constitutes ‘the law’ from 
a Micronesian perspective?77
Jurisprudential debate has been central to Micronesian independence, 
identity and continuity. This has raised the issue of whether the FSM’s 
legal system is genuinely constructed by local values or whether the system 
has been utilised by outsiders to reimpose their values under a different 
guise.78 Is the lack of understanding of Micronesian cultures an appropriate 
defence on the part of foreign judges when rendering decisions contrary 
to indigenous cultures?79 Foreign judges presiding over FSM courts 
immediately after the implementation of the Constitution have been 
73  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’.
74  Yamase, The Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia, pp. 36–38.
75  Yamase, The Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia, pp. 36–38.
76  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, pp. 11–12.
77  No one has raised the issue and it needs to be addressed. See Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, 
pp. 11–12.
78  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, pp. 11–12.
79  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, pp. 11–12.
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regarded as the main architects of FSM’s jurisprudence. The established 
precedents and their rulings have provoked debate between two opposing 
camps within the FSM legal fraternity.80 One view is that the decisions 
of the foreign judges have been admired and recognised as developing the 
legal landscape in the fledgling nation. This is because their decisions were 
seen as endorsing black letter law and the primacy of the individual in any 
contest involving customary law.81 This perspective has been supported 
for providing certainty by not having to determine customary issues in 
key cases and leaving behind a solid legal system. The alternative view is 
that the US judges left behind a half-baked legal system almost devoid 
of Micronesian perspective or input.82 This is evident from their narrow 
interpretation of the Constitution from the outset, which arguably put the 
legal system on an inappropriate footing for developing an independent 
and locally responsive legal system.
Values and Identity in the Legal System
Micronesian criticism of the narrow interpretation of the Constitution 
in decisions made by US judges can be seen in cases such as FSM v Mudong 
(Pon. 1982),83 FSM v Alaphonso (Truk 1982),84 Semens v Continental 
(Pon. 1986)85 and FSM v Tammed (Yap 1990).86 The courts’ decisions in 
these cases and subsequent similar cases constituted a systematic promotion 
of American social values at the expense of Micronesian cultural values. 
The decisions effectively moulded the FSM legal system in the image 
of American jurisprudence, rather than developing a Micronesian legal 
system based on the goals articulated during the ConCon.87 The basis of 
80  My personal observation as a trained lawyer who has frequently worked with lawyers within the 
FSM over the last 11 years. There has been ongoing debate about legal precedents left by foreigners 
that are still followed by Micronesian judges. Micronesian legal scholars have not extensively written 
on this subject.
81  My personal observation.
82  Brian Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia: An Interpretive Approach to Transplanted 
Law, Studies in Humanities (series), Center of Non-Western Societies, Leiden University, The 
Netherlands, 1993, pp. 59–67; Discussions with colleagues at the FSM Supreme Court, Palikir, 
Pohnpei, January 2010 during contractual employment at the Congress of the FSM.
83  FSM v Mudong.
84  FSM v Alaphonso (Truk 1982), fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
85  Semens v Continental, 2 FSM Intrm. 200 (Pon. 1986), fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
86  FSM v Tammed, 5 FSM Intrm. 426 (Yap 1990).
87  Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia, pp. 340–341.
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this harsh assessment is that, constitutionally, court decisions must first 
look at eoranian fanou in the FSM.88 In the case of Etpison v Perman 
(Pon. 1984), for example, it was stated by the court that:
the FSM Supreme Court may look to decisions under the 
United States Constitution for guidance in determining the 
scope of jurisdiction since the jurisdictional language of the FSM 
Constitution is similar to that of the United States.89
In re Sproat (Pon. 1985), again the court said, ‘the jurisdictional language in 
the FSM Constitution is patterned upon the United States Constitution’90 
and the implementation of US legal concepts. In FSM v Alophonso, the 
court reasoned:
most concepts and many actual words and phrases in the FSM 
Constitution [as in] … the Declaration of Rights came directly 
from the [US] Constitution … Bill of Rights. In the two 
Constitutions, the language … is nearly identical.91
Therefore, it was only logical that the court establish a precedent based on 
the import of American laws.92
A comparison of the US and FSM constitutions reveals obvious differences. 
They have a different history, textual language, structure and underlying 
philosophy.93 Even if the Micronesian Constitution was patterned on the 
US Constitution, it does not necessarily follow that a court must transplant 
US precedents to decide cases arising in a Micronesian context. The court 
could have made a greater effort to accommodate Micronesian eoranien 
fanou by seeking the advice of scholars or Micronesians knowledgeable in 
the matters before the court.
Conflict between a narrow interpretation of the law and eoranian fanou 
was initially tested in the cases noted above. Because the courts lacked 
the depth of knowledge in relation to eoranien fanou, they inadvertently 
derailed the development of a fully-fledged Micronesian jurisprudence. 
88  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 11.
89  Etpison v Berman, 1 FSM Intrm. 405 (Pon. 1984), fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
90  In re Sproat, 2 FSM Intrm. 1 (Pon. 1985), fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
91  Alaphanso v FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 209 (App. 1982), 209, fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/index.htm.
92  Alaphanso v FSM.
93  It seems that Edward C. King contradicted himself when discussing the differences between the 
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia and the US Constitution. Yet he preferred to follow 
the US approach in deciding the law. For further discussion, see King, ‘Custom and Constitutionalism 
in the Federated States of Micronesia’, pp. 2–3; Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, p. 13.
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This could be considered a revival of the colonial years when black letter 
law was perceived as superior to customary law.94 This argument treats the 
two judges as facilitators of an American ‘judicial activism’ that further 
diluted Micronesian customs and traditions for the purpose of maintaining 
American interests in the FSM.95 Micronesia requires judicial decisions 
that seriously consider customary law and deliver inclusive, holistic and 
harmonious judgments to Micronesian communities. It is not accepted 
that customary law operates ‘outside’ the constitutional legal system. In 
fact, many municipal-level courts ignore the formal legal system and use 
traditional methods of settling disputes.
The case of FSM v Mudong highlighted the conflict that could arise when 
interpreting the Constitution from an individual rights perspective in 
a case enmeshed in customary and traditional issues. In that case, the 
two appellants asked the court to dismiss the case as the issues had been 
resolved through tiaken Pohnpei, a Pohnpeian customary apology.96 
The court denied the defendants’ motion, citing ‘prosecutorial discretion’ 
and referring to custom as insufficient grounds on which to call a halt 
to and dismissal of criminal proceedings.97 The court indicated that:
the customary effect upon court proceedings of a customary 
forgiveness is not self-evident, and the defendants offered no 
evidence to establish that dismissal of a court proceeding is one of 
customary [law].98
However, it should have been self-evident to the court that it would be 
impossible to find precedents that could establish that the dismissal of 
court proceedings was available under customary law given that there was 
no court system in customary law.99
94  The law provides mechanisms for judges to use expert witness when customary practises are 
involved. Justice King ignored such an avenue. See National Judiciary Act, Public Law No. 1-31 (FSM).
95  Puas, ‘The FSM Legal System’, pp. 21–22.
96  Customary apology in Pohnpei involves bringing together the families of the opposing parties 
over sakau and making apologetic speeches evoking traditional connections. See the case of FSM v 
Mudong.
97  It is often a risk when prosecution discretion is exercised by outsiders as they lack the depth of 
knowledge of Micronesian customs. Today, it is a policy to hire Micronesians first. Foreigners may be 
hired if a position cannot be filled by indigenous professionals.
98  FSM v Mudong.
99  Amicus curiae (lit. ‘friend of the Court’) refers to experienced, retired lawyers familiar with the 
court system and the law who may be called on by the court to offer expert advice on issues before 
the court. See National Judiciary Act, Public Law No. 1-31 (FSM).
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In support of the prosecutorial discretion argument, the court reasoned 
that ‘the National Criminal Code does not grant the prosecutor authority 
to dismiss an existing prosecution on the basis of customary law’.100 
The  court further reasoned, inter alia, that customary law and the 
Constitution perform different functions.101
The court could have considered the alternative, that ‘those customs 
that have the status of customary law are a source of law and should 
be recognised by the Court as such, without evidence having to be 
adduced’.102 That is, evidence of Pohnpeian practice should have been 
sufficient without the appellants requiring ‘expert’ evidence from a foreign 
anthropologist. Pohnpeian custom should have been self-evident as it is 
uniform practice on the main island. Perhaps the court could have called 
upon its amicus curaie103 to assist it in establishing the proper interpretation 
and thus application of Pohnpeian traditions. Moreover, an assessor could 
have been appointed by the court as subject to the National Judiciary 
Act, Public Law No. 1-31. As Section 12 of that Act states, the court 
is authorised:
to appoint assessors to advise about local law or custom … any 
Justice of the Supreme Court may appoint one or more assessors 
to advise him at the trial of any case with respect to local law or 
custom or such other matters requiring specialised knowledge. All 
such advice shall be of record and the assessors shall be subject to 
examination and cross-examination by any party.104
This misinterpretation of the FSM’s Constitution by US judges may be 
considered as undermining the development of the FSM justice system, 
arguably weakening the FSM’s unique cultural identity. In doing so, 
precedents were set that differentiated the law from custom, with the 
view that it would be easier for subsequent judges to concentrate on a 
precedent-based system. However, this has made it difficult for subsequent 
Micronesian judges to reset the system to include both the law and custom.
100  FSM v Mudong.
101  It is undoubtedly true that the US Constitution differs from the Constitution of the Federated 
States of Micronesia as they have had different roles based on the different histories of their respective 
countries. The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia values customs as part of the judicial 
process, especially when issues of the social configuration principle are involved. The issues could be 
generally settled if the court looks at The National Judiciary Act, Public Law No. 1-31 (FSM).
102  Tess N. Cain, ‘Convergence, or Clash? The Recognition of Customary Law and Practice in 
Sentencing Decisions of the Courts of the Pacific Islands Region’, Melbourne Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 2, 2001, p. 51.
103  See the principle of amicus curiae in fn. 99.
104  FSM v Mudong.
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There is still a significant tension between custom and the court system 
within the FSM. It can be argued that the Constitution should not control 
but recognise custom as it plays an important role in disputes, violence, 
or wrongdoing in the Pohnpeian community.105 Many independent 
Pacific Island nations’ constitutions and legal systems effectively recognise 
customary law within their procedures.106 The FSM’s Constitution can 
and should recognise customary means of dispute resolution within 
criminal proceedings. However, per established legal precedent:
[Micronesian custom and] the constitutional legal system 
established by the people of the FSM, flow from differing premises 
and traditions. They serve different purposes … Customary law 
de-emphasises notions of individual guilt, rights and responsibility, 
and places greater stress on the groups to which the individual 
accused and victims belong. The Constitutional … system 
concentrates upon smaller and larger units than those immediate 
groups emphasised by customary law.107
Yet, the Constitution provides the solution to this tension between 
custom and court legal procedures. The root of the problem lies in 
the interpretation of the Constitution within the court system, rather 
than in the Constitution itself. The Constitution does not set up dual 
independent systems of law as suggested in the above court cases; indeed, 
to the contrary, the Constitution intended the courts to take customs and 
traditions into account in all decisions, as set out in Article XI, Section 11. 
These words should be accorded this recognition during the court process 
and not diluted so as to promote individual rights in all contexts.108 
As sociologists Maclver and Page comment:
customs support the law and without such it becomes meaningless. 
Custom establishes social order of its own so that conflict arising 
between custom and the law is not a conflict between law and 
lawlessness, but between the orders of reflection [customs] and 
the order of spontaneity [law]. In general, customs regulate the 
105  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia specifically indicates that judges should be 
mindful in their decisions when customary matters are involved. See The Constitution of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 11; Etscheit v Santos, 5 FSM Intrm 35.38 (App. 1991); Rosie 
v Healy-Tibbets Builders, Inc, 5 FSM Intrm. 358, 361 (Kos. 1992).
106  Lamour, Foreign Flowers, pp. 15–17.
107  FSM v Mudong.
108  Daniel P. Ryan, Essential Principles of Contract and Sales in the Northern Pacific: Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Republics of Palau and the Marshall Islands and US Territories, iUniverse, USA, 2009, 
p. xxiii.
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whole social life of man. Law itself cannot cover the whole gamut 
of social behaviour. It is the customary practices that contribute to 
the harmonious social interactions in a society.109
This combination of law and custom working in tandem towards  the 
same objective of consensus-based social harmony is essential in 
the Micronesian context.
It is clear that the US judges meant to elevate the status of individual rights 
over those of the group and justified this position by claiming that the 
rights of ‘immediate groups’ fall within the purview of customary concern. 
This reasoning does not reflect the reality of life in the FSM. As noted 
earlier, Micronesians belong to an extended ainang diaspora dispersed 
throughout the islands. They are not divided into isolated clans that can 
be left alone to perform their own customary duties.110 Customary law is 
part of the Constitution and should have been considered holistically by 
the courts as a valid means of resolving disputes and bringing peace back 
into the community—surely the ultimate intention of the Constitution.111
Familial relations are equally as important as ainang relationships within 
Micronesian custom. It is undoubtedly true that familial relationships are 
at the very core of Micronesian society and are the source of numerous 
rights and obligations that influence practically every aspect of the lives of 
individual Micronesians. These relationships are an important component, 
perhaps the most important component, of the custom and tradition 
referred to generally in the Constitution (Article V) and specifically in 
the National Criminal Code, which states, ‘this Court has no desire to 
disregard or minimise the importance of such relationships’.112
In FSM v Tammed, the court noted:
the duty of a national court justice [is] to give full and careful 
consideration to a request to consider a particular customary practice 
or value in arriving at a decision requires careful investigation of 
the nature and customary effect of the specific practice at issue, 
a serious effort to reconcile the custom and tradition with other 
109  Robert Maclver and Charles Page, ‘Custom’, Sociology Guide, sociologyguide.com/basic-concepts/ 
Custom.php.
110  The extended ainang family.
111  See The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section XI.
112  FSM v Tammed.
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constitutional requirements, and an individualised decision as to 
whether the specific custom or tradition should be given effect in 
the particular contexts of the case before the court.113
Further complicating the issues of custom, the court stated that ‘the party 
asserting customary law has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence the existence, applicability and customary effect of such 
customary law’.114 The key issue at stake here is who should be recognised 
as having the authority to provide that evidence to the court to ensure that 
Micronesian values are not eroded.
Conflict between the FSM’s Constitution 
and State Traditions
In 1990, a consolidated appeal case went before the court as a test case 
between the primacy of the Constitution and state traditions. The case 
was FSM v Tammed, where two separate appellants were charged with 
rape. However, before they were arrested or charged, they were caught and 
beaten by the relatives of the victims, with both sustaining serious injuries 
and one requiring hospitalisation. Both defendants were convicted of the 
charges but disagreed with the sentencing and appealed.
Both appellants argued that the ‘trial court erred in not giving mitigating 
effect to the beatings each had received when it handed down their 
respective sentences’.115 The Appellate Court faced the dilemma as to 
whether the customary beatings could be considered as mitigating factors 
in sentencing. The chief justice reasoned:
the record reflects no serious effort by any party in either case to 
establish the precise contours of customary punishments. There 
are contentions that some aspects of the beatings were violative 
of customary procedures, there seems to be general agreement 
that these beatings have ‘substantial customary’ and traditional 
implications.116
113  FSM v Tammed.
114  Ankush Sharma, ‘Customary Law and Received Law in the Federated States of Micronesia’, 
Journal of South Pacific Law, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2006, www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol10/7.shtml.
115  FSM v Tammed.
116  FSM v Tammed.
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This ruling came in the face of pre-sentence reports for one appellant, 
whose relatives accepted that the beatings were derived from customary 
practices. The government’s counsel suggested:
as a matter of customary law, the beating may have restored the 
defendants fully to the community, not only reducing or obviating 
the need for further punishment, but entirely cleansing him of 
liability … because of the customary nature of the punishment, 
then no prosecution was ever initiated against any of those who 
attacked either of the defendants.117
However, the court had to draw a line between custom and the law in 
order to render its decision. The dilemma was to balance the customary 
practice of the beating of a wrongdoer against the constitutional right of 
an individual not to be assaulted.118 The court did not want to encourage 
violence against the individual. Yet, if the court condemned beatings as 
merely a customary practice devoid of legal standing, this would devalue 
customary law and thus deny the rights of families under customary 
law as raised in the Mudong case. The court issued a decision that the 
beatings had some mitigating effect but without having any regard to 
their customary implications or their compatibility with the criminal law 
or civil rights.119
It can be argued that the court in FSM v Tammed made its decisions 
on the basis that the state and the individual have greater rights than 
traditional interests. Further argument suggested that perhaps some 
consideration with respect to international law could have been explored 
to moderate the American perspective of the law by way of balancing 
it with certain articles in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
relevant international instruments.120 There have been decisions in other 
jurisdictions where judges have drawn on international instruments to 
resolve problems in domestic jurisdictions. In the alternative, judicial 
decisions about customary law could have been sought from other Pacific 
117  FSM v Tammed.
118  Sharma, ‘Customary Law and Received Law in the Federated States of Micronesia’.
119  Many traditionalists argued that cultural beating is compatible with the Constitution in view 
of Article V, Section 2.
120  Semens v Continental.
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jurisdictions such as Vanuatu, Samoa or Tuvalu,121 as discussed in Semens 
v Continental. In this case, Justice King acknowledged the possibility that 
‘when constitutional and statutory provisions, customs, and traditions 
fail to furnish a full solution to issues the Court will look to common 
law applied in the United States and elsewhere’.122 However, Justice King 
applied American precedents and did not consider other Pacific Island 
states.123
Some indigenous lawyers have rejected the above analysis by the court 
in Mudong on the basis that the Constitution has highlighted the 
importance  of custom in the justice system, as reflected in Articles  V 
and  XI. The  notion that customs and the Constitution flow from 
‘differing premises’ is to narrowly interpret the Constitution if the effect 
is to ignore customs, except in cases where the court thinks it applies 
to ‘those immediate groups  emphasised by customary law’.124 The 
distinction between custom and individual rights is not made explicit 
in the Constitution as the intent was that they both be considered in 
decision-making (judicial and otherwise).
In addition, the concept of the individual in many Micronesian customs 
is hard to determine as the individual is considered inseparable from 
their ainang group.125 The decision that the rights of an individual are 
paramount when compared to an ainang group, as held by the court, 
contributed to the devaluing of Micronesian custom by removing the 
rights of the extended families to settle their own disputes, a central 
tenet of traditional community justice. Such a practice could alienate 
the individual, with devastating consequences for both the family and 
community at large. In this regard, it should be noted that the FSM has 
121  Semens v Continental. Justice King said to look at the South Pacific to borrow precedents 
of common law but then drew on US law instead. It was a contradiction that demonstrated the 
inconsistencies in the law as handled by outsiders.
122  For example, sakau is a ceremonial drink in Pohnpei, used during community gatherings like 
funerals, feasts or customary apology. It is made from the root of the pepper tree (Piper methysticum).
123  FSM v Mudong. The prosecutor lacked knowledge of custom and so to deny Mudong’s request 
to drop the case meant that Pohnpeian custom was secondary to the law in view of the outsider.
124  During my contract work as a lawyer at the FSM Congress and Department of Justice in 2005 
and 2010, I discussed the matters with the Micronesian lawyers in government.
125  Individuals are part of the ainang system and there is no private individual in many parts of the 
FSM. One person’s problem becomes the affair of the whole extended family in land disputes and 
death. Perhaps the court could have adopted the doctrine of ‘circle sentencing’ (restorative justice). 
This is prominent in many Australian jurisdictions involving Australian Aboriginals, where the court 
can determine the question of law but Aboriginal Elders decide on the sentencing of the individual 
offender.
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one of the highest suicide rates by amwinimwin.126 Traditional remedies 
play a crucial role in the maintenance of eoranian fanou, the foundation 
of local identity and continuity.
Tamanaha and his supporters have accused the court of Americanising 
the judicial system through what many call ‘creative legalism’;127 that is, 
judges give lip service to custom and ignore other jurisdictions in the 
Pacific whose treatment of custom in their legal system could provide 
a model, instead preferring to cherry pick US cases. This is not an entirely 
unreasonable stance, given that the judges are more familiar with US law. 
This has raised questions as to the capacity of foreign judges to be involved 
in matters concerning customs and the law. For example, Tamanaha has 
argued that Congress should consider introducing legislation requiring 
all foreign judges and lawyers to undertake workshops in Micronesian 
customs and traditions.128 This would increase their capacity to deal 
with the difficult issues concerning customs and the law to safeguard the 
continuation of Micronesian values.
The Law as a Reinforcer of Identity
Brian Tamanaha, a US lawyer who worked in Yap and later wrote 
a  book about his experiences titled Understanding Law in Micronesia, 
is a critic of the primacy afforded to American jurisprudence and case 
law in matters before FSM courts. He has criticised Justice King for his 
selective approach in favouring American legalism, which had no direct 
connection to the laws and values of Micronesia.129 Tamanaha has argued 
that outsiders created their own brand of what the law ‘ought to be’ rather 
than what ‘the law is’, particularly from a Micronesian perspective.130 
He further argued that the suggestion by Justice King that Micronesians 
knew what they were in for when ratifying the Constitution as a basis 
for strengthening his own analysis (e.g. in FSM v Alophonso) was not 
a defence to the criticism of King’s decisions. Tamanaha asserts that even 
though a high percentage of the population ratified the Constitution, this 
126  Amwinimwin is a form of psychological punishment imposed on parents and close relatives who, 
in the eyes of the victim, wrongly punished him or her. See Francis X. Hezel, ‘Cultural Patterns in 
Trukese Suicide’, Ethnology, Vol. 23, July 1984, pp. 193–206, www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/suicide/
frames/cultpatfr.htm. I use a different spelling of the term.
127  Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia, pp. 59–67.
128  Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia, pp. 59–67
129  Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia, pp. 59–67.
130  Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia, pp. 59–67.
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does not mean that the voters understood the constitutional text in its 
entirety.131 Tamanaha is not alone in his view. This is a part of the ongoing 
debate between the opposing factions within the FSM legal profession as 
to whether a Micronesian perspective of the legal system has been fully 
represented by outsiders. Many indigenous lawyers have since entered 
the legal profession and brought with them different perspectives to the 
debate. Many have questioned both Tamanaha’s and King’s perception of 
Micronesian law and traditions as both are outsiders.
Conclusion
The administration of the Constitution as discussed in the above cases 
has been a challenge to Micronesians. This is especially so because the 
law itself cannot be purely based on imported legal concepts but must 
fit local customs to sustain continuity. Since coming into contact with 
the outside world, Micronesian customs and traditions have adapted and 
maintained their integrity in the globalised world. The management and 
administration of the law are the responsibility of each state and municipal 
jurisdiction, in conformity with the national Constitution. At  the 
municipal level, methods of settling disputes continue to be largely led by 
the heads of the extended family or traditional village leaders of each clan 
in conjunction with the court system. The FSM honours its Constitution 
and the culture it safeguards. Like any newly independent nation, the FSM 
faces tension between its traditions and imported laws. This can be seen in 
the cases outlined earlier, where US judges implemented precedents that 
often contradicted local understandings of effective ways of adjudicating 
and resolving disputes.
The judges’ lack of understanding of Micronesian custom and cultures 
should not be used as a defence of their judgments. The Constitution 
is clear on the issue of customs and traditions having primacy in judges’ 
decisions. Additionally, there were mechanisms available for the judges 
to seek assistance on cultural issues. These avenues were ignored. This 
resulted in legal precedents that continue to promote outsiders’ influence in 
Micronesia. However, Micronesian judges are entering the constitutional 
system to restrengthen constitutionally defined Micronesian jurisprudence 
based on historical experience to ensure the indigenous continuation of 
the Micronesian identity.
131  Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia, pp. 59–67.
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6
Engaging with China  
and the US
Introduction
Independence has meant that the FSM’s external relations have moved 
from essentially bilateral relations with colonial powers to multilateral 
relations with the international community at large. The world’s two 
largest economic powers, which are also military superpowers, China 
and the US, are potentially heading towards a battle for influence in the 
western Pacific. The challenge the FSM now faces is managing the US 
and China under the new global regime in order to promote its own 
interests. This chapter will demonstrate that the FSM has handled this 
challenge in a skilful and considered way that has served its best interests.
Far too often scholars have falsely argued that since the colonisation 
period, Pacific Islanders have been largely lost to the overwhelming 
forces of outside powers, almost to the point of extinction.1 It has been 
claimed that local religious practices have been absorbed into Christianity, 
traditional social organisation has transformed into a Western style of 
government, codified laws have replaced common laws, and land has been 
appropriated by a capitalist mode of production. A litany of misguided 
comments added to this misinterpretation, suggesting that Micronesians 
succumbed to the ‘first taint of civilization’, which reduced them to 
1  Hanlon, ‘Micronesia: Writing and Rewriting the Histories’, pp. 1–3; Roland W. Force and 
Maryann Force, ‘Political Change in Micronesia’, in Induced Political Change in the Pacific: 
A  Symposium, edited by Roland W. Force, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, 1961, pp. 1–6, 8–10; Petersen, 
‘Lessons Learned’, pp. 45–63.
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‘strangers in their own land’ because they could not withstand ‘the winds 
of change’ in their ‘broken canoe’.2 Such assertions of collapse fail to 
address how one accounts for the rich and dynamic Micronesian cultures 
that survived over 100 years of colonisation and still exist today.
The FSM under the Spotlight
The FSM is shaping up as the next potential flashpoint in Chinese–US 
relations in the northwest Pacific because of its strategic position in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Currently, it is going through an intense economic and 
political transition in preparation for the scaling down of the Compact of 
Free Association in 2023. The Compact is a bilateral treaty between the 
FSM and the US, forged as a result of their common historical experience 
and interests post WWII. It was first implemented in 1986, renegotiated 
in 2001 and extended to 2023. The US has provided just over US$7 
billion to the FSM Government in return for America having exclusive 
use of the islands for military purposes.3 Already, the US is scaling down 
its Compact assistance. As a consequence, questions have been raised 
about the FSM’s ability to survive economically in the post-2023 era. 
China, some observers argue, is likely to partially fill the gap by increasing 
its engagement with the FSM due to its own interests in the region.4
Located in close proximity to Asia, the US military base in Guam and the 
missile range in the Marshall Islands, the FSM must tread cautiously and 
exercise due diligence in its foreign relations because of its geopolitical 
position. For the FSM to maintain its position of strategic importance, 
it must learn from the lessons of WWII and balance the presence and 
scope of influence of each of these superpowers in the region. China’s 
2  These are titles from Francis X. Hezel’s books, except for Broken Canoe which was written by 
Ann Nakano. The titles connote ethnocentrism as still part of Micronesian scholarly discussion.
3  Paul D’Arcy, ‘The Role of the Tuna Fishery in the Economy of the Federated States of 
Micronesia’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2006, pp. 75–87. During my interviews with 
them, government officials openly voiced and accepted the fact that the US will use the Compact 
to question the FSM’s motives for dealing with countries viewed as unfavourable by the US. For 
example, an incident occurred over the introduction of an FSM Congress resolution that favoured 
granting China exclusive rights to fish in the FSM’s EEZ. It was speculated by many that after the 
US objection to the resolution, the FSM Congress quietly withdrew the proposal. Additionally, the 
public at large opposed the resolution, especially supporters of the US both in the FSM and the US.
4  My experiences while working in Congress in 2010, interviews with many of the congressmen 
(e.g. Lorin Robert (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 7 January 2011) and the 
adoptions of various resolutions (discussed in this chapter) are good indications of the FSM’s positive 
engagement with China based on Micronesians’ own understanding of the new global order.
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increasing presence in the FSM raises concerns among some political 
observers over China’s long-term objectives. The FSM has stated on many 
occasions that its relationship with China is based purely on economic 
interests. Notwithstanding this, the US may decide to invoke its right 
to deny certain external relations under the Compact if it perceives its 
interests are under threat.5
The undermining of Chinese activities in the FSM has already been 
attempted. For example, China proposed to loan the FSM Government 
US$22million to fund the overhaul and refurbishment of Micronesian 
fishing facilities. A US fishing company called Oceania then attempted to 
undermine this offer. In its letter of memorandum to the FSM Congress, 
Oceania complained about China’s move to overhaul the fishing facilities 
in the nation, stating in part that China’s fishing infrastructure proposal:
does nothing to create additional industries, promote economic 
projects, or even guarantee a sustainable revenue basis. 
The  difference between [the] Chinese proposal and Oceania’s 
detailed comprehensive plan is the latter includes university 
economic study … Oceania’s plan also comes with its own 
financing; there are no loan requirements or guarantees incumbent 
upon the FSM.6
It went further, asserting that the ‘PRC [People’s Republic of China] 
participates only in projects that benefit [itself ]; and maintain its 
interests only to the extent the needs of PRC is met’.7 The question of 
what benefits  the FSM will continue to receive once loan monies have 
been exhausted is unclear.8 As yet, there has been no government-to-
government confrontation between China and the US over their interests 
in the FSM.
5  Carl Apis, pers. comm. (online), 3 July 2012.
6  Bob D. Rosen, ‘Oceania Memorandum to Speaker of the Congress of the Federated States 
of Micronesia’, Issac Figir, 7 January 2011, p. 2; Nick Solomon (chief executive officer, National 
Fisheries), Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 17 January 2011.
7  Rosen, ‘Oceania Memorandum’, p. 2; Solomon, Interview.
8  Rosen, ‘Oceania Memorandum’, p. 3; Solomon, Interview.
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The FSM and the Pacific Region
In 2007, University of the South Pacific academic Ron Crocombe 
noted the fast-growing involvement of Asia in the Pacific and strongly 
suggested that Pacific nations should take serious notice of this influence.9 
The rippling effect of the economic influence wielded by emerging powers 
like China, Japan and South Korea would mean positioning Pacific 
interests to optimise engagement with these countries.
Political scientist Terence Wesley-Smith has observed that China’s 
growing engagement in the Pacific region is part of its own rise as a new 
economic and  political global power, reaching out to the developing 
world with similar initiatives in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East.10 It is a new opportunity for Pacific Island nations to explore 
new possibilities  instead of being trapped in an outdated system that 
often undermines their own interests.11 The Pacific consists of many 
independent nations, and they possess the right to exercise their choice as 
to which countries they engage with.12
The FSM is conscious of other Pacific Island nations’ engagement 
with China and the resulting reconfiguration of Oceania’s collective 
engagement with the rest of the world. For example, former US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, during her trip to the Pacific Forum meeting 
in the Cook Islands in 2012, said that the US would remain active in 
the South Pacific for the ‘long haul’ as the region is big enough for all 
interested parties, including China.13 Beneath this diplomatic rhetoric lies 
genuine American concern about the threat of China’s growing influence 
in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand’s heavy-handed response to the 
2006 Fijian coup resulted in the island nation strengthening ties with 
China. It is seen as an example of US apprehension about the Pacific 
becoming a non-Western lake.14 Moreover, Clinton’s comments were one-
9  Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, University of the Pacific, Suva, 
2007, pp. 213–220.
10  Yongjin Zhang, ‘A Regional Power by Default’, in China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, 
edited by Terence Wesley Smith and Edgar A. Porter, Berghahn Books, USA, 2010, pp. 60–61.
11  Zhang, ‘A Regional Power’, pp. 60–61.
12  Peter Christian, ‘Patriot Games: Island Voices in a Sea of Contest’, Pacific Institute of Public 
Policy, Discussion Paper No. 21, June 2012, p. 2.
13  Jenny Hayward-Jones, ‘China No Rival in the Battle for Island Influence’, Lowy Institute, 
17 May 2013.
14  Fergus Hanson, ‘Don’t Ignore the Big New Player in Fiji’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 
2008, pp. 1–2, www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/05/08/1210131163040.html.
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sided as the tone did not include the perspective of the Pacific Island 
nations and neglected to consider how they play an important role in 
maintaining stability in their own region.15
The FSM is learning from other Pacific Island nations to better position 
itself in regard to relations with China without offending the US. 
Its  diplomatic relations with China have been maintained for more 
than 20 years, while its longstanding relationship with the US is under 
review. Its relationship with China has been the subject of debate over 
the years, with critics claiming that China is using the FSM as part of 
a moving frontier into the northwest Pacific. This is not so according 
to supporters of China, as the FSM has a constitution that defines its 
foreign policy; China is a part of this policy by Micronesian design.16 
Moreover, the FSM has been benefiting from China’s assistance, so this 
relationship remains firm, particularly in view of the scaling down of the 
US’s Compact monies since 2003. Many Micronesians are suspicious 
of China’s foreign aid programs; they perceive China as slowly gaining 
ground in the northwest Pacific.17 The US may exercise the option under 
the Compact to unilaterally dislodge China should it perceive China as 
a threat. However, such an action would raise the issue of violating the 
supremacy of the FSM’s Constitution18 and relevant international laws of 
non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations.
Contact with China
The FSM’s initial contact with China dates back to when it was still part 
of the US-administered TTPI. The traditional inhabitants had waited 
patiently for the transition to independence following the decolonisation 
of the other trust territories around the world. However, the US was not 
in a hurry to forgo its interests in the islands. China, as a member of the 
UN Security Council, was aware of the US’s tactical move in slowing 
15  Jenny H. Jones, ‘Big Enough for All of Us: Geo-strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands’, 
Lowy Institute, 16 May 2013, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/big-enough-all-us-geo-strategic-
competition-pacific-islands.
16  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article II, Section 1.
17  Bill Jaynes, ‘FSM Congress Pushes for Exclusive Fishing Rights: Single Foreign Country Would 
Have Access to Grounds’, Kaselehlie Press, 26 July 2010, p. 1.
18  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article II, Section 1.
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down the process of terminating the trusteeship agreement.19 In an effort 
to gain support in the UN Security Council for the purpose of ending 
the trusteeship agreement, the FSM contacted Chinese diplomats in the 
UN. To demonstrate its support for the FSM’s anticipated independence, 
China invited the leaders of the FSM to Beijing for political discussions 
and to initiate diplomatic relations. A delegation from the FSM, headed 
by the FSM’s first president, Tosiwo Nakayma, and first secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs (now Department of Foreign Affairs), 
Andon Amaraich, visited China in the early 1980s to gain more knowledge 
about China as a developing nation.20 According to former FSM President 
John Haglelgam, the US was not fully aware of all the discussions that took 
place between the FSM and China.21 At the time, Haglelgam perceived 
the trip as a sign of the FSM leaders’ growing confidence to engage with 
other countries in the international arena.
The Road to Control
The transition to independence remained slow as the US was still 
studying the details of its relationship with the FSM under the Compact. 
However, China and the USSR reminded the US of its obligations under 
the trusteeship agreement to honour the demands of the FSM people to 
pursue their goal towards self-determination. Again, Haglelgam noted, 
‘the Americans and Europeans were too legalistic in their approach to 
strictly follow the text of the decolonisation process’,22 which would take 
time to unfold, while China often opted for more flexible diplomatic 
dialogue in dealing with the issue. China’s support for the FSM struck 
a  chord with Micronesian leaders. In response, the FSM pledged to 
honour the ‘One China Policy’ when it became a member of the UN.23 
19  John Haglelgam, currently a professor at the College of Micronesia, was the second president 
of the FSM. He had direct contact with Chinese diplomats during his term in Congress and as 
the second president. I interviewed him and others about these issues: John Haglelgam (professor), 
Interview, College of Micronesia, National Campus, Palikir, Pohnpei, 11 January 2011; Epel Illon 
(special advisor to SBOC and former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs), Interview, 
Palikir, Pohnpei, 11 January 2011; Lorin Robert (secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs), 
Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 7 January 2011.
20  Haglelgam, Interview.
21  Illon, Interview; Lorin Robert, Interview.
22  Haglelgam, Interview; Illon, Interview; Lorin Robert, Interview.
23  Haglelgam, Interview; Illon, Interview; Lorin Robert, Interview.
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Since then, the relationship between both nations has been built on trust, 
respect and mutual cooperation.24 The One China Policy remains at the 
heart of the diplomatic relationship between the FSM and China.
However, China’s presence in Micronesia has lately been under scrutiny 
by critics. They question China’s sudden interest in the FSM, a region 
it had not shown much interest in before. They speculate that China is 
positioning itself to become a major influence in the Pacific area.25 China’s 
intention, according to these critics, is to create a climate of mistrust, 
which is likely to evolve into a new Cold War front in the Pacific. This 
Sinophobia may be a new phase in Micronesian politics, but many see it 
as a continuing legacy of the Cold War period when the USSR and the 
US were at each other’s throat.26
In the case of the FSM, this underlying fear of China is externally derived; 
it is connected to the colonial history of the islands. This antagonism 
towards China is part of a concerted effort by the former colonial powers 
of the Pacific, who remain the leading aid donors to the region, to 
continue their dominance in the Pacific, including the FSM. Micronesians 
were indoctrinated to support the Western style of political philosophy 
by successive Western colonisers and the entrenchment of Western 
governance.27 When one takes a closer look at Micronesia, however, one 
can discern some socialist features present in the island’s traditional social 
superstructure. For example, the inter-island extended family has socialist 
elements based on the principle of eaea fengan.
The undermining of socialism as alien to island cultures has been 
facilitated by Christian and colonial agencies. These twin forces attempted 
to dissuade islanders from getting too close to socialism.28 Islanders were 
taught that democracy and Christianity were precursors for a tranquil 
world, as opposed to the antagonistic and godless socialism. They were also 
taught that any doctrine that undermined the fundamental principles of 
24  Haglelgam, Interview; Illon, Interview; Lorin Robert, Interview.
25  Rachel Reeves, ‘China Not Threatened by U.S. Presence at Pacific Forum. Vice Foreign Minister: 
Clinton’s Visit Not Attempt to Override Influence’, Pacific Scoop, 2 September 2012.
26  My personal experience when growing up in the FSM was that communist countries like Russia 
and China were frowned upon by many Micronesians as being untrustworthy and to be feared 
because of their undemocratic practices.
27  Gonzaga Puas, ‘Is China a Threat in the Pacific? The Case of Micronesian Experience’, Paper 
delivered in the Pacific Islands Political Science Association (PIPSA), Apia, Samoa, 2012, pp. 20–21.
28  Florian Seady, Church Song: Moun Russia, Satawan Island, 1974; Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific, 
p. 340.
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democracy and Christianity was inherently bad and not conducive to the 
sustainability and survivability of Micronesians. For example, I remember 
my high school years, when discussion on the future political status of 
the FSM was in full swing. The students were taught that if they rejected 
American democracy, an evil empire would take over the islands and 
impose its evil wrath on Micronesians, worse than the Japanese during 
WWII. This was supported by the Catholic faith, which propagated 
socialism as naturally evil because of its opposition to biblical scriptures. 
Christians and non-Christians would be slaughtered by the socialist states 
should they allow socialist ideologies to take root on their islands.
Anti-Chinese sentiment is part of the contemporary socialism versus 
capitalism debate in the FSM. For example, many Micronesian soldiers 
who serve in the US military strongly support American democracy 
and have spoken against China’s growing influence in the nation.29 
They claim that the FSM is treading on dangerous ground in allowing 
Chinese influence to rise in the region, and is undermining US interests 
in doing so. To date, however, the Chinese have been extremely cautious 
about challenging or upsetting US interests in the western Pacific. In my 
interviews with the Chinese ambassadors to the FSM in Pohnpei in 2011 
and 2013, they emphasised China’s support for the FSM as a developing 
country, like China.30 China wants to learn more about Micronesians 
as a people, including their cultures and history.31 On these points they 
expressed their frustration at not being able to locate materials written 
from a Micronesian perspective.32 They also emphasised the point that 
they are not in the FSM to antagonise the US but to assist the FSM in 
whatever capacity possible.33 However, it remains to be seen at what point 
the US will object to the diplomatic relationship between Micronesia and 
China, especially in relation to the end of the current Compact in 2023.
29  Haglelgam, Interview. Professor Haglelgam explained that the Micronesians who joined the US 
military forces are the promoters of US interests in the FSM. He referred to them as a fifth column 
and as Micronesian super patriots of Americanism. No statistics are available yet as to the number of 
Micronesian citizens in the US armed forces.
30  Yongjin Zhang (Chinese ambassador to the FSM), Interview, 13 July 2013, Palikir, Pohnpei; 
Zhang Weidong (Chinese ambassador to the FSM), Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 19 January 2011. 
Both ambassadors commented on the Compact of Free Association as being a major part of FSM 
foreign policy.
31  Zhang, Interview; Weidong, Interview.
32  Zhang, Interview; Weidong, Interview.
33  Zhang, Interview; Weidong, Interview.
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Micronesians have always adapted successfully to foreign influences 
and have managed and lessened the impact of such incursions through 
a number of strategies. Currently, the emergence of the internet and 
globalisation have enabled the FSM’s citizens to learn more about the 
outside world for the purpose of contextualising such externalities from 
their own perspective. Micronesian educational institutions have also 
heralded a new period of intellectual discourse to respond effectively 
to the major foreign players who are trying to control their islands. 
At the forefront of this discourse are the challenges the FSM needs to 
consider in relation to its future development in search of an economic 
model that complements its present social order. Additionally, the FSM 
diaspora has been growing tremendously over many decades, and their 
economic knowledge of the outside world has contributed enormously 
to the development of the FSM. The FSM also has a constitution that 
outsiders need to respect if they want to retain their interests in the FSM’s 
jurisdiction. Finally, under its constitution, the FSM has the right to forge 
relations with any country of their choosing, including China.34
The FSM–US Connection
The FSM–US connection was forged after WWII when the US took 
control of the islands as their last colonial master. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the US consolidated its power by registering the islands in the 
UN as a trust territory, the TTPI. The TTPI was the only trust territory 
placed under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, because of 
its strategic value to the US, pursuant to Chapter XII, Article 83 of the 
UN Charter.35
The process of independence took a long time as negotiators on both 
sides sought to secure optimal outcomes in their country’s best interests. 
The key issue for Micronesians was why was the FSM pressured to gain 
political independence prior to economic development?36 In weighing 
the options, Micronesian leaders decided that economic matters should 
be negotiated under a Compact of Free Association and kept separate 
34  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
35  Charter of the United Nations and Statutes of the International Court of Justice, Article 83 of 
Chapter XII.
36  This was the Congress of Micronesia’s response to the US’s foot-dragging approach towards 
Micronesian independence. Nevertheless, political freedom was the priority. See Hanlon, Making 
Micronesia, p. 95.
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from political issues. Political independence only was therefore sold to the 
Micronesian people and accepted in 1979. However, formal termination 
of the TTPI awaited US approval in the UN Security Council.
The UN trusteeship agreement came to an end in 1986, followed 
immediately by the formalisation of the Compact, although not without 
controversy.37 At the heart of this ongoing controversy is the ‘permanent 
denial clause’, which is interpreted by critics as providing the US with 
permanent and exclusive rights to use the islands for military purposes. 
Many supporters of this interpretation claim that, although the financial 
assistance ends in 2023, the security provision remains in American 
hands indefinitely. This view was rejected by most FSM government 
figures interviewed during my fieldwork as being without any basis. 
The denial clause, they argued, only survives for the duration of the 
Compact. Further, the Compact can be unilaterally terminated as subject 
to Title IV, Article 4, Sections 441, 442 and 443.38 However, Section 443 
must be scrutinised closely because it requires a constitutional process 
(i.e. a referendum) for final termination of the Compact by the FSM.39 
This places the burden of terminating the Compact on the Micronesian 
side, as holding a referendum is costly and time consuming to administer 
across all the islands. It is obviously designed to make the Compact 
difficult to be unilaterally terminated by the FSM. However, the US 
cannot prevent the FSM from terminating the Compact by other means 
if provided for by the Micronesian Constitution, which supersedes the 
Compact as subject to Article 2, Section 1.40
Dishonouring the Compact
A political outburst by Senator Dan Inouye of Hawai‘i and his supporters in 
the US Congress exemplified the continuing paternalistic attitude of many 
US officials towards Micronesians. In 2012, the senator wrote a letter to 
37  Lorin Robert, Interview.
38  Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States of 
America.
39  Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States of 
America.
40  My personal interpretation (as a lawyer). Lorin Robert said that the Compact derives from the 
FSM’s Constitution, so it is secondary to the Constitution. There has been an ongoing debate as 
only the financial parts of the Compact are subject to renegotiation, with the military part remaining 
in perpetuity (Lorin Robert, Interview).
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the US secretary of state expressing dissatisfaction over the influx of FSM 
immigrants to Hawai‘i, Kansas and the US territories of Guam and the 
Northern Marianas Islands. The senator claimed that immigrants from the 
FSM were draining the states’ and territories’ financial resources despite 
the Compact money to compensate their costs.41 This led to tension and 
resentment between the new immigrants and many US citizens of these 
states and territories. Senator Inouye advocated for all Micronesians to be 
screened before entering the US to determine whether they were able to 
support themselves independently. Such a demand ignores a basic feature 
of Micronesian social organisation—they are not individualistic; they rely 
on the support of the family system, so any individual assessment at entry 
masks kin support networks in place upon arrival. Such demands also 
ignore the tax payments Micronesians inject into the US economy. As 
taxpayers, they are surely entitled to receive medical attention and social 
welfare.
The senator’s letter was also sent directly to the president of the FSM, 
something seen by both the FSM’s people and leaders as disrespectful 
and lacking the courtesy of international protocol. For example, Senator 
Inouye is not the US president and should not have dealt directly with the 
FSM’s head of state. Inouye’s actions were perceived as nothing more than 
a continuation of the belittling of Micronesian leaders as being inferior 
to their US counterparts.42 This attitude needs to be curtailed by the top 
tiers of the US Government as the Compact was negotiated between the 
sovereign governments of the FSM and US, not the states of Hawai‘i and 
others.43 Micronesia is an independent nation with its own identity. It is 
not part of the US’s domestic jurisdiction.
The FSM Congress’s Resolution No. 17-6144 was tabled in response to 
the US Senate Committee for Appropriations, chaired by Senator Inouye, 
directing the Department of Homeland Security to implement ‘all legally 
allowable grounds of inadmissibility under the Compact which apply to 
41  Giff Johnson and Bernadette Carreon, ‘Micronesia’s Access to U.S. under Review’, Marianas 
Business Journal, 18 July 2011; Giff Johnson, ‘US Lawmakers Seek Limit on Micronesian Migrants: 
Marshall Protests, Cite Compact Terms’, Marianas Variety, 23 May 2011; Bill Jaynes, ‘Senate 
Appropriations Committee Takes Concrete Steps to Begin Barring Some FAS Citizens from Entry to 
the United States’, Kaselehlie Press, 19 September 2011, p. 1.
42  Reactions to Inouye’s comments were widespread on the Micronesian Forum; Inos Walter 
(Chuuk State legislator and Chuukese historian), Interview, 10 December 2012.
43  Walter, Interview.
44  FSM Congress Resolution No. 17-61. It was introduced by Senator Peter Christian of Pohnpei 
to terminate the Compact by 2018.
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nationals from the (FSM) … to establish … advanced permission for 
prospective travellers from the (FSM) to enter the United States’.45 Many 
Micronesians regard Senator Inouye’s action as the branding of FSM 
citizens as terrorists.
The FSM’s response to Senator Inouye’s letter was swift and deliberate, 
with strong overtones expressing the FSM’s dismay and disgust. The new 
generation of FSM leaders like David Panuelo responded to the letter 
by expressing outrage at Inouye’s insensitivity in treating Micronesians 
as scapegoats for domestic Hawaiian problems, which could affect the 
historical relationship between the US and FSM. In his letter, Congressman 
Panuelo (and like-minded colleagues) stated that:
the U.S. can no more unilaterally create a bottleneck for FSM 
citizen’s right to freely travel and work in the United States, than 
the government of the FSM can revisit the defence provisions 
of the Compact. Aren’t the veto powers over the waters and air 
space of the FSM that the two countries agreed to in the Compact 
a security and strategic lifeline for the U.S.?46
These comments were supported by many FSM leaders and also reflected 
the sentiment of educated members of the public. For example, the 
Micronesian Seminar website received many comments from the FSM 
diaspora reminding the US that if it changed the terms of the Compact 
unilaterally to the detriment of FSM citizens, the FSM might see fit to 
terminate the US’s interests in its territorial jurisdiction.47 The political 
tension between the two congressmen may produce negative consequences, 
but it effectively demonstrated the extent to which the FSM has come of 
age and is able to deal with matters of international concern on its own 
terms. Congressman Panuelo represents a new style of leadership that puts 
the FSM first, and he sincerely articulated the Micronesian perspective 
without fear of political repercussions.48
Two resolutions introduced by the two longest serving FSM congressmen, 
Peter Christian and Dohsis Halbert, provide good examples of how the 
FSM was considering terminating the Compact. Christian’s Congressional 
45  Jaynes, ‘Senate Appropriations Committee’, p. 1.
46  David Panuelo, ‘Where Did Our Real Friends Go?’, Honolulu Civil Beat, 5 April 2012, www.civil 
beat.org/2011/08/12669-where-did-our-real-friends-go/.
47  Panuelo, ‘Where Did Our Real Friends Go?’.
48  My personal reflection based on analysis of his background. He has held many positions in the 
FSM and Pohnpei governments.
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Resolution No. 17-61 asked the FSM president to terminate the 
Compact early, in 2018 rather than 2023, while Halbert’s Congressional49 
Resolution No. 16-89 proposed granting China exclusive fishing rights 
in the FSM’s EEZ. In return, the FSM sought higher fishing fees from 
China and guaranteed that it would effectively patrol its EEZ and arrest 
ships not displaying the Chinese flag.50
China also expressed its interest in redeveloping the FSM’s fishing facilities 
and increasing its fishing activities in FSM waters through a US$30 
million soft loan and other assistance packages aimed at filling the gap in 
the FSM’s fishing capacity. As previously noted, an American company, 
Oceania, torpedoed the plan.51 The US objected to the resolutions and 
cautiously reminded the FSM about its obligations and duties under the 
Compact. The response from the FSM Congress was that the resolutions 
were economic in nature and fell outside the Compact’s denial clause, 
thereby rendering the US’s claim as being without legal effect.52 The above 
concerns have prompted the FSM to seriously reconsider its foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the Compact.
The actions of the US-dominated JEMCO have also raised questions 
about the US’s intent to continue to honour the Compact in good faith. 
Critics perceive the Compact as nothing but a vehicle for facilitating 
the recolonisation of Micronesia.53 JEMCO, which has a set majority 
of American members, dictates how Compact funds are to be used, even if 
there are objections from the Micronesian members. This was seen in the 
dispute over the spending of funds earmarked for the Chuuk education 
sector, discussed in Chapter 4.
As US financial contributions under the Compact dwindle, the FSM 
has to find ways to sustain itself. US ambassador to the Marshall Islands 
Martha Campbell noted the grim reality in 2010:
49  Jaynes, ‘Senate Appropriations Committee’, p. 1.
50  Hers, ‘US Congress Pushes for Limits on FAS Entry to the US’, April 2011, www.micronesia 
forum.org.
51  Hers, ‘US Congress Pushes’.
52  Sitan, Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 27 January 2011.
53  FSM Congress Resolution No. 17-61.
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[there is a] dangerous belief that the U.S. will extend more aid 
when the current Compact of Free Association grant package ends 
in 202354 … there is no intention on the part of anyone anywhere 
in the government of the U.S. to extend Compact funding 
past 2023.55
This stance poses two key dilemmas for the US and FSM. Will the US 
allow increased Chinese funding to replace its own diminishing funding 
in the FSM leading up to 2023 and beyond? If not, what other means 
will the US use to persuade the FSM to circumvent China’s rise in 
the Micronesian region and Oceania if it determines not to extend its 
rent for influence? These issues are increasingly germane in view of the 
FSM’s close proximity to Guam, the Northern Marianas Islands and the 
Marshall Islands, all of which host US military installations and bases.56 
The question of influence will continue to escalate before 2023 while the 
FSM is calculating its future economic interest and viability.
Managing the US and China
The FSM’s diplomatic relations with China and the US remained 
essentially bilateral and separate until 2006 when China’s foreign aid to 
the FSM increased, particularly in light of the watershed announcement 
of Chinese President Hu Jintao in Fiji in April 2006 of a dramatic increase 
in Chinese assistance to Pacific Island nations.57 President Hu announced 
a package of US$300 million in preferential loans and other aid to expand 
trade, investment and infrastructure development.58 As a result of this, 
the FSM will secure a significant increase in Chinese aid and may exhibit 
less care in undertaking actions that could be construed as antagonistic 
towards the US.
Chinese assistance has resulted in the construction of a series of 
infrastructure projects, especially public buildings, development projects 
in farming and fisheries, and a series of smaller targeted grants to assist 
54  Giff Johnson, ‘No More Compact for the RMI’, Pacific Islands Report, 5 November 2010, pidp.
eastwestcenter.org/pireport/.
55  Johnson, ‘No More Compact’.
56  Lorin Robert, Interview.
57  Olivier Wortel, ‘China Increasing Its Presence in FSM in Big and Small Ways’, Kaselehlie Press, 
7 February 2007, www.fm/news/kp/2007/feb07_3.htm. The following details on China’s aid program 
are based on Wortel’s extended interview with Ambassador Liu Fei.
58  Wortel, ‘China Increasing Its Presence in FSM’.
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local community project infrastructure.59 These projects have largely been 
based in and around the state capitals like Kolonia in Pohnpei and Weno 
in Chuuk. For example, in 2006, the use of Chinese aid money resulted 
in the construction on Pohnpei of the Western Pacific Tuna Commission 
headquarters and official residences for the nation’s president, vice 
president and speaker of congress. School buildings have been constructed 
for Kosrae State, while Yap and Chuuk states have benefitted from the 
delivery of two custom-built cargo and transport vessels for the far-flung 
islands. The Chinese are also keen to further assist each of the four state 
governments in their future infrastructure projects.60 Although Chinese 
assistance is well received by the FSM, the US remains the largest 
contributor to Micronesian development programs.61 However, China’s 
policy of political non-interference in the FSM’s governance, unlike the 
US (exemplified by JEMCO), has led to FSM leaders embracing China’s 
presence in the FSM.
China’s consultative approach in providing infrastructure as requested by 
national and state governments is a dramatic contrast to the previously 
discussed American domination of the budget and aid allocation of 
Compact monies. Chinese Ambassador Liu Fei has had a number of 
Pacific postings and earned a reputation for being sensitive to local needs 
and respectful of Micronesian aspirations as a developing nation. The 
ambassador notes that China is also a developing nation, and characterises 
her country’s aid policy as ‘very open and practical’.62 She notes that, in 
addition to providing requested infrastructure, China’s aid is aimed at 
assisting economic ties, trade and investment between China and the FSM, 
and giving people a better and more positive understanding of China.63 
The latter objective figures prominently in small-scale aid projects for 
individual institutions below the level of national and state governments, 
such as providing libraries with books on China. Another example is the 
first wave of these small-scale aid projects including new computers for 
the FSM Congress and a donation of over 200 books on Chinese subjects 
59  Weidong, Interview.
60  My personal notes on WikiLeaks Documents. China’s assistance to the FSM since the two countries 
opened diplomatic relations with one another is estimated to be over US$170 million. Compare this 
to the over US$7 billion provided by the US. See also Philippa Brandt, ‘The Geopolitics of Chinese 
Aid’, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/geopolitics-chinese-aid.
61  My personal notes on WikiLeaks Documents.
62  Wortel, ‘China Increasing Its Presence’.
63  Wortel, ‘China Increasing Its Presence’. The Chinese ambassador said the people of the FSM 
should know more about China than what is reported in the media.
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to the Pohnpei Public Library and College of Micronesia. Chinese library 
collections are available for many other educational institutions, such as 
Kosrae and Xavier high schools.64
Educational exchange programs for students and high-ranking officials 
are also an important part of China’s policy of enhancing understanding 
of its culture and intentions in the Pacific Islands, as a means to counter 
the generally negative reporting in Western media and academic analysis. 
Examples of this include collaboration between Zhejiang College in 
southern China and the College of Micronesia, including learning 
exchanges and scholarships in marine science. Chinese scholarships 
offered to FSM citizens jumped from two to three per year before 2006 
to 17 in 2006 and have continued to increase. In April 2014, Chinese 
Ambassador Zhang Lianyuen stated that ‘over 100 FSM students [were] 
granted the full government scholarship to study in China’.65 In the health 
sector, two groups of Chinese medical experts have visited FSM and 
offered precious services to local people, and ‘China will continue to offer 
its sincere assistance within its ability to help FSM achieve sustainable 
development and enhance its people’s living standards’.66
China is increasingly involved in the FSM’s agriculture and fisheries 
sectors as an aid donor, trainer and participant. China has developed 
a large pilot farm in Madolenihmw District, Pohnpei, growing a large 
variety of vegetables. A large tuna fishing fleet and operation, Luen Thai, 
from Hong Kong, is also based permanently in Pohnpei, and has plans 
to significantly increase the size of its fishing fleet.67 China also assists 
the FSM trade schools on Pohnpei by offering training in trades such 
as carpentry, plumbing, washing machine repairs and electrical repairs. 
The Chinese acknowledge the merit of developing primary industries 
that add value to locally produced foods such as noodles made from taro, 
breadfruit or banana flour, which Ambassador Liu notes are ‘healthy, 
balanced, [and] cheaper’ than imported foods.68
64  Wortel, ‘China Increasing Its Presence’.
65  Zhang Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity and Prosperity. Commemorating the 25th 
Anniversary of Diplomatic Relationship between China and FSM’, Kaselehlie Press, 6 April 2014, p. 8.
66  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, p. 8.
67  Peter Sitan (president of the FSM National Fisheries Corporation), Interview, Micronesian 
Symposium, The Australian National University, 28 April 2014.
68  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, pp. 8–9.
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China has been sensitive to American and Micronesian critics. China is 
at pains to emphasise that its aid program in the Pacific Islands is far 
smaller than those of the US, Japan and Australia. China’s aid to the 
Pacific Islands amounted to US$850 million in 2006–2011,69 compared 
to Australian aid of US$4.8 billion in the same period.70 China desires 
collaboration with other donors and denies it is ratcheting up aid in direct 
competition with other donors. Ambassador Liu emphasises that China 
sees itself as filling a supporting role to the region’s big three aid donor 
nations. She notes:
We are very keen on helping the education, private, and 
infrastructure sectors, as well as trade and investment and the 
other areas that have been outlined in the country’s Strategic 
Development Plan. We are very much the same in focusing on 
the key sectors here … we actually are on the same policy with 
the U.S. Government in this regard. … If the U.S., Australian, 
and Japanese Embassies want to work with me, I always welcome 
them.71
The Exhibition Travel Group
A new tourist project proposed by the business group Exhibition 
Travel Group (ETG) seems at odds with Ambassador Liu’s statements. 
The project is massive and has deeply divided local communities. The 
company is still negotiating with the Yap Government and landowners. 
Initially, ETG planned to build a mega-tourist resort with 10,000 hotel 
rooms and associated infrastructure, such as expanding the airport and 
constructing docks, a golf course, roads, hospitals, shopping centres and 
beaches.72 The company anticipates direct flights to the FSM and large 
profits, although tourism is a fickle market dependent on the buoyancy 
of the home economy of travellers and jet fuel prices. The ETG project 
will not compete with the nearby tourist industry of Guam and Saipan 
since it is anticipated that direct flights from China will become the norm, 
sidestepping US security checks and delays in Guam.73
69  Brandt, ‘The Geopolitics of Chinese Aid’.
70  Brandt, ‘The Geopolitics of Chinese Aid’.
71  Gonzaga Puas, ‘Micronesia and the Rise of China: Realpolitik Meets the Reef ’, Paper delivered 
to the Pacific History Association, Taiwan, 3 December 2014, pp. 20–22.
72  Rubinstein and Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap’, pp. 8–10.
73  Rubinstein and Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap’, pp. 8–10.
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However, there has been controversy about the scale of this mega 
tourism project, prompting voices of concern from within the FSM 
and the international community. Many have condemned the size and 
the impact it will have on the pristine Yap environment. A recent study 
conducted by anthropologist Donald Rubinstein and attorney Clement 
Mulalap indicated the polarisation of views in the Yapese community. 
For  example,  anti-ETG proposal citizen groups such as the state 
legislature, Yap Women’s Association and Catholic Church are at odds 
with pro-ETG proposal lobby groups such as the executive branch of 
government, the business community and certain traditional leaders.74 The 
anti-ETG forces claim that the proposal is unrealistic and unsustainable, 
while the pro-ETG forces argue in favour of the development on the 
basis of the enormous financial windfall that the project could bring 
to Yap. Rubinstein and Mulalap raised two important questions about 
ETG’s intentions. First, ‘what is China’s real purpose in building a billion-
dollar resort complex in Yap’?75 Second, why is Yap still considering the 
project in light of ETG Chairman Deng Hong being remanded in jail in 
China for alleged corruption since March 2013?76 Despite this, China’s 
government has no plan to slow down its diplomatic relations with the 
FSM, although there is no evidence that the mega-resort has any political 
motive behind it. If  the Yapese people approve the project, the FSM 
will become a tropical playground for Chinese tourists and other Asian 
nationals, as well as for tourists from the US and Europe.
It is anticipated that Micronesian scholars and professionals trained in 
Chinese higher education institutions will benefit the FSM’s future. 
An  association between the citizens of China and the FSM, the 
Micronesia–China Friendship Association, was established in early 
2011.77 Its first president was the highly esteemed Micronesian scholar 
Professor  Haglelgam. He possesses a vast wealth of knowledge on 
China due to his previous position as the second president of the FSM. 
The  association’s stated aim is to promote greater contact between the 
citizens of both countries through education and cultural programs.78 
Direct business contact between citizens is also encouraged.79
74  Rubinstein and Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap’, pp. 8–10.
75  Rubinstein and Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap’, pp. 11–12.
76  Rubinstein and Mulalap, ‘A Proposed Chinese Mega-Resort in Yap’, pp. 8–10.
77  Haglelgam, Interview.
78  Haglelgam, Interview.
79  Haglelgam, Interview.
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In 2009, the FSM and China celebrated the twentieth anniversary of their 
friendship. Chinese President Hu Jintao and FSM President Emmanuel 
Mori exchanged congratulatory notes praising the hard work of their 
countries in maintaining their ongoing friendship based on a model of 
mutual respect. President Hu indicated that China and the FSM have 
maintained ‘a good momentum of reciprocal cooperation’ that has 
‘delivered real benefits’ to both nations and ‘promoted stability’ and 
prosperity in the region.80
President Mori’s speech highlighted the ‘growing bonds’ that exist 
between the two nations and noted that the FSM is ‘looking to the 
challenges ahead’.81 The FSM will continue ‘to count on the strength of 
the partnership and friendship’ between the two countries. He further 
noted that the FSM has ‘greatly benefitted’ from the assistance provided 
by China.82 Although China is a recent actor in FSM politics, the island 
people consider China as a new addition to Micronesia’s list of diplomatic 
friends. This is part of the FSM’s diplomatic adaptation to the external 
world to assert its identity and continuity.83
On 24 March 2014, China’s ambassador to the FSM again reinforced 
China’s growing relationship with the FSM, noting:
China and FSM offer each other unfailing support in their own 
capacities and with sincerity. In the past 25 years, the bilateral 
trade volume between our two countries rose from nearly nothing 
to 15 million dollars last year.84 The pilot farm donated and 
constructed by China has successfully run for 18 years and quite 
a number of biogas generators have been set up in local farmers’ 
homes. The two cargo-passenger vessels donated by China are 
playing vital roles in Chuukese and Yapese people’s daily life. 
The  fruitful outcome of our practical cooperation can also be 
easily seen around us, like China-FSM Friendship Sports Centre 
in Pohnpei and High School Building in Kosrae. More and more 
FSM people begin to appreciate Chinese culture and see China 
as a genuine friend … China will continue to offer its sincere 
assistance within its ability to help FSM achieve sustainable 
80  ‘The FSM President Hu and President Mori Exchange Congratulation Letters to Celebrate the 
20th Anniversary of China-FSM Relations’, FSM Information Service Press Release, Palikir, Pohnpei, 
1 September 2009.
81  ‘The FSM President Hu and President Mori Exchange Congratulation Letters’.
82  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, p. 8.
83  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, p. 8.
84  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, p. 8.
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development and enhance its people’s living standards. And there 
are more exciting new projects under detailed discussion and are 
making important progress. Great potential also lies in tourism, 
infrastructure, transportation and fisheries, etc.85
Epel Illon, a former negotiator for the Compact, former secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and currently senior advisor for SBOC, 
commented on how China can deliver benefits to the FSM: ‘China can 
buy up all FSM exports overnight and that will be a great benefit to the 
FSM. Can you imagine that?’86
Is China a Threat?
China’s growing influence in the FSM has been met with optimism at the 
top level of the FSM Government. However, others continue to speculate 
that China is using the FSM as a means to develop its strategic presence 
in the region.87 China dismisses this claim, stating that its presence in 
the FSM is based on mutual respect and common interests as developing 
nations. In my interview with China’s ambassador to the FSM on 15 
July 2013, he cited the Preamble of the FSM’s Constitution as part of 
China’s foreign policy: ‘We extend to all nations what we seek from each: 
peace, friendship, cooperation, and love in our common humanity’.88 
China  shares this goal with the FSM.89 The FSM is part of the Pacific 
region—a region of competing interests between external powers—and 
so too is China because of its strategic interests. China has been unfairly 
demonised as the red dragon ready to create disequilibrium in the region.90
85  Lianyuen, ‘25 Years’ Run toward Amity’, p. 8.
86  Illon, Interview. Illon said China is economically important to the FSM. For example, China 
could buy up all the FSM’s export commodities within one hour. The FSM private sector can benefit 
immensely from China’s assistance.
87  The FSM is the only country among the Compact nations with diplomatic relations with 
China. There are suspicions and speculations regarding China’s presence and intentions in the FSM. 
In my personal communications with many FSM government officials and diplomats, many stated 
that China is not in the FSM for military purposes. Many of them support the idea of the US 
engaging with China rather than fearing it. However, many did not want to be identified as they fear 
repercussion for making comments contrary to official FSM Government policy. The two Chinese 
ambassadors I interviewed claimed that there is a strong relationship between the US and the FSM 
and that China is in the FSM for reasons other than military (e.g. for mutual diplomatic and cultural 
assistance) (Zhang, Interview; Weidong, Interview).
88  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Preamble.
89  Zhang, Interview; Weidong, Interview.
90  Terrance W. Smith, ‘China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics’, Pacific Islands Policy, 
No. 2, East-West Center, Hawai‘i, 2007, pp. 13–19.
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The FSM seeks friendship with all powers in order to develop itself and 
its interests. This principle will be tested by circumstances where friendly 
powers act in ways contrary to the FSM’s perceived interests. For example, 
the Chinese fishing vessel Ping Da 7 ran aground on Nankapenparam 
Reef in Pohnpei State in December 2013. A state of emergency was 
declared out of concern for the environmental threat to the reef and its 
marine life posed by leaking fuels and chemicals from the vessel. The 
ship’s owner, Jianghai Ping, indicated that he had no intention of taking 
full responsibility for salvaging the boat, much less collaborating in 
undertaking preventive measures against environmental harm.91 This 
kind of response will jeopardise relationships between the two nations. 
The bottom line is that it is for Micronesia to decide its own future, 
including which countries to associate or disassociate with. China and the 
US are not immune from such a decision-making process.
Conclusion
The FSM does not believe that it will sink into oblivion without Compact 
funding.92 The economic wealth of the FSM is yet to be tapped because 
of the vastness of its EEZ and lack of technology and investment. Many 
suspect that vast mineral deposits and marine resources exist in its EEZ. 
The FSM has been bleeding economically because much of its fishing 
harvest has been stolen due to illegal fishing activities or foreign fleets 
paying a mere fraction of the sale value for fishing licenses.93 Exploitation 
of and profits from the FSM’s marine resources will depend on the FSM’s 
understanding of international business practices and diplomatic relations 
within the global community.
Already, many Pacific nations are forming new regional organisations to 
protect the potential economic wealth in their EEZs, demonstrated at 
a meeting of Pacific Island leaders in the Cook Islands on 15 May 2014.94 
91  FSM Updates, ‘President Mori Declares “State of Emergency” as Ping Da 7 Post Greater 
Threat Sitting on Nan Kepkepin Param Reef in Pohnpei’, 23 January 2014, myfsm.blogspot.com.
au/2014/01/president-mori-declares-state-of.html.
92  Interviews with many FSM officials during my fieldwork in 2011–2013. They did not believe 
that the FSM would sink into oblivion without the Compact funds. The question is, how did 
Micronesians survive for centuries? Did they need the Compact?
93  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 4–5; Peter Wilson, ‘A Tuna Industry in Micronesia?’, 
Micronesian Counsellor, No. 66, April 2007, pp. 1–4.
94  Ben Chapman-Smith, ‘Income from Sea Bed Mining in Cooks Could Eclipse Tourism and 
Cook Islands has “World Class Resource” Worth “a Vast Sum”’, Cook Island News, 15 May 2014.
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Harmonising environmental laws and claiming a bigger share of profit 
from future seabed mining are top priorities for Pacific Island states. This 
emergence of big ocean nations in the Pacific to control their potential 
wealth will bring about a new perspective of the Pacific. The FSM is 
taking the same steps to exploit the potential wealth in its EEZ to become 
self-reliant and ensure its continuity.
Roger Gale has noted that Micronesia will always be in someone else’s 
strategic plan.95 This sums up why the FSM must be mindful of its history 
and identity. The FSM’s future security will depend on understanding 
how valuable it is to the outside world, and how empowered it is to engage 
in mutually respectful dialogue in the present environment of competitive 
bidding for engagement.96 Much of that value lies in the natural resources 
in its territorial seas and seabed. Yet, the greatest immediate threat to the 
FSM derives not from superpower strategic rivalry in the western Pacific 
but, rather, from the climatic consequences of the race to modernise by 
means of industrialisation and its polluting residue. Its future is threatened 
by the consequences of climate change, including increasingly frequent 
and destructive typhoons and rising sea levels, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
95  Gale, Americanization of Micronesia, p. vi.
96  Paul D’Arcy, ‘Leading by Example: Micronesians and the Sea as World’s Best Practice’, paper 
delivered at the Micronesian-Australian Friends Association (MAFA) Symposium, The Australian 





This chapter deals with climate change and its impact on Micronesia’s 
food security, health, territorial integrity and adaptation policies. Effective 
management of the impacts of climate change may be possible if future 
scenarios are modelled properly. To this end, the low-lying islands in the 
Mortlocks will be used as a case study since they are already suffering the 
consequences of rising sea levels due to climate change. Their experience 
will be extrapolated to the other low-lying islands1 in the states of Yap 
and Pohnpei and the coastal areas of Kosrae. Traditional environmental 
knowledge is being used to counter the impact of climate change, but 
is also an example of the persistence, strength and ongoing relevance of 
Micronesian ways of organising and interacting with their environments.
Micronesians derive their livelihood from the oceanic environment. 
The ocean occupies a larger space than their land. In that respect, the land 
must be integrated with the ocean in terms of managing resources to create 
balance in nature. For example, specific types of agricultural production 
must be in sync with the seasons of the year. Lerak is the season when food 
is in abundance. Breadfruits are harvested and stored away in mar pits. 
Catching fish is also easier, and they are salted and dried in the sun for 
the lean lefang season. Taro production is left to allow the taros to grow. 
When the lerak season ends, people survive on what they stored during 
1  For descriptions of low-lying islands in the FSM, see Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and 
Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 44–48; Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, pp. 12–20. For the names 
of low-lying islands in Yap and Chuuk, see D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 151–152.
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the lerak season, supplemented by taro farming. The rhythm of nature 
shapes the islanders’ environmental conservation practices. It also dictates 
the type of social activities undertaken on each island and inter-island 
events. The reliance on integrated social and environmental practices 
adopted by islanders prior to colonisation has endured to the present day. 
The Mortlockese are part of this social endurance.
The Mortlock Islands
The Mortlock Islands are situated in the southern part of Chuuk State and 
are all low-lying atolls. The distance between Weno, the capital of Chuuk, 
to the southern tip of the Mortlocks is roughly 273 kilometres (170 
miles). It takes around 12 hours by cargo ship to reach the southern end. 
The Mortlocks are divided into three subregions, the Upper, Middle and 
Lower Mortlocks. The Upper Mortlocks are near the port town of Weno 
and consist of three islands, Nama, Losap and Pis. Namoluk, Ettal, Kuttu 
and Moch islands make up the Middle Mortlocks. The islands of Satawan, 
Ta, Lekinioch and Oneop comprise the Lower Mortlocks subregion. They 
range from less than 1.6 kilometres (1 mile) to 8 kilometres (5 miles) in 
circumference.2
Their elevation is around 3–4 metres above sea level.3 Because of their 
vulnerability to sea level rise, they will be among the first to be submerged 
if climate change–induced sea level rise scenarios eventuate. Relocation 
will be the last option, but many islanders have stated that it is not an 
option for them at all. For example, during my field interviews, many 
interviewees described being unable to foresee living in a different 
environment, even if it was on another island, where their life would be 
subject to someone else’s dictates. They prefer to remain on their islands 
and die rather than subject themselves to an alien space somewhere 
beyond the horizon.4
2  Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, p. 14. Marshall’s description of the Namoluk Isles reveals 
similar features to other islands in the Mortlocks.
3  Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, p. 7.
4  Many elders from Lukunor islands said they would rather remain on the island and die 
(Notes from interviews during fieldwork in 2011–2013).
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Identity and Natural Disasters
The FSM is located on the southern edge of a typhoon belt, with typhoons 
regularly causing severe damage to the environment and threatening 
human life. Two patterns of typhoon are common in the FSM. The first 
one usually originates in the southern part of the Mortlocks region and 
slowly intensifies as it moves westward towards Yap and the Philippines. 
The other pattern is usually generated in central Yap and moves northward 
towards Guam and Japan.5 However, regardless of their origins, typhoons 
have often inflicted colossal and unforgiving injuries to humans and 
the environment in the Pacific. They have also left significant scars on 
Micronesian history.6 However, natural disasters have taught Micronesians 
to be resilient and enhanced their adaptation skills. The recent looming 
threat to Micronesia is climate change. Recent studies have indicated that 
climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of typhoons and 
tropical depressions.7 Sea level rise is also presenting new sets of challenges 
for Micronesians. Adapting to climate change as resiliently as possible 
is urgent since the prospect of Micronesians continuing without their 
islands—a source of their identity—is questionable.
Like other Micronesians, the Mortlockese are natural conservationists; 
they have a deep understanding of their fragile environment, having 
made the islands their home for many centuries. They understand that 
their environment demands constant care to conserve the islands’ natural 
resources. For them, conservation means having a holistic understanding 
of human behaviour towards the physical environment, an intricate 
knowledge of the weather system, and an ability to utilise the best available 
practices compatible with the survivability of Micronesians. Adaptation 
to climate change has once again required Micronesians to resort to their 
traditional knowledge of conservation. Current government policies at 
the national level are supporting local strategies to form the frontline of 
climate change defences.8
5  Alkire, An Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Micronesia, pp. 6–7; D’Arcy, The People 
of the Sea, p. 15.
6  Dirk H. R. Spennemenn, Melimel: The Good Friday Typhoon of 1907 and its Aftermath in the 
Mortlocks, Caroline Islands, Albury, NSW, 2007, pp. 15–18.
7  Joahnnes Berden (manager of the Weather Station in Chuuk), Interview, 21 June 2013; Local 
fishermen such as Tonio Muritock, Lewis Estep and Kauten Kandy, pers. comm. on different 
occasions in Palikir, Pohnpei; Weno, Chuuk; and Lukunor Island, 2001, 2008, 2013. All stated that 
it has been getting difficult to predict the seasons due to the changes in weather patterns.
8  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–7.
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Historically, the Mortlockese divided their atoll islands into common 
zones, from the ocean side to the middle of the lagoon or vice versa. 
The zones differ slightly from those on the volcanic islands and standalone 
islands due to differences in topography.9 An outline of the different zones 
is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Common zones in the Mortlock Islands
Name of zones Environment Activity
Lematau The deep ocean near the horizon Deep water fishing/trawling
On mong Behind the crashing waves Underwater spearfishing
Likin ounou The exposed reef system Shellfish finding
Fan ounou Where the waves crash Pole and net fishing
On alang Shellfish area Shellfish and sea crab gathering
Fan Net Beach at the ocean side Gathering plants for medicines 
and picnicking
Ilik Inland breadfruit trees Breadfruit farms
Lenunu Where tall coconuts grow Build gardens
Lepwel Taro farms Taro farming
Imor The edges of taro farms Coconut planting and gardening
Leal The lagoon side road system Inter-village road system
Roro The foreshore Small-scale gardening
Leppei The beach Leisure activities
Lemoshiset Swimming zone for children Spearfishing
Lein imwmwimw The sea grass zone Line fishing
Wenen The exposed lagoon side Path for canoe transportation
Lepweshepwesh Swimming zone for adults Spearfishing
Mesenpal The sloping part of the lagoon Underwater spearfishing
Lelol The first deep part of the 
lagoon floor
Bottom line fishing and 
turtle hunting
Lekung Invisible depth of the lagoon Deep bottom line fishing
Lenomw The centre of the lagoon Big fish trapping
Note: These zones are used as part of cultural maintenance. They can also be used to 
monitor climate change impact on the total environment in the low-lying islands.
9  This was taught to me on the atoll where I grew up. I learned from my uncles about the 
zones, their relationship within the ecosystems and the importance of knowing the zones. For fishing 
zones in the low-lying islands in Pohnpei, see Lieber, More Than a Living, pp. 51–59. For Yap, see 
Alkire, Lamotrek Atoll, pp. 19–22. For Yap Island, see Samuel T. Price, ‘The Transformation of Yap: 
Causes and Consequences of Socio-Economic Change in Micronesia’, PhD thesis, Washington State 
University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975, pp. 54, 57–60. For a general outline of the Pacific Islands, 
see D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 21–23.
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The purpose of these zones is for cultural maintenance, conservation and 
communication. The zones are vital for everyday communication between 
the residents of each island because they pinpoint space, events and time; 
that is, zones specify where people are during the day in terms of work and 
leisure activities. For example, a person may be working at the lepwel (taro 
farms) or fishing in the lenomw (lagoon centre) and remain there until 
the sun reaches the height of lenunu (tall coconut trees). Communication 
with the ancestral gods is an important part of island life as it provides vital 
information to resolve problems or predict likely future events. As Victor 
Puas, former mayor of Lekinioch Municipality alluded, ‘environmental 
zones are like our traditional library as they provide useful information 
about nature and our relationship with it’.10
Moreover, the zones are crucial environmental references to those who 
have specialised skills, for example, for sou safei (traditional doctors), sou set 
(fishermen) or sou fal waa (canoe builders) to locate the resources that 
their professions require. For example, sou safei only need to locate specific 
zones to collect the ingredients for medical remedies, or to train students 
as to what particular fauna or flora grow in each zone to treat specific 
ailments. Island priests also rely on the zones to determine which ancestral 
gods to pray to or direct their waitawa11 to when the need arises.
Islanders have developed deep knowledge of the zones and an 
understanding of the interdependency between the species in the food 
chain hierarchy. Changes in any of the zones may be a warning sign of 
a  threat to certain species, which would affect the food chain system 
or the entire environment the islanders depend on. It would therefore 
require the islanders to react quickly and implement remedies to curtail 
such a  threat. The zones provide information regarding the habitual 
behaviour of species, allowing the indigenous population to locate them 
easily.12 Likewise, knowledge of the 30 stages of the moon, such as sikauru 
or wereian anu (visible to ghosts), eling (visible to human) and meseling 
10  Victor Puas, pers. comm., 2 July 2013, Palikir, Pohnpei. See Segal, Kosrae, pp. 212–215, 218–220; 
Andrew L. Debuce, Cultural Change in Horticultural Practices on the High Island of Kosrae - Micronesia, 
University of Oregon, 1996, pp. 58–59.
11  This is according to the oral history of Lekinioch Island. Waitawa means channelling to 
communicate with the ancestors. See Peter, ‘Chuukese Travellers’, p. 264.
12  My personal experience. For zones in the volcanic islands such as Yap, see Falanruw, ‘Food 
Production and Ecosystem Management in Yap’, pp. 5–22. For zones in low-lying atolls, see Duane, 
Clan and Copra, pp. 28–33. For specific fauna and flora, see Marshall, ‘The Structure of Solidarity’, 
pp. 16–19.
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(all  can see),13 are also crucial to the ecosystem as they influence the 
behaviour of species. For example, during a full moon in the Mortlocks, 
land crabs migrate en masse to the beach to lay their eggs. The islanders 
only need to go to the beach and wait for them at midnight when the high 
tide is in to collect the crabs for food.
Certain schools of fish such as momishik (island sardines) and kish (squirrel 
fish) are caught only at certain times during lefang and lerak. Moreover, 
souset have developed a sophisticated regime in calculating when and how 
to harvest the fish. Religious rituals in the form of ngorongor (chants) 
are also part of fishing activities to lure other types of fish like angerap 
(bonitos or skip jack) close to the beach for lalo (encircled traps made 
from coconut fronds) or maaii (fish weirs). Ngorongor are chanted before, 
during and after the fishing activities to pay respect to the ancestral 
gods. Each clan has a specific system of ngorongor, which is passed down 
through the generations for the purposes of continuing the clan’s history 
and safeguarding its reputation.14
The impact of climate change on these zones has been affecting the 
livelihood of islanders over the years, with the effects becoming more 
pronounced over the past few decades. For example, saltwater incursion 
on land due to ocean surges is changing the dynamic of both the fauna 
and flora ecosystems. Islanders are devising ways to adapt to this threat 
by studying the new life dynamics in the zones. Only time will tell as 
to whether they will find new solutions to maintain the health of the 
environment, hopefully by collaborating with climate change experts 
from the international community.
Climate Change Background
Climate change is a complex phenomenon with numerous different causes 
and associated impacts varying from country to country and region to 
region.15 It is a worldwide phenomenon affecting all of humankind. It is no 
13  Kamilo Likichimus (master canoe builder and oral historian from Lukunor Island), Interview, 
Weno, Chuuk, 20 June 2013. See also Uman, Saladier and Chipen, Uruon Chuuk, pp. 359–361.
14  Being a member of an ainang is permanent and demands your total loyalty. Emotional 
attachment to one’s ainang is strong as it is tied to one’s personal identity and history.
15  Christopher B. Field, Vicente Barros, Abdrabo Mohamed A. K. et al., IPCC: Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. WGII AR5 Phase I Report Launch. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability Summary for Policymakers, 31 March 2014, pp. 4–9; Climate Institute, 
Sea Level Rise: Risk and Resilience in Coastal Cities, www.climate.org/topics/sea-level.
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longer defensible to blame natural processes as the main cause of climate 
change. Increasingly, scientists from across the  world have identified 
anthropogenic activities as a significant accelerator of  climate change.16 
A rise in sea levels is one of the consequences of climate change and has 
already affected islands and coastal regions around the globe.17
Since data collection on climates began in 1880, the temperature of 
the earth’s surface has increased, especially from the 1970s onwards. 
For example, satellite images indicate that the ice sheets in Greenland and 
Antarctica are melting faster than predicted, with an especially noticeable 
acceleration from April 2002 to February 2009.18 Such acceleration 
has been largely caused by the increasing amount of greenhouse gases 
collectively produced by industrialised economies.19
It is a slow process, but the steadily increasing volume of water in 
the ocean caused by ice melting is causing sea levels to rise. This has 
significant consequences for the low-lying islands of the Mortlocks, which 
are only 3–4 metres above sea level. Climate change is also affecting the 
dynamics of the Pacific Ocean in terms of the El Niño20 and La Niña21 
weather patterns and marine life due to the increased level of acidification.22 
It is hoped that the advanced economies will reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions sufficiently to keep the temperature rise below 2°C so as to 
slow the impact of climate change on low-lying islands in the Pacific and 
elsewhere.
A study conducted in the FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau over 
a 50-year period (1951–2010) provided convincing evidence that 
weather and environmental changes have occurred throughout most of 
the Micronesian region. For example, these islands have experienced 
16  Field et al., IPCC, pp. 4–9.
17  Field et al., IPCC, pp. 4–9.
18  Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, p. 6.
19  Gillian Cambers and Paul Diamond, Sandwatch: Adapting to Climate Change and Educating for 
Sustainable Development (revised and expanded edition), United Nations, Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, France, 2011, p. 15.
20  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, pp. 16–18.
21  D’Arcy, The People of the Sea, p. 17; Francis X. Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low Atolls’, Micronesian 
Counselor, No. 76, 2009, p. 2, www.micsem.org.
22  Radio Australia (Melbourne), ‘Fish Losing Survival Instinct Due to Climate Change: Study 
Research on PNG Reefs Says Fish Behavior Becoming Riskier’, Pacific Islands Report, 15 April 2014.
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a significant to moderate rise in temperatures and a decrease in rainfall 
over the 50-year period.23 The study is one of many confirming that the 
temperature of the earth’s surface is rising, which is causing droughts and 
sea levels to rise.
The increase in the earth’s temperature is impacting the atolls, as seen in 
the unusual sea surges witnessed by Micronesians in 2007 and 2008.24 
Sea  surges have occurred before with varying degrees of intensity, 
for example, in the 1970s25 to 1990s, but these were nowhere near as 
devastating as the events in 2007 and 2008. The 2007 and 2008 surges 
affected 50–75 per cent of the land used for food production.26
The first National Communication to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1999 noted the 
increase in:
the frequency, duration and intensity of El Niño droughts, and 
the need to enhance capacity to address El Niño and La Niña 
events. Accelerated sea level rise was identified as a concern over 
the longer-term…[other] concerns were noted as being [the] coral 
reef ecosystems, coastal zones, waste management … agriculture 
and water supply.27
23  Maria Ngemaes, Johannes Berdon et al., ‘NOAA: Republic of Palau, The Federated States 
of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands’, Paper presented in Noumea, 3–4 July 2013; 
Johannes Berdon (director of Chuuk Weather Station), Interview, Weno Island, 4 April 2015.
24  Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low Atolls’, pp. 2–3; Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management 
and Adaptive Strategies, pp. 8–9; Gaynor Dumat-ol Daleno, ‘High Seas Flood Tiny Lekinioch, 
Chuuk’, Pacific Daily News, Guam, 3 May 2007; Kauten Kandy (local fisherman), Interview, Likie, 
Pohnpei, 28 June 2013; Paulis Chol (local fisherman), Interview, Sokehs, Pohnpei, June 2012. 
Kauten and Paulis were among the many from Lekinioch who witnessed firsthand the sea surge and 
its impact on 5 March 2007.
25  I personally witnessed the sea surge in 1971 (which was not caused by a typhoon). It destroyed 
almost half of the taro farms in my village, Rewow. Other surges occurred afterward, but on a small 
scale and only affected the shoreline. Unfortunately, there are no documents about these events.
26  Susumu and Kostka, Federated States of Micronesia Food Security Assessment Report, p. 22; Fletcher 
and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, p. 9.
27  Mulalap, ‘Islands in the Stream’, pp. 382–383, 386.
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Figure 14: Puron sat (sea surge) on Lukunor Atoll in 2007.
Source: Photograph taken by Kanrina Puas.
Figure 15: Puron sat (sea surge) in Kosrae 2007.
Source: Photograph courtesy of Abraham Simpson.
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Territorial Integrity and Climate Change
Micronesia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are defined by its 
constitution and in compliance with international laws. Article 1, 
Section 1 of the FSM’s Constitution states:
The waters connecting the islands of the [Micronesian] archipelago 
are internal waters regardless of dimensions, and jurisdiction 
extends to a marine space of 200 miles measured outward from 
appropriate baselines, the seabed, subsoil, water column, insular 
or continental shelves, airspace over land and water, and any other 
territory or waters belonging to Micronesia by historic right, 
custom, or legal title.28
Yet, the FSM’s islands and surrounding waters are being slowly affected 
by climate change. Both citizens and climate change experts have noted 
the effects of climate change in Micronesia.29 The legal implications of 
submerged islands in regard to territorial sovereignty have still not been 
seriously considered.
Like colonisation, climate change can be considered a result of foreign 
state actors, particularly the industrialised nations of Japan, China, 
India, Brazil and the US. Their industries have high rates of fossil fuel 
consumption and are largely dependent on these resources. One of the 
consequences of this is the trapping of heat in the atmosphere, resulting 
in melting ice caps and ice sheets at the poles and, in turn, sea level 
rise.30 The  resulting damage has already affected many Micronesian 
communities, and they have started to adapt to this new phenomenon as 
best as they can. However, new studies need to be conducted to further 
Micronesians’ understanding of climate change in order for them to meet 
the challenges of adaptation effectively.
28  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article 1, Section 1.
29  This is my personal observation following interactions with the local people on Kosrae in 2012. 
I also interviewed people from the various low-lying islands in the FSM. See also Henry, Jeffery and 
Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, pp. 7–9, 37–38; Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low 
Atolls’, pp. 1–3; Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, pp. 8–10.
30  R. Warrick and J. Oerlemans, ‘Sea Level Rise’, in Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, 
edited by J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins and J. J. Ephraums, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, pp. 263–267.
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The FSM Government has adopted a policy that articulates survivability 
as an uncompromising priority. In its official policy statement, the 
national government stated that its role is ‘to mitigate climate change 
especially at the international level, and adaptation at the national and 
(local) levels to reduce FSM’s vulnerability to climate change’s adverse 
impacts’.31 In this context, the FSM reaffirms its right to exist as a nation 
under international law, particularly in view of the debate on sovereignty 
as a result of possible reconfiguration of island territories if some islands 
become totally submerged in the future.32
For the FSM Government, mitigation means, among other things, the 
promotion of a ‘post Kyoto carbon dioxide emission reduction that 
will maintain temperature rise as advocated by the “Tuvalu Deal”’33 
at the Copenhagen climate summit. For adaptation purposes, the 
national government has required all development activities to take 
into account new recommendations for project design34 in compliance 
with its Strategic Development Plan, use ecosystem-based approaches 
to encourage and strengthen the application of (local) knowledge and 
conservation practices, and implement strategies as soon as possible to 
improve food production.35
The Impact of Climate Change in 
the Mortlocks
The Mortlockese have already anticipated changing their agricultural 
practices and fishing techniques to adapt to the effects of climate change.36 
The islands are very small in land size and completely flat. One can stand 
31  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 1.
32  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–2.
33  The Tuvalu Deal refers to maintaining a less than 1.5°C rise in world temperature to ensure the 
survivability of the low-lying islands in the Pacific (Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–2; 
Masao Nakayama, ‘Statement before the Committee of Religious NGOs and the United Nations. 
The Last Push Before Copenhagen: Defining Positions Strategies and Goals on Climate Change’, 
New York, 10 November 2009).
34  Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, p. 17; Henry, Jeffery and 
Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, pp. 38–39.
35  Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low Atolls’, pp. 18–19, www.micsem.org/pubs/counselor/pdf/mc76.
pdf; Susumu and Kostka, Federated States of Micronesia Food Security Assessment Report, pp. 5, 27.
36  Gibson Susumu and Mark Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, Palikir, Pohnpei, 
2012, p. v.
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on the beach and survey the islands from one end to the opposite end.37 
There are no forests, only dense bushes and a few gigantic breadfruit trees 
and coconut trees. Nu (coconuts), fash (pandanus tectorius), rakish (sea oak 
tree) and a variety of waterfront bushes usually surround the beach areas 
and the shorelines, especially on the ocean side. Further inland, islanders’ 
houses are built with their usual surrounding household gardens. Swampy 
taro patches, breadfruit trees, coconut trees and thick bushes are located 
in the interior of the islands.38
The Mortlocks do not have massive agricultural lands suitable for large-
scale rice cultivation or cattle rearing (both of which produce methane), 
thus their greenhouse gas emissions are negligible. Deforestation is not 
applicable in the Mortlockese context given the lack of forests. Moreover, 
the FSM as a whole does not have large-scale factories or heavy coal-
burning industries, and cars are largely confined to district capitals. What 
the islanders are aware of is that the emissions from the aforementioned 
activities are caused by the lifestyle and activities of the ‘West’ and the 
emerging economic powers from the developing world, and that this 
affects their traditional economic and ecological systems via accelerating 
the process of climate change.39 The combined impact of the economic 
practices of the outside world on the earth’s climate is forcing the 
Mortlockese to find effective adaptation strategies to grow traditional 
crops in the face of intensified droughts and sea level rise.40
Climate change is one of the biggest threats currently facing the FSM. 
It poses severe risks to health, agriculture, water and food security, and 
political relations. It is destroying coastlines, corals, coastal fisheries, 
taro patches and breadfruit trees. If there is no significant reduction in 
greenhouse gases in the next 15 years, ‘climate models predict that low 
lying islands in the Pacific may become uninhabitable within the next 
50 years’41 or towards the turn of the century. This includes the Mortlocks 
and the low-lying islands in Yap and Pohnpei.
37  Gonzaga Puas, ‘How Could the Agricultural Sector Become More Conducive towards 
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation?’, Paper presented to CliMates International Student 
Organisation, Paris, France, April 2012, p. 5.
38  Puas, ‘How Could the Agricultural Sector’, p. 5.
39  Mulalap, ‘Islands in the Stream’, pp. 382–383, 386.
40  Local adaptation strategies are being utilised, including assistance from the national government 
(Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–3).
41  Barry Pittock, cited in Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, p. 7.
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Seawalls
In the late 1960s, seawalls were considered to be the best approach to fight 
shoreline erosion in the Mortlocks.42 However, many local elders were 
against their erection. They opposed the construction because seawalls 
required the clearing of native trees and bushes on the shorelines, which 
naturally prevent coastal erosion.43 Many seawalls fell apart within a few 
months due to changing near-shore currents, as predicted by the local 
elders. In response, government officials claimed that the seawalls were 
not installed properly. A new engineering approach was recommended 
and the seawalls again erected. After the completion of the so-called 
‘well engineered seawalls’, local people started to complain again about 
resulting changes in the seascape around the shorelines. For example, the 
usual habitats of certain schools of fish were interrupted, causing their 
migration to different parts of the islands. This caused tension between 
clans as certain fish belong to particular clans by tradition, and the 
seawalls forced fish into different shoreline zones owned by other clans.44 
This is a sensitive cultural issue, with the tension between clans caused by 
both the effects of climate change and attempts to mitigate these effects. 
This needs to be resolved to bring the communities back together.
The result of this erosion has been the shifting of some beach sand to 
different parts of the shorelines. It has also confirmed the elders’ suspicion 
about the seawalls. It was not until the late 1970s when Typhoon Pamela 
hit the Mortlock Islands that the folly of the seawalls was extensively 
revealed to the public.45 The typhoon completely destroyed the seawalls, 
and saltwater soon found its way into the taro patches, devastating 
people’s livelihoods.
42  Seawalls were built based on a model erected at the channel by the Japanese. Unfortunately, they 
were not successful in preventing shoreline erosion.
43  This is according to Ring Puas and Alfonis Buluay, who were present at the debate on seawall 
erection in 1972–1973 during a sotang (village meeting) in Relong village. See also Marshall, Namoluk 
beyond the Reef, p. 68.
44  I watched village elders debate the issue during the early 1970s. It became apparent in later years 
that the seawalls were politically motivated, and so many called seawalls the ‘political wall’. Today, 
seawalls are still required due to clearing of vegetation near the coast, but they must be carefully 
designed according to the topographical features of the coastline.
45  Typhoon Pamela destroyed many seawalls in the Mortlocks (Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, 
p. 68).
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Figure 16: Old-style seawall constructed in the 1970s on the island 
of Lukunor.
Note: This seawall, like many others in the Mortlocks, fell apart shortly after its construction 
due to various environmental factors that were not accounted for due to the elders’ lack of 
involvement in the project.
Source: Photograph courtesy of Inos Walter (2012).
Many local people suspected that the erection of the seawalls was 
politically motivated.46 It was alleged that the seawall project was part 
of several municipality capital improvement projects used to disguise 
corruption. The process of allocating funds was controlled by powerful 
political figures, with funds channelled to relatives at the local level. 
The construction of seawalls was not properly planned and lacked input 
from professional engineers.47 The overall result was that the funds 
earmarked for these walls were used for political reasons, rather than to 
properly safeguard the shorelines.48
46  I observed this public reaction and discussed it with Haglelgam during my fieldwork interviews. 
Haglelgam, Interview.
47  Saltwater was mixed with cement, gravel and sand. When the concrete dried, it took only 
a few days to crack and fall into the water. A similar experience occurred in the Solomon Islands 
according to Terry Brown, ‘Small Island States and Global Warming’, Anglican Communion News 
Service, Niagra, Canada, 5 June 2014.
48  Haglelgam, Interview; Congress of the FSM, Public Law No. 3-12, First Regular Session, 1983.
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Today, the debate over seawall construction is still dividing island 
communities.49 In my interview with Marion Henry, a traditional leader 
from the island of Oneop and national secretary of the FSM Department 
of Resources and Development, he stated that:
seawalls contradicted traditional wisdom because they interrupt 
the natural flow of ocean currents around the islands which deposit 
sand on different shores and thereby increase beach erosion rather 
than preventing it.50
He argued that native bushes and trees should have been left alone.
More people are becoming receptive to such traditional wisdom. However, 
others dispute this view and believe seawalls are still necessary, but that 
their design must be compatible with the topographical configuration of 
the islands.51 In Kosrae, for example, a new design of seawall has been 
implemented with some success. The seawall was built on a beach, with 
solid concrete blocks lined in a pattern that hugs the natural configuration 
of the local foreshore area. In my discussion with some of the locals, 
they said the seawall has prevented beach erosion and withstood big 
tides and strong storms.52 To this end, it should be up to each island to 
adopt specific designs that suit their local areas, with the support of the 
national government.
Seawall technology is a modern form of defence that could assist the 
islanders in their fight against the effects of climate change. However, 
collaborative approaches using local and outside experts are required 
for the purpose of implementing the appropriate solutions to suit local 
requirements.53
49  Elders and officers of Lukunor Municipality, Interview, Pohnpei, 26 January 2014. This is an 
ongoing debate.
50  Marion Henry (secretary of Resources and Development), Interview, Kolonia, Pohnpei, 18  July 
2013 (he is also a local samol from the Island of Oneop); Haglelgam, Interview; Congress of the FSM, 
Public Law No. 3-12, First Regular Session, 1983; Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, p. 68.
51  Personal observation of seawall in Kosrae, 22 June 2013.
52  Personal observation of seawall in Kosrae, 22 June 2013.
53  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 2.
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Figure 17: New seawall design in Kosrae to prevent beach erosion.
Source: Photograph taken by author on 23 June 2012.
Traditional Foods
The main food staples in the Mortlocks and the low-lying islands in Yap 
and Pohnpei are taro, breadfruit, coconut, banana and resources obtained 
from the sea. Farming activities involve land clearing and planting of 
traditional crops such as taro, breadfruit, coconuts, papayas and pandanus 
for consumption. Taro is available year round, while breadfruit is in 
abundance during the summer months, usually from May to September. 
Preservation of food such as mar (preserved breadfruit) is still observed 
but is practised using new methods.54
Resources from the sea are also in abundance and harvested year round. 
Meat sources are coconut and land crabs, pigs, dogs and chicken. Imported 
food products such as rice, flour, canned goods, sugar and salt are also 
54  Mar (preserved breadfruit) are now stored in big iron cooking pots called kama above the ground 
and kept in the outdoor cooking house. It is now more accessible and can be eaten anytime of the 
year rather than waiting for the lean months when it has to be dug up from the ground. See D’Arcy, 
The People of the Sea, p. 155.
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consumed alongside a traditional diet. Mortlockese employed in the port 
towns also send foreign food products to their families.55 Traditional food 
crops are constantly under threat from the impacts of climate change. 
The low-lying islanders are improvising their traditional practices to limit 
the intrusion of saltwater onto agricultural land along with new methods 
of preserving food.
Vulnerability to Climate Change
While advanced economies abroad accelerate the process of climate 
change, the Mortlockese are constantly studying ways to adapt to the 
changes in their environment. The national government has required:
all development activities … to take into account projected climatic 
changes … in compliance with its strategic development plan … 
use ecosystem based approaches, encourage and strengthen the 
application of [local] knowledge on conservation practices, and 
implement strategies to improve food production.56
The Nationwide Climate Change Policy has yet to be translated into 
specific defence strategies.
National legislation57 was adopted in February 2013 to further reinforce 
the policy. Its purpose is to provide a Nationwide Integrated Disaster 
and  Climate Change Policy, with relevant departments such as the 
Department of Resources and Development, Office of Environment and 
Emergency Management, and Department of Transportation obligated to 
implement the policy. It requires that:
every year … the President of the Federated States of Micronesia 
shall submit a report to Congress on the progress of the 
implementation of the Climate Change Policy, and recommend 
additional legislation where applicable and necessary.58
55  It is an established custom that relatives send assistance to those in trouble during natural 
disasters. See Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, pp. 26–27; Spennemann, Melimel, p. 6; Lessa, 
‘The Social Effects of Typhoon Ophelia (1960) on Ulithi’, p. 369.
56  Nationwide Climate Change Policy, 2009, p. 2.
57  Congress of the FSM, Public Law No. 18-34, Second Regular Session 2013, Palikir, Pohnpei.
58  Congress of the FSM, Public Law No. 18-34, Second Regular Session 2013, Palikir, Pohnpei.
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This illustrates the seriousness of the FSM Government’s resolve to tackle 
climate change by creating a legal framework for the nation to actively 
measure its adaptation strategies. As the policy states:
in order for the FSM to successfully achieve its objectives the 
policy requires … [the] support of all levels of governments in the 
FSM, the civil societies, the private sector, [local] communities 
and traditional leaders.59
The FSM is also seeking assistance and support regionally and 
internationally to ensure that its adaptation goals are systematically 
implemented to increase the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes. 
Geologists Charles Fletcher and Bruce Richmond suggested that adaptation 
within the FSM may be facilitated by a two-step approach of ‘forming 
international partnerships to aid adaptation efforts, and continuing 
the development of internal policies focused on building resilient and 
sustainable communities’.60 International partnerships will adhere to local 
needs based on discussions from both sides but within a domestic policy 
framework, which will lead to appropriate decisions being made, for 
example, planting more pandanus, sea oaks and mangroves around island 
shores as has been done in other Pacific Islands. Advanced technology 
seawalls should also be part of the adaptation strategies adopted, where 
appropriate. Although there are new concepts for creating floating and 
artificial islands and barrier reefs, many are too costly for the government 
to fund. Perhaps they will become a reality if the potential resources from 
the nation’s EEZ are able to be exploited.
Observations of Ecosystem Alterations 
due to Sea Level Rise
Mortlockese fish behaviourists have deep knowledge of the sea 
environment. Since the 1990s, they have noticed changes in the 
behaviour of certain kinds of fish.61 They no longer reside in specific 
habitat zones due to changes in the weather patterns that have affected 
water temperatures. Fish with a low tolerance of temperature variation 
59  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 4.
60  Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, pp. 11–12; The Nationwide 
Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 2.
61  Interviews with many fishermen from the Mortlock Islands during my fieldwork.
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such as angarap (bonitos), momoshik (island mackerels) and sarikai me til 
(anchovies) are now hard to locate. Their migratory habits have become 
difficult to predict, and islanders have difficulty catching them in schools 
using lalo (coconut fronds to trap the fish) or maii (fish weirs).62
During one of my visits to the Mortlocks in the summer of 2001, the 
fishermen informed me that the low tide no longer exposed the reefs where 
fish used to congregate in abundance. I used to join the fishermen of my 
village on the reefs, where I learned about fish behaviour. I can no longer 
predict their movements based on my past knowledge. The indigenous 
people are readjusting to the new circumstances in the sea environment.63 
For example, they are developing new observation strategies to understand 
the behaviours now exhibited by the local fish populations. I hope to learn 
this new adaptive knowledge from my villagers soon. For example, sarikai 
have moved to different depths and zones along the shorelines. Momoshik 
(owned by my father’s clan) now appear in different months, making it 
harder to pinpoint when to catch them in weirs.64
In recent years, islands in the Micronesian region have suffered serious 
damage due to wave surges, saltwater inundation and drought. Traditional 
methods are being utilised to minimise their impact, particularly saltwater 
incursion into taro farmland. An example of this is new canals being dug, 
following the land’s topography, to provide an environmentally conscious 
way to drain the saltwater out of affected taro plots.65 Constructing 
barriers to resist the flow of saltwater into gardens is another example. 
Just as in the past, Micronesians continue to adapt and seek new methods 
to prolong their survivability and continuity.
There have been a handful of studies conducted in the Mortlocks on the 
effects of sea level rise. Most of these studies noted the real vulnerability 
of beach erosion due to high tides as being an ongoing issue.66 The 
intrusion of saltwater into taro patches is also becoming a major problem. 
For example, in 2007, the Mortlocks was inundated by saltwater caused 
62  Interviews with many fishermen from the Mortlock Islands during my fieldwork.
63  Interviews with many fishermen from the Mortlock Islands during my fieldwork.
64  My personal experience. Elders from Sofa and Soumosh ainang complained about momoshik 
appearing in different places.
65  When an ocean surge hit Lukunor in 2007–2008, the youth groups dug canals to drain saltwater 
from the taro patches.
66  Inos Walter (mayor of Lukunor), Interview, February 2011 (he assessed the damage of the 
sea surge during his time as mayor); Kandy, Interview (he witnessed the event); Chol, Interview 
(he witnessed the event).
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by king tides,67 which infiltrated the taro farmland and drinking wells. 
Other crops such as bananas, papayas, pumpkins and sweet potatoes 
were destroyed.
On Lekinioch Island, more than half of the island’s taro farms were 
decimated by saltwater incursion in 2007.68 It took approximately two 
years for taro crops to regrow. Youth groups from the island were organised 
into groups to dig canals to release the saltwater from the taro patches 
and other affected areas. People survived because of the extended family 
system, which is relied on during natural disasters as it was in the past. 
Other relatives from throughout Micronesia and the new diaspora in the 
US also remit assistance to their families. The quick action by the youth 
groups prevented further destruction of the taro farms. The  islanders 
continue to observe wave patterns and signs of nature that will alert them 
to oncoming meteorological events. New adaptive strategies are being 
monitored, and the islanders must adopt new methodologies for farming 
to protect their taro farms and other agricultural land against further 
saltwater intrusion.69
Some suggested farming alternatives include hydroponics and vertical 
farming. Others have recommended the erection of hollow, soil holders 
built well above the ground.70 They can be filled with soil and perhaps 
enhanced with the use of fertilisers, allowing food crops to be grown and 
harvested year round.71 New plant species such as saltwater-resistant taro72 
have been experimented with to supplement the anticipated reduction in 
food supply. New varieties of crops that can be rotated throughout the 
year and harvested in a shorter period are also being explored.
67  Interviews with other witnesses, December 2011; Keim, Sea Level Rise Disaster in Micronesia.
68  This was told to me during interviews with many people from Lukunor, including the mayor of 
Lukunor (who assessed the damage of the sea surge) and Kauten and Paulis who witnessed the event 
(see fn. 207). See also Mark, Sea Level Rise Disaster in Micronesia.
69  Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low Atolls’, p. 18.
70  Hezel, ‘High Water in the Low Atolls’, p. 18.
71  Gibson Susumu, Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 13 July 2013.
72  The State of Kosrae, and other islands in Chuuk and Yap, are experimenting with saltwater-
resistant taros (Gibson Susumu, Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 13 July 2013).
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Recent Research on Climate Change
Research undertaken on climate change in the Mortlocks confirm what 
the islanders have already witnessed or experienced. For example, a study 
conducted by Australian academic Rosita Henry and her team on Moch 
Island found that many Mortlockese are aware of climate change. When 
the islanders were questioned about their views on the causes of the rise in 
sea level, one local person claimed, ‘to my own understanding and word 
by mouth from some people, the iceberg at the North and South Pole 
start melting and cause this sea level rise’.73
Others linked the concept of global warming to global issues and human 
activities such as pollution, airplane emissions and greenhouse gases. These 
responses are not confined to Moch Island but are widespread throughout 
the Mortlocks. Their awareness of climate change has been heightened by 
the recent installation of internet networks, by radio announcements, by 
networks of students in the diaspora and by engagement with officials at 
the national level.74 Indeed, Micronesians are placing responsibility for 
global warming on the larger economic structures of bigger nations.75
Another study conducted by Fletcher and Richmond noted that in 2007 
and 2008:
[FSM] communities were flooded by large high tides … that 
eroded beaches, damaged roads, intruded in aquifers and … and 
inundated communities. Seawater flowed into coastal wetlands 
and surged up through the water table killing taro, breadfruit, 
and other food crops. Fresh water [wells] turned brackish and 
[have not fully recovered]. Crop sites in use for generations were 
physically and chemically damaged or destroyed on approximately 
sixty percent of inhabited atoll islets. Again, food and drinking 
water were in short supply. A nationwide state of emergency was 
announced on December 30, 2008, and food security was declared 
the top priority in the nation.76
73  Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, p. 21.
74  This is based on my personal observations and interviews with Micronesians at home and abroad.
75  Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, p. 21.
76  Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies, p. 9.
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A study of the same event by Mark Keim77 on Lukunor and Oneop islands 
corroborated Fletcher and Richmond’s views. However, Keim (a medical 
doctor) went further, cautioning authorities to be mindful of the health 
issues that can arise from climate change due to water and food shortages.
The FSM Government has appointed a team of field observers to collect 
information to assist in the implementation, monitoring and reporting 
of observable impacts from storm surges, beach erosion and saltwater 
inundation in taro patches.78 The observers are also charged with 
educating locals in relation to the newly adopted national government 
policy. Fundamental to the observers’ task is to detail local knowledge 
of adaptation strategies to be integrated into the Western methods 
of research studies. For example, during my interview with one of the 
project coordinators, Gibson Susumu, he commented on how the local 
people resorted to traditional food items that were typically only eaten 
during drought.79 These strategies need to be recorded as they form the 
foundation of any first response strategy to be implemented while waiting 
for further assistance to arrive.
Food Production Strategies
The Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report authored by two FSM 
agricultural specialists, Gibson Susumu and Mark Kostka, indicated that 
agricultural production is declining due to poor soil conditions caused by 
exposure to saltwater. They stated that ‘the biggest threat to food security 
is the impact of climate change. Over forty-five atolls in the FSM continue 
to be affected by the sea level rise’.80 Taro patches are the major problem as 
local inhabitants are either abandoning them because they have become 
unproductive or waiting for rain to dilute the saltwater before re-farming 
the land (which takes considerable time to return to full production).81
The government has set up a national food security committee, the FSM 
Food Security Steering Committee, whose role is to enhance coordination 
and cooperation of food security for the nation and oversee the effective 
77  Keim, Sea Level Rise Disaster in Micronesia.
78  Susumu, Interview.
79  Susumu, Interview. Drought foods include parts of the coconut and banana trees, shrubs and 
small land and sea creatures.
80  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, p. v.
81  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, p. v.
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implementation of future initiatives.82 Again, in my interview with 
Susumu, he noted that during a trip in 2012 to the low-lying atolls in 
Chuuk, many people were close to starvation due to the failure of food 
crops affected by saltwater. He estimated that close to 70 per cent of all 
the islands he visited in Chuuk alone were affected by food insecurity, and 
safeguarding effective and consistent food production stood out as the 
main challenge for the islanders. Many of the low-lying islands in Yap and 
Pohnpei were experiencing the same difficulty.83
The FSM Government has been working hard on its adaptation policies 
for food security and environmental management, with the following 
strategies suggested to sustain food production:
• switch to different cultivars
• improve and conserve soils
• increase water supply by using groundwater and by building reservoirs 
and rain catchment areas
• improving watershed management to assist in desalination
• improve or develop water management
• alter system operating rules (e.g. pricing policies and legislation)
• improve coastal zones and marine ecosystems
• protect the environment, including via building seawalls and beach 
nourishment
• research/monitor the coastal ecosystem.84
According to Susumu and Mark, new ‘concept projects’ have been put 
to the national government to consider.85 If the government accepts the 
proposals, they will be shared with both the state and local governments. 
The concept projects include the following recommendations:
82  Australian Aid, Food Security: Securing Food Resources in the Federated States of Micronesia (Pacific 
Adaptation Strategy Assistance Program (PASAP)), Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, terranova.
org.au/repository/paccsap-collection/securing-food-resources-in-the-federated-states-of-micronesia.
83  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, pp. iii–v.
84  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, pp. iii–v.
85  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, pp. iii–v. New concepts of 
farming (e.g. the saltwater-resistant taro project in Kosrae) were also mentioned by Gibson during my 
interview with him in Palikir, Pohnpei, 13 July 2013.
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• Household food security to create awareness in the community 
about the importance of food security and the need for people to eat 
more indigenous food. This will involve the restrengthening of food 
production systems through the supply of root crops, with vegetables, 
breadfruit, coconut and fruit trees to be integrated into the agroforestry 
system.
• Integrated atoll farming system and capacity building. This will involve 
the planting of traditional food crops, home gardening, establishment 
of plant nurseries, hydroponics and hands-on technical training.
• Integrated coconut development. This project targets the rehabilitation 
and replanting of coconut trees.
• Fisheries and aqua culture to carefully assess locations suitable for the 
production of fish, seaweed, sea cucumber and other sea food resources.
• On the atolls, traditional practices such as restricting fishing activities 
on the coral reefs for a number of months or even years have been 
explored. This practice will allow further observation of the reef 
ecosystem and allow repopulation of fish stocks.
• Building of fishing weirs to farm fish in the lagoon.
• Renewed use of breadfruit ground pits (a hole dug in the ground to 
store preserved breadfruit for future consumption). Many islanders 
now use above-ground storage units in the form of large cooking pots 
to preserve breadfruit and other crops, and these are vulnerable to 
disasters such as floods and typhoons.
• Reducing family size to lessen food demands as climate change 
threatens to curtail food production.
• Use of traditional fishing canoes as these are less harmful to the marine 
environment compared to motorboats that use fuel and pollute the 
water.86
I noted other food production strategies during fieldwork in the islands 
that can be included in the above list:
• Utilising peiel (coconut fibre)87 to absorb water and constructing stone 
walls and pre-dug canals to use the land topography to deviate water 
flow. This has been done on my island, Lekinioch.88
86  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, pp. iii–v; Gibson, Interview.
87  Peiel is the fibre enclosing the copra. The fibre is separated from the copra by using a big, sharp 
stick called anget. Piles of the fibre are used to encircle crops to slow the flow of water to the crops.
88  Personal recommendation based on my experience growing up learning the traditional methods 
of environmental conservation.
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• Small family farms for growing coconut trees and land crabs. This will 
involve locating appropriate inland areas where both species can 
survive and thrive.89
• Barter. This will encourage local people to concentrate on planting 
traditional crops and reduce the importation of junk food, which is 
causing all kinds of health problems for the local population.90
• Develop marine farms for octopi and clams, as well as the reintroduction 
of traditional weirs that can be used for both the growing and catching 
of specific fish species.91
The rapidly growing body of evidence documenting the adverse impact 
of global warming on small island states has prompted the FSM 
Government to undertake an active role in the international arena to call 
on industrialised nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions.92 The FSM 
has signed international agreements related to climate change including 
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Vienna Convention and Mexico City 
Pact. It has also signed and ratified other major conventions concerning 
environmental issues.93
The FSM is also part of a subregional agreement called the Green 
Micronesia Initiative. This subregional agreement, which is spearheaded 
by the chief executives of the various regional governments in Micronesia, 
seeks to increase energy efficiency by 20 per cent, increase energy 
conservation by 20 per cent and expand renewable energy to 30 per cent 
of power generation94 by 2020.95 However, Mr Soram, the national 
government’s spokesperson for climate change, has stated that the FSM is 
not committed to the COP15 (Copenhagen). It has signed the COP16 
(Cancun) agreement but is still in the process of studying the agreement 
before implementation. As for the COP17 (Durban), the FSM is still 
89  Personal recommendation based on my experience growing up learning the traditional methods 
of environmental conservation.
90  Personal recommendation based on my experience growing up learning the traditional methods 
of environmental conservation.
91  Personal recommendation based on my experience growing up learning the traditional methods 
of environmental conservation.
92  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 2–3.
93  Jackson Soram (head of Climate Change Advisory Body to the FSM Government), Interview, 
21 January 2011.
94  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 74; Benadette H. 
Carreon, ‘Pacific Leaders Launch Green Initiative’, Marianas Variety, 11 August 2010.
95  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 74.
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considering some of the issues before committing itself fully.96 However, 
the FSM’s participation in international climate change forums cannot 
solve all its local issues.
Initiating Environmental Strategies
The FSM’s environmental strategy began in 1999 during the nation’s 
second economic summit. It called for the establishment of ‘a network 
of effective, community managed, ecologically sustainable agricultural 
practices, in order … to safeguard the nations’ precious natural heritage’.97 
This strategy was refined further in different action plans over the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. These plans include the National 
Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan (2002), Blueprint for Conserving the 
Biodiversity of the FSM (2003), state-specific Biodiversity Action Plan 
(2004), FSM Strategic Development Plan (2004–2023) and National 
Environment Sector Plan (2009).98 The biodiversity reports identified that 
the biological resources of both the nation and the states are faced with 
existential biological and anthropogenic threats.99 The development plan 
looks at strategies to optimise economic output in light of future threats 
and the scaling down of Compact funding.100 The report on the national 
environment identifies strategies that can be implemented to protect the 
nation’s environment, on which much of the country’s economic output 
relies.101 The national government is seeking funds to implement the 
recommendations of these reports. It remains to be seen how long it will 
take for implementation to occur.
In 1994, the FSM prepared a baseline assessment of its greenhouse 
emissions. It noted total emissions as expressed in CO2 equivalents were 
246.01 gigagrams per year.102 Almost all of the emissions (98 per cent) 
came from the energy sector, with only a small contribution from the 
96  Jackson Soram (deputy assistant secretary, Foreign Affairs, International Division), Interview, 
Nett, Pohnpei, 10 October 2012.
97  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 72.
98  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 72.
99  The Blueprint for Conserving the Biodiversity of the Federated States of Micronesia, 2003, pp. iii–iv.
100  The Blueprint for Conserving the Biodiversity of the Federated States of Micronesia, p. 8.
101  The Blueprint for Conserving the Biodiversity of the Federated States of Micronesia, pp. 3–5.
102  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 74.
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agricultural sector. It is important to note that these emission volumes are 
minute on the global scale. However, as a member of the international 
community, the FSM is committed to reducing its domestic emissions.
Similarly, industrialised countries need to commit themselves to reducing 
their own emissions if humanity is going to survive the impacts of climate 
change. The FSM is a supporter of the ‘Tuvalu Deal’,103 which advocates 
the reduction of emissions to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C 
to curtail sea level rise.104 Other considerations involve getting the major 
international ‘emitters’ to adhere to their suggestion to set aside funds 
for vulnerable countries in the Pacific and Indian oceans for immediate 
adaptation projects to safeguard their future.
Saving the Environment
Ensuring a sustainable environment rests on the nation’s development 
goals, which are ultimately geared towards improving adaptation 
techniques. Development, to the Mortlockese people, may be measured 
in terms of the application of local knowledge coupled with skill-based 
imported technology able to be used to enhance islanders’ adaptation 
strategies.105 For example, the main food supplies for islanders are from 
the sea and the breadfruits and taros they harvest from their land. Islanders 
have designed new methods to preserve breadfruits by putting them above 
ground in large pots instead of preserving them in underground pits to 
prevent saturation from seawater floods.
Modern technologies such as refrigerators, freezers and ice plants are also 
used to prolong the storage of fish and other perishable local foodstuffs. 
Solar panels have been introduced, especially on the low-lying islands, 
to enable the use of refrigeration technology and connection with the 
103  The Tuvalu Deal emerged during the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, where it was 
put to the member states attending that Tuvalu will be unable to maintain itself if global temperature 
rises by more than 2°C. See also Masao Nakayama, ‘Statement before the Committee of Religious 
NGOs and the United Nations’.
104  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 1.
105  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 2.
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international community through the use of computers, radios and 
televisions.106 The communication links provided by this technology have 
enhanced the islanders’ understanding of climate change issues.107
The adaptation policy published by the national government has not 
yet sufficiently filtered down to the local level to have a comprehensive 
local impact. Part of the problem is the lack of trainers to educate the local 
population on policy issues. The Mortlockese are doing the best they 
can to protect their land while waiting for further research findings and 
welcoming the knowledge of climate change scientists and international 
aid. Local communities have implemented programs based on local 
knowledge, such as the planting of native plants with big roots such as 
shia (mangroves), fash (pandanus) and rakish (sea oaks) that have the 
ability to prevent soil and beach erosion. Adaptation remains a matter of 
life and death to the Mortlockese and has higher priority than large-scale 
economic development.108
Development and Climate Change
A 2006 report titled ‘Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment 
Report’ discussed sustainable development strategies. Written by FSM 
economist and financial expert Fabian Nimea, it indicated that there is 
not a single comprehensive National Sustainable Development Strategy 
(NSDS) for the nation. However, there are disparate pieces of information 
and plans that could and need to be put together to formulate an overall 
NSDS plan. Any such NSDS should be accompanied by supporting 
mechanisms for the purpose of implementation and reinforcement.109 
This will include policy development and a legal framework. As Nimea 
noted, ‘sustainable development planning [will] … better manage 
the process [of ] development, implementation and improvement’.110 
However, missing from this report is a specific economic model that the 
106  Larry Bruton, ‘Successful Renewable Energy Projects in the FSM’, Paper presented at the 26th 
Pacific Islands Environment Conference, 22–25 June 2009, Saipan, CNMI.
107  Stephen J. Winter, ‘Water for an Island’, The FH Foundation, Long Beach, California, 1995.
108  According to a local source in the atolls, the most important thing in their lives is maintaining 
local production to sustain their livelihood as they have been doing for many centuries. However, 
imported goods are shared to supplement local diet. See also Gonzaga Puas and Anelita Puas, ‘How 
Can Development be Linked to Climate Change Adaptation Policies?’, CliMates- International 
Student Organisation, Paris, France, December 2012, pp. 4–5.
109  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, p. iii.
110  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report.
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Mortlockese can utilise to sustain their livelihood instead of perpetuating 
outsiders’ perceptions of development, which are often unsuitable for an 
island lifestyle.
Ten key objectives, ranging from establishing a comprehensive system 
of environmental law and good governance to strengthening the 
knowledge base of the local people, were key factors in formulating 
sustainable development strategies ‘that will be evolutionary, adaptable, 
and sustainable for all generations’, according to Nimea.111 Despite all the 
suggested frameworks identified in the report, the proposed NSDS fell 
short of ‘linking and integrating them with socio-economic priorities’ for 
the FSM.112
In 2009, the FSM Government produced its own Nationwide Climate 
Change Policy that incorporated the objectives of Nimea’s report. 
This policy document identified some major issues that the national 
government needed to inform its people about, such as the importance 
of combating the impacts of climate change within the framework of 
sustainable development. This policy document was compiled using 
mainly international adaptation instruments and needs input from local 
inhabitants to ensure the complementary policy of ‘act locally, think 
globally’ is enacted. Thus, the overall statement of the policy should be for 
the FSM Government to participate globally in the mitigation of climate 
change while promoting adaptation at the domestic level to ensure the 
survivability of its people into the future.113
At the international level, the FSM Government is actively involved in 
lobbying the world’s largest economies to be mindful of their practices 
that are destroying the livelihoods of Micronesians. The FSM is also 
part of the Small Island Developing States organisation and regional 
organisations such as the Pacific Forum whose purposes include 
promoting their collective interests, including the addressing of climate 
change. At the domestic level, local knowledge should be the main 
driver while new partnerships are sought with the international scientific 
community. Partnership means ensuring the preservation of natural 
heritage and natural resources in all the islands.114 It also means requiring 
all development activities to take into account ‘projected climate change 
111  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, pp. iii–iv.
112  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, pp. ii–iv.
113  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, pp. 35–36.
114  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, pp. 35–36.
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design and implementation of [the] strategic development plan, such as 
the use of eco-based approaches, and the implementation of strategies to 
sustain food production’.115
Self-Reliance
Food security presents one of the main challenges to the FSM 
Government. The Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report (authored 
by agriculturalists Susumu and Kostka in 2012) gave a snapshot of what 
the FSM may look like in the future. The authors characterised the FSM’s 
economy as aid dependent, wherein the FSM relies primarily on money 
provided by the US under the Compact and from other donor countries 
like Japan, China and Australia. The authors found that the Compact’s 
funding accounts for about 65 per cent of national government revenue 
and 75 per cent of state government revenue. The FSM economy remains 
in negative growth today.116 A shift to local thinking is required to ensure 
self-sufficiency remains an objective for the nation, especially in the 
coming years when the effects of climate change are predicted to become 
more severe.
Additionally, construction methods for public buildings and private 
dwellings need to incorporate changes in the local environment, such as 
variations in temperature and topography caused by climate change.117 
The best possible design for these buildings is one that uses local knowledge 
and materials, in addition to weather-resistant imported materials and 
engineering models from the global community. For example, shoon 
fash (pandanus leaves), shoon nu (coconut leaves), sopon mei (breadfruit 
trunks), sopon nu (coconut trunks), shia (mangrove), mosor and shokis118 
are best suited to the island environment. They can withstand the tropical 
weather longer than materials imported from China or Japan, for example. 
Moreover, local products are cheaper than the inflated prices charged for 
115  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 3.
116  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, p. 3.
117  Islanders also need to observe temperatures caused by climate change to give them ideas about 
their fishing activities (Walter, Interview).
118  Shokis is a very strong tree that is grown in saltwater on the shoreline. Its branches, which can 
last for many years, are used in traditional house construction, especially for pillars, and for fish traps.
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imported materials. Local knowledge should be incorporated into high 
school or post-secondary trade qualifications to encourage sustainable 
building practices.
Sustaining the Seas and Agriculture
The fishing industry has been targeted as part of the FSM’s self-sufficiency 
blueprint for survival in the future. The FSM’s EEZ is about 2.9 million 
square kilometres and considered one of the most productive tuna fishing 
areas in the world. It is estimated that the FSM is capable of sustaining a 
yield of well over 100,000 tons annually; however, it lacks the capabilities 
to exploit this potential.119 Its fishing zone benefits outside countries 
like Japan, Korea and Taiwan who pay a fishing license fee to the FSM 
Government that is less than 10 per cent of the sale value of the fish 
caught. Aquaculture has the potential to be a productive industry, and 
the government is exploring this option. Aquaculture and marine farming 
trials have commenced in Pohnpei but require skilled workers to maintain 
them. The National Fishing Corporation is also involved in a joint venture 
to maximise the EEZ’s potential. Already, there has been an increase in the 
National Fisheries Corporation’s profit.120
Local agricultural production for domestic consumption is another 
priority for food security and self-reliance. However, the budget set 
aside to encourage local people to engage in agricultural programs has 
been disappointing. For example, Susumu and Kostka noted that in 
‘2004 to 2005 only 1.8 per cent of the national budget (the budget was 
US$63 million in total)121 was set aside for agriculture’.122 Many argued 
that the locals’ lack of interest in engaging in agricultural activities 
stemmed from the following. First, the younger generation considers 
agriculture to be a ‘dirty’ business, and so it is not a priority for them. 
They prefer to engage in white-collar employment where the pay is higher 
than other local options. Second, agriculture is not widely promoted in 
the educational curriculum. Third, the younger generation does not see 
119  Peter Sitan, pers. comm., Micronesian Australian Friends Association Research Symposium, The 
Australian National University, 29 April 2014. Peter Sitan is the president and chief executive officer 
of the National (FSM) Fishing Corporation. The shortcomings in the FSM’s capacity to maximise its 
fishing potential is also discussed by D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–5.
120  Sitan, ‘The Development of the Tuna Fisheries’.
121  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, p. 5.
122  Susumu and Kostka, Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Report, p. 3.
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the need to enlarge the scope of agricultural activities as they consider it 
to be for local consumption only, rather than for commercial sale to attain 
large profits.123
With the onslaught of climate change, the attitudes of many in the 
younger generation is that, if the soil cannot be saved from erosion 
and the impact of sea level rise, what is the point of agriculture if it is 
a doomed enterprise? Why concentrate on agriculture if many people will 
likely be leaving their homes in the future due to climate change? There is 
an urgent need for education about options for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation for young Micronesians so they do not abandon hope.124
Policy Formulation
The mobilisation of government field officers to collect data to provide an 
overall picture of the impacts of climate change on the nation is ongoing. 
Evidence suggests that there is a heightened awareness shared by islanders 
in relation to soil erosion and sea level rise, most notably regarding the 
intrusion of saltwater onto farmland.125 Some islanders have expressed 
anxiety in relation to the gloomy predictions about their possible 
relocation, which seems to become more certain as the years go by. There 
are already people moving to join their relatives on the volcanic islands. 
However, others, determined to ‘keep up the battle’ to ensure that future 
generations will have homelands where the ancestral ways are preserved, 
have accepted the risks of climate change.126
To complement its climate change adaptation policy, the FSM 
Government produced yet another document in 2010, the ‘Millennium 
Development Goals and Status Report’. This report was in response to 
the UN’s eight Millennium Development Goals, alternatively known 
as the  ‘Millennium Declaration’, which was supposed to be finalised 
123  Susumu, Interview.
124  Marcus Samo (deputy secretary of the FSM Department of Health and Social Affairs and 
Chuukese Historian), Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 21 June 2013.
125  Susumu, Wichep and Silbanuz, Preliminary Damage Assessment, pp. 14–16. For further 
assessment and discussion, see Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies; 
Henry, Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia, pp. 5–15; Hezel, ‘High Water in 
the Low Atolls’.
126  Interviews with Mortlockese people during field research in Pohnpei, 5–12 January 2011.
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in 2015.127 In 2003, the FSM completed a 20-year Strategic Development 
Plan that reflected the input of over 400 participants, representing a broad 
range of perspectives including government, traditional leaders, industry 
and civil society.128 The report identified priorities for the promotion of 
sustainable development objectives.
The objectives included good governance, coordinated nationwide 
sustainable economic development with inputs from grassroots 
organisations and state governments, encouragement of a private sector–
led economy, development of technical know-how by merging traditional 
and outside knowledge, investment in relevant infrastructure to combat 
the adverse effects of climate change, and implementation of long-term 
environmental protection and sustainability. The report declared that 
the link between the Millennium Development Goals and the Strategic 
Development Plan could be achieved by a coordinated approach between 
the national and state departments, offices and agencies, the private sector, 
NGOs and civil society organisations.129
While the report identified the areas of development priorities for 
the nation, it remains to be seen how this will translate into concrete 
action. Take, for example, goal number seven. Its objective is to ‘ensure 
environmental sustainability to integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into … policies and programs; reverse loss of environmental 
resources by 2015’.130 To achieve this objective by 2015 was unrealistic as 
the FSM Government did not have the capacity to implement it. Perhaps 
it should be left to each country to set its own implementation deadlines. 
Alternatively, the FSM should not be obliged to implement a UN goal that 
is outside its capacity. There are inherent flaws in the FSM Government’s 
policies as it is paying too much attention to dictates from the outside. 
The  report is therefore a symbolic statement that does not reflect the 
realities of Micronesian modes of production, their environment and their 
social system.131 These are the backbone of their identity and continuity.
127  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, pp. 8–9.
128  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 7.
129  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 2.
130  Office of Statistics, Budget and Economic Management, Overseas Development Assistance and 
Compact Management, Millennium Development Goals and Status Report 2010, p. 72.
131  See Rich Harris and Clare Provost, ‘The Millennium Development Goals: Big Ideas, Broken 
Promises?’, The Guardian, 24 September 2013.
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Resiliency and Local Communities
The FSM must continuously explore its economic potential in terms 
of its  own resources to deliver important services to its people.132 
The national government advocates for the introduction of all development 
activities that take into account projected climate change design and 
implementation of its Strategic Development Plan, such as the use of 
eco-based approaches and strategies to improve local food production, 
as being fundamental to the nation’s adaptation policy.133 Adaptation 
is therefore about the maintenance and preservation of Micronesian 
cultures through locally based education and combined efforts with 
outside agencies as a model of preserving the history of Micronesia, 
which continues to be threatened by the impact of climate change.
Capacity building and training involves developing a coordinated system 
of educational and instructional programs in order for the FSM to be able 
to respond to the impact of climate change issues as they arise. The first 
priority is to implement local knowledge as a first line of defence.134 In order 
to deliver effective programs, the national government has teamed up with 
its state counterparts in designing and developing strategies to ensure that 
people at the grassroots level are aware of new information about climate 
change. Human resources for the purpose of collection and analysis of 
data for enhancing adaptation policies are already in place but require 
more personnel. Of course, many foreign governments and institutions 
are present in the FSM, but they are there to assist in the implementation 
of policy practices and community-based climate change projects initiated 
locally, rather than being the main drivers of the initiatives.135
Adaptation and Island Development
The Mortlockese people have adapted to their local environment and 
utilised local knowledge to provide for their needs for centuries.136 When 
one speaks about development in the Mortlock Islands, the islanders 
132  Nimea, Federated States of Micronesia: National Assessment Report, pp. 1–10.
133  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, p. 2; Susumu, Wichep and Silbanuz, Preliminary 
Damage Assessment, pp. 15–16.
134  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–3.
135  Nationwide Climate Change Policy 2009, pp. 1–3.
136  Mortlocks Oral History; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 3–5.
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often react by asking, ‘development for who?’ Such a reaction reflects 
the long history of colonialism in the FSM and Mortlockese suspicion 
of outsiders’ influence in their attempts to reshape the region according 
to foreign plans or models. The Mortlockese are always aware of their 
economic circumstances due to the limited modern technology they have. 
Further, the Mortlockese consider that developing their islands should be 
done according to how locals envisage their island, and at their own pace.
The interconnection between extended families, which has been in place 
for many centuries, acts as a safety net for islanders’ ongoing survival. 
It maintains the fabric of the islands’ social wealth, which feeds into the 
larger economic system.137 Today, this infrastructure continues to be at 
the heart of the islanders’ continuity. The extended family model has 
increased its connection globally by virtue of the new diaspora under the 
Compact. Islanders continue to adapt to an increasingly globalised world 
to ensure the survival of future Mortlocks generations.138
Micronesians understand the benefits that derive from retaining their 
connections within the diaspora. They also understand the benefits that 
can derived from engaging experts from a variety of international channels 
in designing a unique, locally based economy for the proper conservation 
of their environment in anticipation of climate change challenges. The 
education curriculum should also play its part in teaching the younger 
generation about local knowledge so that they can appreciate their 
environment and transmit both traditional skills and relevant modern 
skills from the outside world to the next generation.
Adaptation is a priority not just for the Mortlockese but throughout 
the  FSM and the Pacific Islands. Individual scientists and groups are 
partnering with community-based groups in the FSM to collaborate on 
the best options to fight the impacts of climate change. The Nationwide 
Climate Change Policy’s overall objective is to harness all traditional 
practices from all low-lying and volcanic islands to form the basis of 
a  Micronesian ‘first line of defence’ against the encroaching sea level 
rise. Field officers are monitoring environmental changes and educating 
islanders from low-lying atolls. In Pohnpei, for example, the island of 
Pakin has recently planted pandanus trees on its shorelines, borrowing 
137  Mortlocks Oral History; Petersen, Traditional Micronesian Societies, pp. 3–5.
138  For discussion on Micronesian global movement, see Marshall, Namoluk beyond the Reef, 
pp. 113–130.
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the idea from Mokil and Pingelap islands. Likewise, many islands are 
circulating new ideas regarding the idea of creating a first line of defence 
by utilising new engineering projects like the seawall in Kosrae and above-
ground farming in Yap. Islanders will continue to adapt as they always 
have done.
Conclusion
Climate change issues are the responsibility of the three branches of 
government in the FSM. However, each level of government works 
within its own jurisdiction, as defined by the nation’s constitution. 
The president, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Resources 
and Development, and Office of the Environment and Emergency 
Management are working together with their state counterparts and 
historical preservation offices.
Climate change adaptation ranks as one of the top priorities of the nation, 
and newly introduced laws have been enacted to support government 
policies that address this issue. National government officials have been 
conducting field studies and engaging in discussions with the populations 
of all the islands, where there is strong support for implementing climate 
change adaptation strategies.139 The FSM’s climate change policy is 
evolving to meet the challenges of its changing environment, although 
obstacles remain. These include a lack of human resources development, 
infrastructure building capacity and funding.140 However, at least the 
people of the FSM understand that their government is trying as best 
as it can to link the issues of development with its climate change 
adaptation policy. In the Mortlocks region, economic development 
emphasised sustainability practices and discouraged reliance on foreign 
assistance (except in the use of new technologies) to fight the effects 
of climate change.
Sea level rise is not only affecting the islands’ fragile arable land but is also 
disturbing fishing activities. Beach erosion and intense sea currents are 
interrupting the flow of nutrients to feeding grounds. Oral testimonies 
from fishing communities have indicated that many species of fish are 
migrating to different parts of the shorelines or lagoon. Schools of fish 
139  Susumu, Interview.
140  Susumu, Interview.
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such as sarikai, umulo and iketor that were once found in the shallow 
water have disappeared and it is not clear whether they will return to their 
original habitats, especially with the changes in the shoreline zones due to 
climate change.141
From the 1970s to the mid-2000s, the Lower Mortlocks were hit by 
unusual tides.142 Locals have observed the increase of saltwater inundation 
in food crops as a result of king tides. Due to the volume of saltwater, it 
remains on the farms for many weeks. Luknunor Islanders have had to dig 
new canals to drain the saltwater. They have even caught fish in the taro 
swamps, and it was also claimed that they encountered new fish species 
never before seen by locals.
This is a grim reminder of what the islands will experience in the future 
without effective adaptation strategies developed in conjunction with 
the international community. Micronesians’ first priority is to maintain 
self-sufficiency to ensure continuity. The land and the surrounding seas 
sustain Micronesians’ livelihoods. They must be prepared to face this 
challenge as a priority in order to continue as a people with a distinct 
history in a unique place where past generations lie buried. The future is 
unpredictable and challenging, but Micronesians have overcome climate-
related obstacles in the past. How Micronesians might best face this 
uncertain future is the topic of the next chapter.
141  This observation stems from my personal experience growing up on Lukunor, listening to local 
fishermen discuss issues about fishing.
142  Kandy, Interview; Chol, Interview. My interviews with many Mortlockese confirmed the 







This chapter deals with the challenges currently facing the FSM. 
The main obstacles include the reduction in funding from the Compact 
of Free Association, climate change, promoting economic development 
to increase the sources of funding, education, health, the Constitution, 
foreign relations, customs and traditions, the EEZ and leadership issues. 
I will discuss these challenges within the context of how Micronesians 
have previously dealt with and are continuing to respond to these issues, 
including what sort of self-reliant practices and external assistance the 
FSM requires to overcome these challenges. Should there be a particular 
timeframe to address these challenges in light of the imminent end 
to  Compact funds post 2023? Is the ainang system strong enough to 
withstand the increasing impact of the globalised world?
Compact of Association or 
Disassociation?
The FSM is going through an intense economic and political transition 
in preparation for the reduction of Compact funds post 2023. Since 
the implementation of the Compact in 1986, the US has provided over 
US$2 billion dollars to the FSM Government in return for granting the 
US power to deny access to the islands to third parties, ostensibly to 
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preserve regional security but, in reality, a strategic denial to potential 
enemies of US national interests.1 The scaling down of American financial 
assistance to the FSM may open up opportunities for other regional 
powers to extend their influence in the region. A trust fund was set up for 
the FSM under the Compact, supposedly to replace Compact funds after 
2023. However, it is uncertain whether the proceeds from the trust fund 
will be enough to sustain the FSM.2 There is speculation that China is 
likely to pay more attention to the FSM post 2023 due to its own interests 
in the region. As was noted in previous chapters, China has been assisting 
the FSM in many areas such as the building of infrastructure, educational 
scholarships, training for FSM citizens to learn the Chinese language and 
social system, concessional loans and small-scale grants for community 
development.3 For the FSM, the key concern will be preserving and 
extending its autonomy in these circumstances. The Compact has been 
the major source of the FSM Government’s income since 1986. It is often 
referred to as being a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is seen 
as a saviour in that it prevents the FSM from bleeding to death from 
economic collapse; however, on the other hand, it is seen as handicapping 
the FSM’s progress both internationally and domestically by creating 
dependency on Compact monies. Despite this, Micronesians are aware of 
the fact that reliance on someone else’s money is not economically viable 
in the long term. The nation is embarking on a balancing act to ensure its 
future economic survival.4
The supporters of the amended Compact (2004) have welcomed US 
oversight of the distribution of funds, with the hope that this will stop 
the misspending of funds earmarked for essential sectors such as the 
private sector, education, health and public infrastructure.5 JEMCO has 
conducted audits of the Compact funds and, on occasion, withheld certain 
1  Since WWII, US interest in the FSM has always been of strategic military interest. The Compact 
was negotiated in relation to such an interest. See Compact of Free Association between the Federated 
States of Micronesia and The United States of America, pp. 93–101.
2  It is predicted that there will be a shortfall of the trust fund by 2023. This has put stress on 
the leaders of the nation, which prompted Chuuk to seek independence in order to handle its own 
financial affairs. See President Mori, State of the Nation Address, 18 May 2012, p. 8.
3  Weidong, Interview.
4  Debate on the Compact and whether it has been beneficial is an ongoing issue. Epel Illon 
(advisor to the president of the FSM), Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei, 13 January 2011; Lorin Robert 
(secretary of Foreign Affairs), Interview, 7 January 2011.
5  See Debate on the Compact on Micronesia Forum under the heading ‘The Compat is a Done 




funds, pending their satisfaction that the necessary checks and balances 
have been put in place by the FSM Government. With this new auditing 
measure, both sides are studying their next move before the year 2023. 
It remains uncertain as to whether the Compact will be renegotiated/
extended for a third time.
Optimists perceive the Compact as a means of maintaining the important 
connection between the US and FSM. They feel the FSM should not 
‘cut its nose off to spite its face’ even though the US has been unwilling 
to compromise on many occasions. The Compact, they argue, is a safety 
net as it has provided the financial means to enable the building of the 
nation’s political and economic capacity.6 The US’s presence in the FSM 
has brought stability to the nation and regional security. Moreover, 
it has allowed Micronesians to live, work and seek education in 
America—a good opportunity to release the population pressure through 
emigration, an additional benefit of which has been remittances.7
The FSM is weighing its options and ability to tap into alternative sources 
of funding to replace the Compact funds. Many observers have predicted 
that the FSM is heading towards economic hardship in the years ahead, 
with a reduced living standard compared to that currently enjoyed under 
the Compact. Many Micronesians I interviewed over a two-year period 
(2011–2013) expressed concerns as to what will happen after 2023. Some 
want to revert back to traditional subsistence using the sea and land from 
which they have been sustained historically. Others have expressed the 
desire to look for employment overseas or to join their families who have 
already established themselves in the US.8 The challenge is whether the 
FSM will survive politically without economic assistance from the US.
Facing Climate Change
The leading threats that arise from climate change are coastal erosion, 
freshwater pollution, crop destruction due to salination and sea level 
rise. Micronesians’ ability to sustain environmental resources for future 
generations depends on careful stewardship that reinvigorates traditional 
6  Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, pp. 5–6.
7  Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, pp. 5–6.
8  Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, pp. 5–6; Elizabeth Grieco, The Federated 
States of Micronesia: The ‘Push’ to Migrate, Migration Policy Institute, 1 July 2003, www.migration 
policy.org/article/federated-states-micronesia-push-migrate.
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conservation practices and merges these with modern scientific principles. 
Most of the islands in the FSM are low lying. A further rise of 2 metres 
in the sea level would overwhelm the islands and require the relocation of 
the inhabitants. The Tuvalu Deal9 is seen as a lifesaver for islanders if it is 
adopted by the major international polluters.
Climate change is an ongoing challenge for the FSM. As was detailed 
in the previous chapter, this new threat is already affecting the nation, 
especially those on the low-lying atolls. For example, strong storms, 
typhoons, sea surges and droughts have become more frequent and 
intense. From the 1960s to 1990s,10 these events have been of concern 
but remained on the  margins of political debate, the reason being 
that climate change was not well understood by a large number of 
Micronesians, especially at the local level. Information about climate 
change has largely only been accessible to the few government officials 
who attended overseas conferences in relation to the issue. Until recently, 
there were no major studies undertaken on climate change events in the 
FSM. The only relevant information provided to the public were the daily 
reports regarding weather forecasts.
The atolls in the FSM are far from the major port towns, and there 
has been  no face-to-face education programs provided to the atoll 
communities  to enable them to better understand the issues relating 
to climate change. For example, when I was teaching at the College of 
Micronesia in the late 1990s, the Mortlockese were complaining about 
serious foreshore erosion, especially on the ocean side of the lagoons. 
A  team of assessors was dispatched to the Mortlocks but could not 
stay long enough to conduct in-depth studies, as the only means of 
transportation available, the inter-island ship, had to be shared by the 
many outer islands. This inevitably resulted in short and infrequent visits, 
as this transport was routinely subject to change.
Many Mortlockese have heard about climate change but do not understand 
the process fully, such as the causes of the extreme sea surges, although they 
may see the effects. What they know is that they are witnessing unusual 
changes in their environment. For example, weather patterns are not as 
predictable as they have been in the past. Summer months have come late 
9  See fn. 33.
10  Mortlocks Oral History and personal experience. Transportation between Weno, the capital, and 
the outer islands was infrequent and, as such, studies were not properly conducted.
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or too early. This has affected the pattern of their fishing activities and the 
cultivation of crops. They have also observed that breadfruit trees (one of 
the main staple crops) are producing fewer fruits. The Mortlocks region is 
not an isolated case as these experiences are shared with its neighbouring 
islands and other parts of Chuuk and the atolls in Pohnpei and Yap.
There have also been changes on the volcanic islands, though with less 
impact due to the elevation of the islands. The FSM Government is 
slowly developing policies to engage the public about how to respond to 
climate change. The policies are ad hoc owing to the lack of local expertise 
in the field, and the national government is still amassing resources to 
deal with the effects of climate change. From the mid-2000s onwards, 
major studies began to appear detailing the causes of the sea surges and 
the changes in the seasonal cycle impacting the outer islands in Pohnpei, 
Chuuk and Kosrae.11 Today, many local and national organisations have 
been established for the purpose of educating the public about this threat 
and monitoring the progress of climate change in the FSM. Historical 
knowledge is also integrated into these educational programs, such as 
traditional food storage, building materials and methods of protecting 
shorelines from saltwater incursion.
Education and Health
Education and health are major challenges, particularly in terms of non-
communicable diseases. The national government is mindful about 
its responsibilities and obligations to provide quality education and 
health services to its citizens. This follows the constitutional mandate 
of Article XIII, Section 1:
the national government of the Federated States of Micronesia 
recognizes the right of the people to education, health care, and 
legal services and shall take every step reasonable and necessary to 
provide these services.12
11  Some reports are Fletcher and Richmond, Climate Management and Adaptive Strategies; Henry, 
Jeffery and Pam, Heritage and Climate Change in Micronesia; Susumu and Kostka, Federated States 
of Micronesia Food Security; Keim, Sea Level Rise Disaster in Micronesia.
12  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XIII, Section 1.
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According to the FSM Government, there have been improvements 
in these two areas. For example, total youth literacy was at 95 per cent 
according to a report in 2000.13 However, the relevance of the type of 
education offered to young people remains to be seen. For example, is 
education targeting the development of individuals to be good citizens 
or the acquisition of skills and knowledge for the competitive job market 
both at home and overseas? The College of Micronesia has dealt with 
this issue and offered both academic degrees and vocational certificates.14 
Many students have attained qualifications and either moved to the US 
to find work (where the wages are more attractive) or continued their 
education. Many have followed their families to start their high school 
years in the US and continued on to American colleges.15 Those who 
choose to remain in the FSM seek employment in the domestic market 
and continue to live a more traditional lifestyle. Therefore, the challenge 
is for educators to implement the best practices in education for the 
nation’s future.
A report entitled Health Progress Report: 2008–2011, authored by 
Assistant Secretary of the FSM Department of Health and Social Affairs 
Marcus Samo, indicated a marked improvement in the department’s 
capacity to collect and analyse data for the purposes of monitoring and 
responding to emerging health issues over the three-year period under 
review.16 The report further acknowledged an increase in the availability 
of medical, pharmaceutical and biomedical assistance to the hospitals in 
the FSM.17 An increase in funding was also noted as essential for the 
department’s achievements. It should be noted that there is a need to 
improve the health of the population, especially in the areas of non-
communicable diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and lung cancer, 
which require special equipment.18 It must also be remembered that 
13  SBOC, www.sboc.fm/ (site discontinued).
14  My personal knowledge as the program coordinator and curriculum designer at the College of 
Micronesia, Pohnpei Campus in 1998–2001. See also Henry H. Kellam, Social Sector: Education, Part 
I: Education: Background Analysis: Understanding the Educational System in the FSM, September 2001, 
pp. 10–12.
15  My personal knowledge as the program coordinator and curriculum designer at the College 
of Micronesia, Pohnpei Campus in 1998–2001. See also Kellam, Social Sector: Education, Part I, 
pp. 10–12.
16  Marcus Samo, Health Progress Report: 2008–2011, Palikir, Pohnpei, 1 January 2012; Gonzaga 
Puas, Review of the Current Health Protection Practises in the FSM: Law, Regulation and Policy Regimes, 
Palikir, Pohnpei, 30 July 2013.
17  Samo, Health Progress Report, pp. 32–33.
18  Samo, Health Progress Report, pp. 32–33.
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a healthy nation depends heavily on the enhancement and enforcement 
of its laws, policies and regulatory regimes governing the delivery and 
maintenance of both its social and health protection programs. Health 
and education responsibilities are shared between the states and the 
national government. They are thriving on the philosophy that a healthy 
nation depends on the quality of social services and the education of 
the population. Traditional lifestyles and diets can significantly reduce 
these non-communicable diseases. New programs aimed at educating 
the population on the benefits of local foods are in progress.19 However, 
ongoing success depends on local attitudes as Western foods are seen 
as a  sign of prosperity and monetary wealth. This is a big challenge in 
the areas of education and health at the grassroots level.
Foreign Relations
Foreign relations is one of the key indicators of FSM’s success as it will 
define the extent to which Micronesia interacts with the outside world and 
the benefits that flow from such interactions. For example, opportunities 
for capacity building provided by other governments, particularly in 
the areas of technology and economic development assistance, need to 
be maintained. However, Micronesia will only deepen its relations with 
countries empathetic to Micronesian causes such as the impact of climate 
change on the islands, respect for the FSM’s EEZ and airspace, and 
a commitment to the principle of non-interference in the FSM’s internal 
political affairs.
At this stage, there are still some outstanding legal issues that need to be 
resolved before the FSM can conduct itself effectively and independently 
on the international scene. The ongoing debate between US and FSM 
leaders over the issue of the security of the US in the Asia-Pacific region 
under the terms of the Compact will remain a challenge.20 However, 
it needs to be noted that in recent years, the primacy of the FSM’s 
Constitution over the Compact has not been fully articulated by FSM 
officials when the Compact is at issue. Further, the FSM Congress at times 
usurps the function of the executive branch in terms of foreign relations. 
For example, Congress was involved in the renegotiation of the Compact, 
19  Island Community Food Community of Pohnpei, Let’s Go Local: Culture, Health, Environment, 
Economy and Food Security, Koloia, Pohnpei, 2013, www.Islandfood.org/index.html.
20  Naich, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, pp. 1–6.
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which was seen as a responsibility of the executive branch. The function 
of the executive branch is expressed in Article X, Section 2(a) and (b), 
which stipulate that the president is assigned ‘to faithfully execute and 
implement the provisions of [the] Constitution and all national laws’ 
and  ‘to conduct foreign affairs and the national defense in accordance 
with national law’.21
Conversely, it has been argued that the above sections contradict 
provisions of the Compact. For example, Article II, Section 123(a) of the 
Compact states:
in recognition of the authority and responsibility of the 
Government of the United States under Title Three [Defense and 
Security Relations], the Government of … the Federated States of 
Micronesia shall consult, in the conduct of their foreign affairs, 
with the Government of the United States.22
Section 123(a) is being used by the US to assert its right to veto decisions 
by the FSM Government in relation to the conduct of its foreign affairs if 
the decisions are not seen to be in the interests of the US. This is an area 
of significant debate and tension between the two governments.
The Constitution states that a:
treaty is ratified by vote of 2/3 of the members of Congress, 
except that a treaty delegating major powers of government of the 
Federated States of Micronesia to another government shall also 
require majority approval by the legislatures of 2/3 of the states.23
The Compact is a treaty delegating major authority over the FSM’s 
defence to another country, the US, which has been permitted under the 
Constitution. It is within this legal context that the US asserts the primacy 
of the Compact over the Constitution and, in particular, the US’s right to 
veto decisions by the FSM Government in relation to third parties that 
are perceived to threaten US security. However, one can argue that the US 
cannot blindly rely on the Compact to pursue its objectives at the expense 
of Micronesian sovereignty and national interests. This is because the 
Constitution can limit the power of the Compact if the Compact exceeds 
21  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
22  Refer to the original Compact of Free Association between The Federated States of Micronesia and the 
United States of America, uscompact.org/files/index.php?dir=FSM%20Publications%2FCompact%20
Documents.
23  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 4.
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the power bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Should there be a need 
to terminate the Compact, Article XIV, Section 1 maybe invoked.24 
The  FSM Foreign Affairs Department will have to monitor its duties 
under the Constitution and escalate issues when any violation arises to 
ensure Micronesians stand firm on the issue of sovereignty. Micronesia’s 
image in the international community will be judged on how it conducts 
itself based on self-respect and respect of others.
The EEZ
The FSM’s EEZ remains the biggest single hope for the nation’s future, 
particularly at the end of Compact funding in 2023. The EEZ covers an 
area of 2,978,000 square kilometres.25 It has significant wealth in marine 
biota and likely mineral resources under and on its seabed. In 2007, Peter 
Wilson, a fisheries expert whose consultancy work includes work for the 
governments of Papua New Guinea and the former TTPI, conducted 
a study of the tuna industry worldwide. He estimated that approximately 
60 per cent of the total tuna harvest in the world comes from the western 
Pacific nation states of Palau, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.26 The FSM contributes 28 per cent 
of this harvest. Wilson noted that the main beneficiaries of the fishery 
harvests were Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, the US and South Korea, 
while the European Union market is a growing beneficiary.
The tuna fishing industry, according to Wilson, continues to grow on 
a yearly basis. Russia and the Arab League are also expressing interest in 
the Pacific Islands commercially, particularly to access the tuna industry, 
and diplomatically, by fostering new relations with Pacific nations.27 Like 
many Pacific Islands countries, the FSM faces problems of illegal fishing 
in its EEZ by foreign fishing vessels. To combat this problem, the FSM has 
joined with the Marshall Islands and Palau to pool their resources to more 
effectively patrol their waters. The Australian Government has provided 
patrol ships and been involved in the ongoing training of  maritime 
surveillance activities with these three nations.28
24  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 4.
25  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, p. 3; Commercial Fisheries in the Federated States of Micronesia, 
www.fsmgov.org/nfc/.
26  Wilson, ‘A Tuna Industry in Micronesia?’.
27  Pacific Islands Report, East-West Center, Hawai‘i, 24 June 2010, p. 1.
28  Marar, Interview.
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According to the president and chief executive of the National Fisheries 
Corporation, Peter Sitan, the fishing industry is the main FSM resource 
capable of replacing some of the financial shortcomings in the Compact.29 
Tuna fishery licensing fees are being adopted, but those fees need to be 
increased substantially to turn sufficient profit for the nation. It is argued 
that there should be a correlation between the license fees and market 
value of the fish caught in the FSM’s EEZ.
Micronesian fishing analyst Paul D’Arcy agrees with Sitan and suggests 
that another way of developing the indigenous fishing industry is value-
added processing in the country.30 However, the FSM requires partners 
to assist with technical knowledge and capital to develop a viable fish 
processing industry. This could be achieved by entering into joint ventures 
with outside fishing nations so that the FSM can maximise its earnings 
from fishing resources.
Notwithstanding the possible future directions, illegal fishing remains an 
ever-present financial drain on the FSM’s limited resources both in terms of 
policing and lost marine resources. Surveillance needs to be strengthened 
in order to deny foreigners the opportunity to steal from Micronesian 
waters.31 In addition, there needs to be more effective enforcement when 
vessels are caught in the EEZ, including confiscation of the vessel and its 
haul. As D’Arcy noted:
Offshore fishing fleets from larger and wealthier Pacific Rim 
nations regularly violated Pacific Island EEZs in the absence of 
local monitoring. The same lack of resources to monitor offshore 
waters also meant that Island nations could not develop effective 
fishing fleets and were forced into fishing access agreements that 
returned a mere fraction of the value of the catch at market.32
Foreign fishing companies haul in hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of 
fish caught in the Pacific Islands’ EEZs; yet only a fraction of their profits 
are received by the island states. Again, D’Arcy conservatively estimated 
that in 1998 Pacific Island nations received approximately US$60 million 
29  The fishing industry in the FSM has the potential to replace most of the funding under the 
Compact. See Sitan, ‘The Development of the Tuna Industries’, pp. 17–19.
30  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–4.
31  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–4.
32  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–4.
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in fishing access fees from fleets that declared an annual catch sale price 
of approximately US$1.3–1.9 billion.33 This shortfall between actual and 
potential income for the host country is staggering.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 
1982) established the legal regimes that protect the rights of coastal nations, 
like Micronesia, from unscrupulous illegal harvesters.34 The regimes cover 
the exploitation of economic resources within the designated EEZ, which 
covers 200 nautical miles (370.4 kilometres) from the shores of the islands 
that form the outer limit of the archipelagos. The economic resources 
include fishing and extraction of mineral resources both on and beneath 
the ocean floor, bearing in mind the sustainability of the resources.35 
Notwithstanding these international legal principles, illegal fishing by 
foreign fleets continues. Palau is in the process of exploring for oil in its 
EEZ, and if it is successful, the FSM may do the same. Perhaps mineral 
extraction activities will be easier to monitor compared to fishing activities 
because the activity will occur within designated zones. It will be easier 
to observe the amount and manner of extraction to ensure adherence 
to restrictive environmental laws.36 With these challenges and potential 
benefits looming, the FSM needs to seek new international partnerships 
for the purposes of expanding its capacity to build its future economic 
and social programs.
Leadership Issues
Unified leadership is fundamental to the integrity and future development 
of the FSM. Leadership comes in many forms in the FSM. Traditional 
leaders are confined to specific geographies of the nation, but their roles 
in the national political process need to be revisited. Political leadership 
spans all three levels of government: national, state and municipal. There 
is often a conflict between leaders of these jurisdictions over decisions 
made by the national government. One area of great conflict is the 
power relationship between the leaders of the legislative branch versus 
the executive branch of the national government.37 The basis of this 
33  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–4.
34  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 3–4.
35  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, p. 1.
36  D’Arcy, ‘The Lawless Ocean?’, pp. 7–8, 14–15.
37  Francis X. Hezel, ‘Chuuk Independence: Why and How?’, Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 
2 March 2015, pacificpolicy.org/2015/03/chuuk-independence-why-and-how/.
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conflict is constitutional in nature. For example, the president is selected 
by the members of Congress, rather than by voters. This has caused much 
public discord whereupon many citizens have claimed that the president 
is basically the puppet of Congress since it is Congress that installs the 
president. The president is elected by the 13 members of the Congress 
instead of by the people under Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution:
the executive power of the national government is vested in the 
President of the Federated States of Micronesia. He is elected by 
the Congress for a term of four years by a majority vote of all the 
members. He may not serve for more than two consecutive terms.38
The lack of participation by women in the highest decision-making 
process in the nation is another issue of concern in the leadership of the 
national government.39 Many observers advocate that women should 
be a  part of the decision-making process as they can offer different 
perspectives than men. Moreover, Micronesian communities are largely 
based on ‘matrilineality’, and so it is only natural that women should be 
involved at the highest levels of government. This is true in Micronesia 
and other Pacific nations. To address this concern, a Congressional Bill, 
C.B. No. 16-10, January 2010, was introduced to bridge the gap between 
the genders. The Bill states:
to propose an amendment to the Constitution of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, for the purpose of increasing the 
representation of women in Congress by increasing the number of 
at-large seats in Congress, and reserving said seats for women, and 
for other purposes.40
This Bill was defeated for many reasons, ranging from sexism to outside 
intervention.41 The response of those opposed to the Bill was that the 
Constitution already provides for women to run for Congress, thus 
making the Bill unnecessary. Federal politics is dominated by males, 
a  post-colonial construct that does not take into account the role of 
women in traditional communities and elsewhere in other government 
38  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
39  Fifteenth Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia: 5th Special Session 2008.
40  Sixteenth Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia, First Regular Session 2009, C.B. No. 
16-10.




branches and departments. Many have claimed that old fashioned male 
chauvinism still reigns, just under a different guise. Others claim that 
Congress is not the venue for gender balance to be addressed.42
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that increasing numbers of women 
are in key government positions, such as ambassadors, heads of 
departments and agencies. Women’s associations in some states and an 
office in the national government have been created to monitor women’s 
rights for the purpose of improving their participation in the political 
process. It  is in the best interests of the nation that women should be 
involved in the decision-making process as their contribution to their 
communities is significant and deeply rooted in Micronesian traditions.
There is an emerging view that the FSM has been suffering from a lack 
of leaders representing the new generation. The old leaders continue to 
rotate through government seats. They are not in tune with the latest 
best government practices that would assist in taking the nation into the 
future. Retiring older leaders may provide opportunities and openings for 
the next generation, including women, to take up future challenges.
Constitutional Issues
The Constitution is under pressure to accommodate changes that have 
been evolving since independence and threaten the FSM’s integrity and 
continuity. Micronesians must continue to cooperatively harness their 
strength to deflect such pressures from rupturing the nation’s unity. 
Micronesian unity is framed and promoted by Article XIII, Section 3 
of the Constitution, which states:
it is the solemn obligation of the national and state governments 
to uphold the provisions of this Constitution and to advance the 
principles of unity upon which this Constitution is founded.43
It is only proper that the maintenance of this constitutional philosophy 
should be taken seriously, otherwise Micronesians will once again be 
subject to outside dominance, as they were in their colonial past.
42  Bill Jaynes, ‘Special Seats For Women’, Kaselehlie Press, 25 September 2012.
43  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.
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The Constitution is the legitimate source of power and a reference for 
the citizens when confronted with complex issues from both within and 
outside the nation. It is expected that differences in opinion between the 
state and national governments will continue for some time, maintaining 
the old political wounds over jurisdictional issues. Various secession 
movements since independence continue to threaten the Federation, 
especially over the allocation of national funds. The secessionist movement 
in Chuuk State is the latest threat that may rupture the Federation. It is 
driven by leaders from the trust territory days and centres on their belief 
in allocating the budget between states on the basis of population, noting 
that Chuuk is by far the most populous state in the FSM.44 These older 
leaders also blame the lack of Chuukese funds on other states for draining 
the nation’s purse through chronic mismanagement. One consequence of 
this is that the new generation is increasingly disillusioned by this political 
rhetoric, used by many leaders stir up public opinion and maximise their 
votes.45
The Chuuk State Legislature recently introduced Bill No. 11-12-08, 
which later became law, creating the Future Status Commission:
to review and recommend possible political status suitable for 
long term financial survival of Chuuk State after the economic 
assistance provided under the amended Compact between the 
FSM and US expires in 2023, and for other purposes.
This particular move contradicts the spirit and language of the 
Constitution. For example, the Constitution promotes the concept of 
unity in diversity, and the Compact should not be seen as the source of 
Micronesian survival, since Micronesians’ continuity is dependent on the 
ainang system. Ainang binds people together and survives on the principles 
of reciprocity and sharing as deeply rooted in Micronesian traditions and 
cultures, like the sawei system in Yap. To divide the Federation would mean 
disaster. The FSM could become a softer target for transnational crime as 
44  Hezel, ‘Chuuk Independence: Why and How?’.
45  The ongoing feuding among political leaders at all levels is affecting the new generation in terms 
of their future as the year 2023 is not too far away. See Heather Jarvis, ‘Voices of Young Women Need 





law and order would be compromised.46 Political observers see Chuuk’s 
move as a teething problem, a typical symptom of a young nation finding 
its way to maturity. Moreover, those in the secessionist movement need to 
understand that to secede requires jumping many complex hurdles. One 
of the hurdles is compliance with the constitutional process that protects 
the nation’s political integrity. The process for splitting the Federation is 
subject to Article IV, Section 1, which states:
an amendment to [the] Constitution may be proposed by 
a  constitutional convention, popular initiative, or Congress 
in  a  manner provided by law. A proposed amendment shall 
become  a part of the Constitution when approved by 3/4 of 
the votes cast on that amendment in each of 3/4 of the states. 
If conflicting constitutional amendments submitted to the voters 
at the same election are approved, the amendment receiving the 
highest number of affirmative votes shall prevail to the extent of 
such conflict.47
Domestic debates are fundamentally important steps towards developing 
the FSM’s social and political health; they provide opportunities for 
self-evaluation and thus the resolution of complex issues. The political 
discourse between the federal government and its constituents is subject 
to Article VIII, Section 1, which states, ‘a power expressly delegated to the 
national government, or a power of such an indisputably national character 
as to beyond the power of a state control, is a national power’.48 The state 
governments have consistently held the position that anything that is not 
specifically provided for in the Constitution falls withing the bounds of 
state jurisdiction. Lawyers and academics have been exploring specific 
measures to pre-empt jurisdictional rifts arising between the disputants. 
One suggestion is that they negotiate outside the Constitutional Court on 
the basis of Micronesian cultural principles of fairness and equity.49 This 
is because if the national governmental continues to assert control over 
matters that are not clearly defined as its prerogative, it may antagonise the 
states and undermine solidarity. Instead, the issue should be premised on 
46  Michael Yui, ‘Border Security: Transnational Crime in Micronesia. Part 3: Micronesia and 
Its Law Enforcement Problems’, 6 March 2012, www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/216/
Border-security-Transnational-crime-in-Micronesia.
47  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article IX, Section 1.
48  The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article VIII, Section 1.
49  My personal opinion as no literature exists on this particular topic. Many leaders rigidly follow 
the constitutional process and the law to solve their differences. Unfortunately, apparently no one has 
bothered to consider negotiation outside the constitutional process to settle this difference and find 
a solution based on FSM traditional principles of fairness and equity.
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striking a balance based on mutual interests to strengthen national unity.50 
Traditional leaders may therefore have a role to play in the undefined 
legal areas.
Political and Economic Challenges
Since colonisation, economic goals for Micronesia have always been set 
by outsiders and designed to benefit outsiders. For example, during the 
Japanese period, economic development in Micronesia was seen as very 
successful, although such success did not benefit Micronesians. The US, 
under the trusteeship agreement, was tasked with developing the islands 
but failed to carry out its mandate. After Micronesians’ pushed for 
a new political status, the US poured millions of dollars into Micronesia 
to compensate for years of neglect.51 This sudden injection of money 
resulted in the creation of the classic model of economic dependency. 
This model characterises Micronesians as being incapable of fending 
for themselves due to a lack of economic infrastructure, a social system 
that hinders capitalism and an unfriendly legal system that discourages 
foreign investment necessary to stimulate economic activities to promote 
the trickle-down effect.52 The problem with this analysis is that it applies 
a neoclassical economic model, which is better suited to big economies, 
not Micronesia. It is therefore not surprising that the trickle-down effect 
has not been very effective in Micronesia. The Micronesian social system, 
which is the backbone of Micronesian survivability, continues to be 
misunderstood by outside economists. It should be remembered that the 
implantation of any economic philosophy that requires the dismantling 
of the central pillar of indigenous life—communal and kinship support—
is doomed to fail. The nature of the Micronesian economic system as 
inherently opposed to wholesale capitalism should be subject to further 
studies to ensure the development of a suitable economic model to 
sustain continuity.
50  My personal opinion.
51  Yet, oddly, the predominate literature has portrayed the US as neglecting the FSM since the end 
of WWII. See Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, pp. 90–91.
52  The FSM has been characterised by many reports by outsiders as lacking infrastructure and 
having unfriendly laws for foreign investment. See e.g. Asian Development Bank, Federated States of 
Micronesia Development Framework 2012. Looking to the Future: A Foundation for Discussion at the 




In his State of the Nation address in 2012, President Mori expressed the 
need for Micronesians to change their mindset:
our governments need to prioritize and align development efforts 
with its development plan. Our governments must always ensure 
that the allocation of our financial resources adheres to our 
development plans. Our governments must formulate sound 
policies and regulations that are business and development 
friendly in order to attract more foreign investments and improve 
related ratings by the World Bank. We must also facilitate the 
privatization of our government-owned enterprises. These steps 
are essential to promote economic growth.53
While this speech articulated sound goals for developing the FSM’s 
economy, there was no roadmap provided for how this would be achieved. 
Decades of development rhetoric has not translated into anything 
concrete to benefit the people. Development theories are illusive concepts 
that have been routinely fed to the public for political purposes rather 
than economic benefits.54 By and large, they have never filtered down to 
capture the public’s attention and support.
From this author’s perspective, development means devising and 
implementing processes that allow a country to utilise knowledge, skills 
and attitudes that sustain a desired lifestyle. It means sustaining self-
sufficiency and adapting the modes of production in conjunction with 
global forces to suit local context. A wholesale import of economic 
models designed to overwhelm Micronesia’s unique circumstances are 
not conducive to the FSM’s development.55 Micronesians have tried to 
grapple with what development entails ever since the traditional social 
system came into contact with the colonial economic system. Theories of 
economic development are far removed from the realities of day-to-day 
53  Emmanuel Mori, State of the Nation Address, 18 May 2012, p. 9.
54  Political rhetoric on economic development has been fed to the public since the beginning of 
the Compact in 1986. However, in reality, nothing much came from successive economic plans. See 
Giff Johnson, ‘Ad Hoc Decisions Don’t Make It in an Increasingly Complex World’, Pacific Institute 
of Public Policy, 9 October 2013.
55  Since the ideas of development have entered Micronesia, they seem to suggest that the Micronesian 
lifestyle has problems. Micronesians have seemingly believed this suggestion and want to imitate 
the capitalist way of life. The question remains, why? For some explanations, see Francis X. Hezel, 
‘Reflection of Micronesia’s Economy’, Micronitor, Majuro, 29 April 1973, www.micsem.org/pubs/
articles/economic/frames/reflectfr.htm.
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life for most Micronesians.56 What they know is that their subsistence 
lifestyle provides sustenance and keeps the extended family together. 
By  comparison, Western economic development seems abstract and 
unrelated to the life they have been accustomed to since their ancestors 
made the islands their home. Those that do not move into the wage 
economy and remit money are often on the margins of this system and 
still rely, in part, on ainang for support.
The Western mode of economic production based on mass commercial 
consumerism is not suitable for the FSM’s circumstances due to a lack 
of appropriate technology, lack of infrastructure, the small size of the 
islands and the social structure.57 To Micronesians, development is about 
protecting and sustaining their subsistence way of life and safeguarding their 
traditional practices with small-scale technology that may complement 
their lifestyle. For example, a small outboard engine for fishing, solar 
energy to provide lighting and operate electrical household appliances, 
new models of cooperative stores for bartering goods and handicrafts, and 
small retail outlets that will provide necessary manufactured items and 
jobs. To this end, ‘development’ may then be defined as the capacity to 
accommodate changes while maintaining the health of the environment 
and sustaining the extended family system, particularly in the low-lying 
islands.58 The low-lying islanders’ ideas could be applied to the economies 
of the volcanic islands, utilising their different capacity for integrating 
traditional and modern economic practices, so long as development 
does not negatively affect the fragile environment. Again, appropriate 
technology and infrastructure to cater for both domestic and international 
consumerism may be possible, but within the Micronesian brand of 
development and under local control.59
56  My encounters with many people at the grassroots level during my field study (in Pohnpei, 
January 2011, and Chuuk, June 2013) suggest that the language of development, such as ‘statistics’, 
‘evidence’ and ‘gross national product’, are foreign concepts that are not yet fully understood by many 
Micronesians (despite even my attempts to explain these concepts in the simplest form possible). 
Planting taros, gardening and fishing dominated our discourses.
57  The geographical conditions and cultural system of the FSM are incompatible with the ideas 
of capitalism, something that consultants have often misunderstood. Capitalism does not seem to be 
a viable way for the future development of the FSM.
58  J. Dobbin and Francis X. Hezel, ‘Sustainable Human Development in Micronesia: Origin 
and Meaning of the Term’, Micronesian Counselor, No. 21, March 1998, www.micsem.org/pubs/
counselor/frames/sushumdevfr.htm.
59  Dobbin and Hezel, ‘Sustainable Human Development in Micronesia’.
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Revisiting the Traditional System
Traditional economic practices are premised on a network system, 
patterned along socio-cultural lines in terms of labour relations; resource 
management; and the interconnection between families, clans, villages, 
islands and regions. This system remains central to Micronesia’s economic 
sustainability and is intrinsically linked to Micronesians’ identity, which 
is deeply rooted in the nation’s history. It is about assisting each other 
when the need arises, for example, in agricultural and fishing activities, 
construction of houses and canoe building, and the maintenance of local 
knowledge and the clanship system.60 For example, the sawei system in 
Yap and clanship connections in Pohnpei, Chuuk and Kosrae maintain 
the flow of ideas and goods and help redress inequality throughout 
Micronesia today.
The Micronesian labour system has been modified to adapt to the new 
economic circumstances introduced under colonialism and maintained 
through globalisation. Today, labour relations have two major aspects, 
voluntary and paid work.61 For example, in the low-lying islands, many 
people continue to volunteer their labour in exchange for a particular 
item as payment, or they may be obliged to assist due to familial ties. The 
volunteer, in return, expects the recipient of such labour to reciprocate 
when the need for future work arises, thus triggering the obligation and 
response cycle.62 The interconnection and voluntary model underscores 
the foundation of the economic mode of production in traditional 
Micronesian societies. It also protects members of the community from 
exploitation. This practice has continued through successive colonial 
periods until today. In some instances, labour can be paid for with items 
like cigarettes, alcohol and other Western items that are considered 
temporary but a luxury.63
60  Gonzaga Puas, Labour Standards in the FSM, FSM Department of Justice, Palikir, Pohnpei, 12 
April 2005, pp. 2–5.
61  Puas, Labour Standards, pp. 2–5.
62  Puas, Labour Standards, pp. 2–5.
63  Puas, Labour Standards, pp. 2–5.
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Figure 18: People of Rewow village, in 2014, on Lekinioch work to 
replace pandanus sheets on foeng, the ainang faal of Sopunpi, 
demonstrative of the principle of alilis fengen.
Source: Photograph taken by Amanson Ansin in 2014.
Observers and historians, such as Hezel, have noted that the rise of the 
cash economy is weakening the very foundation of the Micronesian 
family structure.64 It has ruptured the family connection, and many 
wage or salary earners are forming what sociologists refer to as ‘nuclear 
families’. Nuclear families, by and large, manage their own family affairs 
and depend on money they earn as self-contained and self-supporting 
economic units. They can afford luxuries in life and buy many things they 
want without sharing with their extended family.65 Hezel’s observation 
may be true in a few cases; however, Micronesians prefer to remain within 
the extended family system as it provides security, certainty and social 
acceptance. One  can argue that the cash economy is not threatening 
traditional Micronesian socio-cultural foundations but, rather, has 
reinforced its structure. The strength of the traditional system rests with 
how Micronesians rearticulate the forces of the cash system to suit their 
contemporary lifestyle. Some examples can be illustrated by the way 
money has been absorbed and distributed like a commodity itself within 
the extended family structure.
64  Hezel, The New Shape of Old Island Cultures, pp. 1–10.
65  In the Trust Territory period, nuclear families formed when people were new to a place and 
had no relatives nearby (e.g. when working on assignment for the government). It was not due to a 
deliberate move to be separated from the rest of the extended family. Today, the ‘nuclear family’ does 
not exist in the FSM.
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Money is not new to Micronesians; it first appeared during the colonial 
period. It has been used by Micronesians to buy Western commodities to 
supplement one’s lifestyle. For example, when food items are bought, they 
are distributed to close relatives who live nearby. In return, traditional 
foods are shared with the members who earned the cash.66 Further, when 
a member of the extended family needs money to satisfy a community 
obligation, other members of the extended family will pool their money 
together to assist the member who sought assistance. Those who cannot 
assist can volunteer their services to perform the tasks required. Funerals 
and family meetings naturally oblige extended family members to 
contribute. Family members who have an earning capacity cannot operate 
outside the extended family system, as to do so would bring social stress 
upon themselves. As my grandfather once said, ‘people do not eat money, 
but food’. This is in reference to WWII, where money was worthless. It 
is also about the fact that a person may have money, but what could that 
person do if people refuse to sell their food to them? Or, to put it simply, 
what can money earners do when faced with sudden unemployment or 
illness? Would they eat the money they earned? Who would provide care 
in lieu of the members of the extended family? Even those families now 
living in the heartland of the cash economy, the US, continue to maintain 
connections with each other, especially when important social events arise 
that require the pooling of financial resources.
Conclusion
Micronesians face many challenges today, ranging from economic 
development and constitutional issues to education, health and the 
development of a new generation of leaders. Maintaining the fluidity 
of the traditional system is the foundation for Micronesians’ future 
survival. It is an evolving system that has been at the heart of Micronesian 
history. It has adapted, transformed and rearticulated itself, even under 
the stresses caused by ongoing engagement with the outside world and 
the current tides of globalisation. Successive waves of colonial regimes 
attempted to undermine the traditional system by inserting their own 
brands of development and different regimes of governance, all of which 
66  My personal experience. On weekends, the extended family worships together and share, and 
exchanges food while visiting each other. Money is also circulated at this time through food shopping 
and by request from relatives.
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were largely unsuccessful. Micronesian countermeasures were adopted 
through the process of adaptation, which arrested alien practices that 
could not be assimilated into its indigenous cultural practices. That is, 
Micronesians only accepted the essential elements of colonialism that 
ensured indigenous continuity. The current, relatively new, Micronesian 
Government has the task of ensuring that its modern legal, political, 
social, health and economic institutions perpetuate relevant traditional 
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